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p For many months world public opinion
and the press have been focussing their attention on the developments in the People’s Republic of China. A group of leaders of the Communist Party of China have created a situation and proclaimed a line in home and foreign policy which depart farther and farther away from the building of a socialist state and society and, in many respects, clash with the principles and practice of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

p The line adopted by Mao Tse-tung and his group has dislocated China’s economy, caused a regression in social relations, artificially exacerbated contradictions and, in the long run, led to massacres and mass arrests. In the international arena Mao and his supporters have openly embraced a chauvinistic policy, ceased co-operating with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, separated and isolated themselves from the Third World and launched actions which increase international tension. Particularly grave consequences have ensued from the attempts of the CPC leadership to force the international communist and working-class movement to accept their special line and at present, instead of concentrating forces on the common struggle against imperialism, the main blow is being aimed at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal Parties.

p The Communist and Workers’ Parties and all other progressive forces in the world are watching these consequences with deep anxiety. They are, of course, affording satisfaction to the imperialist camp. In a recent issue the American magazine US News & World Report wrote that American officials 198 were inclined to wish Mao Tse-tung victory on the consideration that this would cause the Soviet Union further embarrassment. On February 11-12, 1967 The New York "Times carried a report on an international conference in Chicago attended by more than 70 American, West European and Asian "academic specialists on China”. This conference discussed policy towards China. According to the newspaper, "several participants asserted that it was more in American interest in the short run to see the militant faction of Chairman Mao Tse-tung win Communist China’s power struggle than his opposition”. Their basic argument was that Mao’s supporters wanted a break with the Soviet Union and were not inclined towards united action with the USSR in matters related to assistance for Vietnam.

p Experts offer the most diverse viewpoints on the causes behind the tragic developments in China. Some explain everything as being simply the outcome of a power struggle between various groups in the Chinese leadership. Others believe that the "cultural revolution" was a necessary means of suppressing popular discontent deriving from the economic difficulties in China. Still others hold that the political objective of Map Tse-tung and his supporters is to build up a social and material foundation for their hegemonistic, Great-Power ambitions. According to other theories the recent developments have their roots in the past. The proponents of these theories refer to a series of factors such as China’s inherited backwardness, the nature of Chinese society which is predominantly peasant and petty-bourgeois (the working class comprises about two per cent of the population), Great-Power nationalism deeply rooted even among the masses, and the hegemonistic aspirations of the leadership.

p There are grounds for each of these theories. However, the most important factor is that instead of dedicated creative work and socialist principles and methods of education, a petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionary and adventurist spirit has come to the fore in the solution of the problems of Chinese society. The difficulties growing out of voluntaristic views and aspirations have evoked desperation and protests among part of the masses and Party cadres. The "cultural revolution" was used by the Mao group first to muzzle and then suppress these protests.

p With the victory of the people’s revolution China became a Great Power in the world if only by virtue of her huge 199 population and of the unity achieved for the first time in several decades. At the same time, this victory brought with it new problems: China had to fight the heritage of centuryold imperialist colonisation, backwardness, and the blockade enforced by US imperialism. Today one can clearly see the extent to which the plans of the Chinese leadership have been motivated by the determination to create in defence, economy and politics the means that would give China the status of a Great Power. In the early years this determination was of positive significance: China established a firm alliance with the USSR and, with its assistance, launched on mammoth industrialisation. The Chinese revolution put an end to the rule of the exploiting classes in the countryside, gave rise to agricultural co-operatives, limited the possessions of the national bourgeoisie, and then gradually turned these possessions into state property and created the conditions for building a socialist society. The result of this policy was that for the first time in a hundred years it became possible to put an end to famine and raise the people’s standard of living. This line thus proved to be fruitful, enhancing China’s internal strength and her international prestige.

However, instead of engaging in political and economic activity ensuring the country’s development through further persevering work, a group of Chinese leaders, guided by petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionary sentiments, launched a drive for ostentatious successes and quick results. In 1958, on Mao Tse-tung’s initiative, the Communist Party of China adopted a voluntaristic, Great-Power policy. The "big leap" was an attempt to achieve communism by the shortest route, bypassing all intermediate stages of development. Ignoring objective laws the Chinese leaders sought to outstrip all other countries in a "single leap" and create the material basis for their hegemonistic ambitions. These ambitions induced the Peking leaders to proclaim the Trotskyite programme of "world revolution”. Mao Tse-tung and his group advanced the slogan: "Three years of hard work and ten thousand years of prosperity”; but the "big leap" proved to be a fiasco from which the country has not yet recovered.  [199•* 

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p The "big leap" was accompanied by the proclamation of Peking’s "new revolutionary strategy" in the international communist and working-class movement. That was when the Chinese leaders began their ideological and then political debate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Parties of other socialist countries. In subsequent years they made increasingly open attempts to impose their ultra-revolutionary views on these Parties, and when these attempts failed they launched a vicious political campaign against the socialist countries, chiefly the Soviet Union, leaving imperialism alone. During the past few years Mao and his group have done everything in their power to split the international working-class movement and the socialist community.

p The fact that the true implications of the many ideological “delusions” of the Chinese leaders have come to light, the fact that they have time and again grossly interfered in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and countries, belittled the fraternal Parties and obstructed unity against the forces of imperialism, the fact that they have engaged in subversion and divisive activities in international democratic organisations has diminished China’s prestige in the world and placed her in increasing isolation. Even those who had at first been misled have turned away from Peking. The Chinese theories are, almost without exception, adopted only by splinter groups, which have no influence to speak of. They have been rejected by the main forces of the international working-class movement, by the Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers’ Parties.

p The adventurist line in foreign policy and the collapse of the unrealistic plans at home have given rise to protests against the Maoist policies even in China. This is clearly demonstrated by developments in the Communist Party of China. Life developed normally in the Party in the initial years of socialist construction, when its general line was correct and expressed the united will of the leaders and the masses. Policies were charted and approved at congresses. But no congress has "been convened since 1956 despite the fact that a 201 group of leaders has fundamentally revised the political guideline adopted in 1956. Moreover, even plenary meetings of the Central Committee have not been called for a number of years.

p However, the Maoists obviously regarded their encroachments on Party democracy as insufficient for the attainment of all their objectives. Therefore, parallel with these encroachments, they used Party and Government organs to enhance the role of the Army, which was under the command of Lin Piao. This prepared the military basis for the " cultural revolution”. Lin Piao became the most consistent exponent of the "thought of Mao”. He abolished ranks in the Army and then, in November, formulated the "five points”, the first of which prescribes the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung, and the fourth states that military leaders should be appointed to key posts.

p When this proved inadequate, the Mao group started the "cultural revolution”, which, of course, has nothing in common with the Marxist interpretation of this concept, namely, that the working class and peasants master the cultural achievements and the knowledge which formerly the bourgeoisie regarded as its exclusive domain. Neither has the "cultural revolution" anything in common with culture: it began with attacks on intellectuals and went over to the rejection and destruction of cultural values, to the closure of schools for many long months. The "cultural content" of this movement consists in studying the works of Mao Tse-tung, the practical learning by heart of phrases from books of Mao quotations published in incalculable editions; the organisers of the "cultural revolution" believe that this replaces everything else. (“One can deny oneself food, and also sleep, but not the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung,” wrote the newspaper Kuangming Jihpao.} Consequently, in the given case culture meant a means of mass influence for putting hegemonistic aspirations into effect, dealing summarily with doubters and dissenters and establishing an unparalleled cult of Mao Tsetung’s personality.

p But one no longer hears anything of revolution. True, for several months there were street demonstrations of mobs of hungweipings and tsaofans, but they were openly and officially directed from above by a group of leaders united around Mao Tse-tung. In continuing the struggle for power, these leaders dislocated production, removed Party and 202 government cadres from responsible posts, ordered free transport on the railways, provided free accommodation and food for several million hungweipings and thereby precipitated an economic crisis and the threat of inflation. They used the so-called red guards, recruited from among immature, inexperienced and politically illiterate young people, against their political adversaries. This has nothing in common with the concept of revolution.

p Who are the sides in the political campaign called the "cultural revolution”?

p Although this campaign was officially announced by Chou En-lai on April 30, 1966, it really got under way later when it became obvious that it was encountering stiff resistance. Much later it was ascertained who had initiated it, and only early this year it was officially stated who it was directed against. This makes preceding developments more understandable.

p In the Mao group a key role is played by Defence Minister Lin Piao. The "group for cultural revolution affairs" is headed by Chen Po-ta, editor of Hungchih, the Party’s theoretical journal. An important role is played by Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung’s wife.

p Furthermore, it has come to light who the organisers of the "cultural revolution" regard as their principal political adversaries. This year, already in official documents, it was stated that the trend represented by the President of the Republic Liu Shao-chi and the General Secretary of the CPC Teng Hsiao-ping "must be crushed”. Peking’s former mayor Peng Chen, former member of the Political Bureau Peng Tehhuai, Marshal Chu Teh and the former Chief of the General Staff Lo Jui-ching have also been denounced as enemies of the "cultural revolution”.

p All the indications are that the adversaries of Mao Tsetung’s line have clashed with him and his group for the most diverse reasons and that not all the divergences are over a principled line. According to available information, Mao and his group are fighting for personal power and this struggle is directed against individuals among the Party and Government leadership and also against persons who have stated dissenting views on various issues but have given no cause for believing that they desire a change of general policy.

p It is becoming clear that a serious internal struggle over some basic issues of policy had been going on in the CPC 203 during the years preceding the "cultural revolution”. This was mirrored in the early 1960s by the policy of “ adjustment”, which, in effect, was no more than a modification of the "big leap" and the system of people’s communes. Confirmation that this is so is to be found in the “critical” statements published in the course of the present internal struggle. For instance, in its issue No. 18 for January the newspaper Hungweiping Pao “accused” Lo Jui-ching of having opposed the line of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao in the Army. The same newspaper asserted that four former political and military leaders—Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun—"were preparing a counter-revolutionary putsch in order to seize control of the Party, Army and the Government”. This newspaper called Yang Shang-kun, Secretary of the Central Committee, a traitor and revisionist for considering the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung a piece of formalism and vulgarisation and stating that all problems could not be resolved by reading the works of Mao. Furthermore, he held that China’s general political line was not in keeping with the spirit of the times and stressed that the years of the "big leap" have thrown China’s economy back by at least five years.

p Although there is at present no possibility of elucidating the nature of the various opposing forces and the actions of individuals and groups, the reports in the Peking press in any case show that the former associates of the CPC Chairman are precisely the people against whom, according to the leaders of the "cultural revolution”, "Chairman Mao must be protected”.

p The entire course of the "cultural revolution" is evidence of the strong resistance encountered by the Mao group. This is explained by the drawn-out nature and dramatic consequences of the campaign. As soon as it started so-called workers’ groups were sent to all Party committees and government organs on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi. Formally, the task of these groups was to implement the " cultural revolution”, but actually the exact opposite took place, namely, the nullification of Mao Tse-tung’s plans. Later, therefore, instructions were issued on the recall of these workers’ groups.

p Press reports are making it clear that when, after a long interval, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee was convened in August 1966, the Mao group was strong enough 204 to obtain approval of the home and foreign policy that it had been pursuing for a period of four years and to ensure official sanction for the "cultural revolution”. However, they failed to get an absolute majority of the votes on each issue for they were unable to remove all their adversaries from the Central Committee. But the Central Committee’s approval of this campaign created a situation enabling the organisers of the "cultural revolution" to attempt to do away singly with those they had been unable to cope with at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

p In the autumn of 1966, simultaneously with the appearance of many millions of hungweipings, the Communist Youth League was, in effect, liquidated and an offensive was started on Party organs and Party cadres. It was then clear that there were large forces resisting the "cultural revolution”. Many Party and Government organs in the provinces denounced the "cultural revolution" and strong resistance was offered by workers at factories and in the trade unions, for they were also attacked by the hungweipings. Even the leaders of the campaign were cautious in their approach to the rural areas. Various opposition forces used the situation to form their own "red guards”. In its January issue the magazine Hungchih lists a numerous group which "was pursuing an erroneous line”. Counter-revolutionary groups evidently could and did emerge and became active in that situation, and this further intensified the incredible political muddle. Consequently, confusion mounted in this period and internal creative work was jeopardised. However, even at the price of all this the Mao group failed to break the internal resistance.

p The leaders of the "cultural revolution" were thus compelled to bring in the Army to achieve the objectives of the campaign. Prior to this they had endeavoured to avoid making open use of armed force. On the one hand, they were kept in check by the unseemliness of this step and, on the other hand, they took the following circumstance into account: a far-reaching reshuffle had been necessary in the preceding months because Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao felt they had not had the unanimous backing of the Army.

p At the close of January Hungchih called on the hungweipings and the Army supporting them to "seize power" from the former Party and government organs and set up "new organs of power”. This absurd idea of setting up "new 205 organs of power" by “smashing” the Party and administrative organs of a socialist state demonstrated the Mao group’s determination to deal summarily with tested fighters of the socialist revolution and dedicated builders of the new society, and it showed its readiness to sacrifice key organs and gains of the revolution on the altar of their ambitions.

p This, evidently, was not fortuitous. The experienced, old cadres had a knowledge not only of the "thought of Mao" but of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, while the mobs of young people, who were brought out into the streets under the slogan of "cultural revolution”, had been raised in the Maoist aggressive nationalistic spirit and had no inkling of the theory of scientific socialism. These young people could therefore be easily deceived with demagogic slogans and used for any purpose.

p In mass agitation the stress is on the propagation of Mao Tse-tung’s nationalistic and voluntaristic views on an unprecedented scale, the whipping up of Great-Power chauvinism and the encouragement of anti-Soviet sentiments. The organisers of the "cultural revolution" are out to prepare the Chinese people for further sacrifices for the sake of the Mao group’s Great-Power ambitions. The Maoists ar.e bent on creating the means for their policies and building up China’s military capability, and to these ends the Chinese people are required to agree to a lower living standard, to a growth of the intensity of labour, to the abandonment of their modest material blessings. The protest of the workers was expressed in strikes and in actions against the hungweipings. The Mao group has accused veteran workers defending the people’s interest of “economism”, charging that "they are trying to bribe the working class with economic benefits”. Here the Maoists underscore their demand that a "rational low wage must be established”, that "in production the striving must be for high results, while in life one can be content with little”.

p The baiting of Party and government cadres has had an adverse resonance throughout China. This compelled the Mao group to undertake a new manoeuvre. It made haste to give the impression that it did not approve the campaign against Government and Party cadres, that it wanted to draw closer to them. Jenmin Jihpao called on the tsaofans to refrain from indiscriminate attacks on veteran cadres, to refrain from persecuting those "who have made mistakes but are prepared to reform”. The Mao group withdrew the 206 fanatic mobs of hungweipings and tsaofans from the streets and called for the "unity of broad circles”.

p There were two reasons behind this change. First, the Maoists were forced to manoeuvre because the hungweipings and tsaofans proved to be unable to crush the resistance they were encountering all over China. The change of tactics pursued the objective of politically dividing the opposition and giving the leaders of the "cultural revolution" the possibility of mustering their forces for the next “coup”. The second reason was that months after the beginning of the "cultural revolution" China found herself in greater economic difficulties than ever before. Production was dislocated as a result of the attack on Party and economic leaders accused of revisionism and as a result of the ensuing anarchy. Factories remained idle for long periods of time. The railways were brought to the verge of paralysis. In many provinces the communes were pillaged and the peasants were unable to start the spring sowing. Consequently, it was found impossible to do completely without experienced cadres, to avert the looming catastrophe without them. In March Prime Minister Chou En-lai made a series of public statements in which he urged the "revolutionary masses" to "unite the three forces”, ensure the continuity of production and press forward with the “revolution” on a more civilised and higher political level than hitherto. These statements expressed a certain striving for consolidation.

p The slogan calling for the "unity of broad circles”, proclaimed by the magazine Hungchih, implies that in order to "seize power" the three forces—the Army, the tsaofans and the Party cadres devoted to Chairman Mao—have to unite. In practice this line has given the Maoists key positions in the Army. Army representatives have the decisive say in the "provisional leading organs" formed in the towns and villages and embodying both state and Party authority. Economic and political life throughout the country is controlled by the Army. At mass rallies organised by the Army sentences are passed on "counter-revolutionary elements" openly opposing the "thought of Mao”. The press, radio, the post and all sorts of offices are under the direct control of Army representatives. The military were the main organisers of the spring sowing and took a direct part in the opening of the new school year in March.

p However, basic policy did not change. The "cultural 207 revolution" is a sweeping attempt to’ give Chinese society a military orientation. At the same time, it eradicates the principal features of socialist democracy and suspends the functions and role of the proletarian dictatorship. Moreover, it sustains bellicose sentiments among the population.

p The divisive, anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy grew more aggressive than before in the course of this political campaign, and this artificially exacerbated Soviet-Chinese relations and led to unprecedented provocations. Abusing the Soviet Union’s exclusively patient and restrained behaviour, the Maoists laid siege to the Soviet Embassy in Peking in February; elsewhere they fomented all sorts of provocations against the Soviet Union and against its citizens and diplomats. The hungweipings organised provocations against diplomatic representatives of other socialist countries, Hungary among them. The Maoists want to make the Chinese believe that they are “threatened” and thereby unite the masses by playing on unbridled nationalistic feelings. Another reason for the growing antiSoviet sentiments is that the Soviet people’s labour achievements bring out the failure of Mao Tse-tung’s policy in striking relief. That is why the Chinese leaders attack the policy of the CPSU, demand that the socialist countries scale down their standard of living and abandon their policy of promoting socialist democracy and building socialism.

p During the "cultural revolution" the Chinese leaders brought into prominence other negative features of their foreign policy. The brutal US aggression against the people of Vietnam demands that the socialist countries should act together in helping the victim of aggression. The Chinese leaders, however, not only refuse to take joint action against aggression but impede military and political assistance to Vietnam from the socialist countries. By so doing they play into the hands of US imperialist policy, pouring grist on the mill of the Washington extremist circles, who are going all out to escalate the barbarous aggression against the Vietnamese people.

p While stepping anti-Soviet sentiments the Chinese leaders are establishing ever broader contacts with leading imperialist countries, the USA, for example. China’s trade with capitalist countries is growing while her turnover with socialist countries is diminishing.

p The leaders of the "cultural revolution" turn a blind eye 208 to the fact that their home and foreign policy line is being increasingly condemned by the international working-class movement and other progressive forces and that in recent months this line has alienated even those who had supported Mao Tse-tung’s policies.

p Everything that the Maoists proclaim and carry out in the name of the CPC concerns not only China. It affects other countries because the Chinese leaders proclaim their experience universal and compulsory for socialist countries, for the international communist and working-class movement. At the same time, in the eyes of many people this theory and practice discredit the ideals of socialism. They are alien to Marxism-Leninism, inflict enormous harm on the international communist and working-class movement, undermine socialist unity and are a terrible ordeal for the fraternal Chinese people.

p The socialist forces throughout the world are therefore anxiously following the developments in China, developments that may for a long time influence the future of the Chinese revolution. On the one hand, it is a fact that in China the Communists and the broad masses of the people have set their hearts on socialism, that public ownership of the means of production and the existence of agricultural co-operatives have created the objective conditions for the building of socialism. On the other hand, the general line of the present leaders of the CPC—petty-bourgeois adventurism in home policy and chauvinistic, Great-Power hegemonism in foreign policy—threaten achieved results and the possibility of socialist construction, and their further tenure of power would mean a deviation in the development of Chinese society.

The political struggle goes on. Two prospects face China: the continuation of the anti-Leninist, adventurist policy of the Mao group, which can only bring China further grave difficulties at home and abroad, or a return to MarxistLeninist principles, which would lead to an economic upsurge and the normalisation of relations with the socialist community and other progressive forces in the world. It is our firm belief that the healthy forces in the Communist Party of China will sooner or later gain the upper hand and once again lead their people along the road of socialism, along the road of the joint anti-imperialist struggle of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties.