5 From a Speech by L.I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Head of the CPSU Delegation at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969
  I
  PETTY-BOURGEOIS NATIONALISTIC ROOTS OF MAOISM
15 A, Kozharov (Charakchiev) MAOISM: POLICY AND “THEORY”
  "THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG" VERSUS MARXISM
33 [introduction.]
34 Emergence of Maoism
40 Maoism Versus Historical Materialism
42 Distortion of the Concept of Class—Falsification of the Class Theory
45 Link Between Nationalism and the Theory of Strength
  Miroslav Míka THE REASONS BEHIND THE CHINESE ATTITUDE
50 [introduction.]
54 Dual Understanding of Revolution
59 Historical Links
61 Not Only Objective Factors
65 THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND IN THE CPC AT THE PRESENT STAGE
  II
  GREAT-POWER CHAUVINISM OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP
91 B. Shirendyb THE GREAT-POWER CHAUVINISM OF THE MAOISTS
105 MAOIST POLICY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
  WAR AND REVOLUTION
123 [introduction.]
123 "People’s Wars Will Defeat Imperialism"
125 Thesis Identifying Revolution with War
127 Ignore New Conditions for Victory over Imperialism
129 The Role of People’s War and Vietnam
131 Minimising Danger of Nuclear Conflagration
  NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE
137 [introduction.]
137 The "Policy of Self-Reliance"
140 The "Cities" and the "Countryside"
143 The Role of the American People
  Gerhard Weisser MAOIST POLICY TOWARDS AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES
146 [introduction.]
147 Anti-Marxist Positions
150 Great-Power Chauvinistic Objectives
151 Demagogic Theory of "People’s War"
153 Anti-Sovietism as the Fundamental Principle
155 Against Social Progress
157 Services to Bourgeois Ideologists
159 N. K. Krishnan UNDERMINING ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
  Peter Burschik CHANGE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND WASHINGTON
167 [introduction.]
167 China’s Role in US Imperialism’s Plans of World Domination
169 End of the Policy of Open Confrontation
171 "Gentlemen’s Agreement"
176 Growing Contacts and Agreement
  III
  "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"— A BLOW AT SOCIALISM IN CHINA
181 0. Lvov POLITICAL MANOEUVRES OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP
197 Gyula Dénes DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN CHINA
  Mitsugu Hashimoto LIQUIDATIONST POLICY OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP
209 1. Introduction
211 2. Lenin’s Struggle Against Liquidationism and the Liquidationist Policy of the Mao Croup
215 3. Liquidation of the Communist Party of China and Its Conversion into a Domain of the Mao Group
219 4. "Revolt Is a Just Cause" and "A Great Democracy"—Slogans of Liquidationism Founded on Ultra-Left Opportunism and Anarchism
225 5. Liquidationist “Revision” of the Party’s Organisational Principles
231 6. Deification of Mao Tse-Tung and the Conversion of the Chinese Army into a Weapon of the Mao Tse-tung Liquidationist Group
  Goro Harumi ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY IN THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
238 1. Introduction
241 2. The Army as the Mainstay of the Absolutisation of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung"
251 3. Army Intervention in the "Cultural Revolution" and the "Armed Struggle"
258 4. The Army’s Role in Establishing the Absolute Rule of the Mao Group
  Jean-Emile Vldal 19th ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
265 I "Cultural Revolution": A Pyrrhic Victory!
268 II The Working Class Takes Action Without Waiting for "Directives"
  IV
  ANTI-LENINIST ECONOMIC POLICY
273 Klaus Mähnel ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE MAO GROUP
  Wlodzimierz Wowczuk HIEROGLYPHS OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY
298 [introduction.]
299 The "Big Leap" and Its Impact
302 Second Wind
304 "Cultural Revolution"
  Hideo Yonezawa WHAT THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" HAS BROUGHT THE CHINESE ECONOMY
307 A Criticism of the Theories of the Chinese Economy Propounded by "Blindly Following Elements"Introduction
307 The Role of the Party and the State in the Socialist Planned Economy and the Mao Group Which Is Out to Undermine It
310 How the "Cultural Revolution" Spread to the Processing and Mining Industries
317 Resistance of Railwayman and Dockers
320 Peasants Begin to Withhold Deliveries to the State
325 The People’s Communes Must Not Be Idealised
327 Conclusion
* * *
 

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