p The evolution of Mao Tse-tung’s
anti-Marxist outlook into a special political and ideological platform with its anti-Marxist policies screened with the banner and ideals of communism was a long, complex and contradictory process. This platform took shape in the course of protracted discussions between representatives of MarxistLeninist and petty-bourgeois nationalistic trends in the 35 Communist Party of China. There are many objective historical reasons behind the emergence of this petty-bourgeois nationalistic philosophy. Among them are the backwardness of the productive forces, the feudal and semi-feudal relations of production in various parts of the country and the correspondingly low level of social development at the time of liberation, the composition of the population, China’s long isolation and the propagation of national exclusiveness, the domination of a military clique, and the traditions of Confucian philosophy.

p When at the age of 27 Mao Tse-tung, who had received a classical Chinese education,  [35•*  became interested in Marxism, the Chinese revolution was facing anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks. The Chinese people’s inexorable striving for independence was the decisive, driving force of the revolutionary struggle. In those years bourgeois and pettybourgeois circles came under the influence of Great-Power tendencies. Already then it was vital to ensure the leading role in this struggle for the working class in order to prevent the Chinese revolution from sinking into the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic swamp. The actual state of affairs undoubtedly made this task extremely difficult for the then young and numerically relatively small working class of China. The national liberation movement pushed radical elements from among the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals into professing progressive, revolutionary-democratic views. These were the elements that initially predominated in the Communist Party of China, which was founded in 1921.

p The first Marxist study groups, the predecessors of the Party, were formed in 1920 under the impact of the Great October Socialist Revolution. There were all sorts of people in these study circles, as in the first CPC organisations. For a time the communist movement had in its ranks people who subsequently became the leading exponents of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary Kuomintang. During those years the growth of the CPC was influenced not only by the revolutionary upsurge in the country, the build-up of the proletarian forces and support from the Comintern, but also by pressure from the "petty-bourgeois ocean" which from the very outset was the main source of the petty-bourgeois 36 outlook and the most ominous threat to the CPC. This development of antagonistic forces was mirrored in the struggle between internationalist Marxists-Leninists and the exponents of the national-revolutionary but petty-bourgeois outlook. This struggle has been waged throughout the history of the CPC.

p The class battles that started as soon as the Party was founded, first and foremost strengthened the working-class movement, and this influenced the Party’s policy. The energetic struggle against chauvinistic, nationalistic and sectarian views, which the CPC waged during the early years of its existence, was due chiefly to the efforts of the Party’s Marxist-Leninist nucleus (Li Ta-chao, Tsu Chiu-po and others) and to the assistance of the Comintern. The impassioned debates resulted in a policy calling for a united front with the then progressive national-revolutionary Kuomintang headed by the great Chinese democrat Sun Yatsen.  [36•*  The CPC social composition likewise underwent a change: the number of workers increased appreciably and in the spring of 1927 comprised 60-70 per cent of the Party’s 60,000 members.

p Chiang Kai-shek’s open betrayal of national-revolutionary ideals and the brutal suppression of the working-class movement in the summer of 1927 gave birth to the idea of orienting the development of the revolutionary movement on the countryside: this fully conformed to the acute agrarian problem in China and to the role of the peasants as the predominant section of the population. But this re- orientation required that the Party should pursue a consistently proletarian policy in order to rule out the possibility of petty-bourgeois influences pervading the Party as a result of the new qualitative change of its composition. At the Sixth Congress in 1928 some delegates pointed out that the petty-bourgeois deviation in the CPC "was dangerous not only at the given time but also for the future ... our Party has 100,000 members, among whom, however, there are only 3,000 workers. If this state of affairs continues, the Party will find itself beset by even greater difficulties”.

p Waging a struggle in remote regions, far away from the slowly reviving working-class movement, the Party’s ranks 37 grew mainly through the influx of non-proletarian elements. By 1931 the percentage of workers in it dropped virtually to nil. This reinforced the petty-bourgeois views of Mao Tse-tung and other leaders, and led them to anti-Marxist positions. These positions were repeatedly stigmatised by the Comintern and the Chinese Marxists-Leninists, with the result that the Party adopted a correct revolutionary line. Despite all the zigzags and differences, the CPC headed and directed the heroic struggle of the Chinese Communists, revolutionary workers, peasants and other working people and brought the people’s democratic revolution to victory. At the national-democratic stage of the revolution the pettybourgeois, nationalistic forces and the Marxists-Leninists acted in concert despite their differences on individual issues.  [37•*  This unity enabled Mao Tse-tung and some other leaders to put forward tactically correct slogans which concealed their petty-bourgeois, nationalistic way of thinking.

p The creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the actual conditions in China was unquestionably a task of paramount importance and at the same time it was a particularly complex task. The communist teaching had to be applied "to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism”.  [37•**  In this connection Lenin said it was imperative "to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people”.  [37•***  However, while referring to Lenin’s propositions, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters substituted Maoism for Marxism in the course of its “ Sinification”. Instead of creatively applying the true communist doctrine to the actual conditions in China Mao Tse-tung vulgarised and distorted Marxism. He treated it in accordance with his statement that everything foreign plays the role of an edible product which "is divided into waste, which is eliminated, and the extract absorbed by the organism”.

p It must be noted, however, that being a politician, Mao Tse-tung had to take the requirements of the day into account 38 in his tactical slogans. Popular slogans and simplified formulations enabled him to mobilise the masses and secure victories in the drawn-out guerilla war. This enhanced his personal prestige. He went to all ends to turn his personality into the symbol of the revolutionary struggle and of victory. Although, like many other petty-bourgeois politicians, he often adopted a contradictory stand, he managed to win a leading position in the Party. To this end he did not shun anti-democratic methods, and to take the leadership of the Party into his hands he utilised the hardships of the people and, in particular, the armed struggle forced on the Chinese people.  [38•*  The Rules adopted by the Seventh Congress of the CPC in 1945 stated: "In all its activities the Communist Party of China is guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung.” The reactionary nature of this thought, which is permeated with petty-bourgeois ideas, nationalism and even Great-Power chauvinism, was not so striking as it has become today.

p First, during the war against Japanese imperialism Mao Tse-tung’s stand did not contravene the tasks set by history, as became the case later, during the building of socialism. Second, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was shown in its true colours only when it was turned into an all-embracing, anti-Marxist, adventurist, Great-Power doctrine.

p The factor bringing about the triumph of the Chinese revolution was not the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" but the unity of the broad masses round the CPC on the basis of the policy of a united front against Japanese imperialism, charted in the 1930s with the assistance of the Comintern. It triumphed as a result of the heroic struggle of the Chinese working people against the Chiang Kai-shek regime, with the healthy, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Party saying the last word on decisive issues. History has shown that in the period of socialist construction success was achieved only when Mao Tse-tung’s anti-Marxist, adventurist views were pushed into the background. An immense role was played in the victory of the Chinese revolution by the favourable international situation, by the Soviet Union’s victory over 39 German nazism, by the defeat of a crack Japanese Army by Soviet troops in Northeast China and by the transfer of that Army’s materiel to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. That was what changed the military situation in favour of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, it owes its successes to the formation and consolidation of the socialist world system and the growth of the national liberation movement. To some extent and for a certain period the existence and assistance of the world socialist system compensated for the weak sides of the Chinese working-class movement.

p The victory of the revolution confronted the Chinese Communists with many complicated problems. The transition to the socialist revolution was vital to a backward country like China, where the material prerequisite’s for the socialist mode of production were in an embryonic state. By that time it should have become obvious to Mao Tsetung that these problems could not be solved without building up a real economic and social basis, without the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This, the Marxist-Leninist internationalist forces in the Party believed, was the only way China could build socialism. Despite Mao Tse-tung’s nationalistic approach to assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to the application of Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction, China’s successful development until 1956 strengthened the Marxist-Leninist forces and principles in the Party. Within a short span of time the Chinese people made considerable headway in building the foundations of socialism: in economic development, in establishing a people’s democratic system, in education and in raising the standard of living. The significance of these achievements was underscored by the Eighth Congress of the CPC in the autumn of 1956. This Congress formulated and adopted a Marxist-Leninist general line for the .stage of socialist construction.

p Consistent enforcement of this general line would have enabled the Chinese people to join in the broad torrent of socialist development and would have enhanced the role of the working class and the Marxist-Leninist forces. The Party had already embarked on that road, and at the Eighth Congress Mao Tse-tung was powerless to prevent the mention of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" from being deleted from the Party Rules, although the successes scored 40 in socialist construction were still being associated with his personality.

But the year 1956, which should have marked a turn in China’s domestic development and in the promotion of her foreign relations, showed that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters were opposed to the Party’s line of building socialism. By that time the petty-bourgeois, Great-Power thought of Mao Tse-tung, in combination with obsolete methods of the past, one-sided conclusions and the overrating of initial successes had taken the shape of an anti-Marxist, adventurist, nationalistic platform. It had become clear that Mao Tse-tung and his group were typical exponents of pettybourgeois views. At the critical moment, in the period of transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution, they veered away from scientific socialism and found themselves in a dead end of history. Moreover, they dragged the Chinese people into that dead end. Without openly coming out against the Party’s general line, and utilising the national upsurge in the country and his prestige won with the aid of the Party’s correct policy, Mao and his clique in effect revised the Party line, interpreting it in their own way. In contravention of the decisions of the Eighth CPC Congress and ignoring its warning that the adventurist ambition of building socialism "in one morning" was pernicious, the Maoists began enforcing their "big leap" and "people’s communes" policy. This policy nullified all the earlier achievements and plunged China into chaos. The collapse of this adventure and the Maoists’ forced retreat led to a relative stabilisation of the economy. But in 1966 Mao Tse-tung openly launched the "cultural revolution" designed as the means of implementing his wild nationalistic concepts.