Edited by V. I. Krirtsov
PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW
[1]Translated from the Russian by David Skvirsky
Designed by S. Danilov
MAOH3M FJIA3AMH KOMMVHHCTOB Ha UHBAUUCKOM HSblKC
__COPYRIGHT__ First printing 1970 Comrades, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union regards with the greatest attention and respect
the great work being carried on by our foreign comrades.
The historical experience of many countries, the experience of the class struggle has given convincing evidence of how necessary the activity of the Communist Parties is for mankind and how fruitful this activity is for social development. Guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, the Communist Parties show the peoples the road to the communist future. They rally the peoples to the struggle and steadfastly march in the van of the mass movements for the great goals of social progress. Communists are always in the front ranks of the fighters for the vital rights of the working people, for peace. They carry high the invincible banner of the socialist revolution.
Soviet Communists, whose path to the socialist revolution was complex and difficult, are well aware of the vigour, the determination and flexibility, steadfastness of spirit and readiness at any moment to sacrifice everything for the Party's cause that the revolutionary fighters confronting the class enemy must constantly display. These qualities of Communists are of especial importance in our time, a time of intense and dogged class battles.
The successes which the Communist Parties have achieved are incontestable. But our Meeting is right to concentrate its attention on unresolved tasks, on the new possibilities in the anti-imperialist struggle and on the difficulties that arise in the path of this struggle. Such difficulties do exist, _-_-_
^^*^^ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague 1969, pp. 155--60.
5 and some of them spring from the state of affairs in our movement itself, which is going through a complex period of its development. Unity has been seriously impaired in some of its links. Some fraternal Parties have suffered setbacks and even defeats.There are various reasons for these difficulties.
One is that in present-day conditions, when a tremendous social break-up of the pillars of the old world is taking place under the onslaught of socialism and all other revolutionary forces, there is growing resistance from the bourgeoisie. To maintain its positions it strives to use all the economic and political possibilities of state-monopoly capitalism. In the capitalist countries, anti-communism has been elevated to the status of state policy. To erode the communist and the whole revolutionary movement from within is now one of the most important orientations of the class strategy of imperialism.
Another reason is that fresh millions of people belonging to various social strata are being drawn into vigorous political action. Many of them enter politics with a great store of revolutionary energy, but with rather hazy ideas about how to solve the problems agitating them. Hence the vacillations---the swings from stormy political explosions to political passivity, from reformist illusions to anarchistic impatience. All this tends to complicate the activity of the Communist Parties, multiplies the number of their tasks and increases the demands on their practical work. In this situation, Communists must display Marxist-Leninist firmness and loyalty to principle and a creative approach to the problems of social development, if they are to keep control of developments and tackle their problems in the light not only of short-term requirements but also of the long-term interest of the revolutionary movement. Otherwise, grave errors in policy are inevitable.
We cannot afford to ignore the divergences existing in the communist movement today and pretend they do not exist. These divergences have been caused largely by the penetration into the communist movement of revisionist influences both of a Right and of a ``Left'' nature. And these influences are making themselves felt not only in the sphere of ``pure'' theory. Revisionism in theory paves the way to opportunist practices, which inflict direct harm on the antiimperialist struggle. Revisionism is, after all, a departure from proletarian class positions, the replacement of 6 MarxismLeninism with all sorts of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois concepts, old and modernistic.
We subscribe to the stand of the fraternal Parties which in their decisions draw attention to the need for resolutely combating this danger. The Communist Parties rightly contend that their own unity and the interests of the whole anti-imperialist movement insistently demand an intensification of the struggle against revisionism and against both Right and ``Left'' opportunism. A principled stand on this issue has always been a most important condition for strengthening a Party's political positions and has always rallied Communists and made them more active in the class struggle.
Right-wing opportunism is a slide-down to liquidationist positions, signifying conciliation with Social-Democracy in policy and ideology. In socialist countries, Right-wing opportunism goes to the extent of repudiating that the Marxist-Leninist Party should play the leading role; this can lead to surrender of the positions won by socialism and to capitulation to the anti-socialist forces.
``Left"-wing opportunists use ultra-revolutionary verbiage to push the masses into adventurist actions, and the Party onto the sectarian path, which paralyses its ability to rally the fighters against imperialism.
With all their distinctions, the deviations from MarxismLeninism to the Right or to the ``Left'' ultimately result in similarly harmful consequences; they weaken the militancy of the Communist Parties and undermine the revolutionary positions of the working class and the unity of the anti-imperialist forces.
A frequent feature of ``Left'' and Right opportunism is concessions to nationalism, and sometimes even an outright switch to nationalistic positions. Lenin showed up this connection a long time ago. He wrote: "The ideological and political affinity, connection, and even identity between opportunism arid social-nationalism are beyond doubt.''^^*^^
Of course, in one country or another the struggle against opportunism and nationalism is, above all, a sphere within the competence of the fraternal Party concerned. No Party can advance successfully unless it consistently and resolutely upholds the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles. But it is _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 154.
7 also true that when this struggle is abandoned in some sector of our movement, this affects the movement as a whole.The stand taken by the leadership of the Communist Party of China offers a striking example of the harm that can be done to the common cause of Communists by a departure from Marxism-Leninism and a break with internationalism.
Frankly speaking, just recently we had no intention at all of touching on this question at this Meeting. However, the events of the recent period, particularly the nature of the decisions taken by the Ninth Congress of the CPC, have forced us to deal with it. There has arisen a new situation, which is having a grave negative influence on the whole world atmosphere and the conditions of the struggle of the anti-imperialist forces.
Peking's present political platform, as you are well aware, was not shaped either today or yesterday. Almost 10 years ago Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted an attack on the principles of scientific communism. In its numerous statements on questions of theory the CPC leadership has step by step revised the principled line of the communist, movement. In opposition to this line it has laid down a special line of its own on all the fundamental questions of our day.
At the same time, Peking started a political offensive against the communist movement. fThis offensive steadily gathered momentum, assuming ever sharper and more open forms. From polemics with the Communist Parties the CPC leaders went on to divisive, subversive activity, to active attempts to range the revolutionary forces of our day against each other. From a folding-up of their ties with the socialist countries to hostile acts against them. From criticism of peaceful coexistence to the staging of armed conflicts, to a policy undermining the cause of peace.
The Ninth Congress of the CPC marked a new stage in the evolution of the ideological and political propositions of Maoism. In the new Rules of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung's thought has been proclaimed the Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch. Chinese propaganda openly proclaims the task of "hoisting the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought over the globe''.
It is a big and serious task to make an all-round MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events in China 8 over the last few years, and of the roots of the present line of the CPC leaders, who have jeopardised the socialist gains of the Chinese people. The CPSU, like the other fraternal Parties, is giving it due attention. But in the light of the tasks facing the Meeting there is a need to dwell here, primarily, on the international aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy. It is doubly important to speak about it, because a section of progressive world opinion still believes that the present Chinese leadership has revolutionary aspirations, believes its assertions that it is fighting imperialism.
It seems to us that the Ninth Congress of the CPC revealed whom the Chinese leadership is really fighting, and for what purpose. The Congress indicated that "a merciless struggle" had to be waged principally against so-called "modern revisionism''. Yet, in this category Peking classifies not revisionists, but the overwhelming majority of the socialist countries and Communist Parties.
You will recall that the Chinese leadership accused the Communist Parties of France, India, the United States, Italy, Latin America and other countries of refusing "to conduct revolution'', of being renegades and of other deadly sins. ``Traitors'', "social strike-breakers'', ``social-imperialists''--- those are the labels attached to many of the Parties represented here. Everybody here knows what insults have been showered on all the participants in the present Meeting by the CPC leadership in its reply to our invitation.
The Peking leaders impute ``revisionism'' to all Parties that do not subscribe to their views and aims. They resort to all possible means against these Parties---from slanderous charges of "connivance with imperialism" to organising subversive splinter groups. Such groups now exist in nearly 30 countries. The Peking leadership is trying to give them the nature of an organised movement.
The damage done by Peking's divisive activities should not be underestimated. Recent class battles clearly showed what great harm Peking's activity, which prods people on to an adventurist path, is doing to the organised struggle of the working class, of all working people.
The present Peking leadership's fight against the MarxistLeninist Parties for hegemony in the communist movement is linked closely with its Great-Power aspirations, with its territorial claims on other countries. The idea that China has a Messianic role to play is drummed into the heads of 9 the Chinese workers and peasants. A wholesale conditioning of minds in the spirit of chauvinism and malicious antiSovietism is under way. Children are taught geography with textbooks and maps that show territory of other countries as belonging to the Chinese state. The Chinese people are being oriented to "starve and prepare for war''. Nor is any doubt left about what sort of war is meant. Only two days ago the Peking Kuangming Jihpao issued the call "to prepare for both a conventional and a big nuclear war against Soviet revisionism''. Of course, noisy statements are a far cry from actual possibilities. The Soviet Union is strong enough to stand up for itself, and the Soviet people have firm nerves--- they will not be frightened by shouts. But the orientation of official Chinese propaganda speaks for itself.
In the light of all this, the policy of militarising China takes on a specific meaning. We cannot help comparing the feverish military preparations with the fanning of chauvinistic feelings hostile to the socialist countries, with the general approach of the Chinese leaders to the problems of war and peace in the modern epoch.
Possibly, many of the comrades here remember Mao Tsetung's speech in this hall during the 1957 Meeting. With appalling airiness and cynicism he spoke of the possible annihilation of half of mankind in the event of an atomic war. The facts show that Maoism calls not for struggle against war but, on the contrary, for war which it regards as a positive historical phenomenon.
The combination of the Chinese leaders' political adventurism with the sustained atmosphere of war hysteria injects new elements into the international situation, and we have no right to ignore it.
Peking's practical activity on the international scene convinces us increasingly that China's foreign policy has, in effect, departed from proletarian internationalism and lost the socialist class content. That is the only possible explanation for the persistent efforts to identify the Soviet Union with US imperialism. What is more, these days the spearhead of Peking's foreign policy is aimed chiefly against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For a start, the Chinese leaders reduced to a minimum China's economic contacts with most of the socialist states and rejected political co-operation with them, ending up with armed provocations on the Soviet frontier. Provocative calls resound from Peking, 10 exhorting the Soviet people to "accomplish a revolution'', to change the social system in our country.
The facts show that the Chinese leadership speaks of struggle against imperialism, while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by everything it does. It helps the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at times of acute international crises. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass organisations of young people, women, and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union movement, and so on.
Naturally, the imperialists make the most of Peking's present foreign policy orientation as a trump in their political struggle against world socialism and the liberation movement.
To sum up: the attack on the Soviet Union all down the line, the specious propaganda, mud-slinging at the Soviet people, at our socialist state, our Communist Party, the fanning of hatred against the USSR among the people of China and, now, resort to arms; intimidation and blackmail in relation to other socialist states and the developing countries; flirtation with the big capitalist powers, including the Federal Republic of Germany---those are the guidelines of China's present foreign policy.
As you know, comrades, in March the Soviet Government, striving to end the clashes organised by the Chinese side on the Soviet-Chinese border, called on the Government of China to refrain from border actions that might create complications, and resolve differences, wherever these occur, by negotiation in a tranquil atmosphere. We proposed that the Soviet-Chinese consultations on border issues, which were begun in 1964, should be resumed in the immediate future. At the same time, we warned them that any attempt to deal with the Soviet Union in terms of armed power would be firmly repulsed.
Recently, the Chinese Government made public its reply. If one may judge from words, the Chinese side does not reject the idea of negotiations. There are also expressions of consent to avoid conflicts on the border and refrain from opening fire. At present, we are preparing the appropriate reply to this Chinese statement. This reply, like the Soviet 11 Government's statement of March 29, will naturally be in complete accord with our principled stand: to settle differences through negotiation and to favour equitable and mutually beneficial co-operation.
It should be pointed out, however, that the statement of the PRC Government can hardly be described as constructive either in content or spirit. The wordy document is full of historical falsifications, distortions of the facts of modern times and of crude hostile attacks upon the Soviet Union. It renews groundless territorial claims on the Soviet Union, which we categorically reject.
The future will show whether the Chinese leaders are really eager to negotiate, whether they desire agreement, and what course events will take. However, we cannot afford to overlook the fact that the provocations by Chinese military personnel on the Soviet border have not stopped. At the same time, an unprecedentedly broad and intensive anti-Soviet campaign is being conducted all over China on the basis of the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the CPC. The idea is being drummed into the heads of the Chinese people that the Soviet Union allegedly wants to attack China.
It is needless to refute these fabrications. Not only Communists, but all other decent people on earth know perfectly well that our people are preoccupied with peaceful creative labour, building communist society, and that they have never attacked nor intend to attack anyone.
Our policy with regard to China is consistent and based on principle. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government chart their policy on the long-term perspective. We are conscious of the fact that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide. We have always persevered and shall continue to persevere in our efforts to keep alive the friendly feelings of the Soviet people for the fraternal Chinese nation, and are certain that the Chinese people, too, have the same feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
At the same time, we do not feel we can remain silent about the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the political and ideological principles of the present leaders of China. We shall carry on a resolute struggle against Peking's divisive policy and against its Great-Power foreign policy line. It stands to reason that we shall do everything to safeguard 12 the interests of the Soviet people, who are building communism, from all encroachments.
We do not identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China's genuine national renascence and her social development shall be best served not by struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and fraternal co-operation with them.
Comrades, the situation created by the policy of the Chinese leadership introduces a new element into the problem of anti-imperialist unity. We Communists must take a responsible and clear stand. The policy of subverting the communist ranks, of dividing the anti-imperialist forces, can and must be opposed by our firm will for unity, by our deeds and joint actions promoting unity.
[13] ~ [14] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ I __ALPHA_LVL1__ PETTY-BOURGEOIS^^*^^ Novo Vremc, No. 10, 1968 (People's Republic of Bulgaria).
[15] ~ [16] __NOTE__ Author and LVL2 moved back. As a science and ideology, as the
theoretical foundation of the international communist
movement as a whole and of every Communist Party,
MarxismLeninism develops in unremitting struggle with the ideology
of the exploiting classes, in struggle chiefly with bourgeois
ideology, which dominates capitalist society. Moreover, it
sharply opposes the socio-political and philosophical theories
reflecting reactionary tendencies and the instability of the
petty-bourgeois strata in exploiting society.
In capitalist society, until workers and other working people join the Communist Parties they are constantly influenced by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, which is not easily shaken off. Through various channels this ideology also has some influence on a section of the membership of the Communist Parties. The penetration of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence into communist ranks manifests itself mainly in the emergence of Right or ``Left'' revisionism, of Right or ``Left'' deviations in the workingclass and communist movement. Therefore, besides combating undisguised proponents of reactionary bourgeois and pseudo-revolutionary Utopian petty-bourgeois ideology, Marxism-Leninism develops in irreconcilable struggle within the working-class and communist movement directed against Right and ``Left'' deviations, against all attempts at revising the scientific ideology of the working class.
A general outline of the struggle against Right and ``Left'' deviations in the working-class and communist movement to safeguard the purity of and creatively develop MarxismLeninism as the revolutionary ideology of the working class __PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__ 2---2466 17 may be traced by the struggle against Lassallcanism and anarchism at a time when Marxism was in the process of evolution, by the struggle against Bernsteinianism and, generally, against Right opportunism and revisionism in the Second International and against modern Social-Democracy and other forms of Right revisionism, by the struggle against ``Leftism'' as an infantile disease of communism at the time the Communist International was set up, against Trotskyism as the most dangerous manifestation of ``Left'' adventurism in the period between the two world wars, the struggle against Left sectarianism and dogmatism and, lastly, the struggle against Maoism. The international communist movement was considerably strengthened by the defeat of the most aggressive imperialist forces in the Second World War, from which the USSR, the world's first socialist country, emerged as the principal victor, and by the triumph of the socialist revolution in a number of countries. However, the influx of tens of millions of new people into the communist movement brought with it, in varying degree, ideas and sentiments alien to the working class. The countries that took the road to socialism found themselves confronted by totally new and complex tasks: besides having to eradicate the disproportions in the economy and the national and territorial antagonisms inherited from capitalism, they had to build up inter-state relations of a new type, based not only on equality and mutual non-interference in internal affairs, but also on many-sided co-operation and internationalist reciprocal assistance. The changes in the international situation likewise brought problems to the. Communist and Workers' Parties in the advanced capitalist countries and in countries fighting for national liberation or which had just won liberation from colonial dependence.
By concerted effort the international communist movement analysed the basic problems of the new epoch and charted the general line of its strategy and tactics under present-day conditions. This is mirrored in the documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties. However, during the quest for forms and methods of applying the new strategy and tactics in the obtaining conditions, the impact of various factors gave rise to objective possibilities for errors of a Right or ``Left'' nature in individual Parties.
Having lost their former predominant position, the 18 imperialists find that under the new balance of forces in the world it is becoming harder and more and more hazardous to organise armed interventions to suppress the revolutionary movement in various parts of the globe. As a result, ideological subversion receives prominence in imperialism's "global strategy" directed against the world revolutionary movement as a whole and, mainly, against the socialist countries. Amid subversion of this kind special importance is attached to encouraging anti-Marxist deviations and fanning nationalism in some Parties in the hope that this would undermine the unity of the international communist movement and then weaken and destroy the affected Parties. Inasmuch as the CPSU continues to be in the van of the international communist movement and the USSR remains the mainstay of socialism and the most powerful barrier to imperialist aggression, the preaching of anti-Sovietism has become the main element of imperialism's global strategy.
This is the angle from which we have to assess the real substance and role of Maoism, which at the close of the 1950s took shape as a petty-bourgeois, ``Leftist'' trend in the international working-class movement and in the course of a single decade became a clear-cut anti-Soviet force. In effect, it more and more frequently adopts the role of an assistant and ally of imperialism in its efforts to crush the international working-class and communist movement.
The situation obtaining in the world today was strikingly laid bare by the developments in Czechoslovakia. These developments provided further testimony of the villainy and perfidy of imperialism's strategy and were an indication of some weakness in our own ranks. Furthermore, they reaffirmed that regardless of differences in argumentation, both Right and ``Left'' revisionism are to be seen at the decisive moment working hand in glove with the forces of black reaction, coming out against genuine revolutionary action, against genuine revolutionary forces.
Lenin pointed out that it is particularly hard to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively in countries with a predominantly peasant population, and that the penetration of classalien influences into the proletarian Parties of these countries is fraught with grave danger. This wholly and completely applies to a backward and semi-colonial country such as China has been. From the history of the Communist Party of China we know that its leadership has frequently been __PRINTERS_P_19_COMMENT__ 2* 19 influenced by Right and ``Left'' deviations. For instance, one of the reasons that the Chinese revolution of 1927 was defeated was that a Right-opportunist group headed by the Party's General Secretary Chen Tu-hsiu held sway in the CPC leadership. Towards 1930 the leadership passed into the hands of the Li Li-san ``Left'' group, which artificially speeded up the organisation of insurgent action, calculating that this would provoke war between the USSR and world imperialism. Such a war, the Li Li-san group believed, would ensure the victory of the Chinese revolution.
The leadership of the CPC and the Chinese Army was seized by the Mao Tse-tung group in January 1935 as a result of a factional struggle. By that time Mao Tse-tung had fallen into error on a series of fundamental issues. However, considerable success was achieved on the eve of and during the Second World War in founding a united front of the Chinese people and in enhancing the prestige and increasing the membership of the CPC through the active assistance of the Comintern and under the beneficial influence of the decisions of its Seventh Congress on forming a united front in the struggle against fascism and against the war in China. In the autumn of 1940 the Comintern requested the CPC leadership to vitalise the struggle against Japanese imperialism in order to prevent Japan from attacking the USSR. Although Mao had the possibility of complying with this request, nationalistic considerations made him adopt a wait-and-see attitude.
The Chinese revolution triumphed chiefly because of the assistance received by it from the Soviet Army. Substantial progress was registered in China as a result of the dedicated labour of the Chinese people and the generous economic, scientific and technological assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In less than ten years, i.e., from 1949 to 1957, China's industrial output increased more than fivefold. In view of this striking achievement, the Eighth Congress of the CPC, held in 1956, recommended that the CPC should continue its correct line calling for the building of socialism in China in close alliance with the USSR within the framework of the world socialist system, and in active struggle against imperialism.
Everything seemed to be running smoothly. But in the period from 1957 to 1960, the Mao group, which held the leading position in the Party, sharply veered away from the 20 general line of the international communist movement, from the well-founded decisions of the Eighth Congress, and embarked on an erroneous, disastrous policy. What is the explanation for this?
At the first Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in 1957, Mao Tse-tung, who led the Chinese delegation, sought to impose on the international communist movement the perverse theory that despite the changed balance of forces in the world another global war was inevitable and that such a war should be regarded as the principal means of crushing imperialism and securing the victory of the world revolution. In effect, this was a variant of Trotsky's discredited theory of "permanent revolution''. Another effort to incite the international communist movement to aggravate the world situation and artificially speed up the world revolution was made by the Chinese delegation at the Moscow Meeting in 1960.
True, in both 1957 and 1960 the Chinese representatives signed the international communist movement's main programme documents that were drawn up jointly by all the fraternal Parties. But it soon became evident that the Mao group had signed these documents for purely tactical reasons and had no intention of adhering to the general line charted in them.
Back in 1935--45, after gaining control of the leadership of the CPC and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Mao Tse-tung brutally made away with leading Party cadres whom he found objectionable, and thereby seized absolute power. In this situation, the Party Rules adopted at the Seventh Congress of the CPC in 1945 contained the provision that the Party "is guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. This provision was omitted from the Party Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress in 1956. They correctly stated that the Party was guided by Marxist-Leninist theory. Moreover, the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC warned against the harmful consequences of the personality cult and stated that inner-Party democracy had to be promoted. These provisions came into conflict with Mao Tse-tung's past practice and his ambition of perpetuating the cult of his personality.
The successes achieved in building up a united China and in developing her economy turned the heads of the CPC leaders and gave them the subjectivistic idea that China's 21 internal growth and also world development could be speeded up artificially in the direction desired by them. They believed the conditions were favourable for establishing their hegemony in the international communist movement. This brought to the fore the Great-Power, chauvinistic tendencies, subjectivism and petty-bourgeois ``Leftism'' displayed earlier by them. The Maoists swept aside the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC and plunged into adventurism in home and foreign policy. Maoism took shape as eclecticism, consisting of the most diverse views, whose role was to use pseudo-revolutionary verbiage to conceal the Great-Power, chauvinistic, subjectivist and adventurist political line of the Mao group. The adventurist, "three red banners" policy---"new general line'', "big leap" and "people's communes"---thus came into being in 1958.
The "big leap" and the people's communes were subjectivistic attempts, clashing with the objective laws of social development and with realistic possibilities, to multiply many times over the rate of industrialisation and agricultural development in the People's Republic of China in order to leap over the socialist stage and rapidly go over to communism. The collapse of this line, which was both Utopian and adventurist, became obvious as early as the end of 1959, while at the beginning of 1960 it was, in fact, abandoned. However, this did not have a sobering effect on the Peking leaders. All they did was to change their tactics, laying emphasis on their adventurist course in international politics.
The theoretical and international aspects of Mao's "new general line'', in opposition to the general line adopted at the Moscow Meetings, were formalised in the notorious ``proposal'' of 1963. It was inevitable that the international communist movement should reject it as being anti-Marxist. Every effort was made to show the CPC leaders that they were wrong.
The Mao group paid no heed to the friendly counsels of the vast majority of the fraternal Parties. After their failure to force the international communist movement to accept their programme, the Maoists, like the Trotskyites of the 1920s, began to run down and slander the CPSU and other fraternal Parties which did not agree with them. Chinese diplomats in all countries and Chinese representatives at international forums started divisive activities in order to rally around themselves all opposition and all the shady 22 elements expelled from fraternal Parties and made it plain that they were bent on splitting the international communist movement. This became a feature of the activities of the CPC representatives in the national liberation movement and in the various international progressive movements.
__*_*_*__The Mao group's divisive activities in the international communist movement have undermined the unity and the militancy of the revolutionary movement in many countries. This has enabled the reactionary forces throughout the world to go over to the offensive and deal the revolutionary and progressive forces a series of blows. The most striking illustration is Vietnam, where, as a result of Peking's divisive activities, the USA has been able to launch a most wanton aggression against the Vietnamese people.
To halt this aggression and, in general, cut short imperialism's acts of aggression, it was imperative to unite all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, regardless of the differences between them. However, the Mao group, which calls itself the most determined fighter against imperialism, categorically refused to take part in any negotiations with the USSR and other socialist countries on concerted action against imperialism. The pretext was that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries "are the allies of the imperialists''. This despite the fact that the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam had repeatedly declared that the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries were among the forces rendering Vietnam massive military, economic and political assistance. Why, in that case, were the Maoists so virulently opposed to joint action? Only overwhelmingly naive people inexperienced in politics can assume that the Chinese leaders really believe their slanderous fabrications against the CPSU and other fraternal socialist Parties and therefore have no desire to negotiate with them. The truth lies somewhere else, and is inexorable.
Co-ordinated joint action by all socialist countries and progressive forces in support of Vietnam would have put a speedy end to US aggression in Vietnam and restored peace throughout the world. Moreover, it would have created conditions favourable for a further powerful upsurge of the 23 revolutionary and progressive movements throughout the world. In that case the prestige of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system would have soared to new heights and the danger of another world war would have diminished. But this runs counter to the Mao group's adventurist concepts, according to which war is the sole means for ensuring the triumph of the revolution on the national and the global scale. That is why the Maoists are so fanatically opposed to joint action in aid of Vietnam and in the struggle against imperialism generally.
On the basis of the above considerations the Mao group made the following insidious demand of the CPSU and other fraternal Parties: "If you desire to prove that you are really enemies of imperialism, aggravate the international situation everywhere and provoke military conflicts.'' Here the point must be made that the Maoists want others to employ these tactics, while they confine themselves to denunciations of the imperialists.
In this light one can clearly see the real purport of the Maoists' assertions that the temporary stationing of the troops of the USSR and other socialist countries in Czechoslovakia is "another conspiracy between the USSR and the USA''.
Troops of five socialist countries entered Czechoslovakia in order to prevent the counter-revolution from seizing that country and prevent Czechoslovakia from falling prey to the imperialists and being turned into a springboard for further aggressive acts by NATO against other European socialist countries. That was why imperialist propaganda raised a hue and cry against the five socialist countries and played the role of ardent champion of the "new Czechoslovak road to socialism''. The imperialists never for a moment meant to give the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia open military assistance. The reason was not that they did not wish to take such a step, but that the balance of strength was unfavourable to them both in Europe and throughout the world. What then lay behind the absurd accusation of conspiracy with imperialism? The fact that a military conflict did not break out between the USSR and the imperialists in this case, either: the cardinal aim of the Peking leaders, as we have already mentioned, is to provoke such a conflict, which, according to their calculations, would end their international isolation and lead them out of the chaos 24 reigning in China. Moreover, they hope that another world war would devastate mainly North America and Europe, as a result of which China would become the dominant power in the world.
__*_*_*__In order to substantiate the factional struggle, which has developed into a civil war for the seizure of absolute power in the Party and the state, and justify their foreign policy aimed at hotting up international tension and provoking war between the USSR and the USA, and also to divert the anger of the masses over the tremendous internal difficulties, Mao Tse-tung and his group took a series of steps to give Maoism the shape of an ideology.
In an editorial carried by the magazine Hungchih and the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao on May 18, 1967, it is emphasised that the decision passed by the CC CPC on May 16, 1966 (drawn up under Mao Tse-tung's personal direction, it was published almost a year after its adoption) is permeated with new ideas "of exceptionally great and far-reaching significance''. The ``new'' propositions of Maoism, mirrored in this editorial and in some of Mao's speeches in recent years, contain not well-founded and well-argumented principles but only postulates mostly in the form of dicta and aphorisms. They were ``explained'' in a slanderous speech made by Lin Piao on the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and in editorials in Hungchih and Jenmin Jihpao. The basic propositions of Maoism, ``enriched'' in this manner, are:
1. The USSR and other socialist countries adhering to the correct general line worked out by the Moscow Meetings, the People's Republic of Bulgaria among them, have `` degenerated'' abjectly. Capitalism has been restored in these countries as a result of which they have become wholly and completely allies of the USA and other imperialist countries. For that reason, the struggle for the "defeat of the revisionists is a prerequisite" of the victory over imperialism. Thus, for the Maoists, enemy No. 1 is not US imperialism, the vanguard of all the reactionary forces in the world that is reducing Vietnam to piles of rubble, but `` revisionism'', i.e., chiefly the European socialist countries headed by the USSR. Proceeding from this, the Maoists conduct a base 25 campaign of slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries comparable only with the anti-communism of the most rabid reactionaries. Subversive, splitting activity against the Communist Parties of the developed capitalist countries is carried on in the same manner.
2. It is common knowledge that after it was crushed in the major cities in 1927 and as a consequence of the errors committed subsequently by the CPC leadership, the Chinese revolutionary movement was confined for a long time mainly to rural regions. Today the Maoists seek to dispense this limited experience as a "universal recipe" for all revolutions. Here is what they write: "First and foremost, the peasant masses must be mobilised for guerilla war, the agrarian revolution must be completed and strongpoints must be established in the countryside. Then the cities must be surrounded by the villages and captured.'' According to Lin Piao, this ``discovery'' by Mao Tse-tung is "a great development of the road opened by the October Revolution, a road to power" and it is offered as a "strategic plan" for the victory of the revolution throughout the world.
This anti-scientific Maoist ``theory'' lies at the root of the demand that China should be regarded as the centre of the world revolutionary movement. By nature and content the purpose of this ``theory'' is to bring into the Maoist camp masses of illiterate peasants and other petty-bourgeois strata in Asia, Africa and Latin America who are awakening to independent and political life. In this case, the Maoists counted on their political inexperience and their hatred and distrust of the capitalist West accumulated over centuries of colonial slavery. But developments show that in this issue, too, the Mao group had clearly overrated their own potentialities and underrated the growing political maturity of the working people of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these continents the number of people whom such an absurd idea can inspire is rapidly diminishing.
3. A new and important element of Maoism today is the attempt to give out as a "theoretical discovery of epochal significance" the counter-revolutionary civil war which the Mao group unleashed two years ago under the high-- sounding title of "cultural revolution''. The slogans put forward by Mao Tse-tung at the llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC state: "Remove power from the hands of people following the capitalist road!" and "Open fire at the headquarters!''
26Using Mao Tse-tung's maxims, the Peking theoreticians are seeking to substantiate the civil war started under these slogans and on factional considerations: they contend that the struggle between the ``people'' and the "enemies of the people" must go on uninterruptedly. This is described as a struggle between antagonistic classes, a struggle which must be waged on the principle of "who will beat whom'', in other words, until the enemy is destroyed completely. However, the Mao group does not and cannot offer a genuinely class, scientific criterion to show who are the "representatives of the people" and who are "the enemies of the people''.
Unquestionably, there are enemies of the working people in China today. They are remnants of the exploiting classes--- former capitalists and feudal lords, and remnants of the old reactionary parties. Most of them continue to receive large sums of money as interest on nationalised enterprises and hold responsible posts in the economy and in the state apparatus. These class enemies inflict damage wherever they can. Naturally, given favourable conditions they would have tried to restore capitalism. Precisely these reactionary elements have not been touched by the "cultural revolution''. The label "enemies of the people following the capitalist road" has been slapped not on them but on many veterans of the revolutionary movement, on those Party leaders and statesmen who had disagreed with Mao's line at one stage or another or had expressed doubts regarding the infallibility of Mao's personality or his adventurist policies. In support of this statement suffice it to recall that Liu Shao-chi, President of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of People's Representatives, and many of his deputies, and lastly many members of the Political Bureau of the CC CPC---participants in the national liberation struggle, cadres who had rendered distinguished service in the building of socialism in the PRC---have been proclaimed "ringleaders of the black gang''.
The fact that subjectivism and factionalism have been decisive elements in organising the persecution of cadres devoted to socialism and proletarian internationalism or simply persons objectionable to the Mao faction has given rise to conditions for internecine strife between rival Maoist organisations and groups. This, along with the growing 27 resistance of the working people to the "cultural revolution'', has led to chaos which is accompanied by economic dislocation and a considerable lag in public education, science and culture, and nullifies past achievements in the building of socialism and in uniting the Chinese people morally and politically.
4. In the hope of surmounting the existing anarchy and factional struggle and uniting the masses around Mao for the purpose of achieving their megalomaniac aims, the Maoists have been fanning Great-Power (Great-Han) nationalism on an unparalleled scale. Stress is laid on the numerical strength of the Chinese people and wide use is made of the national superiority complex and exclusiveness cultivated by the Chinese emperors in the course of many centuries.
To reinforce Great-Han chauvinism and substantiate their bid for world domination they have recourse to the longconsidered claim that in our day the centre of the world revolutionary movement has moved to Peking and that Mao Tse-tung is the leader and helmsman of the world revolution.
From history we know that the centres of the world revolutionary movement did indeed move. For instance, France, where the great bourgeois revolution of 1789 triumphed, was the centre of the world revolutionary movement at the close of the 18th century. In the mid-19th century, the centre moved to Germany, where the bourgeois revolution gained broad scope and where Marx and Engels evolved the scientific ideology of the only genuinely revolutionary class, the proletariat.
Early in the 20th century the main centre of the world revolutionary movement moved again, this time to Russia. In those years all the contradictions innate in the new, imperialist epoch were concentrated there. Russia was pregnant with the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The ruthlessly exploited proletariat of that country was relatively concentrated and well organised, and proved capable of leading the bourgeois-democratic revolution in order later to go over to the socialist revolution. As a consequence, Russia became the homeland of Leninism, which marked a new stage in the development of Marxism. Lenin laid bare the new features of the epoch of imperialism and creatively developed the theory, strategy and tactics of the proletarian 28 revolution. Founded under his leadership, the Bolshevik Party secured victory in the struggle to overthrow capitalism and has been successfully building socialism.
After the Great October Socialist Revolution the Soviet Union became the recognised centre, bulwark and beacon of the world revolutionary movement. The Soviet Union played the central role in defeating nazism in the Second World War and in the triumph of new socialist revolutions that followed on the heels of the war. Furthermore, the USSR rendered immense service in making possible the victory of the national liberation movement in a number of countries after the war. Undisputably, the Soviet Union has contributed colossally towards the successful building of socialism in all countries that have taken the socialist road and towards safeguarding them against encroachments by imperialism.
The Chinese leaders, too, recognised all this until 1956 and even at the second Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1960. They frankly acknowledged that in the new situation, too, the USSR remained the centre of the world revolutionary movement and was its most powerful force and mainstay.
What was the state of affairs in the course of the past 10--12 years, when the conflict between the Mao group and the international communist movement burst out and deepened? Owing to its immense achievements in building communist society, the further improvement of the economic and socio-political system, the rapid rate of technological, scientific and cultural advance, the tremendous assistance to Vietnam, the determined defence of revolutionary Cuba, of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression, of socialist Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia today against the inroads of the counter-revolution, the Soviet Union continues to be regarded by the working people of the whole world as the main bulwark of revolution and progress. The USSR continues to render vital assistance to socialist and to many developing countries. It continues to give all-sided support to all democratic and national liberation movements in the world. Another manifestation of the Soviet Union's leading role as the bastion of the world revolution is that thanks to its powerful army, nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear-powered submarines it has become the main, real force paralysing and curbing the USA, the super-powerful, 29 most aggressive and most heavily armed imperialist state, and also the revanchist ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany.
What on the theoretical level is the substance of the evolution of Maoism? Until recent years the followers of Mao sought to represent Maoism as "Chinese Marxism'', having in mind that Mao applied Marxist-Leninist theory to the specific conditions obtaining in China. Indeed, Mao's earliest works contain some Marxist propositions, but these are worded very primitively and vaguely. However, basic concepts like "dialectical contradiction'', "proletarian revolution" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" are not interpreted by Mao in the universally accepted scientific sense. He injects his own, anti-scientific meaning into them. Thus, Marxist phraseology conceals an anti-scientific, profoundly erroneous content. For instance, Mao frequently reduces a dialectical contradiction to a purely formal, external element such as the contradiction between the concepts of good and evil; he includes poor peasants into the concept "working class''; he reduces the dictatorship of the proletariat to a military-bureaucratic dictatorship of a ruling clique headed by himself, and so on.
The anti-Marxist, anti-scientific aspects of Maoism began to predominate after 1956, when Mao turned radically away from the sound decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC. Regardless of the partial use of Marxist terminology, all the ``new'' features introduced into Maoism in recent years and advertised as the "highest stage of the development of Leninism" are profoundly erroneous and constitute an eclectic mixture of Trotskyism, anarchism, Great-Power chauvinism and political adventurism with the addition of the most rabid anti-Sovietism.
To round off the picture, a few words must be said about the substance of modern Maoism. Arbitrarily reducing the significance of Leninism to "the solution of the problem of the triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country'', the Peking ``theoreticians'' maintain in their latest ``works'' that Lenin did not foresee the possibility that capitalism might be restored and did not deal with the ways and means of preventing such a restoration.
On the basis of this untenable premise, Lin Piao and other Peking ``theoreticians'' proclaim that the "cultural revolution" discovered by Mao is a "great historic contribution'', 30 maintaining that it has shown "the ways and means of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism in conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat''. But, as we have already seen, the "cultural revolution" pursues totally different aims, namely, the precipitation of civil war so that a handful of adventurists who have betrayed Marxism-Leninism, can seize absolute power in the Party and the state.
At the same time, the modern Maoist theoreticians incredibly impoverish and distort the basic tasks confronting the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Marxism-Leninism teaches that the entire experience of socialist construction in the USSR and other socialist countries, including the positive experience of the People's Republic of China until 1958, bears out that the cardinal internal tasks of the socialist revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat are: economic development with the main emphasis on socialist industrialisation and the co-operation and mechanisation of agriculture; the launching of a genuinely cultural revolution with the purpose of raising the educational and ideological level of the people and reorganising science and art on a Marxist-Leninist basis; raising the people's standard of living. All this is fully in keeping with Lenin's propositions that the principal task of the revolution after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established and consolidated is to promote peaceful economic and cultural development, achieve a higher labour productivity than under capitalism and raise the people's standard of living. That was how the problems of socialist construction were interpreted in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC.
However, after the failure of the "big leap" and the people's communes, which were counted on to ensure China's direct transition to communism, Mao performed a volteface in the theory of socialist development too. The Leninist policy in economic development, founded on a combination of material and moral incentives, was branded as `` economism'', while the legitimate striving to improve the people's standard of living was stigmatised as a tendency to "turn bourgeois'', as a "return to capitalism''.
The Maoist theoreticians now declare: "Chairman Mao frequently stresses that the problem of 'who beats whom' takes a long time to be settled in the course of the 31 revolution. It must not be imagined that after one or two, or three or four cultural revolutions everything will be all right.''
In other words, instead of economic and cultural development they offer periodic rounds of "struggle against headquarters'', i.e., the extermination of leading cadres objectionable to the cult and the ruling clique supporting it. The Maoists hope to fill decades and perhaps even centuries (to use an expression of Mao himself) of the development of the socialist revolution with a ``revolutionary'' content of this kind. But has this prospect, which in practice brought tragedy to the Chinese people, anything in common with the actual development of the socialist revolution? Does this not, in effect, compromise the very idea of socialism?
There can be no doubt that sooner or later the Communist Party of China and the working class, peasants and people's intelligentsia of the People's Republic of China will find the strength to put an end to the anarchy into which they have been led by the Mao group. Maoism, which has degenerated into Great-Power chauvinism and pseudorevolutionary adventurism and slid into undisguised anticommunism, will be thrown on the scrap heap of history. Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will rejoin us under the banner of the great and invincible MarxistLeninist teaching and proletarian internationalism and advance towards the complete triumph of socialism and communism.
[32] __ALPHA_LVL2__ "THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG" Communists throughout the world are
following the developments in China with growing anxiety.
Although the struggle in that country has not abated and
the policy of the Mao group is meeting with strong
resistance, the gains of the Chinese revolution remain in danger.
This danger is mounting owing to the efforts of the Mao
group to change the very substance of the Communist
Party of China and form a party of the Maoist type.
The offensive of the Mao group on the Communist Party of China is now in its decisive stage. During the past ten years more than two-thirds of the members and alternatemembers of the C€ CPC, elected in 1956 at the Eighth Congress of the CPC, have been removed from political activity. In August 1966, with the beginning of the "cultural revolution'', the Army and the hungweipings were ordered to "open fire at the headquarters''. The Party leadership in the provinces, counties, factories, government offices and educational institutions was paralysed and systematic Party work in primary organisations was rendered impossible. But since the resistance of the most politically-conscious section of the Party members to the encroachment on their very existence and on the political system in China does not relax, the Mao group has openly declared that the Party must be "completely reorganised''.
The Mao group seeks to form a Party consisting of " devoted soldiers of Mao'', a Party free of all the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, a Party with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as its ideology. Since the close of 1967 reports _-_-_
^^*^^ Einheit, No. 4/5, 1968 (German Democratic Republic).
__PRINTERS_P_33_COMMENT__ 3--2466 33 have been coming in that preparations are under way for the Ninth Congress of the CPC. It is planned as the first congress of the Maoist party.These facts alone must induce Marxists-Leninists to make a thorough-going analysis of the essence of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', especially as the Mao group is serving Maoism up not only as the ideological basis on which to ``reorganise'' the Party, not only as the official ideology of Chinese society, but as the "summit of Marxism-Leninism''. Official propaganda speaks of the "thought of Mao Tsetung" as of the "third stage" of the development of Marxism. For instance, in Chinese press reports on the Second Congress of Students of Courses for the Study of the "Thought of Mao" in the Air Force, it is stated that "the world has entered a new revolutionary era with the thought of Mao Tse-tung on its banner. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the era when imperialism moves towards fatal defeat, while socialism advances to victory on a world-wide scale''. According to the Chinese propagandists, the entire world revolutionary movement accepts the "thought of Mao''. This Maoist claim to universal recognition requires that Communists and all other progressive forces in the world should forthwith scrutinise the "Maoist thought" in order to understand its real content and orientation. Maoism's brazen demagogy and its distortion of Marxist propositions frequently make it difficult to understand the substance of Mao Tse-tung's outlook. True, the "thought of Mao" has been rejected by the world communist movement long ago as being non-Marxist, but the fact that the Mao group speaks in the name of socialism is used by bourgeois propaganda with the objective of discrediting Marxism-Leninism and vitalising anti-communist propaganda.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Emergence of Maoism The evolution of Mao Tse-tung's
anti-Marxist outlook into a special political and ideological
platform with its anti-Marxist policies screened with the
banner and ideals of communism was a long, complex and
contradictory process. This platform took shape in the course
of protracted discussions between representatives of
MarxistLeninist and petty-bourgeois nationalistic trends in the
34
Communist Party of China. There are many objective
historical reasons behind the emergence of this petty-bourgeois
nationalistic philosophy. Among them are the backwardness
of the productive forces, the feudal and semi-feudal
relations of production in various parts of the country and the
correspondingly low level of social development at the
time of liberation, the composition of the population, China's
long isolation and the propagation of national exclusiveness,
the domination of a military clique, and the traditions of
Confucian philosophy.
When at the age of 27 Mao Tse-tung, who had received a classical Chinese education,^^*^^ became interested in Marxism, the Chinese revolution was facing anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks. The Chinese people's inexorable striving for independence was the decisive, driving force of the revolutionary struggle. In those years bourgeois and pettybourgeois circles came under the influence of Great-Power tendencies. Already then it was vital to ensure the leading role in this struggle for the working class in order to prevent the Chinese revolution from sinking into the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic swamp. The actual state of affairs undoubtedly made this task extremely difficult for the then young and numerically relatively small working class of China. The national liberation movement pushed radical elements from among the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals into professing progressive, revolutionary-democratic views. These were the elements that initially predominated in the Communist Party of China, which was founded in 1921.
The first Marxist study groups, the predecessors of the Party, were formed in 1920 under the impact of the Great October Socialist Revolution. There were all sorts of people in these study circles, as in the first CPC organisations. For a time the communist movement had in its ranks people who subsequently became the leading exponents of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary Kuomintang. During those years the growth of the CPC was influenced not only by the revolutionary upsurge in the country, the build-up of the proletarian forces and support from the Comintern, but also by pressure from the "petty-bourgeois ocean" which from the very outset was the main source of the petty-bourgeois _-_-_
^^*^^ The classical Chinese education was noted for its conservatism and scholasticism in educational methods, for its stress on learning the works of ancient Confucian scholars by heart.
__PRINTERS_P_35_COMMENT__ 3* 35 outlook and the most ominous threat to the CPC. This development of antagonistic forces was mirrored in the struggle between internationalist Marxists-Leninists and the exponents of the national-revolutionary but petty-bourgeois outlook. This struggle has been waged throughout the history of the CPC.The class battles that started as soon as the Party was founded, first and foremost strengthened the working-class movement, and this influenced the Party's policy. The energetic struggle against chauvinistic, nationalistic and sectarian views, which the CPC waged during the early years of its existence, was due chiefly to the efforts of the Party's Marxist-Leninist nucleus (Li Ta-chao, Tsu Chiu-po and others) and to the assistance of the Comintern. The impassioned debates resulted in a policy calling for a united front with the then progressive national-revolutionary Kuomintang headed by the great Chinese democrat Sun Yatsen.^^*^^ The CPC social composition likewise underwent a change: the number of workers increased appreciably and in the spring of 1927 comprised 60--70 per cent of the Party's 60,000 members.
Chiang Kai-shek's open betrayal of national-revolutionary ideals and the brutal suppression of the working-class movement in the summer of 1927 gave birth to the idea of orienting the development of the revolutionary movement on the countryside: this fully conformed to the acute agrarian problem in China and to the role of the peasants as the predominant section of the population. But this re-- orientation required that the Party should pursue a consistently proletarian policy in order to rule out the possibility of petty-bourgeois influences pervading the Party as a result of the new qualitative change of its composition. At the Sixth Congress in 1928 some delegates pointed out that the petty-bourgeois deviation in the CPC "was dangerous not only at the given time but also for the future ... our Party has 100,000 members, among whom, however, there are only 3,000 workers. If this state of affairs continues, the Party will find itself beset by even greater difficulties''.
Waging a struggle in remote regions, far away from the slowly reviving working-class movement, the Party's ranks _-_-_
^^*^^ Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925. Under Chiang Kai-shek the Kuomintang gradually degenerated into a reactionary organisation.
36 grew mainly through the influx of non-proletarian elements. By 1931 the percentage of workers in it dropped virtually to nil. This reinforced the petty-bourgeois views of Mao Tse-tung and other leaders, and led them to anti-Marxist positions. These positions were repeatedly stigmatised by the Comintern and the Chinese Marxists-Leninists, with the result that the Party adopted a correct revolutionary line. Despite all the zigzags and differences, the CPC headed and directed the heroic struggle of the Chinese Communists, revolutionary workers, peasants and other working people and brought the people's democratic revolution to victory. At the national-democratic stage of the revolution the pettybourgeois, nationalistic forces and the Marxists-Leninists acted in concert despite their differences on individual issues.^^*^^ This unity enabled Mao Tse-tung and some other leaders to put forward tactically correct slogans which concealed their petty-bourgeois, nationalistic way of thinking.The creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the actual conditions in China was unquestionably a task of paramount importance and at the same time it was a particularly complex task. The communist teaching had to be applied "to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism''.^^**^^ In this connection Lenin said it was imperative "to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people''.^^***^^ However, while referring to Lenin's propositions, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters substituted Maoism for Marxism in the course of its `` Sinification''. Instead of creatively applying the true communist doctrine to the actual conditions in China Mao Tse-tung vulgarised and distorted Marxism. He treated it in accordance with his statement that everything foreign plays the role of an edible product which "is divided into waste, which is eliminated, and the extract absorbed by the organism''.
It must be noted, however, that being a politician, Mao Tse-tung had to take the requirements of the day into account _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao's arguments in the 1920s during the debate with the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san may be characterised now as a ``Left'' now as a Right deviation.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 161.
^^***^^ Ibid., p. 162.
37 in his tactical slogans. Popular slogans and simplified formulations enabled him to mobilise the masses and secure victories in the drawn-out guerilla war. This enhanced his personal prestige. He went to all ends to turn his personality into the symbol of the revolutionary struggle and of victory. Although, like many other petty-bourgeois politicians, he often adopted a contradictory stand, he managed to win a leading position in the Party. To this end he did not shun anti-democratic methods, and to take the leadership of the Party into his hands he utilised the hardships of the people and, in particular, the armed struggle forced on the Chinese people.^^*^^ The Rules adopted by the Seventh Congress of the CPC in 1945 stated: "In all its activities the Communist Party of China is guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung.'' The reactionary nature of this thought, which is permeated with petty-bourgeois ideas, nationalism and even Great-Power chauvinism, was not so striking as it has become today.First, during the war against Japanese imperialism Mao Tse-tung's stand did not contravene the tasks set by history, as became the case later, during the building of socialism. Second, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was shown in its true colours only when it was turned into an all-embracing, anti-Marxist, adventurist, Great-Power doctrine.
The factor bringing about the triumph of the Chinese revolution was not the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" but the unity of the broad masses round the CPC on the basis of the policy of a united front against Japanese imperialism, charted in the 1930s with the assistance of the Comintern. It triumphed as a result of the heroic struggle of the Chinese working people against the Chiang Kai-shek regime, with the healthy, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Party saying the last word on decisive issues. History has shown that in the period of socialist construction success was achieved only when Mao Tse-tung's anti-Marxist, adventurist views were pushed into the background. An immense role was played in the victory of the Chinese revolution by the favourable international situation, by the Soviet Union's victory over _-_-_
^^*^^ A purge was undertaken in the Party in the early 1940s under the slogan "movement to direct the style of work''. This purge enabled Mao Tse-tung to consolidate his position. He used this method after the victory of the revolution in 1949. Purges were conducted under various slogans.
38 German nazism, by the defeat of a crack Japanese Army by Soviet troops in Northeast China and by the transfer of that Army's materiel to the Chinese People's Liberation Army. That was what changed the military situation in favour of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, it owes its successes to the formation and consolidation of the socialist world system and the growth of the national liberation movement. To some extent and for a certain period the existence and assistance of the world socialist system compensated for the weak sides of the Chinese working-class movement.The victory of the revolution confronted the Chinese Communists with many complicated problems. The transition to the socialist revolution was vital to a backward country like China, where the material prerequisite's for the socialist mode of production were in an embryonic state. By that time it should have become obvious to Mao Tsetung that these problems could not be solved without building up a real economic and social basis, without the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This, the Marxist-Leninist internationalist forces in the Party believed, was the only way China could build socialism. Despite Mao Tse-tung's nationalistic approach to assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to the application of Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction, China's successful development until 1956 strengthened the Marxist-Leninist forces and principles in the Party. Within a short span of time the Chinese people made considerable headway in building the foundations of socialism: in economic development, in establishing a people's democratic system, in education and in raising the standard of living. The significance of these achievements was underscored by the Eighth Congress of the CPC in the autumn of 1956. This Congress formulated and adopted a Marxist-Leninist general line for the .stage of socialist construction.
Consistent enforcement of this general line would have enabled the Chinese people to join in the broad torrent of socialist development and would have enhanced the role of the working class and the Marxist-Leninist forces. The Party had already embarked on that road, and at the Eighth Congress Mao Tse-tung was powerless to prevent the mention of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" from being deleted from the Party Rules, although the successes scored 39 in socialist construction were still being associated with his personality.
But the year 1956, which should have marked a turn in China's domestic development and in the promotion of her foreign relations, showed that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters were opposed to the Party's line of building socialism. By that time the petty-bourgeois, Great-Power thought of Mao Tse-tung, in combination with obsolete methods of the past, one-sided conclusions and the overrating of initial successes had taken the shape of an anti-Marxist, adventurist, nationalistic platform. It had become clear that Mao Tse-tung and his group were typical exponents of pettybourgeois views. At the critical moment, in the period of transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution, they veered away from scientific socialism and found themselves in a dead end of history. Moreover, they dragged the Chinese people into that dead end. Without openly coming out against the Party's general line, and utilising the national upsurge in the country and his prestige won with the aid of the Party's correct policy, Mao and his clique in effect revised the Party line, interpreting it in their own way. In contravention of the decisions of the Eighth CPC Congress and ignoring its warning that the adventurist ambition of building socialism "in one morning" was pernicious, the Maoists began enforcing their "big leap" and "people's communes" policy. This policy nullified all the earlier achievements and plunged China into chaos. The collapse of this adventure and the Maoists' forced retreat led to a relative stabilisation of the economy. But in 1966 Mao Tse-tung openly launched the "cultural revolution" designed as the means of implementing his wild nationalistic concepts.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Maoism Versus In the educational aids of the Peking
hungweipings and in the official Chinese press Mao
Tsetung's abstract writings and directives are given out as a
great ``development'' of Marxism-Leninism. In addition to
the attempts to disparage the role of Marx, Engels and
Lenin in the development of the three components of
Marxism, Marxist theory has been ``expanded'' to include
40
three more ``components'' deriving from Mao Tse-tung's
theories on the people's war, the upbuilding of the Party
and the "development of the revolution under the
dictatorship of the proletariat''. At first sight the formulations in
Mao's writings do not seem to be at variance with Marxism.
But a closer scrutiny shows that in most cases they are
only a simplified retelling which frequently distorts the
sense of known propositions. In this retelling these
propositions are made to fit Mao's political objectives, and in
action they are given a completely revised content. The
resultant system lacks harmony. But this whole eclectic
mixture of vulgarised Marxist theses, opportunist ideas and
Confucian rules plays the role of a screen for Mao's political
line. On the example of some issues let us examine the
ideological and political content of the "thought of Mao
Tsetung''.
Mao Tse-tung received a classical Chinese education and his thinking was moulded under the influence of the idealism of ancient Chinese philosophers. After coming into contact with Marxist views, instead of critically reappraising this influence he used it as the foundation of his own thought. Hence the extreme voluntarism, the absolutisation of. subjective factors and the virtual negation of objective reality.
In his interpretation of the fundamental problems of philosophy, Mao seeks to make his own viewpoint sound scientific. In Regarding Contradiction he placed being and consciousness on virtually one and the same plane. In the textbook Dialectical Materialism, published in China in 1961, we find a direct statement on the "identity between thinking and being''. The problem of the relationship between matter and consciousness is replaced by the problem of the link between the object and the subject. To quote this textbook: "The fundamental problem of philosophy is ... in effect that of the relationship between the subjective and the objective''. And further: "The question of what is primary---the subjective or the objective---is the only criterion for drawing the borderline between materialism and idealism''.
To all intents and purposes, these views reject Marxism's basic proposition, which says that being determines consciousness. This proposition cannot be substituted by contrasting the objective with the subjective because the 41 objective can embrace both the material and the ideal. Permeated with idealism, Maoism spreads its subjectivism also to problems of social development. In the above-mentioned textbook, for instance, it is stated that the "process of remaking the world lies in applying thinking to being, in the attitude of the subjective to the objective''.
On this basis Mao Tse-tung compares the Chinese people with a "sheet of clean paper" on which "one can draw the newest and most beautiful pictures''. It goes without saying that Mao unquestionably sees himself in the role of the artist. This outlook throws the door open to subjectivism and voluntarism in practical politics. Hence the memorising of quotations from Mao's writings, which, the Maoists think, will remake the subjective world and, consequently, the objective world, too.
The views of the ruling group in China rest also on Confucian philosophy, which continues to dominate the minds of many Chinese. In "Confucianism and Marxism in Vietnam'', Nguyen Khac Vien makes the following interesting observation: "In the homeland of Confucius revolutionary morality frequently gains the upper hand over the concept of the laws of historical development. Marxism is both the `explanation' and the `precept', and it frequently turns out that the `precept' takes precedence.. . . This sort of moralism sometimes leads to voluntarism, according to which any task can be carried out if only the Party functionaries 'tighten the screws' sufficiently.''^^*^^ This assessment is fully borne out by .the theory and practice of the Mao group.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Distortion of the Concept Blatantly ignoring the laws of social
development and hard facts, Mao Tse-tung uses Marxist
concepts in a totally distorted and subjective form. In his
very first works---On the Classes of Chinese Society and
Report on a Study of the Peasant Movement in Hunan
Province---one sees the tendency to distinguish between classes
_-_-_
^^*^^ Nguyen Khac Vien, "Confucianisme et marxismc au Vietnam'', La Pensee, Paris, October 1962, No. 105, p. 25.
42 not by objective criteria, i.e., by their relationship to the means of production and by their position in social production but by their personal material level, ideology and other subjective criteria. Mao Tse-tung perverted the concept ``proletariat'', bringing under this classification the urban lumpen-proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasantry. Today, all who disagree with the "thought of Mao" are labelled "bourgeois elements''. The Marxist theory of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions has always been alien to Mao Tsetung. Despite the Mao group's skill at falsification, they cannot obscure the fact that at the Third Congress of the CPC in June 1923 Mao Tse-tung unequivocally supported the views of Chen Tu-shiu, then General Secretary of the Party, and with him refused to recognise the hegemony of the proletariat and pinned his hopes on the big and small national bourgeoisie. In 1923 he wrote: "Proceeding from historical necessity and the tendencies of the present situation, the most essential and important part of the work for the weal of the national revolution must be undertaken by shopkeepers and not by the mass of the people.''^^*^^ "The stronger the unity among shopkeepers and the greater their influence, the more powerful will be the force leading the people and the faster will the revolution achieve success.''^^**^^This negation of the leading role of the working class continued, in subsequent years, to guide the actions of Mao Tse-tung, who comes from a well-to-do peasant family. The peasants played an unquestionably great role in the specific conditions of China. Taking this into account the Comintern issued important instructions in the mid-1920s. But the role of the peasants, who had for a long time been the main force of the Chinese liberation struggle, cannot be absolutised. Yet such absolutisation is typical of Maoism.''^^***^^ Mao Tse-tung ignored Lenin's proposition, of vital importance to China, that "the proletariat, even when it constitutes a minority of the population (or when the class-conscious and really revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat constitutes a minority of the population), is capable of overthrowing the _-_-_
^^*^^ Hsientao, July 11, 1923, p. 933.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 234.
^^***^^ Lin Piao wrote: "The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory" (Peking Review, September 3, 1965, p. 24).
43 bourgeoisie and, after that, of winning to its side numerous allies from a mass of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeoisie who never declare in advance in favour of the rule of the proletariat, who do not understand the conditions and aims of that rule, and only by their subsequent experience become convinced that the proletarian dictatorship is inevitable, proper and legitimate.''^^*^^ This teaching was skilfully applied by the Bolsheviks in a backward country with a predominantly peasant population.It is not surprising that the defeat of the Chinese revolution in the 1920s strengthened Mao Tse-tung and his supporters in their contention that the proletariat was incapable of leading the revolution. They adhered to this view during the people's democratic revolution, too, when nonrecognition of the leading role of the working class was particularly disastrous. During the years ,of successful socialist construction in China the Maoists tried to slow down the growth of the working class. They went to all ends to keep it from coming to the fore. But industrialisation strongly enhanced the position of the working class and it proved capable of fulfilling its leading role.
True, time and again Mao Tse-tung and official propaganda nodded approval of the working class. However, against the background of the Mao group's home policy, all these nods were nothing but cheap demagogy aimed at giving this policy a Marxist colouring. In On the Correct Solution of Contradictions Within the Nation Mao Tsetung names the Party and the Army as the principal factors strengthening the state. He says not a word about the role of the working class. In other writings he goes even further and virtually equates the hegemony of the proletariat with that of the Army. In the period of the "big leap" and the people's communes the countryside was counterposed to the towns, while the people's communes were proclaimed the "best form of organising the gradual transition from socialism to communism'', which "in the course of its development becomes the basic unit of the future communist society''. But the most striking expression of Maoism's hostility for the working class was the "cultural revolution" spearheaded against the CPC and the trade unions, against the foundations of the political and social existence of the working _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 274.
44 class. The Trotskyite theories about young people being the barometer of the revolution and opportunist views disparaging the working class were used by the Maoists to justify their assault on that class. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Link Between Nationalism Mao Tse-tung's anti-materialistic view
on the development of human society and his lack of
understanding that the history of mankind is a history of the
class struggle were the fertile soil for the bloom of the
pernicious ideas of nationalism. Edgar Snow, one of the few
foreigners who had access to Mao Tse-tung and studied the
theory and practice of the Mao group in direct proximity to
them, wrote as early as 1942 of the extremely pronounced
nationalist sentiment of Mao Tse-tung and his followers.^^*^^
Mao Tse-tung has long ago regarded the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China as a model for other countries, which would "follow the example of China''. On July 6, 1943, the central newspaper of the CPC in the liberated areas called the CPC's experience more valuable than that of any other Communist Party in the world.
With the victory of the people's democratic revolution and the consolidation of the Chinese state the danger of nationalism increased. There was fertile soil in China for Great-Power chauvinism. The deep-rooted millennium-old philosophy of a powerful feudal empire, the many centuries of isolation, the low level of education among the people, their petty-bourgeois way of thinking and the achievements of the first years of socialist construction favoured the fanning of nationalistic passions. The Party and many of its leaders had repeatedly warned that nationalism might grow. Li Ta-chao, one of the CPC founders, emphasised: "The peasants do not know what imperialism is, but they know the foreigners who personify it. It is our duty to explain to them the nature of imperialism, which oppresses China and exploits the Chinese peasants, who hate all foreigners. This sort of explanation makes it possible gradually to steer _-_-_
^^*^^ Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asir Cleveland and New York, 1942, p. 288.
45 the peasants away from narrow nationalistic thinking and help them to realise that the revolutionary workers and peasant masses of other countries are their friends.''Instead of paying heed to this advice Mao Tse-tung and his group began to whip up the flames of nationalism. Today nationalism provides the foundation for Mao's Great-Power policies and, at the same time, diverts the attention of the people from the calamitous situation in the country. In the Chinese press today, exactly as in the day of the emperors, the national ``exclusiveness'' of the Chinese is lauded to the skies, and they are told that their abilities are vastly superior to the abilities of other peoples. For example, the Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao wrote on March 2, 1966: "Our people, armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, are the most courageous, most clever and most unanimous people.'' This playing by Mao and his supporters on the national feelings of the Chinese people serves as confirmation that they have assimilated Marxism-Leninism through the prism of nationalistic pragmatism. They planted nationalism in the course of the many years of struggle against the internationalist forces in the Communist Party of China. Militant nationalistic philosophy has become the banner around which the Maoists are now grouped in their fight against Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
Those who substitute voluntarism for historical materialism and regard history not as a history of the class struggle but of a struggle between rival nations, assign the decisive role in historical development to violence. In Anti-Diihring Engels ridiculed exponents of violence and pointed out that the decisive factor in human history was not violence but the economy, particularly the development of the productive forces. But for Maoism the history of mankind is a history of wars. For Mao Tse-tung war is not merely a form, but the "highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes and political blocs''. He regards war as the principal means of settling all issues and, for all practical purposes, maintains the theory that war is all-powerful.
That is why Maoism urges the "export of revolution" regardless of the actual conditions and prerequisites in the different countries. What it is interested in is not the revolution but the settlement of the problem by force and the possibility of deriving a benefit for its nationalistic plans. To further its mercenary interests Maoism is prepared to 46 use wars fought by other peoples, regardless of whether these are just wars or not, or whether they benefit or harm the freedom and progress of these peoples.
It is no accident that while juggling with the concept of ``revolution'' Mao is least interested in its essence, in the qualitative changes of the socio-economic basis of society, and attaches significance to the violence factor as a means of resolving the problem. This is the direct outcome of his understanding of revolution as an uprising, as a putsch. His disregard of objective criteria of revolution brought him round to perverted assessments as early as the 1920s and 1930s. For instance, at the Party Congress in 1928 he was criticised for seeking to bypass some stages of the revolution. He applies the term ``revolution'' to the most diverse actions, including the present "cultural revolution" in China.
The monstrosity of these views on revolutionary development in the world, which the Maoists regard from the standpoint of its utility for their Great-Power policies, is revealed most fully by their attitude to the socialist camp and the world communist movement. Marxists-Leninists find it hard to believe that socialist countries have become the main target in the political game played by the Mao group. The spearhead of their foul, incessant slander is directed against the Soviet Union, the bulwark of socialism and world peace. But history has shown that the attitude to the Soviet Union is the criterion of the attitude to the revolution, to world progress. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Mao group have started an open fight against the world communist movement and are actively engaged in subversive activities against the Communist Parties in accordance with the task, set in 1965, of "making a final break with these Parties ideologically and organisationally''. What is the objective' of this policy directed against the revolutionary communist movement, of a policy based on the theory that the world revolution has shifted to China?
The fusion of nationalism with Great-Power chauvinism and the theory of violence, the attempts to change the essence of the Communist Party of China, the training of the Chinese youth in a nationalistic and militaristic spirit, the underrating of the threat of a nuclear war and the development of nuclear weapons of their own serve the main objective of the Maoist foreign policy, which is to establish China's dictatorship over the whole world with Mao Tse-tung at its 47 head as the arbiter of the destinies of nations. But inasmuch as according to Mao war is the only decisive factor of development, this aim must be achieved by war or wars, and nuclear war is not ruled out as a "means of politics''. That is why the Mao group does not oppose the conflicts which imperialism is constantly fomenting. On the contrary, from time to time it seeks to aggravate the international situation by its own policy. But the "extraordinarily revolutionary" anti-imperialist prattle by no means revolutionises China's extraordinarily restrained behaviour towards the USA. Mao with his peasant-like cunning evidently wants only one thing---to bring about a clash between the USA and the Soviet Union and "sit on a mountain and watch the tigers fight in the valley''.
The Maoists do not recognise the main contradiction in the world---the contradiction between socialism and capitalism---and seek to keep aloof from the struggle. In line with their view on world domination, they expand on the alleged contradiction between the "cities of the world" (Europe and North America) and the "rural areas of the world" (Asia, Africa and Latin America), between the ``rich'' and ``poor'' nations, and give it out as the basic contradiction; anti-Sovietism has been elevated to the status of official state policy and, in effect, determines the Maoist foreign policy line. Wide publicity is given to Mao's theory that ``revisionism'' (meaning the Soviet Union and other socialist countries) must be defeated before victory can be achieved over imperialism. The llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC, which marked a complete break with the line laid down by the Eighth Congress of the CPC, adopted a general formulation of struggle against "imperialism, world reaction and modern revisionism" justifying any arbitrary action. For example, Lin Piao made a speech in which he used the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which the entire world communist movement marked as its own jubilee, to call for the overthrow of the Soviet Party and state leadership.
To create the soil for their anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy, the Maoists endeavour to discredit all Marxist-Leninist Parties in the eyes of the people. To this end they slandered the Consultative Meeting in Budapest. One of the fruits of their divisive, Great-Power policies was the following dirty concoction in the Peking Jenmin Jihpao on July 26, 1967: 48 ``The command headquarters of the proletariat headed by Chairman Mao is the most authoritative, respected a'nd genuine Marxist-Leninist command headquarters in the world. It represents the basic interests of the broad masses. It represents the progressive orientation of society. Those who dare oppose this high revolutionary command headquarters will feel the telling blows of the revolutionary people of China and the People's Liberation Army armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung; they will inescapably turn into a street rat which is chased and beaten and their end will most certainly be a bad one.'' This Great-Power chauvinism lies at the root of the theory of "people's war'', widely publicised in African and Asian countries, and in the rejection of peaceful coexistence if such coexistence does not fit into the Maoist plans.
These nationalistic and voluntaristic theories, which completely disregard the actual relationship of forces, naturally have no prospect whatsoever. But they have aftereffects as shown by the developments in Indonesia and by China's relations with her neighbours. Here, in practice, we can see the pernicious character of the Maoist ideology, which guides this policy. It is vital that the Marxist-Leninist Parties should expose this ideology and policy and thereby help the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists to climb out of the present impasse and re-occupy their place in the struggle for socialism and peace in their country and in the whole world. Moreover, this denunciation is necessary for the preservation of the purity of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and their proper application to various present-day problems. It is necessary for success in the struggle against the machinations of imperialism and forprogress, peace and socialism throughout the world.
[49] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Miroslav M\'ika In the international communist
movement the differences between the CPC and the
overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties have been dragging
on for a number of years. At first they were mainly of an
ideological nature, but gradually the political aspect grew
more and more pronounced. At the price of destroying the
unity of the international communist movement the leaders
of the Communist Party of China began to move more and
more openly from an ideological dialogue and polemic to
a political struggle against what they term as "modern
revisionism''.
The Chinese leaders have gone to the extent of drawing the conclusion that the differences in the international communist movement are antagonistic. On November 11, 1965 Jenmin Jihpao wrote that "there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us; we have nothing in common, everything is antagonistic. . .''. Peking has demanded that a demarcation line---political and organisational---should be drawn between it and the ``revisionists'', and called for the establishment of new, ``revolutionary'' parties in various countries.
From this divisive policy Mao Tse-tung and his group moved to open political animosity against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, in particular, and against scientific communism, in general. This is borne out by their practical activities, which demonstrate that they have ceased to regard the Soviet Union as their friend and ally, classifying it as one of their principal enemies---this is obvious from the utterances of fanatical hungweipings and from official newspapers. _-_-_
^^*^^ Nova Mysl, No. 4, 1967 (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic).
50 Present-day developments in China insistently bring up the question: How far will the Chinese leadership go in this policy? Numerous facts indicate that the hostile policy towards socialist countries, the Soviet Union, in particular, is in China herself coming up against countless obstacles in the Party and among the people.The international communist movement anxiously follows the developments in China. Most of the Communist and Workers' Parties have stated their disagreement with the policy of the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution'', stigmatising it as a policy discrediting communism.
What are the reasons behind the present-day events in China? They are extremely complex and their root lies deep in history.
Before the revolution China's level of economic development was one of the lowest in the world. Even tsarist Russia in 1913 produced 3.3 times more steel and 3 times more pig iron per head of the population than People's China in 1957. Before the revolution the railways in China used locomotives of more than 200 makes, and not one was made in China. The world's largest exporter of tungsten, China imported filaments for electric bulbs.
The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. A new stage of the development of the Chinese revolution began and, at the same time, a colossal drive was started to eradicate backwardness. During the years of rehabilitation (1949--52), the government carried out important reforms aimed at resolving this vital problem. Those years witnessed democratic reforms and preparations for gradual socialist transformations.
The first five-year plan (1953--57) was launched in 1953. China started building an industrial basis, organising agricultural co-operatives, carrying out socialist reforms in artisan production, capitalist industry and trade, and setting up mixed state-capitalist enterprises. Major achievements were also registered in raising the Chinese people's standard of living.
The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China, an important landmark in that Party's history, was held in September 1956. It was convened after an interval of 11 years (the Seventh Congress was held in 1945) and was the first Congress after the People's Republic of China was __PRINTERS_P_51_COMMENT__ 4* 51 proclaimed. It set the task of creating, in the course of three five-year plans or a longer period, an effective system of industrial production, in which the main share would come from heavy industry (primarily the engineering and iron and steel industries). In its decisions it was stressed that industry must develop in proportion to agriculture in order to strengthen the alliance between the workers and peasants. To that end the Congress summed up the results of preceding economic development and passed a decision to reduce its rate and eliminate the disproportions that had come into being especially between production potentialities and consumption in order to create favourable conditions for the transition to the second five-year plan (this plan, whose targets were likewise determined by the Eighth Congress, embraced the period 1958--62).
The next few years, however, witnessed some adventurist undertakings. In May 1958 the second session of the Eighth Congress condemned the demand for a proportionate development of the economy as being conservative, as a barrier to the initiative of the people. It underscored that it was wrong to fear disproportion. This session passed a decision charting a new general line aimed at accelerating socialist construction. Without taking the level of the economic basis into account, it proclaimed that the growth of political consciousness was the catalyst accelerating the rate of socialist construction in China. It came to the conclusion that the initiative of the people had to be utilised without fearing disproportions, that a "big leap" had to be accomplished in three years and that fundamental changes had to be secured in China's economic position so that "after three years of hard work there would be ten thousand years of prosperity" (a slogan put forward by Mao Tse-tung).
These conclusions signified there had been a radical change of policy. A span of three years was given for the transition to communism. The "big leap" was proclaimed. This was an unprecedented political adventure, a policy isolated from real objective potentialities and founded on the desire to resolve colossal tasks in the shortest possible time and ``teach'' others new methods of building socialism and communism. The Chinese economy, not too powerful as it was, found itself subjected to numerous and unfounded experiments, which resulted not in a "big leap" but in long years of stagnation.
52The People's Republic of China registered a series of achievements despite the adverse influence of this policy. In September 1962 the 10th plenary meeting of the CC CPC launched measures to promote science and technology and set the orientation for new, modern industries. The result of this orientation was that within a few years the production level of a number of industries came close to the world standard (electronics, nuclear physics, biochemistry, the production of artificial materials and chemicals, and so on.
The level of education rose. The number of students in institutions of higher learning increased from a little over 150,000 in 1949 to 600,000 in 1955 and more than 1,500,000 in 1960. In 1949 there were 25,000 engineers in China, while in 1963 their number rose to 370,000, and, besides, fliere were 70,000 biologists, 100,000 agronomists and 110,000 experts in social science. When the war ended 90 per cent of the population was illiterate. In 1966 100 million children were going to school and 15 million young people were studying at higher-standard schools. China had 20 universities and 848 research institutes subordinated to the Academy of Sciences.
However, the successes attained by China in the struggle against centuries-old backwardness were accompanied by developments which caused us and the whole of progressive mankind grave anxiety.
For a number of years the international communist movement has had to polemise with the Chinese leaders over the problems of war, peace, peaceful coexistence, the forms of transition to socialism, and so forth. For a number of years the Communist Parties anxiously watched the Chinese leaders pursue an adventurist line in international policy and, since the second half of 1966 they have been watching developments in China herself. The so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution'', which has nothing in common either with culture or with revolution, arouses the apprehension that in the sphere of social development much of what has been achieved in socialist construction will be eradicated. The very fact that this ``revolution'' is directed against, among others, the Chinese intelligentsia, against outstanding scientists of universities and other institutions of higher learning, that classes have been stopped at institutions of higher learning and then at secondary schools to enable 53 students to devote themselves entirely to ``revolutionary'' activity cannot but evoke legitimate concern for the destiny of socialist development.
Where is one to look for the causes giving rise to these developments? What are the mainsprings of this extremism in the policies of the Chinese leadership which is astounding the whole world, of the incessant inner-Party clashes, of the switches from realism to adventurism and pseudo-- revolutionary radicalism, from internationalism to nationalism and even chauvinism?
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Dual Understanding When one studies the history of the
Communist Party of China one is struck by a noteworthy
fact, namely, the constant or, to be more exact, recurring
struggle against Right and ``Left'' deviations. In 1924--27 the
struggle was against a Right deviation headed by Chen
Tuhsiu. In the course of the struggle against this Right
defeatist line (known as the "Conference of August 7'', 1927),
``Leftist'' sentiments began to come to the fore and they
developed into a ``Leff'-putschist (i.e., adventurist) line.
The 1930s witnessed the so-called "second line of the `Left' deviation''. Its inspirer was Li Li-san, under whose leadership on June 11, 1930 the Political Bureau of the Central Committee passed a ``Leftist'' resolution and launched a struggle against the so-called "Right deviation''.
This list may be continued to embrace the present. A closer study shows that, properly speaking, throughout the history of the Communist Party of China there has been a constant quest to understand revolutionary development, that throughout Chinese history there has been a clash between a proletarian and a petty-bourgeois understanding of revolution.
Earlier we mentioned the backwardness of Chinese economy. On that backwardness rests the social structure of Chinese society. China has more peasants than any other country in the world (today over 80 per cent of the population are peasants). The urban petty bourgeoisie---small 54 shopkeepers and artisans---formed a numerically large stratum. When the revolution triumphed in China, the industrial proletariat, which is the leading force of the socialist revolution, hardly totalled one per cent of the country's population. After the revolution the Chinese working class grew numerically to about 20 million, which was, however, less than three per cent of the population (this was a young working class consisting mainly of former peasants). Although the Communist Party of China had had quite a good revolutionary training, its proletarian basis was insignificant. It grew and obtained its cadres chiefly among the peasants. Before the revolution the Party was active mainly in rural areas, outside the large cities and industrial centres.
For more than a decade, beginning in 1935, the centre of the Chinese revolution was the frontier region lying along a line across three Chinese peasant provinces: Shensi, Kansu and Ningsia. The Central Committee of the CPC, all the central Party organs and most of the Party members were in that region.
Mao Tse-tung wrote in those days: "As China is a country with a very large petty bourgeoisie, our Party is surrounded by this enormous class, and it is natural that a very great number of our members of this class origin join the Party without shedding their petty-bourgeois tails, long or short.''^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung himself has time and again admitted that the Communist Party of China has been powerfully influenced by petty-bourgeois ideology, an ideology which, according to his own words, manifests itself in ``vacillation'' now to the Right now to the ``Left'', gravitating towards ``Leftist'' revolutionary phraseology and slogans, towards sectarian narrowness and an adventurist policy.
The whole paradox is that Mao Tse-tung has himself come under this petty-bourgeois influence, and there are many facts justifying the conclusion that he has been and, properly speaking, continues to be its chief exponent.
As early as 1925 he sided with the view that the revolution in China was a peasant revolution and that the peasantry was the mainstay of the revolution and must be its leading force.
When the Nanchang uprising was suppressed in 1927, _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-lung, London, 1956, Vol. IV, p. 49.
55 Mao Tse-tung was expelled from the CC CPC for disobeying the order to continue the assault on the cities. Mao joined with Chu Teh and built up his own base on the border between Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. In 1928 he was re-elected to the CC CPC. However, in 1933--34 differences again flared up between him and most of the Party leadership. He was criticised for his petty-bourgeois understanding of revolution, -for his so-called "bandit doctrine'', and was again expelled from the Central Committee.An extended conference of the Political Bureau of the CC was convened by Mao Tse-tung in the town of Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, in 1935, during the Great March. As a result of this conference Mao again headed the Central Committee. In 1949 the revolutionary forces were victorious, and the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. During these years Mao Tse-tung became extremely popular and later this popularity gave rise to the myth that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was infallible. Incidentally, in the course of China's long history there have been many emperors who had been regarded as infallible.
The victory of the forces of progress in 1949 returned to the fore the question of the further development of the revolution, and in this connection the old problem, that of understanding revolution, could not but arise again.
The first indications of a struggle over this problem could be seen as early as in 1953--54 (the political trials of adversaries of the Party line and policy and the liquidation of the Kao Rang opposition). The struggle unfolded in full in 1957--58 in connection with the "big leap" policy.
Disregard of objective laws triumphed over common sense. The new economic policy carved its way in a new clash, this time with ``Right-wing'' elements, who, it was alleged, lacked revolutionary enthusiasm, underrated the gigantic strength in the millions of Chinese hands, overrated machinery, rejected the principle of self-reliance, overrated the potentialities of international co-operation, and so forth. The chief exponent of this so-called Right opportunist line was Marshal Peng Teh-huai, the Defence Minister. Among his supporters was Chen Yun, the only leader with a proletarian background, who had been directing China's economic policy until 1958. Like Peng Teh-huai and others, he did not approve Mao Tse-tung's "magnificent plans" and therefore quickly disappeared from the scene. Further, mention may 56 be made of the outstanding economist Sun Yeh-fang, who at this time was the director of the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and said the ``leap'' was prattle worthy of regret.
The "big leap" led China into a dead end economically and politically. She found herself up against serious economic problems, which were aggravated by a series of elemental calamities. The root cause of the blunders and of the fact that industry and agriculture remained at the 1957 level was the unfeasible subjectivistic policies of the Party leadership. In both 1958 and 1959 the autumn harvest was not brought in because nearly 80 million people were "smelting steel" in primitive blast-furnaces. The ruinous policy was partially rectified by the 8th plenary meeting of the CC CPC in August 1959, by the 9th plenary meeting in January 1961 and, in particular, by the 10th plenary meeting in September 1962.
In the political practices of the Mao group the ``Leftist'' aspiration to find a ``new'' approach to the revolution was carried over more and more distinctly to the sphere of international politics. Nationalist and petty-bourgeois ideology made themselves felt in this sphere, too, intensifying the hegemonistic ambitions of the Chinese leaders. To attain these ambitions the Mao group adopted a policy spearheaded against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, and against the unity of the socialist countries and the communist movement. They sought to drive a wedge between the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the one hand, and the peoples building socialism and the working- class of the developed capitalist countries, on the other. They opposed the policy of peaceful coexistence and went to all lengths in an effort to take over the leadership of the national liberation movement. More and more frequently recourse was made to Mao Tse-tung's theories that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and that the "seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries''.^^*^^ This, it was believed, would show the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in action and _-_-_
^^*^^ Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy'', Peking Review, No. 36, Sept. 3, 1965, p. 23.
57 the right of the CPC to hegemony in the communist movement. Part of this campaign was Lin Piao's article Long Live the Victory of People's War! in which he spoke of the Chinese experience of "surrounding the cities" by the countryside: "The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory.''All this strikingly recalls the petty-bourgeois, peasant interpretation of revolution over which Mao Tse-tung fell out with the Party leadership time and again. There are many examples in history of clamorous "revolutionary enthusiasm" going hand in hand with the most rabid nationalism. Lenin had frequently pointed out that the same social and economic conditions, which give rise to the small proprietor, strengthen one of the most deep-rooted pettybourgeois prejudices, namely nationalist egoism and national narrowness. Facts show that petty-bourgeois ideology and nationalism, which is one of its components, are becoming increasingly more pronounced in/the policies of the Chinese leaders and taking the form of a lever of their practices.
The decline of the revolutionary wave in the countries of the Third World over the past two years has blasted the expectations of the Chinese leaders and called forth a painful reappraisal of the political crisis which is being aggravated by China's growing isolation and her waning influence in the world. This crisis has found expression in the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution''.
This ``revolution'' is reminiscent of the malice of the nationalist, whose ideology is founded on the principle that the aim justifies the means. How can one otherwise explain the hostility towards the Soviet Union, or the concept linking the triumph of communism with thermonuclear war, or the violence of the hungweipings against everybody and everything coming into conflict with the "great and invincible thought" of Mao Tse-tung? The aim of the "great struggle" is to uproot opposition and destroy the exponents of the so-called "black line''. This is yet another clash between two trends in understanding the further development of the revolution.
Why are Mao Tse-tung and his supporters finding allies despite their political twists and turns? The answer to this question must be found in some of China's specific features.
58 __ALPHA_LVL3__ Historical Links If we try to define the specifics of the
relationships in China our attention will be drawn primarily
to the unique fact in history that Chinese civilisation and
culture developed for more than three thousand years
without any external influences. In fact, China is the only
country in the world where to this day the millennia-old
civilisation continues to be part and parcel of national and
state life.
In the most diverse spheres in China we find a direct succession between the remote past and the present. Understandably, this fosters national exclusiveness and nationalism. If to this is added the fact that China has the largest population in the world, the Chinese leaders' contention that China must be the model and leader of the world will not seem so incomprehensible.
Another factor heightening the nationalism of millions of Chinese is that China had waged a long and bitter struggle against imperialism under the slogan of nationalism. This struggle brought out the positive, progressive aspect of nationalism. The negative, reactionary aspects of nationalism begin to manifest themselves after a country shakes itself free of foreign tyranny. In a small country these negative aspects usually begin to show themselves in the shape of distrust, but in a large country, on the contrary, they take the form of a striving for expansion, an aspiration for power and hegemony.
Instead of trying to halt the growth and spread of the negative aspects of nationalism, the CPC leaders themselves fell under their influence and gradually began to utilise the national consciousness of the Chinese people for GreatPower, chauvinistic aims.
Another specific alive today and used by the Chinese leaders is the 2,000-year-long despotism of the central government and the fairly widespread bureaucracy at higher and lower levels united by Confucian ideology. This Confucian (or, rather, neo-Confucian) ideology has been decisive in establishing the considerable stability of political and administrative institutions. No change was introduced into this either by the social or by the class struggle of the peasants. No matter how powerful or radical the peasant uprisings have been, we do not know of a single case in which 59 they wrought any essential change in the traditional forms of administration. A strong, authoritarian central power, founded on the monopoly of Confucian ideology, has been the standing feature of traditional Chinese society. The problem of the destiny of the individual did not exist for Confucianism or for any other Chinese ideology. For that reason, the question did not arise of the rights and claims of man, because he was only a detail of large or small collectives, to which he was totally subordinated.
The large, rich families controlled political life although their members were sometimes involved in various political intrigues and storms. The state gave the heads of such families considerable administrative and juridical autonomy not only with regard to the members of the families but also to servants and other subordinates. The authorities intervened only in cases of infringement of the vital interests of the ruler or at the request of representatives of the basic autonomous units. Communal economy, which naturally consolidated the feeling of collectivism, existed in China for a fairly long period. The federal government constantly and deliberately sustained the prestige of small and large groups of the population. People were recruited collectively for irrigation or other large projects and also for the Army. Taxes were, as a rule, determined not on a per head basis but by villages or small collectives, which were held responsible for the duties and misdemeanours of each person. The guilt of individuals was determined depending on the gravity of the crime and also on the number of relatives. This traditional ideology of dependence on the state as a whole and on the family or village collective concerned left no room for personal freedom. It demanded blind subordination to authority.
Here the parallel with modern China is clear-cut. Today, as before, a young man cannot quite independently choose a wife, nor can a girl choose a husband. This is strictly controlled by the director or by the Party or trade union organisation. In most cases the initiative of the fututre husband and wife is not required. The decisive factor is not mutual love but the expected benefit to society, a benefit that can only be determined by the appropriate higher authority (in different form than in the past) and not but the persons involved.
Authorities continue to be blindly recognised by old 60 traditions, and their slogans and orders are accepted without question. Against the background of the shortage of means of information and the ordinary people's limited knowledge or total ignorance of the surrounding world, one can easily understand why the most diverse twists and turns in policy are accepted without a word.
Another feature must be mentioned. This is the cult of revolutionary radicalism, which requires unfading revolutionary enthusiasm and tension, regularly kept up by various campaigns. Moreover, revolutionary radicalism requires a constant strengthening of power through consistent and strict control over each person.
The revolutionary radicalism in China frequently astounds the European observer by its extreme severity. But this too is linked with past history. It will be recalled that the peasant insurgents were in most cases extremely hard-boiled because they were severely exploited. Since the second century of our era radical Utopian ideas of peace and absolute equality (which were partially realised during the great Taiping Rebellion of 1851--64) have always been of great significance in their uprisings. The radicalism of present-day Chinese views on the problems of war and peace, on revolutionary development in the world and on revolutionary actions in China, and the radicalism of the hungweipings are linked with the experience of these uprisings.
Much of what in "present-day China" surprises, startles and puzzles us and what in recent years has been seriously worrying us is linked with the traditional prototype of "old China'', which, allegedly, has been eradicated completely. Unfortunately, we grew accustomed much too quickly to regarding China as a socialist country and took it for granted that development there was proceeding without conflict and was following a classical pattern. The past few years have shown that such patterns do not operate unconditionally even in the European socialist countries, and much less can they be expected to operate in such a huge country as China with her unique history.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Not Only Objective Factors Although China's economic
backwardness, the pressure of petty-bourgeois elements, features of
historical development and survivals of the past play a
61
considerable role and create the soil for the adventurist and
nationalistic line and policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group
they do not by themselves lead to these policies.
It is not a matter solely of objective factors. No matter how heavy the petty-bourgeois influence it can be surmounted if the Party leadership pursues a correct proletarian policy, if it remains true to Marxism-Leninism. But Marxism-Leninism is what the Chinese leaders lack. Instead of combating the pressure of petty-bourgeois elements they have capitulated to them and from these positions have gone to the extent of launching a fight against communism.
We respect the rich history of the great Chinese people and recognise their contribution to world culture. But we cannot help being surprised by the CPC's contention that the "Chinese are one of the few progressive nations in the world''. The views about the Manchu and Mongol invaders have in recent years been revised in China. Chinese propaganda has turned Genghis Khan from a bloodthirsty and ruthless invader, as he is known to history, to a leader who played a progressive role in the history of China and forty other countries.
For a number of years the Communist Party of China has been living and acting not on the basis of Leninist principles of democratic centralism but in an atmosphere of a personality cult. This is the cult of the personality of Mao Tse-tung and it is leading away from Leninist standards in the Party, to an adventurist policy and to a drive for hegemony in the international communist and national liberation movements. It is no longer a secret that the verbal juggling around theoretical problems, the ultra-revolutionary verbiage, the courtship of unstable elements in other parties, the conclusion of pacts with all sorts of apostates of the working class, the propaganda hullabaloo given out as a struggle against "modern revisionism'', and other devices have been and remain for Mao Tse-tung and his supporters nothing more than a means of achieving their objectives and that all this continues to spring from the desire to plant the Mao Tsetung cult at all costs.
Fear of the spirit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU made Mao Tse-tung, Marshal Lin Piao and the other members of this group settle accounts ruthlessly with all the people who could make them see their own reflections and-threaten their reputation of ``infallibility''.
62As distinct from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung regards the cultural revolution not as the culminating point of the socialist revolution in ideology but as an uprising against Party organs and the socialist state apparatus. On January 31, 1967, an editorial in the magazine Hungchih stated that it was a "life and death struggle'', that it was a matter of seizing power, that it was a matter of "wresting power from a handful of Party leaders''. Mao "called on the People's Liberation Army to help the proletarian revolutionaries in the struggle for power''. Students only create a clamorous oreole around a much more serious process which in reality is leading to a change of power in the state. The militarisation of social organisations in China undermines the Party's leading role and raises doubts about the people's nature of Chinese socialism.
In this question it is not enough to determine the socialist nature of the relations of production, it is necessary to determine the nature of the social authority owning the means of production. At a time when in all the other socialist countries socialist democracy is being extended to enable the people to take an increasingly direct part in administration and thereby exert a growing influence on this administration, in China we observe the reverse process under which elective organs are replaced by the appointment of ``loyal'' military leaders, with the result that the circle of people administering the state is steadily narrowing down.
The newspaper L'Unita has correctly observed: "Before us is a picture of an extremely acute political struggle which has caused a deep split in the country's ruling circles and among the people . . . this is a revolution started on the basis of the principle expressed by the Maoist press in the following words: 'A revolt is a just cause'. Whose revolt and against whom? This is passed over in silence in the press. However, we were convinced that the power established as a result of the revolution of 1949 belonged to the people. The call to overthrow that power must most certainly make us extremely worried. Day-to-day developments unfortunately show that our apprehensions are absolutely legitimate.''
The secret intentions, political objectives and reasons behind the actions of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are gradually coming to light. Practically no doubt has remained that the ``theoretical'' turns and twists of the Chinese nationalists and their so-called "principled revolutionary" policy 63 directed against so-called "modern revisionism'', against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, sprang from a desire to halt the process started by the 20th Congress of the CPSU.
The real course of events is increasingly laying bare the ideological poverty of the Chinese splitters, revealing the nationalism and subjectivism of their policies. We should like to believe that those who in this process have adopted an incorrect stand mistakenly, due to immaturity or inadequate experience, will return to the right road.
[64] __ALPHA_LVL2__ THE SITUATION IN CHINA The 12th "plenary meeting" of the
CC CPC heralded a new stage in the implementation of
the policies of the Mao Tse-tung group.
Convened in flagrant contravention of the Party Rules, this so-called plenary meeting was, in effect, a conference of a narrow group of Mao's closest supporters. It mechanically sanctioned the practices of the Maoists and officially called the campaign launched by them a "political revolution''. It endorsed Mao's directive of "opening fire at headquarters" of August 5, 1966, a directive which sparked the suppression of Party organisations and of organs of popular rule, reaffirmed the "decision on the great proletarian cultural revolution" of August 8, 1966, and endorsed the communique of the llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC, and all of Mao Tse-tung's ``instructions'' and Lin Piao's statements.
This "plenary meeting" denounced Liu Shao-chi, President of the PRC and Vice-Chairman of the CC CPC, labelling him a "traitor, provocateur, strike-breaker and watchdog of imperialism, modern revisionism and Kuomintang reaction''. Special significance was attached to this act for it connoted virtual condemnation of the socio-political system existing in China until the "cultural revolution'', inasmuch as Liu Shao-chi had delivered the report on the draft Constitution of the PRC in 1954 (which legalised the people's democratic system in China) and the political'report of the CC to the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 mapping out the programme of socialist construction in the People's Republic of China.
_-_-_^^*^^ Kommmiist, No. 4, 1969 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
__PRINTERS_P_65_COMMENT__ 5---2466 65Mao Tse-tung needed this "plenary meeting" to give a semblance of legality to the persecution of many prominent leaders of the CPC and many hundreds of thousands of honest Communists who opposed his anti-popular policies.
The Maoists staged the 12th "plenary meeting" to provide further justification for the "cultural revolution'', dissociate themselves from the line laid down by the Eighth Congress of the CPC and thereby end the PRC's socialist development, and ideologically prepare the country for the establishment of a new system of political rule.
The machinery of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship is being rapidly built up in China today.
The demolition of the political superstructure of the people's democratic system is nearing completion. The Communist Party as the leading force of society, the elective organs of state power, the trade unions, the Young Communist League and all other public organisations have been disbanded or paralysed under the slogan "break the old machinery of state''. The principles underlying socialist rule by the people have been branded as ``bourgeois'', as " revisionist rubbish''.
To mislead the people the Maoists have utilised their dissatisfaction with various abuses in the work of the Party and state apparatus engendered by the general atmosphere around the cult of Mao Tse-tung's personality. The blame for these abuses has now been put on Mao's political adversaries. At the same time, a bureaucratic stratum is being planted in the Party and the state, whose organisation and functions have a military-feudal colouring, which is traditional in China.
The higher organs of the Party and the state have been replaced by the so-called "proletarian headquarters of Mao Tse-tung'', which consists of a small group of functionaries loyal personally to Mao. This ``headquarters'' has been proclaimed the "sole leading organ of the entire Party, the entire Army and the entire country" (the communique of the "12th plenary meeting of the CC CPC''). It is now engaged in building up the mechanism of power, in which a definite place will evidently be given to the Party, which is being formed on a new basis, and to other political organisations.
The central link of this system consists of "revolutionary committees'', which are replacing the former Party and state organs. The system of "revolutionary committees" is being 66 set up on a territorial-production basis---from provinces to rural communes, at factories, offices, educational institutions and so forth. At present they exercise the functions of executive authorities, the courts, the procurator's office and also of Party and public organisations. In other words, they are organs of the centralised dictatorship of the Maoists and rule out socialist democracy and legality.
The "revolutionary committees" are formed from the top and formally represent the coalition of the three forces on which Mao relies, viz., the Army, a section of the former Party and government cadres, and the hungweiping and tsaofan organisations. In practice, all elements of electivity and representation have been swept away, and all the members of the "revolutionary committees" are appointed from among people who have shown their devotion to Mao and his ``thought''. But this does not remove the antagonisms between representatives of the three forces, and they continue the struggle within these ``committees''. The purpose of these organs is to serve as the bulwark of the militarybureaucratic regime and give it the semblance of being a civilian regime.
The Army remains the mainstay of the Maoists. Under orders from Mao Tse-tung, beginning in January 1967 military control has been established everywhere in China---in industry and transport, in the rural people's communes, at state offices and in cultural organisations. The Army is now openly used as a weapon of violence and terror. In a message to Lin Piao in May 1968 Mao demanded that the Army should "participate more actively in the great cultural revolution''. Of the 200 people forming the ruling group in Peking, more than 130 are Army representatives. Of the 14 persons in Mao's immediate entourage (``headquarters of Mao Tsetung''), eight hold Army rank.
The Army has the decisive say in the "revolutionary committees" as well. These ``committees'' are set up only after the Army takes over a given region or enterprise. The military predominate in them (in the lower echelon, particularly in rural localities, the predominating element consists of militia cadres) and occupy key positions: 24 of the 29 provincial "revolutionary committees" are headed by the military.
Army representatives devoted to Mao Tse-tung are active in all spheres of Chinese society. Officers and men carry out __PRINTERS_P_67_COMMENT__ 5* 67 Mao's instructions at industrial centres and in the villages, ``enhance'' the political consciousness of people working in artistic spheres and "establish order" in the field of education. This is leading to total militarisation in all spheres of life. Today they are already talking of "forming the classes and groups in elementary and secondary schools after the system of squads, platoons and companies" (Jenmin Jihpao). An Army barracks regime is, in fact, being established in China under the Maoist slogans of " strengthening socialism''. Here the Army is helped by the military units of the Interior and Security Ministries (which, incidentally, have been placed under Army control) and by the militia.
But the Army itself is not a homogeneous political force. In it a struggle is raging between the supporters and adversaries of Mao. This struggle is inevitable because the Maoists are using the Army for anti-popular purposes, and this is increasing tension between the Army and the people and giving rise to new conflicts.
The Mao group is takin'g steps to strengthen the Army as its main bulwark. All persons regarded as unreliable by the Maoists are expelled from it: in the course of the "cultural revolution" the chiefs of the PLA's General Staff have been changed twice, and the composition of the " AllArmy Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs" has been changed entirely several times. The term of conscription has been lengthened. In 1968 the PLA grew numerically as a result of the reduction of the number of men transferred into the Reserve and of the increase of the number of conscripts.
Thus, the central place in the emerging machinery of state authority is occupied by the Army, which controls all spheres of social, political and economic life. The organisational foundation of this authority consists of " revolutionary committees'', which, in effect, rules out the participation of the people in the administration of the country.
In the social sphere the present phase is marked by intensive manoeuvring by the Maoists, the purpose of which is to strengthen the basis of their dictatorial authority.
They are aware that in a country with a huge population the Army cannot ensure the regime's stable existence over an extended period without relying on a more or less broad 68 social basis. They employ tactics aimed at aggravating relations between the principal social groups and the various strata within these groups, and utilising the contradictions thus engendered to consolidate their own positions.
Lately, the striving of the Maoists to win over the poorest sections of the peasantry by means of stratification, pressure and demagogy has become more and more clear-cut. It should be borne in mind that there was a relative improvement in the condition of the working peasants in the period from 1949 to 1957. Nevertheless, the poor peasants continue to make up the bulk of the rural population. Their political outlook is narrow owing to illiteracy and the absence of unbiased information. Because of the extremely limited material requirements of this section of the population, which subsists largely through the redistribution of incomes in the co-operatives (distribution not according to work but on a per head basis), the calls for universal levelling and for a reduction of consumption to the level of the poor peasants find fertile soil. Moreover, the nationalistic, Great-Power policies of the Mao group fall in with the prejudices of the petty-bourgeois masses and further cloud their consciousness.
The disorganisation of industrial production by the " cultural revolution" has not affected the way of life in the countryside. The slogan that economic units must be selfsufficient is not opposed by the peasants for they have not had time to feel the full benefit of industrial development and commodity-money relations and are accustomed to rely on themselves for everything. That is why the poorest section of the rural population, forming the majority of the peasants, does not offer active resistance to Mao Tse-tung's policies.
The course of the "cultural revolution" has shown that only in some areas the peasants side with the opponents of the Maoists, that on the whole they have proved to be passive. According to the Chinese press, in the countryside the struggle is mainly around concrete problems of organising production and everyday life. However, having been the main source of unrest in China in the past, the rural population may become active and offer serious opposition to the Mao regime under the influence of various factors (social and economic oppression, elemental calamities, and so on).
Mao's policies arc resisted by that section of the peasantry which has been able to better its position within the 69 framework of existing co-operatives and raise its standard of living during the short period of ``readjustment'' (1961--65). Overtly or covertly, it protests against the disregard for material incentives, the universal levelling, the abandonment of distribution in accordance with work. But frightened and terrorised by the "cultural revolution" this section of the rural population has yet to start an organised and active struggle for its rights.
The ruling group is now making fresh efforts to bring the working class under its influence.
With the disbandment of the Party organisations and of the elective organs of power (people's committees), the workers have been deprived of the possibility of defending their interests, while the abolition of the trade unions left their occupational interests unprotected. Their activity is paralysed by the constant threat of resettlement in the countryside, a resettlement entailing material privations. Placed under Army control, the working class is deprived of the possibility of influencing the course of events, and it is finding itself increasingly subjected to non-economic pressure.
The Maoists are counting heavily on a split in the working class. A considerable number of workers has not had long factory steeling and has not mastered class proletarian ideology, with the result that it easily succumbs to Mao Tse-tung's demagogy. Mostly these are young workers and also workers who had come from the countryside only recently and are prepared to cling to the towns at any cost because they regard a return to the countryside as the most terrible calamity. The tsaofan organisations get their recruits from these workers.
Veteran workers, whose interests have been seriously impinged by the "cultural revolution'', are dissatisfied with the struggle against so-called ``economism'' and the abolition of the system of material incentives. But being unorganised and deprived of leadership they limit themselves to individual outbursts of protest, which the Maoists suppress by brute force.
Another set of Mao's "latest instructions'', stating that "the proletariat is the leading class" and that its leading role "must be fully unfolded" were published in China in mid-August 1968. The demagogic nature of these instructions, whose purpose is to give the new regime a proletarian hue, reveals that the Maoists themselves make it plain that 70 by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" they imply the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the absolute authority of his ``though''. Implementation of this demagogic policy is facilitated by the strong petty-bourgeois influence on the Chinese working class and also by its low cultural level.
In practice all that Mao's ``instructions'' have led to was the setting up of so-called ``workers' teams for the propagation of the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. These teams, consisting of Army representatives and tsaofans, are sent "to all spheres of the^ superstructure'', to "centres of intellectuals'', to educational institutions, factories and offices with the task of pushing forward the "cultural revolution" where it has bogged down. These ``workers' agitation teams" have thus been given the role of storm troopers of the "cultural revolution'', a function only recently performed by the hungweipings.
The persecution of intellectuals, who are subjected to violence and humiliation, continues and assumes increasingly more subtle forms. In characterising the intelligentsia as being thoroughly ``revisionist'' or ``bourgeois'' and putting forward the slogan of ``re-educating'' it, the Maoists pursue several objectives: first, they get the possibility of persecuting those who are opposed to the line of the ruling group; second, they counterpose the intelligentsia to the workers and peasants; and third, they cut off from the workerpeasant masses that section of society which has been critical of Mao Tse-tung's policies.
``As regards the intelligentsia'', states the communique of the 12th "plenary meeting'', "it must be re-educated by the workers, peasants and soldiers.'' The substance of this `` reeducation'' is that intellectuals are deprived of the possibility of pursuing their work and are sent to the countryside or to a factory to receive "labour steeling''. Today, as distinct from the preceding period, this measure is applied not only to Party and academic intellectuals but also to scientists and engineers. The Chinese press reports that staff members of research institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences are being sent to factories and rural communes. Like engineers and technicians from industrial enterprises, they are switched to manual work.
Mao's instructions on the sending to the countryside of "broad masses of educated youth and urban inhabitants who have lost touch with labour" were published at the close of 71 December 1968. The Army, the "revolutionary committees" and the "agitation teams" promptly got down to carrying out these instructions. Several tens of millions of people are being forced to resettle. From the Chinese press we learn of the resettlement in rural areas of a "large number of Party cadres, teachers, students, medical personnel and other urban inhabitants''. Thus large numbers of the people discontented with the Mao group's policies are resettled in the villages. Among them are former Party and Government cadres, intellectuals and also hungweipings and recent members of the "revolutionary committees" who had vacillated. Despite the .fact that Mao had instructed the " comrades in rural areas to welcome" the resettlers and although special "PLA agitation teams" have been sent to these areas, some communes are openly refusing to receive townspeople and demanding that they be sent home. This is giving rise to a new source of serious social contradictions.
Under the "revolution in education" the state schools in the countryside are placed under the direction of production teams; in the towns they are turned over to the factories and street committees. Hostility towards teachers is encouraged. As Jenmin Jihpao wrote in December 1868, " workers, poor and lower middle peasants, retired veteran workers and cadres of the street revolutionary committees are taking over the work of teaching, completely changing the features of the intelligentsia in the Celestial [China]''.
The sources reinforcing the intelligentsia are being sharply curtailed. Institutions of higher learning and secondary schools have been closed since 1966. Where studies are being resumed, instruction is founded on the study of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and the "class struggle'', while scientific and general education has been reduced to a minimum. Estimates based on official Chinese statistics show that in the recent period of a little over two years China's economy did not get roughly 140,000 engineers and technicians, the schools were short of 90,000 teachers, and the polyclinics and hospitals did not receive 50,000 doctors.
The only social group which remains almost unaffected by the "cultural revolution" is the national bourgeoisie. Although the 12th "plenary meeting" announced that there was a "question of power, a question of struggle for hegemony between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie'', nothing has so far been done to limit the political and economic 72 rights of the national bourgeoisie in the course of the " cultural revolution''.
The Maoist policy of baiting individual sections of society against each other has adversely affected the condition of young people and their sentiments. Most young people in China are today infected by pessimism and uncertainty of the future. Their desire for education does not find satisfaction, while their trust in the Mao group has been to some extent undermined. The Maoists are seeking to retain control over young people by fostering a nationalistic spirit in the system of education, militarising it and resettling students and school pupils in rural areas.
For a number of years the Maoists have been hotting up the situation through a policy of "unceasingly aggravating the class struggle'', which, in their interpretation, signifies the persecution of adversaries and engineering clashes between various sections of Chinese society, whose interests do not coincide.
In the criticism of Liu Shao-chi, prominence is given to the struggle against the theories of the "waning of the class struggle" and of "conciliation between classes" which he is alleged to have expounded. The Maoists set unskilled workers off against skilled workers, the ``young'' against the ``old'', the members of the ``workers' agitation teams" against those remaining at the factories, who have to do the work of the former without remuneration. In the countryside, the "poor and lower middle peasants" are brought into collision with the rest of the peasantry. The working class is baited against the intelligentsia, the "agitation teams" being used as a club against intellectuals. The Maoists exacerbate the contradictions between the peasants and intellectuals, sending the latter to the countryside despite their not knowing the first thing about farming; in a number of cases peasants have to pay for the upkeep of intellectuals. The objective of these manoeuvres is to strengthen the position of the Maoists by means of social demagogy combined with the artificial whipping up of social antagonisms, and to prevent the working class from uniting with other sections of the population.
The demolition by the Mao group of the former political superstructure has seriously hit the very foundation of the Chinese state---namely, the alliance between the working class and the peasants, an alliance that had been undermined by the Mao group's policies prior to the "cultural 73 revolution'', policies that in the period of the "big leap" had broken the economic links between town and countryside and increased the contradictions between the peasantry and the working class. In China the alliance between the working class and the peasantry has, in fact, lost its chief political institution, the National Assembly of People's Representatives, which was the expression of that alliance. Subordination of the countryside to Army control and the setting off of peasants against workers erode the socio-economic foundation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.
The atmosphere of a "besieged fortress" and undisguised chauvinism and anti-Sovietism is used by the Mao group to cloud the minds of the people and distract their attention from the failures in home policy.
The policies of the Mao group towards the different sections of Chinese society, policies pursued under the slogan that the class struggle is intensifying, undermine the very foundation of the socio-political system of the People's Republic of China as a "People's Democracy guided by the working class and based on the alliance between the workers and peasants`'' (Article 1, 1954 Constitution of the PRC).
__*_*_*__Having secured a relative stabilisation of the political situation in China, the ruling clique is now taking steps to restore the economy dislocated by the "cultural revolution''. However, the quest for the ways and means of surmounting economic difficulties is being conducted on a voluntarist basis, while the economic policy continues to pursue GreatPower, hegemonistic aims. It is founded on the intention to secure these aims by using China's enormous manpower resources as basic capital.
The "cultural revolution'', which has been in progress for more than two years, has undermined industry and agriculture, diminished state revenues, raised difficulties for the financing of the economy and disorganised transport. An enormous amount of working time has been lost, and huge material and cash resources have been spent unproductively. The situation has been further worsened by the demolition of economic administration bodies and the removal of many experienced administrators and economists from active work.
74Industry has been particularly hard hit. In 1967 the output of coal, which forms 90 per cent of China's fuel, fell by 40 per cent, the output of electric power by 30 per cent and the output of steel by 25--30 per cent. Many factories were paralysed almost completely. Today the tendency is to restore production and, judging by reports in the Chinese press, some headway has been made in the coal, iron and steel and a number of other industries. However, it is much too early to speak of a considerable improvement because restoration is proceeding slowly and encountering enormous difficulties. Experts estimate that in 1968 industrial output will be about 20 per cent below the 1966 level. Production will continue to be adversely affected by factors such as the absence of an efficient system of management, the shortage of engineers and technicians, the diverting of workers to various political campaigns, the abolition of material incentives and the reduction of wages.
Although the Maoists have made a special effort to restrict the "cultural revolution" in the countryside, agriculture has been affected by its pernicious influence. In 1968 China's harvest was, on the whole, smaller than in 1967. Gross agricultural output remains at the 1957 level despite the fact that since then the population has increased by tens of millions. The problem of boosting grain production remains unresolved due to the continued backwardness of agriculture. Negative trends have intensified in the home market, consumer goods are irregularly supplied and profiteering has increased. Centrifugal tendencies and the economic isolation of individual regions are growing, and economic links between the provinces have been broken.
Confronted with vast economic problems (the constant threat of famine, the stagnation in many industries, the acute shortage of consumer goods), the Mao group is seeking a way out by setting up so-called "self-sufficient production units''. The Maoist state is steering towards unburdening itself of the expenses for public education and the health services. The State Budget is freed from allocations for the social requirements of the people. Two decades have passed since the republic was proclaimed, yet there is no programme for housing and everyday service development.
Judging by the latest steps taken by the Maoists, they want the state to have the right to appropriate a considerable share of the fruits of the people's labour for the 75 maintenance of the coercion apparatus, the implementation of their Great-Power programme in the international arena and the development of nuclear weapons.
By militarising the economy of the People's Republic of China the Maoists are trying, without giving a thought to the resultant disproportions, to achieve the highest possible rate of growth in industries building up a missile-nuclear potential. The expenditures on military purposes and for the development of a nuclear and missile industry have topped the total allocations for economic development and have several times exceeded the investments in civilian industries.
Militarisation of the economy is expressed by the fact that the key positions in the economic apparatus are held by military men: the management of production is being reorganised on the Army pattern; the main efforts are directed towards promoting war industries and branches connected with them; self-sufficient economic units after the model of the liberated areas of the 1930s and 1940s are being set up; increasing emphasis is placed on indoctrinating the people in a militaristic spirit.
The build-up of the military potential is swallowing funds that could be used to extend reproduction. Industrial production plant has not been renewed for many years with the result that it is becoming obsolete. The crop area remains unchanged in size and, due to the shortage of fertilisers and the diminution of land-improvement projects, the soil is deteriorating.
``Compulsory labour conscription'', which enables the state to use free, unpaid labour, is being introduced. Plans are afoot to level the incomes of the population still further by reducing them. Here the model is the peasants' standard of living, which is lower than that of the workers.
The wide use of methods of compulsion in industry and agriculture and the disregard for economic levers of increasing labour productivity are inescapably leading to a sharp decline of the labour activity of workers and peasants. In the long run, this is dooming Chinese society to the conservation of economic and cultural backwardness and the preservation of an extremely low standard of living.
The solution of vitally important economic problems is moved farther and farther away. These are, primarily, the building of a modern material and technical basis, the 76 training of scientists and engineers, the improvement of the people's standard of living, the satisfaction of the population's growing demand for food and manufactured goods, and the efficient distribution and utilisation of manpower resources. To all intents and purposes, industrialisation has been halted. The system of central state planning, paralysed by the "cultural revolution'', has not been restored.
On the whole, the deceleration of China's economic development is increasing her lag behind the developed countries. The mounting economic difficulties may push the Maoists to adventurist foreign policy acts as had been the case after the failure of the "big leap''.
It has now become quite obvious that the economic policy of the Maoists is seriously deforming the foundation of socialist relations of production in China.
The socio-economic system in China is based on state and co-operative ownership of the means of production, which took shape as a result of the confiscation of foreign and bureaucratic capital, the abolition of the landed estates and the setting-up of co-operatives in the countryside. However, the flagrant violations of the principles of socialist economic management and the destruction of the political superstructure formed after the victory of the people's revolution are emasculating the socialist elements in China's socio-economic system.
Marx and Engels never regarded the economic system solely as a form of ownership. Pointing out the many aspects of the relations of production and the diversity of their qualities and manifestations, they noted that "state ownership of the productive forces" conceals within it "the technical conditions that form the elements of the solution" of social contradictions in the economic sphere,^^*^^ that the transformation of productive forces into state ownership under various social conditions can yield a different result and have different social consequences. Decisive here is the social nature of the state.
The aim of socialist society, Lenin emphasised, is to ensure "full well-being and free, all-round development for all members of society''.^^**^^ The Maoists have abandoned this aim. The operation of the basic economic law of socialism _-_-_
^^*^^ F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, Moscow, 1962, p. 3S2.
^^**^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 54.
77 has been suspended in China. The Maoists are using the emerging military-bureaucratic regime to subordinate social production to their hegemonistic ambitions contrary to the interests of the people. The national income is distributed in a manner promoting chauvinistic designs and preparations for war. The expenditures on subversive activities against socialist countries and the world communist movement are steadily growing.The measures now being put into effect by the Mao group are largely aimed at suppressing the legitimate economic demands of the people and of production collectives through political manoeuvres and direct repressions. The suppression apparatus, formally directed against remnants of the exploiting classes and external enemies, is being increasingly used against the working people, who are upholding their material and political rights. Planned, balanced economic development has been replaced by voluntaristic ``leaps''. Levelling has ousted distribution according to work, while material incentives have been replaced by non-economic compulsion. The Mao group has made a clean break with one of the key principles of socialism---the participation of the people in the management of the national economy. All this undermines state ownership as ownership of the people.
Collective ownership is receding in the countryside, too. The production teams have not been restored as full-fledged co-operatives, and relative to them the people's commune is an organ of non-economic compulsion which uses militaryadministrative methods of managing production.
As a result of the growing stress on para-military and bureaucratic methods of administration and the removal of working people from the management, the workers and peasants are beginning to regard state and co-operative property as being alien to them. It is quite possible that in the near future there will be a complete rupture between the interests of the state (military-bureaucratic dictatorship) and those of the people, that the state will ignore the entire range of objectively existing economic interests of the working classes and social groups.
If these tendencies continue to grow there are grounds for believing that while preserving external attributes of socialist economy the People's Republic of China will witness a further degeneration of public ownership in keeping with the aims of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, i.e., with 78 the interests of the small Mao group, to the detriment of the basic aspirations of the Chinese people and the aims of socialist construction in the PRC.
Although the healthy elements in the PRC have been unable to act against the Maoists as an organised force on a national scale, this by no means signifies that the Mao group has broken all resistance and consolidated its position. There have been actions by workers, peasants and Party functionaries, who have given voice to economic and social demands. But these actions have not led to the formation of a unanimously operating and united organisation capable of opposing the arbitrary rule of the Mao group.
Many direct and indirect facts indicate that the position of the Maoists is not stable. This has caused Mao to change his tactical slogans and repeatedly reiterate his instructions, as had been done at the 12th "plenary meeting" relative to the decisions of the 11th plenary meeting.
The 12th "plenary meeting" proclaimed that the opposition in the centre and in the localities had been broken and that "usurped power had been retrieved''. At the same time, it was emphasised that "heightened vigilance" had to be maintained and that there had to be a "purge of the class ranks" at factories, the people's communes, government offices, educational institutions, at all enterprises and offices, residential neighbourhoods, and so on. At demonstrations the participants still take an oath "to defend Chairman Mao to their last breath'', while Peking propaganda admits that "Liu Shao-chi, that corpse, may yet crawl out of his coffin''.
The Maoists are continuing a real ``witch-hunt'' in an effort to strengthen their position. Millions of people have been repressed and discredited. The members of the " revolutionary committees" are being constantly reshuffled on the pretext of "reducing the membership and simplifying the structure'', and it is recommended that there should be "regular partial replacements and shifts" of the members.
Another indication of the shakiness of the Maoists' position is the instability of the very organs of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship. Although "revolutionary committees" have been set up in all provinces, no harmonious system of administration exists to this day; the higher organs of power of the new regime have not been created and the formation of "revolutionary committees" below the provincial level has not been completed. The existing " 79 revolutionary committees" are torn by internal discord and frequently face the threat of collapse. The press unceasingly complains of attacks "from the Right and Left'', and urges that an end should be put to "class enemies'', "who use all means in an effort to penetrate into revolutionary committees of all levels" and "openly dispute" their authority.
There is yet another indication of the present regime's instability: the considerable weakening of the central power's authority and the growth of separatist tendencies, which might prove to be particularly dangerous in the light of Chinese tradition: we know from history that at critical times the united state disintegrated into separate entities. Directives from the centre are ignored in the localities. "In the provinces,'' writes Jenmin Jihpao, "there are still comrades with an extremely primitive political outlook. They pay no attention to the present purge of the class ranks, to the efforts that are being made to put the Party in order and build it up, or to other undertakings. They have adopted a simplified stand, which does not in any way facilitate the struggle against enemies.'' It is evidently in this connection that the communique of the "12th plenary meeting" categorically calls for criticism of the "reactionary bourgeois theory of many centres''.
The "cultural revolution" has intensified the forcible assimilation and oppression of non-Chinese nationalities. In the non-Chinese areas the standard of living is falling steadily, workers in culture and art are persecuted and the rights of national autonomy are infringed upon. In the autonomous regions many leaders belonging to local nationalities have been relieved of their duties and branded as enemies. Chinese have been placed at the head of the " revolutionary committees" of all five autonomous regions. The last vestiges of the local autonomy of the non-Chinese peoples, formally guaranteed by the Constitution of the PRC, have been swept away.
Resistance to the Maoists continues, in many cases, to grow into large-scale conflicts. Although the Peking authorities have practically cut off all sources of information for foreign representatives, reports of such conflicts and unrest filter through to the outside world. It has become known that in December 1968 alone there were serious clashes and anti-Maoist actions in Kiangsi, Chekiang, Czechuan, Honan and Hupeh provinces. There is unrest in Peking itself and 80 in its environs, where numerous clashes continue to occur. There has been widespread unrest in Tibet, Sinkiang Province, Inner Mongolia and on Hainan Island. Troops have been used to quell this unrest.
The Army control being established in China differs little from the system of military control committees that functioned in China in territory liberated from the Kuomintang during the civil war. This revival of military administration signifies not only a return to the practices of two decades ago but also an attempt by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship to use these practices for its ends.
Despite the external elements of calm, the situation in the People's Republic of China is fraught with the threat of fresh conflicts and disorder. The internal and external enemies of the Chinese people are using the tense situation to further their own class interests and finally steer the Chinese people away from the road of socialism.
__*_*_*__The situation that has been shaped in China by the " cultural revolution" derives directly from the undermining of the Party's leading role, the abandonment of the CPC's ideological and organisational foundations and the discrediting of its programme guidelines.
The Mao group has broken with the Marxist-Leninist propositions on the proletarian Party's leading role in society, its nature, the standards of inner-Party life and the forms of its links with the working people. The decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC (1956) stated: "The Party is the leading nucleus of the entire working class and the masses of the people of our country. It can maintain this position only if it enhances its Marxist-Leninist consciousness, makes a closer study of the actual situation, extends inner-Party democracy and adopts a correct approach to mistakes in its work.''
The activities of Mao Tse-tung and his group over the past few years clash with the Marxist-Leninist theory of the Party and openly flout the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC. The demagogy of the Maoists cannot conceal the indisputable fact that backed by deprived nationalistic propaganda and relying on the support of fanatic young people, tsaofans and special military units they have come __PRINTERS_P_81_COMMENT__ 6---2466 81 out against the Party. The party they are forming is being built up as a mass political organisation with a petty-- bourgeois programme and policy. It is planned to use it along with the Army as a weapon of the military-bureaucratic regime.
In the course of the three years of "cultural revolution'', the Maoists have smashed the elective organs of the Party from top to bottom. Primary Party organisations are no longer functioning. The middle echelon of leading Party bodies has been demolished. The Party committees in the provinces, autonomous regions, cities and countries, and also at the large factories, government offices, educational institutions and rural people's communes have been disbanded.
The Maoists have persecuted and discredited more than three-fourths of the members of the Central Committee, nearly two-thirds of the members of the Political Bureau of the CC CPC and practically all the members of the CC CPC Secretariat.
The functions of the CC CPC, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CC CPC have been usurped by a handful of persons headed by Mao Tse-tung. They call themselves the "proletarian headquarters''. The members of this ``headquarters'' have been placed above the Political Bureau of the CC CPC, which has not been formally disbanded. Besides Lin Piao, Mao's "closest associate'', the `` headquarters'' includes Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Chen Po-ta, Mao Tse-tung's former secretary and assistant, and Kang Sheng, who carries out Mao Tsetung's assignments in the foulest political machinations. The other nine members of this ``headquarters'' have been selected on the principle of kinship and personal loyalty: Mao Tsetung's wife Chiang Ching, Lin Piao's wife Yeh Chun, Mao's son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan, Lin Piao's former colleagues, Minister for Social Security Hsieh Fu-chih and others.
In the course of the "cultural revolution" the Maoists have destroyed the organisational structure of the CPC, repressed a large number of Party cadres and rank-and-file Communists and usurped the leadership of the CPC, concentrating it in the hands of a very small circle of people. The losses inflicted on the Communist Party will be hard to recoup.
While smashing the Party the Mao group uses its 82 authority, acts under the banner of the CPC and screens itself with the name of the Central Committee. This is compelling the Maoists to preserve some external attributes of the Communist Party and have recourse to Marxist-Leninist phraseology. The convocation of the "12th plenary meeting" shows that the Mao group intends to continue using the CPC as its signboard.
It is no accident that nothing is said in the communique of the "plenary meeting" about the number of members and alternate members of the CC CPC who attended it. Of the 173 members and alternate members of the CC CPC more than 130 have been publicly calumnied and subjected to repression. Small wonder, therefore, that the "plenary meeting" was called ``extended''. This was done to give it the semblance of representation and mask the absence of a quorum of members and alternate members of the CC CPC. Their places were taken by members of the "group of the CC CPC for cultural revolution affairs" (in the communique it was stressed that all the members of this group were present at the "plenary meeting''), representatives of the "revolutionary committees" of the provinces, large cities and autonomous regions, and senior officers of the Maoist military units. Under the CPC Rules, this "plenary meeting" was thus illegal.
The central issues at this "plenary meeting" were " putting the Party organisations in order and building them up" and "purging the CPC''. Mao Tse-tung and his group are obviously apprehensive that the reorganised cells, in which some of the former members of the CPC are included, will not be sufficiently obedient. For that reason they are depriving the former Party organisations of all rights until " complete order is introduced''. In early 1968 Hsieh Fu-chih explained that they "can only study the thought of Mao Tsetung" and "must not play the leading role with regard to the revolutionary committees''.
The Party's "reorganisation and adjustment" has been entrusted to the "revolutionary committees" and special Army units. Maoist propaganda stresses that non-Party tsaofans likewise "have the right to intervene in the work of reorganising the Party'', that they are "fresh blood that will renew the Party''. Chinese press reports indicate that veteran Party cadres are resisting this campaign in the localities. Communists who oppose Army and tsaofan __PRINTERS_P_83_COMMENT__ 6* 83 interference in Party affairs are denounced as counter-- revolutionaries.
Mao Tse-tung and his supporters are exhorting the Army and the "revolutionary committees" to speed up the formation of the party. "Leading centres'', which select "cultural revolution activists" for Party membership, have been set up at the "revolutionary committees''. A noteworthy point is that this recruitment is taking place in advance of the adoption of the Party Programme and Rules.
ihe "adjustment of the Party" is another step towards the total disbandment of the CPC as a Marxist-Leninist Party and the creation of a new organisation that would be an obedient tool of the Mao dictatorship.
The Maoists are counting heavily on the Ninth Congress of the CPC which, according to the Chinese press, is to be convened in 1969. At the 12th "plenary meeting" it was announced that the ideological, political and organisational conditions have been prepared for that congress.
By "ideological conditions" they mean the formalisation of the virtual break with Marxism-Leninism and its final replacement by Maoism. In the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 it is stated that "in its activity the Communist Party is guided by Marxism-Leninism'', that "the Party firmly adheres to Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialism and combats idealistic and metaphysical doctrines''. These propositions have been dropped. Instead, the "thought of Mao-Tse-tung" has been proclaimed the "Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch'', and declared to be the theoretical foundation of the Party.
The CPC's programme propositions on its tasks and aims have been totally discarded. The Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress state: "The task of the Communist Party of China is to promote the economy by plan, industrialise the country as quickly as possible and systematically and consistently implement the technical reconstruction of the economy so that China will have a powerful modern industry, a modern agriculture, modern transport and communications, and modern defences.... The principal objective of the Party's activities is to satisfy the material and cultural requirements of the people to the fullest extent.''
The programme section of the draft new Rules does not formulate positive tasks of socialist construction and contains no word about building the material and technical basis of 84 socialism or satisfying the material and cultural requirements of the people.
The political programme of the Maoists, enunciated in their documents, ignores the interests of the many national minorities in China. One of the programme propositions adopted by -the Eighth Congress of the CPC was that the "Communist Party must make a special effort to improve the condition of the national minorities, paying particular attention to forestalling and surmounting Great-Han chauvinism among Party members''. Today Mao Tse-tung and his group have omitted these propositions from the draft Rules of the CPC and generally bypass this problem. Behind all this is the attempt to give free reign to a policy of forcible assimilation of the numerically small peoples, to unconcealed chauvinism.
On the question of social development, the Maoist programme gives the impression that it is extremely ``radical'', extremely ``Leftist'', but actually it is reactionary and utopian. This programme stems from the complete renunciation of the Leninist principles of socialist construction and from the inability to evolve correct, effective methods of resolving highly complex problems in an extremely backward peasant country. Chinese society is indeed confronted with the need for a sharp growth of labour productivity and of the productive forces. Mao Tse-tung and his group see a way out of the difficulties in reviving universal levelling, under which the requirements of the people are scaled down as far as possible. This, as the entire ideology of Maoism, is incompatible with scientific socialism. It cancels one of the key programme tasks of Communists expressed in the slogan: "Everything for the sake of man, everything for the benefit of man'', and directed towards the building of a society in which the "free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.''^^*^^
The Maoists regard the people solely as the object of the activity of the ``leader''. Mao Tse-tung maintains that the Chinese people are a "clean sheet of paper" on which the "great helmsman" draws "beautiful pictures and writes new, beautiful characters''. The role of man is reduced to zero. The worker, the peasant and the intellectual are accorded the function of a "rust-resisting cog'', and "obedient buffalo''. _-_-_
^^*^^ Marx and Engcls, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow, 1969, p. 127.
85 From the standpoint of the Mao group, the efforts of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries to ensure the fullest satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural requirements of the people, improve social relations and promote and extend socialist democracy, and also the statement of Chinese Communists that the "aim of socialism is to build a happy life for working people'', amount to nothing less than heresy and are evidence of "bourgeois degeneration''.The rupture with Marxism-Leninism is also seen in the programme propositions of the Maoists on international issues. Instead of the precepts in the decisions of the Eighth Congress to strengthen friendship and solidarity with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, pursue a "foreign policy of preserving world peace, and educate Party members and the people in the spirit of internationalism as expressed in the exhortation 'Workers of all countries, unite!' " (this slogan is not even mentioned in the draft Rules), the accent is placed on chauvinistic, hegemonistic aims. The Maoist foreign policy programme breaks with the class approach, with proletarian internationalism. One of the immediate aims is to wage a determined struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. AnliSovietism is becoming not only a programme aim of the Maoists but also an indispensable duty of the members of the new party.
The formal restoration of the party on a purely Maoist foundation is called upon to play an important role in the Mao group's subversive activities in the world communist movement. The political organisation being set up by the Maoists officially dissociates itself from the world communist movement.
The "political conditions" for the Ninth Congress of the CPC are created by purging the Party and persecuting all potential adversaries of the Mao group. The purpose of the 12th "plenary meeting`s'' injunction "to continue settling scores with Liu Shao-chi and his accomplices" is to intimidate the opposition, and is evidence that the Party purge is spearheaded mainly against Communists loyal to the general line laid down by the Eighth Congress of the CPC.
On October 16, 1968 the Chinese press printed Mao Tsetung's instructions on a purge of the CPC and on the mass enrolment of new members under the slogan "Remove the 86 garbage, bring in new blood.'' In this connection the magazine Hungchih wrote unequivocally: "Party organisations must accept tsaofans, who are fighters boundlessly loyal to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.'' Essentially speaking, after the purge the Maoists intend to dissolve the remnants of the former CPC in the many millions of politically inexperienced armymen and tsaofans, who have been poisoned by chauvinistic propaganda and blinded by the Mao cult.
The persons selected by the "revolutionary committees" for membership of the new Party are closely screened to determine the extent of their loyalty. Those who do not pass the requirements of the "three loyalties" (``loyalty to Chairman Mao, loyalty to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and loyalty to the political line of Mao Tse-tung'') are forcibly sent to the "schools for cadres'', which are correction labour camps and, in many cases, are situated on the territory of correction camps for criminals.
``Political conditions" imply a change of the Party's political make-up and its social composition. Although the Communist Party of China was heavily cluttered up with pettybourgeois, nationalistic elements even before the "cultural revolution'', while the working-class nucleus was relatively small and weakened by Mao Tse-tung's policies and the constant purges, there nevertheless were in the Party many Communists who had been trained on Marxist-Leninist ideals and who could see the difference between these ideals and the views of Mao. During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists launched an offensive precisely against the foremost section of the Party, against politically conscious cadres who saw that it was necessary to sustain co-operation and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Mao Tse-tung's most zealous supporters, barefaced nationalists and chauvinists, were promoted to the forefront. The purge and reorganisation of the CPC are leading to a further diminution of the number of politically conscious, foremost representatives of the working class and of Party intellectuals. This is substantially changing the Party's social make-up even if by formal indices its class composition does not undergo a drastic change.
The "organisational conditions" for the Ninth Congress and the Party's new organisational foundations are being created by introducing Army practices into the Party and abolishing all vestiges of inner-Party democracy. The slogan 87 ``The entire country learns from the Army, and the whole people are soldiers" was put forward by Mao as early as 1964. In response to this slogan political departments were set up at factories and offices in order to control and militarise the Party committees.
Democratic centralism, criticism and self-criticism, the electivity and accountability of Party bodies, discussion of inner-Party affairs and conscious discipline have, in effect, been replaced by blind subordination to the will of the "great helmsman" and his trusted representatives in the localities.
In Mao Tse-tung's interpretation, proletarian discipline is discipline of the cane, military discipline. Jenmin Jihpao explains: "We must carry out the instructions of Chairman Mao regardless of whether we understand or as yet do not understand their meaning. This is our absolute discipline.'' Subordination of the minority to the majority, at least at the present stage where the Maoists cannot count on a solid majority in all Party organisations, is denounced as `` opportunist'' and ``revisionist'' by the Chinese press.
An indication of the anti-Leninist organisational principles of the new Party planned by Mao Tse-tung is given by the character of the campaign launched to prepare for that Party's constituent congress. In the notification of the "group of the CC CPC for cultural revolution affairs" it is said that "it is better to appoint delegates to the congress from the top''. Delegates are selected in the spirit of Mao's utterance: "What is democracy? I do not believe in elections in general.'' This was the signal for a virulent campaign against Party democracy, chiefly the electivity and accountability of Party organs to Communists, to the Party. In its October 1968 issue the magazine Hungchih called electivity "a manifestation of conservatism.''
The programme section of the draft Rules contains what is essentially a monarchist thesis, according to which Lin Piao is named the "successor of Mao Tse-tung''. Unlike the former Rules, nothing is said in it about the promotion of inner-Party democracy, the principle of collective leadership, the solidarity and unity of the Party, the impermissibility of divisive, factional activities or actions placing a personality above the collective, or the need for combating bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. Nothing is said about the. procedure of convening Party conferences in the 88 localities or the National Party Congress. No time limit is set for holding plenary meetings of the CC. Absolute power over the Party, the Government and the Army is placed in the hands of the Chairman of the CC and his deputy, who are, in effect, put in a position where they cannot be controlled.
The "study and application of the thought of Mao Tsetung" is proclaimed the prime duty of Party members. The paragraph on the rights of Party members, contained in the former Rules, has been dropped. The principal task assigned to primary organisations is "to direct Party members and the revolutionary masses in the creative study and application, in close contact with life, of the thought of Mao Tsetung''.
In order to renew the composition of the Party the draft establishes regular purges as a norm. Moreover, the enrolment procedure has been simplified, and probation has been abolished in order to facilitate the influx of "fresh blood''.
Mao Tse-tung and his group thus put forward their ``thought'' as the only foundation for the activities of the Party and uproot the ideals of Marxism-Leninism from the minds of the Chinese workers, peasants and intellectuals. At the Ninth Congress Mao Tse-tung and his supporters intend to impose on the country and the Party a political programme which has nothing in common with scientific communism.
The present situation in the Communist Party of China is evidence that the Ninth Congress and the Party's reorganisation on the basis of a new political programme and new Rules pursue the aim of strengthening the positions seized by the Mao group during the "cultural revolution'', and ensuring Maoism with a long period of domination in China. The Ninth Congress in the shape in which it is being prepared will be in fact the constituent congress of a new political organisation.
[89] ~ [90] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ II __ALPHA_LVL1__ GREAT-POWER CHAUVINISM^^*^^ Namcin Amdral, No. 5, 1968 (Mongolian People's Republic).
[91] ~ [92] __NOTE__ LVL2 moved back. The ideas of proletarian
internationalism were first put forward on the theoretical level and
substantiated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. V. I. Lenin,
his followers and the fraternal Communist and Workers'
Parties developed and enriched these principles of the
brilliant leaders and teachers of the working class. In his theory
of the socialist revolution Lenin advanced the ideas of
proletarian internationalism, enhanced their influence and
significance and showed concretely how to apply these ideas
and use them as a guideline in the revolutionary struggle
of the non-proletarian masses of backward countries still at
pre-capitalist stages of development.
Bourgeois nationalism is the direct antithesis of proletarian internationalism. Lenin wrote: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism---these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question.''^^*^^
Nationalism manifests itself in the most diverse ways and springs from historical conditions, national features, the specifics of social development, and so on. The national awareness of oppressed nations rises in the course of the revolutionary struggle. When the struggle is for state independence and freedom, this is a progressive phenomenon. But after political independence is won as a result of the revolutionary struggle and when the democratic revolution deepens and the transition is being effected to the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, __NOTE__ Changed "**" to "*" on this page because real "*" moved back to stay with LVL2 header. 2008.05.23 Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 26.
93 revolutionary remaking of society, nationalism begins to have an increasingly adverse influence and becomes an obstacle to the revolution's further development, to social progress. This has been most strikingly demonstrated by the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China.The working masses of China led by the working class overthrew the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which had the backing of the US imperialists, and seized state power. This opened the door to the revolutionary transformation of Chinese society. However, the pernicious heritage of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism became a threat to the advance of the Chinese people's state to socialism, and the Communist Party of China had time and again made it plain that this threat had to be resolutely combated.
The problem of eradicating Great-Power chauvinism was raised in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, in the statement of the PRC Government of November 1, 1956, and in other official documents. Such was the state of affairs when in a situation marked by a sharp class struggle of the period of transition, Mao Tse-tung and his group flouted the instructions of the Communist Party of China and became the proponents of bourgeois nationalism and petty-bourgeois adventurism and an obstacle to the development of the Chinese revolution. The Maoists have adopted a Great-Power chauvinistic approach also to questions of international relations.
The Chinese revolution and the present-day national liberation movement owe their successes primarily to the might of the Soviet Union, the world's first socialist country, to the strengthening of the world socialist system, the further growth of the international communist and working-class movement, and the aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system.
The Soviet Union's fraternal assistance and support and the defeat of Japanese imperialism's armed forces by the Soviet Army were key factors contributing to the triumph of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in China.
Thanks to material, technical and cultural assistance from other socialist countries, the People's Republic of China successfully carried out socio-economic reforms.
The petty-bourgeois narrowness of Maoism prevented the Maoists from correctly assessing the influence and importance of these factors to the Chinese revolution and to the 94 development of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the role played by them in the collapse of colonialism.
Mao Tse-tung's adherents hold that in the world revolutionary process the leading role is played today not by the international proletariat but by the peasant masses of the East. This springs from the Maoist distortion of the Marxist dialectical understanding of fundamental qualitative changes, which are alleged to be mechanical changes, and from the false theory that the working class had simply changed places with the peasants.
This brought the Maoist group to its claim that Mao Tsetung, the "red sun'', as he is called, is the leader of the international communist, working-class and national liberation movements. Bourgeois nationalism and Great-Power chauvinism, whose roots are to be found in China's distant feudal past, are the soil nourishing this claim.
In the course of many centuries the rulers of China believed and sowed belief in the superiority of the Chinese over any other nation and in the exclusiveness of Chinese civilisation, manners and customs. On the other hand, many centuries of oppression and exploitation by the Manchus and by European capitalists and imperialists kindled in the Chinese people hatred of foreign invaders. These two factors became increasingly more pronounced at the beginning of the present century under the influence of the Chinese national bourgeoisie and left a deep imprint on some of the Chinese Communist Party's leaders, who come from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois families.
Subsequently, this hatred of European capitalists turned into hostility for everything foreign, regardless of its class content.
In The New Democracy, a pamphlet written in January 1940, Mao Tse-tung pointed out, for instance, that the approach to everything foreign had to be extremely cautious and circumspect.
Blinded by megalomania, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage ceased to reckon with the experience of socialist construction in the USSR and other countries, chiefly on the grounds that China had the most ancient culture and was the greatest country. According to the Maoists, the "greatest country'', the "greatest people'', the "greatest Party" and the "greatest leader" have the mission of shaping history anew, in a 95 manner emphatically distinct from other countries. Relying on bayonets and his minions, Mao Tse-tung compels the Chinese people to deify and extol him as the "coryphaeus of Marxism-Leninism'', as the helmsman and great leader, memorise every word uttered by him as though it were the Bible and repeat it as a prayer, and write music, odes and songs in his honour. In this way Mao Tse-tung seeks to rank himself with the founders of Marxism-Leninism and, if possible, even rise above them. The aim is to make the international working-class and liberation movements accept these arrogations.
The experience of Parties, in which the peasant element initially predominated, namely the experience of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and a number of other Marxist Parties, shows how vital the friendly internationalist assistance of the world communist movement and of its advanced contingents is to the efforts to surmount the numerous difficulties which arise in the course of the revolutionary solution of social, economic and cultural problems, in the struggle against petty-bourgeois influences. . . .
Yet the Mao group sharply curtails economic relations with fraternal socialist countries, steers a policy of securing closer rapprochement with the world economic system of capitalism and refrains from wounding the interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie, of the Chinese millionaires. In words it recognises the general laws of social development, but in fact continues to ignore them completely and to accentuate the national specifics of socio-economic development of China and other Eastern countries.
By lop-sidedly exalting the independence of the national contingents of the international communist movement, the Maoists summarily dismiss the general line adopted jointly by the Communist and Workers' Parties and the internationalist tasks and duties stemming from it. This narrowminded nationalism of Mao Tse-tung and his group has isolated the Communist Party of China from the international communist movement. He was obviously behind the CPC's non-participation in the meetings and conferences held by the Communist and Workers' Parties in the recent period with the purpose of strengthening their unity.
The divisive policy of the Maoists in some Parties is used by anti-communist forces and imperialist reaction to undermine the international communist and national liberation 96 movements. A feature characterising Maoism is that it takes not a class but a nationalistic, double-faced, hypocritical approach to problems of international politics.
This approach manifests itself in the total disregard of the specifics of other countries, in the drive to absolutise the Chinese experience and impose it on all countries.
The attacks of the Mao Tse-tung group are directed not against imperialism but against the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, against the CPSU and other fraternal Communist Parties. Comrade Y. Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the CC MPRP, noted: "As the main target of its attacks it [the Mao group---Ed.] has chosen not imperialism but the great Soviet Union, homeland of the October Revolution, and proclaimed it enemy No. 1. This is not accidental, because by steadfastly implementing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and embodying real truth and justice, the first socialist country is a serious obstacle to the adventurist activities of Mao Tse-tung and his group.''^^*^^
Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have distorted the Leninist idea of uniting the advanced, revolutionary forces of all countries and continents in the struggle against imperialism, as expressed in the slogan, "Workers of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!'', and took the line of isolating the peoples of the Eastern countries on a nationalistic basis, whipping up among them nationalistic feelings and sentiments.
The Maoists have distorted Lenin's teaching on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry on a world scale, substituting for it the theory that the "rural areas of the world" are pitted against the "cities of the world'', the East against the West, the poor states against the rich countries. They thereby set some countries against others with total disregard for their socio-political system. In effect, this means detachment of the peoples of the East from the international working class, and the setting of countries which have won liberation from colonialism apart from the world socialist system.
In order to put their designs into effect the Maoists do not shrink from racialist theory, utilising racialism in an effort to engineer a conflict between the peoples of the _-_-_
^^*^^ Y. Tsedenbal, "The Great October Revolution and the Peoples of the East'', Namein Amdral, No. 12, 1967.
__PRINTERS_P_97_COMMENT__ 7---2466 97 yellow and black races and the peoples of the white race. The end purpose of all this is to tear the national liberation movement away from the world socialist system and the international communist movement and subordinate the great forces of national liberation to the dictates of the Mao Tse-tung group. __*_*_*__The Maoists pursue a chauvinistic line in internal national policy. They pay high tribute to and glorify the bloodthirsty conquerors of the past---of both Chinese and non-Chinese origin. More than that, they regard their conquests as great services in the formation of an integral multi-national China, which annexed vast territories. The Maoists thereby demonstrate their total rupture with Marxism-Leninism, which requires a class approach to and a class evaluation of history.
For instance, the conquest and forcible annexation by China of Sinkiang and Dungaria in the mid-18th century, and of Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Nepal and other countries at the close of the 18th century, are justified in A Short History of China. Some Chinese historians try to prove that the piratical wars of the Manchu emperors, who seized and annexed non-Chinese peoples, played a useful role in history. A reference book on the history of China contains the following: "The policy of unification pursued by the State of China made it possible to bring many nationalities closer together economically and culturally.''
In analysing the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors, some Chinese historians maintain that they helped to form the great Chinese Empire. Despite the reservations and allegories accompanying the revelations of Chinese historians, it is not hard to see that they regard and assess the wars of the past from a chauvinistic standpoint.
The chauvinistic views of the Maoists are embodied in their state policy in the national question after the formation of the People's Republic of China.
The manner in which this problem was approached in China after the revolution differs fundamentally in both form and substance from the solution that was arrived at in the multi-national Soviet Union after the Great October Socialist Revolution.
Resolving the nationalities question on the basis of 98 Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the Soviet state granted independence to Poland and Finland. The peoples of former tsarist Russia received the right to selfdetermination and the formation, on a voluntary basis, of a federation of equal Union and autonomous republics.
In China there are more than 50 non-Chinese nationalities totalling 43 million people. Some numerically large nationalities, numbering up to 2-3 millions, have been granted so-called autonomous status. But this status is extremely limited, being confined to the framework of autonomous regions. Others, for example the Manchurian people, numbering 2-4 millions, ceased to exist as national units after the PRC was proclaimed. More than that, Manchuria has been renamed Tungpei or Northeast China.
The Tibetans, Inner Mongolians and other relatively large nationalities have been granted the rights only of autonomous regions. These so-called autonomous regions do not fully ensure the national unity of the nationalities concerned nor their territorial, economic and cultural unification and integrity. In Tibet, for example, the administrative mechanism of autonomy still remains to be completed.
In 1955, on the pretext of uniting all the lands inhabited by Mongolians, half of the territories of Suiyuan, Jehol and Ningsia with a predominantly Chinese population were included in the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia. As a result the population of Inner Mongolia rose to 12 million, of whom Inner Mongolians are an insignificant minority.
The Chinese language is ousting the languages of the indigenous nationalities of the autonomous regions; in those regions national festivals, traditions and songs have been banned, and instead it is demanded that the people sing only about the "red sun"---Mao Tse-tung.
In the non-Chinese autonomous regions all the leading posts in the Party and state apparatus are occupied by Great Hans, by the henchmen of Mao Tse-tung. On the pretext of combating "nationalistic and Right views'', all national cadres have been relieved of their posts, and the least discontent with the chauvinistic policy of the Chinese leadership in the autonomous regions is suppressed by force of arms.
The "cultural revolution" deprived the non-Chinese regions of the last vestiges of their rights to autonomy. In Inner Mongolia, for example, the Army has disbanded __PRINTERS_P_99_COMMENT__ 7* 99 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1970/MTEC326/20080521/199.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.05.23) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ Party, state and other organs of power and replaced them with so-called "revolutionary committees'', which protect the interests of the Maoists, who have thus expunged democracy and flagrantly violated the country's Constitution.
Plans, which the Manchu emperors and Chinese landowners and capitalists had once nurtured in regard to Mongolia, are strikingly embodied in the Great-Power chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung. From the very first day of their existence the MPRP and the Government of the MPR have pursued a policy calling for support of the national liberation struggle of the friendly Chinese people and for the establishment of good-neighbourly relations with China on the basis of proletarian internationalism and equality.
In the report of the CC MPRP to the 15th Party Congress it was pointed out: "The steadfast strengthening and development of inviolable friendship and close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the safeguarding and consolidation of the unity of the countries of the socialist community and the cohesion of the international communist and working-class movement have been and remain the cornerstones of the foreign policy of our Party and our Government.''^^*^^
Thanks to the sound and wise policy pursued by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the MPR's international relations are developing successfully, its international position is becoming stronger and its prestige is growing in the world. Today the MPR has diplomatic relations with almost 40 countries and trades with more than 20 countries.
Our country occupies a firm position in the system of international relations and pursues an active foreign policy in support of peace and equal co-operation among states.
Yet as early as 1935 Mao Tse-tung told the American author Edgar P. Snow that when the people's revolution triumphed in China, it might happen that the Republic of Outer Mongolia would mechanically become part of the Chinese federation. Eight years later he again declared that the Government of China must recognise Outer Mongolia as a national region (province---Ed.) enjoying the right of self-- administration. Another ten years went by and Mao Tse-tung _-_-_
^^*^^ 15th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Moscow, Russ. cd., I960, p. 22.
100 began to style himself as the "great leader of the CPC'', "a true Marxist'', but even after the Chinese revolution and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the MPR he and his associates, speaking behind the back of the Mongolian people, declared time and again that the MPR should be part of China.Their claims, naturally, evoked the surprise and indignation of all Marxists-Leninists, Chinese Marxists among them. In an interview given to a group of Japanese specialists in July 1964 Mao Tse-tung went so far as to allege that Mongolia had fallen under the ``domination'' of the Soviet Union and feigned concern over Mongolia's destiny. This was the kind of slander to which the Kuomintang had recourse, and in any case Mao Tse-tung repeated the words said by Tang Yang-wu of the Kuomintang back in 1934.^^*^^
The policy of the Maoists towards a neighbouring independent socialist country, the Mongolian People's Republic, thus somehow poorly squares with their assurances of their un changing respect for the state independence of other countries.
In this connection it does not seem to be superfluous to recall some facts characterising the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters to the MPR's membership in the UN.
The long procrastination over the question of the MPR's admission to the UN was due to the opposition of Chiang Kai-shek and his representative in the United Nations Organisation: supported by reactionary circles in the USA they blocked the MPR's admission to the UN on the illegal grounds that it is allegedly part of China. However, the MPR's right to membership in the UN was so obvious that the member states adopted a positive approach to this issue. Time and again the governments of countries of the socialist community officially demanded the MPR's admission to the UN. This demand was supported by the Communist and Workers' Parties of many countries and by world public opinion.
It is therefore utterly astonishing that the Government of the People's Republic of China did not at any time officially state its attitude to the question of the MPR's admission to the UN. Yet the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic continues, as it has always done, to support the _-_-_
^^*^^ Tang Yang-wu, The Past and Present Position of Outer Mongolia, Shanghai, 1935, p. 25.
101 demand for the restoration of the PRC's rights in that organisation.Inasmuch as the MPR had a legitimate right to UN membership and inasmuch as that right was supported by world public opinion, our country was admitted to the United Nations in 1961. Already then attention was drawn by the fact that while the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan grieved over this development, Mao Tse-tung and his group were maintaining a sullen silence.
The existence and consolidation of the independent and sovereign Mongolian People's Republic and the growth of its prestige in the world do not conform to the ambitions of Mao Tse-tung and his associates, who seek to subordinate Mongolia to Chinese rule.
In the course of the past two years the Maoists have rejected every initiative by the MPR to improve trade and economic relations between our two countries. Moreover, the Maoists sought to make the very possibility of normalising relations directly dependent on our approval and recognition of their anti-Marxist activities and theories. After finding that pressure was bringing no result they organised the most flagrant provocations against our embassy in Peking.
Moreover, in its attempts to bring ideological pressure to bear on the MPR, the Mao group has recourse to manoeuvres, to the falsification of history beginning from the most remote times. True, this is not new, but it has been stripped of its former disguise.
Chinese historians who glorify Great-Han aspirations accentuate the racial kinship and religious community of the Manchu emperors and the Mongolian khans.
In a paper entitled On Genghis Khan the historian Han Ju-lin writes that the campaigns of Genghis Khan and his successors did much to bring the subjugated peoples together.
Marxist scholars, on the other hand, regard the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors as predatory, piratical and reactionary. Any attempt to revise the Marxist assessment of the wars of conquest by invaders and enslavers---khans and noyens (feudal nobility---B.S.)---is a complete retreat from the basic principles of historical materialism and brings grist to the mill of aggressors, imperialists, revanchists and chauvinists, of all the forces eager to seize foreign territory.
The Great-Power, anti-Marxist policy of the Mao 102 Tsetung group in the international arena and its chauvinistic designs on our country are directed first and foremost against the lasting friendship, unity and solidarity between the Soviet and Mongolian peoples. The Maoists are slandering Soviet-Mongolian friendship because the revolutionising example of the experience of the non-capitalist road of transition to socialism, effected thanks to the heroic struggle of the Mongolian people and the selfless assistance of the Soviet socialist state, is a serious obstacle to the attempts of the Maoists to occupy the leading position and establish their hegemony in the liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The materials fabricated by the insidious propaganda of the Mao Tse-tung group glaringly contradict the statements made formerly by some leading members of that group.
For example, in a speech at a meeting in the central square of Ulan-Bator in June 1960, Premier of the State Council of the PRC Chou En-lai said: "In the course of this visit we have seen with pride and rejoicing the rich fruits of the magnificent work of the Mongolian people.
``In the broad expanses of your country the number of new industrial enterprises is growing uninterruptedly, agricultural production is increasing, and the co-operation of the small individual economies of the herdsmen has been swiftly completed.
``The face of the MPR has changed fundamentally with the advance of socialist construction and the victory of socialism. From a country engaged solely in animal-breeding you have become an agrarian-industrial country, where both agriculture and industry are developing evenly.''^^*^^
Our country's fine achievements in all spheres of the economy are the result chiefly of the dedicated work of the Mongolian people, who are moving from success to success in the building of socialism, the result of the correct and wise policy of our Marxist-Leninist Party, the result of the MPR being a member of the great family of countries of the socialist community. Moreover, they must be put down to the credit of our true friend and ally, the heroic Soviet people, who rendered our country disinterested assistance in the building of socialism. That was why at the 15th Congress of the MPRP it was specially emphasised: "The _-_-_
^^*^^ Unen, June 1, 1960.
103 further all-sided consolidation of the unseverable ties of fraternity and friendship between the MPR and the Soviet Union remains, as formerly, the prime concern of our Party.''^^*^^Mongolia's achievements over the past 47 years in the building of socialism under the leadership of the MPRP and with the all-sided assistance of the USSR are an embodiment of the words spoken by Lenin in 1916 that the working class of Russia would help the Mongolian, Egyptian and other peoples to go over to the use of machines and lighter labour, to democracy and socialism.
The peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' Parties of almost the whole world follow the achievements of the Mongolian people with admiration and delight.
__*_*_*__Like the fraternal Communist Parties and peoples of other socialist countries, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the people of the Mongolian People's Republic firmly believe that sooner or later the correct MarxistLeninist political line will triumph in the policies of the Communist Party of China, that the harmful consequences of the profoundly erroneous philosophical and political tenets of Maoism, which mirror the adventurism of the petty bourgeoisie, will be eradicated, and that the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people will occupy a worthy place in the international revolutionary movement, in the common struggle against imperialism, and confidently lead China along the road to socialism.
With other fraternal Communist Parties, the MPRP firmly upholds the unity and solidarity of the international communist movement, wages a struggle against imperialism, for democracy and peace, resolutely combats dogmatism, revisionism and other manifestations of opportunism, and safeguards the purity of the Marxist-Leninist teaching.
_-_-_^^*^^ 15th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, p. 24,
[104] __ALPHA_LVL2__ MAOIST POLICY Mao Tse-tung and his group regard
the countries of the socialist community as the principal
obstacle to their Great-Power chauvinistic ambitions for
hegemony in the international arena. That is what lies behind
the Peking leadership's increasingly open acts of hostility
against socialist countries. At the present stage the Maoists
have set themselves the task of undermining the unity of
the socialist community, weakening its international positions
and inducing imperialist circles to intensify their hostile
activities against the fraternal countries. The Maoists now
declare openly and officially that the socialist camp as such
no longer exists and there can be no question of common
interests of the socialist community (speech by Chou En-lai
on September 2, 1968).
According to the foreign press, in a confidential document of the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC CPC, the tactical guideline is reduced to the following: shatter the socialist community, encourage the growth of separatist and nationalistic sentiments in it, inject complications into the relations between fraternal countries, and stir up and intensify centrifugal forces in the world socialist system. This line is clearly detected particularly when an acute situation arises, in periods when world tension increases and the struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism becomes sharp.
With the sanction of the 12th "plenary meeting'', the Maoists have invigorated their subversive activities against socialist countries. Lately they have been trying to set up illegal groups to head the "struggle of the peoples" of the _-_-_
^^*^^ Kommunist, No. 5, 1969 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
105 socialist countries of Eastern Europe against their Party and state leadership.In pursuance of designs of this kind the Maoists seek to make wider use of their only ally, Albania, counting on turning her into their springboard in the European continent. Albania is used to step up pro-Chinese propaganda in socialist countries. The visit paid to Albania by a delegation led by the Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army at the close of 1968 accentuates the possibility that the military aspects of the Chinese-Albanian alliance may be intensified and has aroused widespread speculation that Chinese missiles may be installed on Albanian territory. All this harbours the threat of retaliatory provocative acts by the imperialists and of the Balkans becoming a centre of serious tension. That is exactly what fits into the calculations of the Maoists, who are determined to push the USSR and other socialist countries into a clash with the forces of imperialism.
The Maoists make every effort to disrupt all the steps taken by socialist countries to consolidate peace and socialism. They denounce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and misrepresent and falsify the stand of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on this issue; they denounce the Moscow partial test-ban treaty; they hinder the efforts of the socialist countries to settle the problems of disarmament and relax tension in Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
In keeping with their general policy of aggravating international tension, the Peking leaders have been for a long time adding fuel to the Vietnamese conflict in an effort to compel the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to fight a "protracted war" and draw the USSR and other fraternal countries deeper into that war in order "to sit on a hill and watch the tigers fight''. Practically every stage of the escalation of the aggression in Vietnam was accompanied by reciprocal assurances of non-aggression by the USA and the PRC. It will be recalled that Mao and his entourage flatly rejected united action in the struggle against United States aggression, and to this day they obstruct the transit of armaments and strategic materials from socialist countries to Vietnam across Chinese territory. Mao and his group use the Paris talks on Vietnam for fresh slander, accusing the Soviet Union of ``conspiring'' with the USA.
There have lately been signs that without publicly 106 abandoning their former stand the Maoists have been compelled to adopt a new approach to the Vietnam problem. This is due to many factors, one of which is the apprehension that China may find herself on the sidelines of a political settlement of the Vietnam conflict. It is not to be ruled out that after the war the Mao group may undertake an attempt to widen its influence in other Southeast Asian countries and kindle military conflicts in that region. But perhaps the key factor is that Peking is seriously considering a change of policy towards the capitalist countries and is prepared to pay the appropriate price.
The activities of the Mao group against the countries of the socialist community are undermining the world revolutionary movement and weakening the front of struggle against imperialism.
__*_*_*__Anti-Sovietism is the pivot of the Maoist acts of hostility against the socialist system and the world communist movement. The CPSU and the Soviet Union are the main target. The Maoists regard the Soviet Union and the CPSU as the chief obstacle to their designs. A few years ago Mao cynically formulated this policy, saying: "Hit the head, and the rest will fall apart.''
The CPSU regards the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations as a major component of the general problem of promoting the cohesion of the world socialist system and the international communist movement, and has made the maximum effort to surmount the difficulties and divergences with the Communist Party of China and strengthen relations with the People's Republic of China, to unite the communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. However, Soviet-Chinese relations steadily deteriorated. In a telegram to the Albanian leaders in September 1968, Mao Tse-tung announced that he was beginning a "new historical period of struggle" against the Soviet Union and the CPSU. Facts reaffirm that Mao and his entourage are continuing to deepen and broaden their struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries, that they are hurrying to legalise this policy in important documents and redoubling their efforts to create an atmosphere of hostility around the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The 107 communique of the "12th plenary meeting" and the draft of the new Rules of the CPC, approved by that "plenary meeting'', distinctly show that anti-socialist and anti-Soviet policy underlies the long-term internal and foreign political programme of the People's Republic of China.
Maoist home policy rests entirely on the fanning of hostility to the Soviet Union. The planting of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the PRC is directly linked with calls to uproot the influence of "Soviet revisionism''. The Maoists realise that in China politically conscious people identify Marxism-Leninism and socialism with the Soviet Union and with the achievements of all socialist countries. Therefore, for Mao and his supporters to strike at socialism means to attack the Soviet Union. For many years the Chinese people regarded the Soviet Union as the prototype of the future China, and it is this image that the Maoists are now trying completely to expunge from the minds of the people and drown in a foul torrent of slander and misinformation. In the course of 1968 more than 600 lengthy anti-Soviet articles appeared in Jenmin Jihpao alone. Oral propaganda and the radio are widely used for anti-Soviet attacks. Having discarded Marxism-Leninism in favour of the chauvinistic and nationalistic "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', the Peking leaders did not find it necessary to mark, in 1968, the 98th anniversary of Lenin's birth, the 150th anniversary of the birth of Marx, or the 51st anniversary of the October Revolution.
Mao and his group are instilling in the minds of the Chinese people the thought that there might be armed conflicts between the USSR and the PRC. Formerly this was done mostly on the level of the hungweipings and secret documents, but now slanderous accusations are hurled at the Soviet Union by the open press and by officials. The Chinese leaders take a direct hand in fanning anti-Soviet hysteria. At a government reception marking the 19th anniversary of the PRC, Premier Chou En-lai declared that "anything may be expected" of the Soviet Union, including an "attack on China" (Jenmin Jihpao, October 1, 1968). This cold war spirit was endorsed by the notorious 12th "plenary meeting" of the CC CPC.
The outrageous armed provocations organised by the Mao group on the Soviet-Chinese frontier on March 2, 14 and 15 of this year are a central link of the anti-Soviet line. The 108 anti-Soviet hysteria whipped up in China on the heels of these provocations is a cardinal element of the Maoists' plan to adopt the anti-Soviet platform as the Party's general line at the pending Ninth Congress of the CPC; to divert the attention of the Chinese people from the failures of the Maoist home and foreign policies; to stir up chauvinistic sentiments in the country and, on that basis, try to consolidate the forces of their supporters. On the international level, the purpose of these provocations is to impede the holding of an international meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties and facilitate the Maoists' unprincipled political bargaining with imperialist states, chiefly with the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, which took a toll of life on both sides, vividly lay bare the adventurist and militarist nature of the Maoists' policies, for whose sake, as Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly stated, he is prepared to sacrifice half of China's population and even more than half of the population of the world.
Recently Chinese propaganda has sharply stepped up its slander of the internal life of the USSR and the CPSU. In effect, the Maoists attack the key general orientations of economic, political and cultural development in the Soviet Union. It is widely alleged that the Soviet people "ardently love" Mao Tse-tung. Direct appeals are addressed to the peoples of the USSR from China, calling on them to "take up arms" and "rise in rebellion''. All the facts indicate that Mao Tse-tung is counting mainly on undermining the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, the unity between the people and the Party headed by its Leninist Central Committee. Mao's ultimate objective is to impose his ideological and political platform on the peoples of the USSR and turn the CPSU and the Soviet Union into a weapon of his policies.
The anti-Soviet activities of the Maoists have naturally affected Soviet-Chinese relations on both the Party and Government levels. In 1960 the Chinese authorities began provoking violations of the Soviet frontier. In 1964 Mao Tse-tung laid claim to Soviet territories (in a talk with Japanese specialists). In 1965 the Maoists suspended economic co-operation between the PRC and the USSR. In 1966 they broke off all contact between the CPC and the CPSU. 109 In 1967 they cut off cultural, scientific and technological contacts, the contacts between friendship societies and other public organisations, and halted the exchange of tourists and various delegations.
Through their actions and statements the Maoists continue their flagrant violation of all articles and provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed between the PRG and the USSR on February 14, 1950.
Despite the Soviet Union's efforts to maintain and promote normal relations with China, the few operating channels of inter-state contacts are continuously attacked by the Chinese. The Chinese authorities maintain tension around the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet offices in Peking to this day, periodically organising provocations against Soviet officials and hindering their normal work in every possible way.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is firmly adhering to its line of opposing and exposing the anti-Marxist ideological and political platform of the Maoists, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', the anti-socialist and antiSoviet policy and divisive activities of the Mao group. At the same time, the CPSU has never identified China and the Chinese people with the Maoists.
The CPSU unalterably pursues its policy of educating Soviet people in a spirit of respect for the Chinese people, for their culture, customs and revolutionary history. This is demonstrated by the publication of huge editions of books by Chinese classical and modern writers; by the broad commemoration in the Soviet Union of notable dates of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese working class; the birth centenary of Sun Yat-sen; the 80th anniversary of the birth of Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CPC; the 70th birthday of Tsu Chiu-po, outstanding Chinese Communist and internationalist and one of the prominent leaders of the CPC; the 80th birthday of Lu Hsin, founder of modern Chinese literature; the birthdays of Chou Li-po, Lao She and other eminent Chinese writers. The Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society recently held its 2nd All-Union Conference in Moscow. All this in spite of the fact that the notorious "cultural revolution" started by Mao and his entourage is sowing anti-Sovietism and barbarously trampling on the finest achievements of the great Chinese people, achievements that belong to the treasure-store of world culture.
110The CPSU is steadfastly pursuing its policy of friendship and international solidarity with the Chinese Communists and the whole Chinese people. Its exposure of the ideology and policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group, who have completely broken with Marxism-Leninism, implies a struggle not against China but for socialist China, for the Communist Party of China, for its return to the road of internationalism, for its unity with all fraternal Parties on the principled foundation of Marxism-Leninism and the general line of the international communist movement.
__*_*_*__Lately the People's Republic of China has begun to activate its political contacts and economic relations with the leading powers of the capitalist world. This would have caused the friends of the Chinese people no anxiety if these actions of the Mao group were not subordinated to the objectives of its struggle against the socialist countries and if they did not threaten the interests of the Chinese people.
Among the practical steps taken by the Mao group, of paramount importance in this respect is the declaration made to the USA in November 1968 that China was prepared to sign an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Peking's proposal to resume in February 1969 the Chinese-American talks in Warsaw was assessed in Washington as evidence of a "major change in Chinese foreign policy'', as evidence of the Chinese leadership's desire to strike a bargain. The postponement of the talks by the Maoists by no means indicates any change of their intentions or of their desire that Richard Nixon's pre-election promise to "curtail American commitments" should be realised primarily in Asia. They calculate that US imperialism will centre its aggressive ambitions on Europe.
The intensification of the Maoist attacks against socialist countries and their flirtation with the capitalist states is receiving growing support in the West. Some circles in the USA have already suggested lifting the embargo on American-Chinese trade, establishing "close contact" between the USA and China and using the PRC (in Asia) and the FRG (in Europe) to form a sort of vice to ``contain'' the socialist countries.
111The Maoists are attempting to effect a rapprochement with Japan on a pan-Asian and even racial basis. They openly support the territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists on the Soviet Union and declare their readiness to sign a separate Sino-Japanese peace treaty. At present Japan occupies first place in the PRC's foreign trade.
In Europe the PRC is vigorously promoting relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, which today occupies second place in Chinese trade with capitalist countries. China's relations with West Germany have now gone beyond the framework of usual trade transactions. Secret political contacts exist between Bonn and Peking. The implementation of the Chinese missile-nuclear programme has been made possible largely by technical assistance from the FRG, by supplies of key electronic instruments and by the direct participation of West German experts. The West German press writes of the "colossal interest of German heavy industry in trade with China'', that the "interests of the Federal Republic and Red China could probably draw closer together''. A noteworthy fact is that immediately after the November statement of the PRC Foreign Ministry on ChineseAmerican relations, the FRG Foreign Minister Willy Brandt made it understood that Bonn intends to take further steps to expand relations with China. Franz-Joseph Strauss, leader of reactionary forces in West Germany, declared that he links his plans to strengthen his position in the fight against the status quo in Europe with the policies of Mao Tse-tung. Developments bear out the earlier conclusion that the attitudes of the Maoists and the ruling circles of the FRG coincide on issues like the struggle against the socialist camp, a hostile policy vis-a-vis the German Democratic Republic, the striving to gain possession of nuclear weapons, the heightening of tension in Europe and the revision of state frontiers.
The vitalisation of Peking's European policy, the manoeuvres in Chinese-American relations and the activities of the Maoists in Asia demonstrate that underlying these foreign policy acts are hegemonistic ambitions and the tendency to rely on any forces in the political struggle against the USSR and other fraternal countries. There are indications that the Maoists are already exploring contacts with NATO and expressing ``understanding'' of its aggressive preparations against the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
112The pattern of China's foreign economic relations has undergone a fundamental change in recent years. In 1961-- 67 Peking reduced trade with socialist countries by almost 66 per cent, with the result that the latter's share of China's foreign trade dropped from 64 to 23 per cent. In the same period Chinese trade with developed capitalist countries increased three-fold. From these countries China accepts credits, technological assistance and help in the training of cadres. In order to widen the gulf between China and socialist states, the capitalist countries have considerably relaxed restrictions on trade with the PRC.
Parallel with the promotion of economic relations and their exploration of points of political contact with capitalist states, the Maoists have practically abandoned the antiimperialist struggle, confining themselves to regular antiAmerican statements, which nobody takes seriously.
The new elements in China's foreign policy threaten the cause of revolution and socialism. They demonstrate the Mao group's readiness to establish contact with any forces in order to further its fight against socialist countries, and to this end it uses every possibility for rapprochement with imperialist states.
In the countries of the Third World the Maoists have lately begun to undertake fresh efforts to bring them under Chinese influence.
The Peking leaders are forced to take into account the fact that the attempts to "sow revolutionary chaos everywhere" and their methods of blackmail and pressure have caused a deterioration and even led to an official rupture of relations with a number of developing Asian and African countries. China lost her iniluence over Indonesia and then her influence was paralysed or undermined in Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, Ghana, Tunisia, Kenya, Burundi, Central African Republic, Dahomey and other countries.
The People's Republic of China is stepping up its foreign policy activities in a number of Asian countries. There, as in other parts of the world, Maoist diplomacy is guided by hegemonistic ambitions. In order to bring Asian countries under her influence Maoist China plays on the antagonisms between them, stirs up acute conflicts in these countries, promises aid to some and blackmails others with nuclear weapons. While posing as the champion of the interests of the Asian peoples, the Mao group is in fact totally __PRINTERS_P_113_COMMENT__ 8---2466 113 indiffercnt to their destinies. In pushing forward with its programme of nuclear armament, Peking completely disregards the fact that the Chinese nuclear tests threaten the atmosphere over a number of Asian countries with radioactive contamination.
Today Peking is adopting more flexible tactics and concentrates its effort (economic assistance and political pressure) on individual countries, regarding them as springboards for the spread of its influence and of Maoist ideology. In Asia these countries are Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Yemen and Pakistan. In Africa they are Guinea, Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville) and Zambia.
The Maoists use their influence in countries of the Third World in an effort to discredit socialist countries whose prestige there is high. Putting forward, in particular, the idea of moulding together a special Afro-Asian commonwealth in opposition to the socialist countries, they are relinquishing the class approach to international relations. Their attempts to weaken the ties between the developing and the socialist countries are fraught with the danger that not only the economic progress of the young states but also their political emancipation might be held up. Experience shows that Peking's policy in the Third World clears the way for reaction, neocolonialism and military-bureaucratic regimes. In Indonesia, Ghana and other countries Chinese policy was one of the factors behind the anti-democratic coups, the overthrow of governments pursuing an antiimperialist line.
Objectively, the Maoists are inflicting the greatest harm on the parties and groups following in the wake of their policies. In order to attain their hegemonistic ends they do not scorn to encourage actions leading to the destruction of entire Communist Parties, as in Indonesia. They inspire the physical destruction of progressives who seek to free themselves of their influence. In this respect, a characteristic example is the Communist Party of Burma, which in 1968 was pushed by Peking into starting a "cultural revolution" that developed into a bloodthirsty hunt for Communists who disagreed with Mao Tse-tung. As a result a heavier loss was inflicted on the Communist Party's leadership than during twenty years of guerilla warfare.
The policy of kindling conflicts and encouraging extremist, nationalistic circles, pursued by the Maoists in the 114 Third World, has distinctly manifested itself in Arab countries, where the Mao group is seeking more influence over Palestinian organisations opposing a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Several political and military centres for insurgents from developing countries function in the PRC. The insurgents are trained not so much for the struggle against colonialism as for the attainment of Peking's special objectives in the Third World.
China is changing her methods of penetration in the developing countries in an effort to undermine their relations with socialist countries, turn them into a Chinese sphere of influence and use them as an instrument of her policy. This gives imperialism and reaction a stronger hand against the forces fighting for national and social liberation.
__*_*_*__New means and methods of subversive activity characterise the actions of the Maoists in regard to the world communist movement.
The recent period has witnessed the failure of the Maoist plans to widen and deepen the split in the world communist movement. The Peking leaders have been unable to win over a single Communist Party or secure mass support for pro-Chinese groups.
On the contrary, some Parties which had formerly supported the views of the Chinese leadership have become increasingly more critical of the political line the Mao group wants them to adopt. Fundamental differences have arisen between the Communist Party of Japan and the Maoists. A deep split has occurred in the parallel Communist Party of India, which was formed under Chinese influence. Its leadership had rejected many of Peking's political theses with the result that a new, pro-Chinese splinter group has taken shape.
Many of the pro-Peking groups are in the grip of a crisis. The Grippa group in Belgium, which for a long time the Maoists had used as an "international centre" for subversion against the communist movement, has disintegrated after having undergone six splits since 1964. A split has occurred in the leadership of the recently formed proChinese "Communist Party" of Italy. Dissatisfaction with __PRINTERS_P_115_COMMENT__ 8* 115 having to take orders from Peking is growing in a number of pro-Maoist groups, which are sobering up under the impact of the failures of the Maoist concepts and the decline of China's prestige in the world. Interest in Chinese printed matter has waned considerably. Their clamorousness, repellent extolling of Mao Tse-tung's personality and pseudorevolutionary slogans, which used to be regarded as an expression of "new revolutionary thought'', now more and more frequently evoke derision, protest and sharp condemnation.
Nonetheless, Mao Tse-tung and his group continue to influence the Albanian Party of Labour, the Communist Parties of New Zealand, Burma, Malaya and Thailand and part of the Communist underground in Indonesia. Peking is making an effort to expand relations with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Netherlands. The Maoists are continuing their efforts to turn splinter groups into ``parties'' and strengthen them organisationally. The formation of a Maoist "Communist. Party" of France was announced last January. At the close of December 1968 Mao's supporters in the Federal Republic of Germany held a ``unity'' congress and proclaimed the formation of a pro-Chinese Communist Party of Germany. The founding of a Maoist ``party'' has been announced in Sweden.
At present the Mao group is sharply intensifying its ideological, political and psychological war on the world communist movement. Chinese leaders (for instance, Yao Wen-yuan, member of the "group of the CC CPC for cultural revolution affairs'') insist that "Parties of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" must be set up in the present epoch. The Mao group comes forward as a force openly hostile to the communist movement. The groups that formerly had the task of securing the degeneration of Communist Parties into Maoist organisations have now become strongpoints of the struggle against the Communist Parties from without, concentration points of forces hostile to the communist movement.
This change in the Maoist policy towards the international communist movement has caused a change in Maoist methods and tactics. From support of groups which have embraced the Maoist views one hundred per cent and exactly copy Peking's political slogans and actions, the Mao group is going over to increasingly broader contact with 116 organisations tolerating a certain diversity of views. Formerly Peking deliberately split up the groups supported by it in order to bring out a nucleus that would carry out its orders blindly. Now the accent has been placed on disseminating Maoism as far as possible, even in curtailed form. Today the Maoists demand that their followers in foreign countries should learn to influence the masses and make Maoist ideology and politics attractive to them.
Propaganda methods are also being changed for tactical considerations. Secret orders to the pro-Chinese groups from the CC CPC in May 1968 state that in propaganda less emphasis should be placed on "China's leading role in the international working-class movement'', and mention that Mao is the ``leader'' of the working-class movement and the "leader of the peoples of all countries" should be avoided.
The ringleaders of the pro-Chinese groups are reorganising their work in accordance with these instructions. For instance, the Central Committee of the pro-Chinese ``Party'' in Italy has set up commissions for work in the trade unions, for work among the people, for international relations, contact with Chinese representatives, and so on. They are organising their ``own'' trade-union centre. Last summer the splitters in Italy formed a Maoist youth league, which is already in operation and publishes a newspaper. In some countries, for instance, Japan, Argentina, Norway and Denmark, efforts are being made to find points of contact with so-called people's socialist parties, and in other countries---with ultra-Left organisations; here and there the Maoists are joining hands with Trotskyites. The erasure of the distinctions between pro-Chinese and Trotskyite elements is most conspicuous in some Latin American countries. Maoist propaganda borrows the slogans of the ``Left'' movement in the West and seeks to portray the "cultural revolution" in China as the embodiment of the ideals of the ``Left'' forces in practice (egalitarianism, mass movement of the lower echelons against the ruling bureaucracy, broad participation of young people in political affairs, the " emancipation of the personality'', and so on).
Peking is closely following the rapid development of youth and student actions in Western Europe. Evidence of this is, in particular, the quick and clamorous reaction of Maoist propaganda to the events of May and June 1968 in France. Recent developments show that the student 117 movement, in which anarchist, Trotskyite and other ultra-``Left'' sentiments have become widespread, can be used by the Maoists as a medium for spreading their influence. It was no accident that the number of pro-Chinese groups nearly doubled during the student unrest in France. Peking gambles on the revolutionary impatience of young people. Chinese propaganda is spreading the theory that the Communist Parties have lost their vanguard role. The Maoists and their supporters are paying considerable attention to the organisational aspect, counting on setting up pro-Chinese European and world youth leagues. A conference of proPeking youth from a number of European countries has been held in Albania and it has been decided to hold a youth festival in Tirana in 1969.
The Peking leadership has adopted new tactics towards international democratic organisations (World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Union of Students and others). Here it is becoming obvious that another attempt is being made to strike at these organisations "from below'', by intensifying the divisive activities of Peking's agents in national trade unions and youth, women's and other organisations.
It is not to be ruled out that the Maoist leadership will try to use its formal membership of these organisations to continue the former tactics of organising sabotage cam-
&aings, slander sorties and fresh attempts to set up prohinese trade union, youth, writers', journalists' and other ``forums''.
The attempts of the Maoists to gain political and ideological control of any forces in the capitalist countries, in particular those with a radical petty-bourgeois orientation, indicate that there has been a change of tactics in divisive activity. The danger of this activity for socialist countries and fraternal Parties is that the Maoists are forming an alliance with political forces and organisations which use a pseudo-revolutionary screen to fight Marxist-Leninist Parties and the ideas of scientific socialism.
Recently, especially in connection with the preparations for an international meeting of Communist Parties, the Mao group has been taking steps to consolidate the forces of its supporters on an international scale. Its aim is to organise a "Left Marxist-Leninist movement" and co-ordinate tactics and strategy on a world scale. An "international seminar" 118 of pro-Chinese parties and groups was held in Peking in July-August 1968. It was attended by representatives of pro-Chinese groups in France, Italy, Indonesia and Chile, and the "Polish group'', which has its headquarters in Albania. The Chinese promised to give all groups more financial assistance and demanded that they step up their subversive activities.
Mao and his entourage spare no effort to counterbalance the international meeting of Communists by convening an "international conference" of their supporters. The leader of the Australian splitters Hill toured Western Europe in early 1968 on a special mission from Mao Tse-tung. His assignment was to establish closer contact between Peking and the pro-Chinese groups operating, in particular, in Britain, France and Belgium, and settle the differences between them and in their ranks. It was planned to gather representatives of European Maoist groups in Tirana for a preliminary, ``consultative'' conference.
The question of holding such a conference was discussed at the above-mentioned "international seminar" of splitters in Peking. But it was found that there were sharp differences among them. The Maoists failed to reconcile the participants in the ``seminar'' and make them accept their point of view. As a result, it was only decided in principle that a "world conference" of pro-Chinese groups and parties should be held. The Peking leaders estimated that it might be attended by representatives of divisive groups from over 30 countries in addition to the leaders of the pro-Chinese "pocket parties''. The question of the place and time of the ``conference'' remains open. The Chinese leaders undoubtedly intend to convene this ``conference'' as soon as possible to enable them to proclaim the formation of a Maoist `` International''. Also, they plan an early conference of their supporters in Europe.
The question is thus one of setting up a centrally controlled international political movement spearheaded against socialist countries and the world communist movement.
__*_*_*__An analysis of recent developments in China leads to the conclusion that with the support of trusted Army units and by means of political manoeuvres and social demagogy the 119 Mao group has prevented its adversaries in China from uniting and putting up an effective resistance. The " revolutionary committees" and the impending Ninth Congress are counted on to strengthen the military-bureaucratic regime. However, in spite of this, the anti-popular regime being established by Mao Tse-tung harbours the embryo of serious social contradictions and political conflicts. The seedbeds for this are:
---The reactionary-utopian nature of the Maoist programme, which is devoid of constructive content; divorced from reality, it rules out scientific methods of resolving the problems which Chinese society encountered during the transition to socialist construction.
---The Maoists' flagrant violation of the objective laws of economic development which has complicated and slowed down the advance of the economy, which came up against difficult and complex problems, and undermined economic links between individual regions with the result that the soil was created for new economic upheavals and social contradictions.
---The military-bureaucratic regime being formed by the Mao group which is alien and unnatural to a society that has been advancing towards socialism for a number of years. Far from being able to surmount emerging difficulties, such a regime only tightens the knot of really existing social contradictions.
---The Maoist policies, which lead to distrust and dissociation between the different classes and social groups and are aimed at fanning contradictions and conflicts between them, at levelling the economic position of the working masses of Chinese society. These policies can only strengthen the Maoist regime temporarily but, in the long run, they will shatter and weaken it and bring about its collapse.
---The attempts of the Maoists to isolate Chinese society from the socialist community, from the international forces of progress and revolution, are thoroughly reactionary. These attempts clash with the objective laws of historical development and with the social and national interests of the Chinese people.
The regime taking shape today is a qualitatively new phenomenon for China: its home policy ignores the basic interests of the people, and its foreign policy is one of adventures and provocations directed primarily against 120 socialist countries; to these ends it tries to utilise the advantages of state ownership of the means of production.
It would be wrong to underrate the danger of the Maoist policies to the Chinese people, the socialist countries and the world communist movement.
These policies force the heaviest sacrifices upon the Chinese people, who are compelled to expend their labour and strength for the sake of alien interests and aims. In China economic and cultural progress has been seriously retarded and socialist construction has been suspended. The people, who accomplished a great revolution and defeated their oppressors, are virtually denied the possibility of utilising the fruits of their victory. The regime being established by Mao Tse-tung is placed beyond the control of the people and bears no responsibility to them. This is fraught with dangerous consequences. China's rulers may plunge her into calamitous adventures for which, first and foremost, the Chinese working people will have to pay.
The peoples of socialist countries cannot help feeling concerned for the destiny of their Chinese brothers. Friendship and co-operation with the great Chinese people remain immutable elements of the foreign policy of the socialist states. The ideological and political struggle against the Mao group and the exposure of its reactionary, antipopular policies are among the major means of helping the fraternal Chinese people and of supporting those forces in China who remain true to Marxism-Leninism and seek to return China to the road of socialism.
Aimed at undermining the international prestige and influence of socialist countries, the Maoist foreign policy objectively helps to strengthen the position of imperialism and introduces new elements into international politics. In effect, a second front has been opened against socialist countries, who have to wage a complex and unremitting struggle.
The experience of the past few years shows that nothing comes of any attempt to reach a compromise agreement with the Mao group, even on side issues. A stereotyped reply is given to all proposals for normalising relations: the authority of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" must be unconditionally recognised and in their home and foreign policy the socialist countries must take their orders from Peking.
The anti-communist propaganda and subversion of the 121 Maoists have complicated and embarrassed the position of the Communist Parties in the capitalist world. The Marxists-Leninists of socialist countries see their internationalist duty in helping their class brothers to expose the pseudorevolutionary slogans of Mao Tse-tung and lay bare all the dangers lying in wait for radically-minded sections of society, particularly young people, if they let themselves be carried away by these slogans.
Maoist policy is aimed at undermining the foundations of world peace and security, increasing international tension and utilising the contradictions between socialism and capitalism to attain Mao Tse-tung's hegemonistic objectives. Every success of the policy of peace pursued by the socialist countries conforms to the interests of socialism, democracy and progress and, at the same time, helps the Chinese people.
When we assess Chinese society's prospects of development we must bear in mind that the PRC's return to scientific socialism will be a long and difficult process accompanied by all sorts of unexpected twists and turns. While expressing confidence that the healthy forces of the Communist Party of China will surmount the present acute crisis in their country, Marxists-Leninists cannot afford to relax their struggle against the theory and practice of bellicose Maoism.
[122] __ALPHA_LVL2__ WAR AND REVOLUTION^^*^^ __ALPHA_LVL3__ [introduction.] On September 3 of this year there
appeared in Jenmin Jihpao, organ of the Communist Party
of China, an article which brings the controversy in the
world Communist movement to a new point. The article, by
Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the
CPC and Minister of National Defence, commemorates the
twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Japan. It is entitled
"Long Live the Victory of People's War!''
That this is looked upon as something more than merely another in an endless series of articles is evident not only from the status of its author but even more from the exceptional distribution and publicity given to it by the Chinese leadership. The reason for this is made clear by the article's content, for it goes far beyond the customary realm of ideological dispute. In its final sections it becomes a manifesto laying down a world strategy of revolution and issuing a call to action.
As such, it cannot be ignored. The Communist Party of the United States, along with other Parties, has fully supported the proposal of the Moscow Conference of March 1964 to refrain from public polemics. However, in the face of a direct call for a course of action which we are certain can lead, if it is followed, only to catastrophe, we feel it would be wrong to remain silent. It is necessary to take the sharpest issue with such a line and energetically to combat it.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ "People's Wars From the outset, the ideological conflict
has centred around the question of whether or not peaceful
coexistence is an attainable objective. The leaders of the
_-_-_
^^*^^ Political Affairs, No. 1, 1960 (United Stales of America). Printed here in abridged form.
123 Chinese Party have contended that it is not, on the grounds that, whatever the relationship of forces, the innate tendencies of imperialism drive it inexorably toward war. This propensity is thus beyond the control of its opponents---a view which is expressed in the oft-repeated assertion that "whether or not the imperialists will unleash war is not determined by us; we are, after all, not their chief-of-staff''. One can seek to live in peace with such a monster, therefore, only by capitulating to it, by letting it have its way without resistance. To this the only alternative is to counter war with war---to take the initiative in waging war against imperialism.These ideas find their full crystallisation in Lin's article. It begins with a lengthy analysis of the Chinese experience in the war against Japan and subsequently in the struggle against the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. It deals in some detail with the strategy and tactics evolved by Mao Tse-tung at the head of the Communist Party of China. This pattern, which is pictured as that of a people's war fought by the Chinese people with their own resources against a militarily more powerful foe, is presented as being of universal applicability among peoples seeking their national freedom and the path toward socialism. These goals, Lin contends, are attainable only through the waging of people's wars; indeed, the concluding portion of the article takes as its point of departure the complete identification of revolution with war. It states: "In the last analysis, the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war against the people by people's war. As Marx so aptly put it, 'Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one'.
``It was on the basis of the lessons derived from the people's wars in China that Comrade Mao Tse-tung, using the simplest and most vivid language, advanced the famous thesis that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'.
``He clearly pointed out: 'The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.' "
As the basis of this ``principle'', Lin offers the proposition: ''. . . So long as imperialism and the system of 124 exploitation of man by man exists, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely on armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose war on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will.''
And since one is thus confronted by people who, in Mao Tse-tung's words, "have swords in their hands and are out to kill'', it follows that: "In the last analysis, whether one dares to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against armed aggression and suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys, whether one dares to fight a people's war against them, means whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries and Marxists-Leninists.''
Consequently, in the name of revolution, an appeal is made to all the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to launch people's wars directed against US imperialism---to "defeat US imperialism and its lackeys by people's war''. "History has proved and will go on proving,'' the article says, "that people's war is the most effective weapon against US imperialism and its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against US imperialism and its lackeys.'' And it ends on the following note: "All peoples suffering from US imperialist aggression, oppression and plunder, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world! Long live the victory of people's war!''
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Thesis Identifying Revolution We shall have more to say later about
the Chinese leaders' conception of people's war. But first let
us turn our attention to the basic thesis of the identity of
war and revolution---a thesis which can only be described
as both false and dangerous.
It is essential to note at the start that the question at issue is not whether the use of violence is ever justified. Unquestionably there are cases in which this form of struggle is necessary. Rather, the question is whether it is the only 125 form---whether its applicability is universal. What the article contends is that there is no path to victory over imperialism other than the military path.
What is the basis of this contention? That the Chinese experience, which was one of protracted revolutionary war, is the pattern for all other countries. The article indicates this when it says: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world.'' But thus completely to generalise the applicability of the path of armed struggle taken by the Chinese people is an utterly dogmatic approach, entirely alien to the methodology of Marxism-Leninism. As M. A. Suslov has pointed out, it leaves out of account the enormous diversity of conditions and experiences in different countries. Suslov writes:
``It is particularly typical of the Chinese leaders that they completely ignore the immense variety of conditions in which the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America exist. It is well known that these countries stand at different levels of socio-economic and political development. One group of countries has already taken the socialist road. Another group has won political independence and set about effecting radical social reforms. A third group of countries, where the national bourgeoisie has come to power, adheres on the whole to an anti-imperialist position. There are countries which have formally acquired political independence but have virtually failed to become independent because of the puppet regimes that have come to power in them or because of their participation in imperialist blocs. Lastly, there are countries where colonial regimes remain and whose peoples are waging a heroic struggle for their freedom.''^^*^^
The peoples of these countries face diverse tasks at widely differing levels, which require varied methods of struggle involving political, diplomatic, economic and military forms in various combinations. To reduce all these to a single formula of armed struggle is to depart from reality.
Nor can such dogmatism be upheld by appeals to the _-_-_
^^*^^ Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the World Communist Movement, Crosscurrent Press, New York, 1964, pp. 32--33.
126 writings of Marx and Lenin, both of whom were anything but rigid on such questions. Indeed, the quotation from Marx used by Lin can be made to serve this purpose only by being taken out of context. The statement appears in the course of a discussion of primitive accumulation---the initial acquisition of capital by the emergent capitalist class. Marx writes: ''. . . In England at the end of the 17th century, they (the momenta of primitive accumulation] arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, hothouse fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.''^^*^^Is it not clear that the force of which Marx speaks here is that exercised by the state, which emerging capitalism brings increasingly under its sway and uses-as a means of enriching itself, and not the force of violent revolution against the existing state power? Certainly the statement cannot be construed as referring to the universal necessity of armed uprising as the only form of revolution.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Ignore New ConditionsMoreover, history does not bear out the article's thesis; it demonstrates the contrary.
The source of war, it is true, is imperialism; and war, it is also true, may lead to revolution. But Communists do not on that account seek war as the necessary path to revolution; on the contrary, they strive to prevent war and to win their aims without it. On this point, the 81 Party Statement of 1960 emphatically declares:
``The imperialist reactionaries, who seek to arouse distrust for the Communist movement and its ideology, continue to intimidate the masses by alleging that the Communists need _-_-_
^^*^^ Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, p. 751.
127 wars between states to overthrow the capitalist system and establish a socialist system. The Communist Parties emphatically reject this slander. The fact that both world wars, which were started by the imperialists, ended in socialist revolutions by no means implies that the way to social revolution goes necessarily through world war, especially now that there exists a powerful world system of socialism. Marxists-Leninists have never considered that the way to social revolution lies through wars between states.''^^*^^Even in the days before World War I, when the world anti-imperialist forces were far too limited to prevent the outbreak of that conflict, Lenin made this point unmistakably clear. In April 1914 a Polish journalist, Alfred Maikosen, asked him with reference to the approaching war: "Do you crave for a conflict?''
Lenin replied:
``No, I don't want it. Why should I wish it? I am doing and will do everything in my power to prevent mobilisation and war. I do not wish millions of proletarians to exterminate each other, paying for the madness of capitalism. No misunderstanding is to be allowed in this respect.
``Objectively to predict a war, to try, should this calamity be unleashed, to make full use of it is one thing. To wish for war and work for it is something quite different.''^^**^^
If the possibility of successful revolution without war, whether for national freedom or for socialism, has been greatly enhanced in recent times, this is, to be sure, not due to any lessening of the predatory, warlike nature of imperialism. Its rapacious appetite for profit and plunder remains undiminished. What has happened, however, is that its capacity to satisfy that appetite has greatly decreased, thanks to the much greater power of the forces which oppose it.
Since capitalists are in business not to lay down their lives for sacred principles but to make money, it is but to be expected that there will be those in monopoly circles who will counsel retreat in the face of odds which appear to them overwhelmingly unfavourable, who prefer to adapt themselves to situations they feel they cannot control and seek other ways of maintaining their profits. On the other hand, there will remain those who cling to the opposite _-_-_
^^*^^ The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, Moscow, p. 73.
^^**^^ Cited by M.D. Kammari, "On the Relationship Between War and Revolution'', Krasnaya Zvezda, August 6, Moscow, 1965.
128 view and are prepared to defend the status quo at all costs. And the conllict between the two will sharpen as the difficulties of imperialism deepen.Consequently, situations will increasingly arise in which the anti-imperialist forces prove strong enough to compel a retreat; indeed, there are numerous instances in which this has already happened. In other cases, to be sure, the antiimperialist forces may suffer a setback. The outcome in any given case depends on the relationship of forces and the intensity of the political struggle waged against the imperialist policies. But the position taken in Lin's article completely negates the role of such political struggles and places reliance only on resort to arms.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The Role of People's War Even where the question of violent
conflict arises, history shows that solutions are most often
arrived at not by military means alone but by a
combination of political, diplomatic and military actions. This is true,
for example, of the Cuban crisis of October 1962, in which
the threatened US invasion was averted and Cuban
independence safeguarded not by the sole force of Cuban arms
but by diplomatic negotiations backed by weapons and
supported by political pressures in this country and
elsewhere. It is likewise true of the invasion of Egypt by British,
French and Israeli troops some years earlier, which was
repelled not by military victory of the Egyptian forces but
by the compelled withdrawal of the invaders. Other cases can
be cited.
In both these examples, the defeat of imperialism involved the combined strength of the world anti-imperialist forces. And in both, be it noted, the role of the Soviet Union was decisive. In general, when a people is compelled to take to arms in defence of its freedom, its struggle is part of the world struggle against imperialism and the outcome is determined by combined action on all fronts.
Lin's article, however, places the matter quite differently. The destruction of imperialism is envisioned as being accomplished solely through the military actions of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. "The whole __PRINTERS_P_129_COMMENT__ 9---2466 129 capitalist-imperialist system,'' he writes, "has become drastically weaker and is in the process of increasing convulsion and disintegration.'' US imperialism, despite its unprecedented strength, is especially vulnerable; spread out over the entire face of the globe, it is overextended. "Its human, military, material and financial resources are far from sufficient for the realisation of its ambition of dominating the whole world.'' Through the launching of people's wars, therefore, and the merging of these "into a torrential worldwide tide of opposition to US imperialism'', it can be through off balance, split up and defeated. "US imperialism like a mad bull dashing from place to place will finally be burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions.''
But what of the fact that these countries, themselves poorly' armed, confront an adversary equipped with the most modern of armaments, including nuclear weapons? These, Lin says, "cannot save US imperialism from its doom.'' First, it cannot lightly resort to nuclear weapons in the face of world opinion; if it does so, "it will become isolated in the extreme''. Second, the threat to use such weapons exposes the United States to the same threat, and therefore incurs strong opposition from the American people as well as others. Third, "even if US imperialism brazenly uses nuclear weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable''. Says Lin: "The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.''
Vietnam is presented as "the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating US imperialism by a people's war''. And "the more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more disastrous will be their defeat''.
``Ever since Lenin led the Great October Revolution to victory,'' the article states, "the experience of innumerable revolutionary wars has borne out the truth that a revolutionary people who rise up with only their bare hands at the outset finally succeed in defeating the ruling classes who are armed to the teeth.'' In the case of Vietnam, this is spelled out further by Mao Tse-tung in an interview with Edgar Snow a number of months ago.^^*^^ Snow reports Mao as _-_-_
^^*^^ Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao'', New Republic, February 27, 1965.
130 holding the view that "in truth the Chinese revolution was armed by Americans. In the same way the Vietnamese revolution was also being armed by Americans. . . .'' Also: "American forces in Vietnam were still relatively small. If they increased they could help speed up the arming of the people against them.'' In short, the more numerous the aggressors, the swifter the arming of the people at their expense and the more decisive their ultimate victory.The outlook for the Vietnamese people is thus presented as one of protracted war, culminating ultimately in military victory over US imperialism and its supporters---in short, a carbon copy of the Chinese experience.
To hold forth the prospect of a purely military defeat of US imperialism in this manner, however, is grossly to underestimate its strength and destructive capacity. True, continued escalation is only leading US imperialism deeper and deeper into a bog of endless slaughter, with the chances of a military solution in its favour growing ever dimmer. But by the same token the Vietnamese people are equally condemned, on military grounds alone, to an interminable bloody stalemate, enormoulsy costly in lives and property.
It is true, too, that historically imperialism is on the way out and the balance of forces is turning increasingly against it. But whatever its difficulties, US imperialism can hardly be said to be "in the process of increasing convulsion and disintegration''. Nor are there any grounds for comparing it with the France of 1954---a France which had suffered military defeat in World War II, which was heavily involved in war in Algeria at the same 'time, and which was rocked by internal economic and political instability. In contrast, the United States commands vast military, economic and manpower resources which the war has only begun to tap.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Minimising Danger And what of the danger that the war
may be escalated into a world war fought with nuclear
weapons? The article makes light of this, arguing not only
that US imperialism will hesitate to employ nuclear weapons
but also as follows:
``.~.~.There have been wars of national liberation throughout the twenty years since World War II. But has any single one of them developed into a world war? Isn't it true that the US imperialists' plans for a world war have been upset precisely thanks to the wars of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America?''
Such arguments, however, fly in the face of reality, for they are based on a partial, one-sided picture. In the first place, the danger of nuclear warfare cannot be so easily dismissed. It is well to remember that in those situations in which US imperialism has been most directly involved, we have more than once come frighteningly close to the brink of nuclear conflict.
It is worth recalling, for one thing, Truman's admission that his administration had seriously considered the use of atom bombs in the Korean War. It is also worth recalling that the Eisenhower Administration was no less ready to resort to such weapons.. . .
No less significant is the fact that in 1954, the year of Dien Bien Phu, Dulles twice proposed to French Premier Bidault the dropping of nuclear bombs on Vietnam and Southern China.^^*^^
True, these particular threats did not materialise. But it is clear that in these circumstances the danger of nuclear war was immensely increased. In today's war in Vietnam the dangers are even greater. Unless the present policy is reversed, the hopelessness of military victory for US imperialism at the current level of the conflict must lead to further escalations which can all too easily culminate in a world nuclear war. To reject the political fight for peace in Vietnam, for reversal of the Johnson policy, for removal of all US forces, and instead to call only for continuation of the war until finally these forces are driven out militarily, is to gamble with nuclear catastrophe.
But the article goes further. It calls upon other peoples to emulate the Vietnamese by launching wars of their own, saying: "The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that US imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.'' In short, the world is to be plunged into a prolonged era of warfare---a course which can only end in nuclear war.
_-_-_^^*^^ Cited by Hugh Deane in "The War in Vietnam'', Monthly Review, New York, No. 4, 1963.
132This point is overlooked by Lin and by those in this country who support the Chinese view. The editors of the Monthly Review argue that since the basic problems of the oppressed countries, in particular the elementary problem of feeding their populations, cannot be solved within the framework of imperialism; hence the tide of revolution throughout the underdeveloped world is bound to rise, and US imperialism will find it impossible to cope with it. They say:
``. . . There are some 15 million inhabitants in South Vietnam. According to latest reports, the United States is planning to increase its troop strength there to at least a quarter of a million men. Let us assume, though it may well not be true, that this will be enough to ensure the continued military occupation of a large part of the country. The ratio of occupying forces to indigenous population is thus approximately 1 to 60. Applying the same ratio to the underdeveloped parts of the 'free world', containing in all something like a billion and a half inhabitants, we find that an" occupying force of no less than 25 million would be needed.
``Absurd? Well, yes, in a way. Obviously the United States could never raise and support that kind of an occupying force. But as a statement of where present policies are leading it is not absurd at all. The plain truth is that the United States is taking on commitments which it cannot possibly fulfil. If it continues along this road, the result will be exactly what the Chinese foresee---eventual exhaustion and defeat.''^^*^^
We cannot quarrel with the conclusion that imperialism cannot solve the economic problems of the underdeveloped countries, nor with the conclusion that US imperialism is taking on commitments it cannot fulfil. But the consequences cannot be reduced to a mere matter of arithmetical extrapolation. The very hopelessness of the attempt to cope with the situation by expanded military aggression leads, if it is persisted in, to ever greater pressure to compensate by resort to nuclear weapons, as well as to the growing political ascendency of those who advocate such a course.
The ultimate defeat of US imperialism may be a -built-in consequence of the present world picture, but that it should carry the world to destruction is not. The aim of the world _-_-_
^^*^^ "The Necessity of Revolution'', Monthly Review, December 1965.
133 anti-imperialist forces, and not least of the American people, must be to curb its aggressiveness, to force it to yield in the face of the tide of national liberation. There is no alternative to this other than the disaster of a nuclear bloodbath.Of course, the Chinese leaders have consistently minimised the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and they do so now. Of the eventuality of world war, Lin has only this to say: "If the US imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it can be stated categorically that many more hundreds of millions of people will turn to socialism; the imperialists will then have little room left on the globe; and it is possible that the whole structure of imperialism will collapse.'' Of the hundreds of millions who would perish and of the incalculable destruction of material wealth, he says nothing.
Mao, in his interview with Snow, makes light of this destructiveness. Snow reports his views as follows:
``Americans also had said very much about the destructiveness of the atom bomb and Khrushchev had made a big noise about that. ... Yet recently he [Mao] had read reports of an investigation by Americans who had visited the Bikini Island six years after the nuclear tests had been conducted there. From 1959 onward research workers had been on Bikini. When they first entered the island they had had to cut paths through the undergrowth. They had found mice scampering about and fish swimming in the stream as usual. The well-water was potable, plantation foliage was flourishing, and birds were twittering in the trees. Probably there had been two bad years after the tests, but nature had gone on. In the eyes of nature and the birds, the mice and the trees the atom bomb was a paper tiger. Possibly man had less stamina than they?''
The position of the Chinese leaders adds up to this: imperialism cannot be prevented from launching war; hence a new world war is inevitable. One can, therefore, only "oppose war with war by taking to arms now against US imperialism. If this leads to a nuclear holocaust, what of it? The result will be a tremendous victory for socialism.'' True Marxists-Leninists and revolutionaries, says Lin, "never take a gloomy view of war''.
We need not repeat here the accounts given by scientists and others of the indescribable havoc and annihilation nuclear weapons are capable of producing. We can only 134 say that the logic of any optimism based on the inevitability of their use escapes us.
To be sure, nuclear war will not in the end save imperialism, but neither is there any doubt as to the incalculable destruction of human life it will wreak. In his tale of the birds, the mice and the fish, Mao fails to mention the generations nearly wiped out by the nuclear blast and its aftereffects; we cannot, however, subscribe to the concept of a socialism built upon the decimation of mankind. Such a concept is totally at odds with the humanism, the concern for the welfare of their fellow men, by which Communists are motivated. To fight for socialism is to do everything possible to prevent nuclear war.
Does it follow from this that one must capitulate to imperialism, that there is no alternative to taking up arms, as the Chinese leaders contend? Not at all. If the threatened use of nuclear weapons did not materialise in the instances cited above, and if world war has been averted so far, this is not alone due to the waging of wars of national liberation. Nor is it alone due to the fears of isolation or retaliation in the US imperialist camp. It is also the result of the growing mass movements for peace in the capitalist countries, including the United States. It is the result of the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons and the consistent employment of that possession in behalf of world peace and national freedom. It is the result of the anti-imperialist role of the growing body of newly-liberated countries. In short, it is the result of the joint struggle of all the anti-imperialist forces on all fronts, which have on more than one occasion compelled US imperialism to back down by confronting it with the one thing it understands: a superior combination of forces. Through such struggles US imperialism can be compelled to get out of Vietnam and the threat of nuclear war which the escalation poses can be removed.
To argue as Lin Piao does in his article is to abandon this path and to disunite the anti-imperialist forces in the face of the growing aggressiveness of US imperialism.
In taking issue with the line presented by Lin Piao,^^*^^ we _-_-_
^^*^^ The Mao group's backstage talks and flirtation with the US ruling circles (see Peter Burschik's article "Change in the Relations BeIwccn Peking and Washington'', p. 1G7 of this book) have torn the mask from the Chinese leaders, who juggle with pseudo-revolutionary phrases and slogans.---Ed.
135 do not wish to minimise in the least the reactionary character of US imperialism and its threat to world peace. That it is today the most reactionary and aggressive of all imperialisms, the bulwark of colonialism and the worst enemy of all peoples everywhere, there can be not the slightest doubt. That a relentless, uncompromising struggle must be waged against it by the forces of progress throughout the world, and above all within the United States itself---on this there can likewise be no room for disagreement. Our objection to Lin's position is that it obstructs such a struggle. [136] __ALPHA_LVL2__ NATIONAL LIBERATION The recent article by Lin Piao, as we
noted in our preceding editorial, based itself on the thesis
that the Chinese experiences in the war against Japan and
the subsequent civil war against the forces of Chiang
Kaishek are of universal applicability. On these grounds it
proceeds to identify revolution with war and to call upon
the oppressed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America
to wage people's wars against US imperialism and its
lackeys as the only effective method of struggle for their
freedom and for socialism.
With these ideas we took issue. We now proceed to deal with other aspects of the article.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The "Policy of Self-Reliance" In the people's wars which are to
encompass the downfall of US imperialism, Lin argues, the
peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America must rely on
their own strength, for such, we are told, was the experience
of the Chinese people in their armed struggles. In fact, in
the opening section of his article, he describes the war
against Japan as if it were solely a war of the Chinese
people. He asks:
``How was it possible for a weak country finally to defeat a strong country? How was it possible for a seemingly weak army to become the main force in the war?''
And he replies:
_-_-_^^*^^ Political Affairs, No. 2, I960 (United States of America). Printed here in abridged form.
137``The basic reasons were that the War of Resistance against Japan was a genuine people's war led by the Communist Party of China and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, a war in which the correct Marxist-Leninist political and military lines were put into effect, and that the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies were genuine people's armies, which applied the whole range of strategy and tactics of people's war as formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.''
This is quite true. But it is not the whole picture. Of the surrounding circumstances---of such things as the worldwide anti-fascist war, the military involvement of Japan with the United States in the Pacific, or the smashing defeat of the Hitlerite forces and the central role of the Soviet Union in that defeat---Lin here says nothing. To be sure, in a later section recognition is given to the fact that the war against the Japanese invaders took place within such a framework, and Lin states: "The common victory was won by all the peoples, who gave one another support and encouragement.'' However, this mutual interdependence is regarded as being of distinctly secondary importance. The very next sentence says: "Yet each country was, above all, liberated as a result of its own people's efforts.'' And it is on this aspect that all emphasis is placed. Thus, the article asserts:
``The people's armed forces led by our Party independently waged people's war on a large scale and won great victories without any material aid from outside, both during the more than eight years of the anti-Japanese war and during the more than three years of the People's War of Liberation.''
When this conception is applied to all countries seeking their liberation today, what emerges is the idea of a number of countries waging separate wars against US imperialism, each relying primarily on its own military means and each independently seeking its own victory. The final defeat of the common enemy is envisioned as resulting from the cumulative impact of a number of such individual wars waged simultaneously.
One must fight with one's own resources. Arms are to be obtained by capturing them from the imperialist adversary, and "foreign aid can play only a supplementary role''. Such is the advice given to the oppressed peoples and particularly to the Vietnamese people. Their outlook must be to win on 138 their own, and they can do so. When Mao Tse-tung was asked by Edgar Snow "Can Viet Cong forces now win victory by their own efforts alone?" the answer was "Yes, he thought that they could.''^^*^^
We have already dwelt in our previous editorial on the futility of a country such as Vietnam seeking singlehandedly to defeat US imperialism militarily, and on the danger of escalation of such conflicts into nuclear war. Here we wish only to touch on the following points.
To begin with, the proposition that the Chinese people independently waged war against Japanese aggression and achieved victory on their own is, to say the least, extremely dubious. The fact is that the victory of the Chinese people over Japan and the creation of the conditions for the subsequent rout of Chiang Kai-shek were made possible by the crushing defeat of the Axis powers at the hands of all the forces allied against them, and particularly by the historic victory of the Soviet Union over the nazi invaders. Had the outcome been reversed, had the Axis powers triumphed, could the Chinese people have won their war against Japanese imperialism? Could they have won the people's liberation war against Chiang Kai-shek? The answer is obvious; indeed, it was given by Mao Tse-tung himself in a 1949 speech in these words:
``. . . Had there been no Soviet Union, had there been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, had Japanese imperialism not been defeated (which is particularly important for us), had there been no People's Democracies in Europe, had there been no growing struggle of the oppressed countries of the East, had there been no struggle of the masses in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan against the ruling reactionary cliques---had none of these factors existed, then the pressure of the international reactionary forces would have been much stronger than it is today. Would we have been able to achieve victory in these circumstances? Of course not.''^^**^^
In short, the great victories of the Chinese people were possible only as part of the whole anti-fascist coalition, as _-_-_
^^*^^ Erlfjar Snow, "Interview with Mao'', New Republic, February 27, 19fi.).
^^**^^ On People's Democratic Rule, New Century Publishers, New York, 1950, p. 7.
139 part of the world forces of progress. In fact, if such a coalition had materialised in the thirties in support of the policy of collective security, it might well have been possible to halt fascist aggression without World War II. It is this great lesson of those years---the need for alliance in common struggle of all forces opposing imperialist aggression---that Lin's article casts aside.All this is not to deny the basic truth that each people must make its own revolution---that revolution can be neither imported nor exported. But if revolutionary struggles are to be successful, they must be conducted not in isolation but as part of the totality of the forces of progress. Lin's notion that each country must fight US imperialism on its own, on the contrary, is one that leads to fragmenting the antiimperialist forces, not to uniting them, to weakening the struggle against imperialism, not to strengthening it.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The "Cities"The division of the world antiimperialist forces is further pursued by Lin along the following lines. If the Chinese experience of waging war independently with one's own resources applies in all other cases, so does the Chinese strategy in such a war, which was one of occupying the countryside and surrounding the cities, in which the Japanese forces were installed. The article states: "It must be emphasised that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples. . . .'' This concept is then applied to the strategic situation on a global scale. Lin writes:
``Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world'. Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing 140 vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also represents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.''
Elsewhere he expresses the same idea in these words: "The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world.''
There is no doubt that the sharpest struggles today are in the arena of national liberation. And there is no doubt as to the pre-eminent role which these currently play in the totality of the anti-imperialist struggles. We submit, however, that the way in which Lin places the matter is fundamentally wrong.
In picturing the basic world alignment of forces as one of the ``countryside'' against the ``cities'', he assigns no role to the socialist countries and the forces of progress in the major capitalist countries other than the distinctly subsidiary one of giving assistance to the oppressed peoples in their wars. The brunt of the struggle is seen as resting on these peoples themselves; indeed, the central conflict in the world today is viewed as simply one between them and imperialism, and its overthrow as essentially their task alone.
The obvious effect of such an approach is to isolate the national liberation struggles from other struggles against imperialism, to divide the anti-imperialist forces. But this approach stems from an erroneous conception of the contradictions of modern society. The basic contradiction in the present stage of social development is that between imperialism and socialism. This is the central conflict in relation to which all struggles, all revolutions must be viewed.
A recent editorial in Kommunist^^*^^ calls attention to the emphasis given by Lenin to this point: "Noting the tremendous role played by the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process, Lenin especially stressed the importance of the struggle between imperialism and socialism as represented by Soviet Russia in his time. 'Unless we bear that in mind,' Lenin wrote, 'we shall not be able to pose _-_-_
^^*^^ Kommunist, No. 9, 1965, p. 31.
141 a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world. The Communist Parties, in civilised and backward countries alike, can pose and solve political problems correctly only if they make this postulate their starting point.'~"^^*^^The 81 Party Statement of 1960 expresses this idea in terms of the present historical situation. It says: "Our time, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Revolution, is a time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions, a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale.
``It is the principal characteristic of our time that the world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society."^^**^^
In particular, the existence of a socialist one-third of the world has been a cardinal factor in the great upsurge of the national liberation movement in recent years. The socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, have been a powerful bulwark and source of aid to all peoples struggling for their freedom. Their assistance in every sphere--- economic, political, military---has not been incidental but vital to the successes which have been achieved against colonialism, and is in great measure responsible for the fact that such successes could in many instances be registered without resorting to armed conflict.
Also important are the democratic struggles being waged by the workers and other forces of progress in the imperialist countries. These the article brushes aside with the comment that "the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries''. It is true that no socialist revolutions are taking place in these parts of the world at this moment in history. What is taking place, however, is the growth of democratic anti-monopoly struggles which are serving to lay the basis and mobilies the forces for placing socialism on the order of the day in the not too remote future.
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 241.
^^**^^ The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, p. 38.
142Especially noteworthy on the American scene are the tremendous upsurge of the civil rights movement, the striking rise of the peace movement, and the increasing indications of the development of a new wave of economic struggles. These processes are accompanied by a rising level of political consciousness and by growing tendencies for these struggles to merge in a common stream of opposition to the reactionary policies of US monopoly capital at home and abroad. (Note, for example, the active opposition to the war in Vietnam by sections of the civil rights movement.)
Clearly these struggles are not of minor, subsidiary significance in relation to the world anti-imperialist conflict but constitute one of its vital components. The struggle of the American people against the war of aggression in Vietnam is no less material in shaping its outcome than the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people themselves. Both struggles are essential, and it is their combined strength which is decisive.
Indeed, the combined power of all sectors of the antiimperialist front is essential to the ultimate defeat and abolition of imperialism. To reduce matters to terms of a military conflict between the ``countryside'' and the ``cities'' is to isolate these sectors one from the other and to weaken the effectiveness of all of them. It is to rule out any concept of alliance embracing the manifold forms of struggle which are required. ...
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The Role of the American People To defend world peace, to force US
monopoly capital to retreat from its aggressive policies---
this is the central task of the day. But 'the main
responsibility for its accomplishment lies not in Vietnam, not in Africa
or Latin America. It lies in the United States. The task of
curbing US imperialism rests in the first place with the
American people.
Not least among the inconsistencies in Lin's article is its insistence that whereas the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America must rely on their own strength in fighting for their liberation, the people of the United States must be freed from the rule of US monopoly capital by others. But if revolution cannot be exported to other countries, 143 neither can it be exported to the United States. Like all others, the American people must fight their own battles.
Yet, like all other peoples, they must fight them as part of the overall world struggle against imperialism. Moreover, within that totality they bear a special responsibility, living as they do in the very heartland of world imperialism. To help make them aware of this responsibility, to help mobilise them for the battle---these are the particular tasks of the Communists and other forces of progress in our country.
The logic of Lin's position is that the interests of the American people would be best served by egging US imperialism on into ever deeper military involvement in Vietnam and other countries, so that the people of these countries may destroy it. But nothing could be farther from the truth. This is the path to nuclear war, to mass annihilation. It coincides with the course of action advocated by the fanatic ultra-Right, which clamour for all-out aggression against other peoples and the indiscriminate dropping of nuclear bombs as the means to victory in that aggression.
The interests of the American people will be served rather by organising the widest possible opposition to the war policies of the Administration, and by making common cause with the forces of peace throughout the world. They will be served by combating ariti-Sovietism and by striving for closer ties and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
The struggle for peaceful coexistence is not, as Lin and other Chinese leaders repeatedly assert, in conflict with the struggle for national liberation. On the contrary, to fight for peaceful coexistence today is in the first place to fight for an end to US aggression in Vietnam and for the full freedom of the Vietnamese people to decide their own future.
But it does not end with this. The danger of world war today emanates not only from US imperialism but also from its chief ally, West German imperialism. To fight for peaceful coexistence is therefore to fight against the policy of building a renazified, revanchist West Germany, and supplying it with nuclear weapons, of reviving a reactionary monopolist regime with its own dreams of imperialist conquest. It is to fight against the maintenance of West Berlin as an outpost of provocation and intrigue against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries---an outpost which has more than once become the seat of crisis 144 bringing the world to the brink of thermo-nuclear conflict. This aspect of the struggle is completely obscured by the line of Lin's article with its reduction of the global conflict to one between countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against US imperialism.
The fight for peaceful coexistence also entails the fight for recognition of People's China, for its admission to the UN, and for an end to the senseless total embargo on trade with it. This, too, is part of the special responsibility which falls upon the American people, and upon its progressive vanguard.
To adopt the approach in Lin's article would be to abdicate all such responsibilities, for it writes off the people of the United States as a major force in the anti-imperialist struggle, and it isolates them from their allies in other parts of the world. It is an approach which reflects a profound lack of faith in the masses of working people, particularly in the United States and other capitalist countries. But it is precisely such faith which should motivate Communists in their struggles everywhere. Only on this basis can unity of all forces opposing imperialism be achieved and ultimate victory secured in the fight for peace, freedom and socialism.
[145] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Gerhard WeisserIn the theses of the CC CPSU marking the 150th birth anniversary of Karl Marx, founder of scientific communism, it is stated that "the colonial system of imperialism has disintegrated under the onslaught of national liberation revolutions''.^^**^^ The national liberation movement has become a firm component of the world revolutionary torrent directed against imperialism and war, for peace, democracy and social progress. The international importance of the young anti-imperialist countries is growing steadily.
The advance of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism throughout the world depends in large measure on how strong is the alliance between the world socialist system, the international working-class movement, the anti-- imperialist national states and the national liberation movement.
The closer this alliance the greater becomes the influence of the ideals of socialism and the example of the socialist states on the content of the national liberation movement.
Small wonder, therefore, that the imperialist powers, chiefly the USA, are using every means in an effort to smash this natural alliance and emasculate the national liberation movement of its anti-imperialist, democratic content. Using as its weapons a brute force, demagogy, neocolonialist policies and anti-communism, the international monopoly bourgeoisie seeks to chain the developing countries to the chariot of the world capitalist system and disrupt the antiimperialist and anti-neocolonialist policy of these countries _-_-_
^^*^^ Deutsche Aussenpolitik, No. 7, 1968 (German Democratic Republic).
^^**^^ Founder of Scientific Communism, Moscow, Politizdat, 1968, p. 28.
146 and their endeavours to promote democracy and social progress.In short, we are witnessing a bitter class struggle whose outcome is of great and direct significance to the future of most of mankind.
In 'the Stages of Economic 'Growth, Walt W. Rostow, an American expert on international affairs, writes: "We must demonstrate that the underdeveloped nations .. . can move successfully through the preconditions into a well-established take-off within the orbit of the democratic world, resisting the blandishments and temptations of communism. This is, I believe, the most important single item on the Western agenda.''^^*^^
The socialist countries regard "all-round support to the young national states in their struggle against imperialism, for complete political and economic independence"^^**^^ as an immediate task at the present stage of the global class struggle. They are doing everything in their power to strengthen the natural alliance between socialism and the national liberation movement and promote all-round cooperation with anti-imperialist countries in Africa and Asia.
The further victorious advance of the progressive forces in the struggle for national and social liberation requires, first and foremost, that the principal revolutionary forces of our epoch---the international working-.class movement and the world socialist system---should steadily grow stronger, because, to quote the Statement of the 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, they "are the earnest of victory in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation, socialism and human progress''.^^***^^
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Anti-Marxist PositionsThe Mao Tse-tung group has jettisoned this Marxist-Leninist policy in favour of its own line, on the basis of which it has adopted its own special stand towards the anti-imperialist national states and the national _-_-_
^^*^^ Quoted in World Marxist Review, London, January 1968. Vol. II, No, 1, p. 24.
^^**^^ Neues Deutschland, April 13/14, 1968.
^^***^^ The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, p. 44.
__PRINTERS_P_147_COMMENT__ 10* 147 liberation movement. This stand totally repudiates the principles underlying socialist foreign policy. The propagandists of the Chinese leaders, who have grouped around Mao Tsetung, style themselves the real champions of the national liberation movement and incessantly pour calumny on the Soviet Union's policy.The Maoists have recourse to the most extreme demagogy. Their revolutionary verbiage is a screen for their actual objectives in regard to the anti-imperialist national states.
Facts speak for themselves. The five principles of peaceful coexistence jointly formulated by representatives of the People's Republic of China and India have now been trampled underfoot by the Mao Tse-tung group, as have the ten principles of Bandung, formulated with the direct participation of representatives of the PRC.
The Chinese leaders are making territorial claims on neighbouring countries and assume the right to propagandise their policy without restriction throughout the world, particularly in Afro-Asian countries, in total disregard of the laws and desires of the governments of these countries. They abuse their insignificant economic aid to these countries, bringing powerful political pressure to bear on them. They set up pro-Maoist groups in African and Asian countries.
In addition to ignoring the principles of MarxismLeninism, this policy has no use for the democratic principles, formulated at the Bandung Conference, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, recognition of the equality of all races and nations, renunciation of pressure on other countries, and so forth. The Maoists intend to replace these principles with a system of arbitrary rule and violence in foreign relations, particularly in relations with China's neighbours.
After an attentive scrutiny of the dismal results of the "great proletarian cultural revolution'', we have to note that tension has increased in the relations between the People's Republic of China and the anti-imperialist national states. The slogan of "struggle against reactionaries throughout the world" is one of the blinds of the "cultural revolution''. If we closely analyse the content of this demagogic slogan, we shall see that by ``reactionaries'' the Chinese leaders mean also the governments of many anti-imperialist national states who energetically oppose infringements of their 148 sovereignty and the attempts of the Maoists to interfere in their internal affairs.
In recent years the Maoists have arrogantly interfered in the internal affairs of the Burmese Union. The Government of Burma rejected the demands of the Chinese leaders and put a stop to their propaganda in Burma. In retaliation the Peking leaders called for the overthrow of the progressive Ne Win Government and organised hysterical demonstrations and disorders in front of the Burmese Embassy in Peking.
The Chinese leaders used the same methods to pressure the governments of other Afro-Asian countries. For instance, in defiance of the will of the Government of Nepal, demonstrations and rallies were organised in Katmandu, the country's capital.
On the question of the frontier with India, the Mao group has been pursuing an unprincipled policy for a number of years. This has seriously harmed the progressive movement in India and caused a split in the Communist Party of that country. In pursuing their policy of kindling new conflicts, the Chinese leaders have renounced the socialist stand also on the question of frontiers. For instance, they bluntly declare that the "proposal to renounce the use of force in the settlement of territorial and frontier issues is a new fraud'', which will serve the interests of imperialist policy.^^*^^ They do not scorn to use any means to further their national. istic, Great-Power chauvinistic interests. They obviously believe they can pressure other countries into serving their interests, which, according to their plans, must be promoted largely by Chinese successes in developing nuclear weapons and missiles.
In 1964 Mao Tse-tung had a talk with French parliamentarians which proved to be highly revealing. On the question of China's plans for nuclear armament he said: "We shall also have a bomb of our own. ... It is an instrument of power.''^^**^^ Thus, Mao Tse-tung himself clearly characterised the aim and meaning of China's nuclear and missile armament.
_-_-_^^*^^ Jcnmin Jihfjtio, April 26, 19C4.
^^**^^ L'Humanite, February 21, 1964.
149 __ALPHA_LVL3__ Great-Power Chauvinistic For a long time Peking had
painstakingly avoided speaking openly of the real views of the Mao
group. But all diffidence was thrown to the winds in the
course of the "cultural revolution''. On July 13, 1967 the
Peking newspaper Jenmin Jihpao wrote with rare frankness
that "the banner of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung
must be unfurled throughout the world''.
It has become evident that what the Peking leaders want is not the national and social liberation of the peoples of the world, as they have hypocritically declared, but the attainment of their Great-Power chauvinistic objectives. Quite naturally, therefore, resistance to the Maoist policy is growing and the Maoists have, through their own fault, found themselves isolated internationally.
The general picture of the political situation created in China by the Maoists becomes more lucid when the Chinese leaders assess the history of China herself. Today the Chinese propagandists say nothing in condemnation of the colonial oppression of other nations by China's rulers in the past. The history of the Chinese dynasties is one of the enslavement of neighbouring peoples, including the peoples of Korea and Vietnam, who waged a heroic liberation struggle against foreign, Chinese domination. But people who cannot adopt a principled attitude to the history of their own country cannot speak convincingly on modern international issues of a similar nature.
An example of this is the new assessment of the bloodthirsty conqueror Genghis Khan, who sowed terror among nations, pillaging and killing in Asia and Europe. Presentday Chinese historiography attributes to Genghis Khan a "progressive role in the history of China"^^*^^ and in the history of "40 other states''.^^**^^ This ``assessment'' is founded on the claim that Genghis Khan's barbarous conquests brought the enslaved nations into contact with "a higher culture''.
In order to justify the conquest and enslavement of other peoples by an allegedly higher culture, the Chinese leaders employ methods that for centuries had served colonial _-_-_
^^*^^ Jcnmin Jili/iao, August 10, 1961.
^^**^^ Lishi Yanjiu, No. 2, 1962.
150 enslavers as grounds for their odious policies. This approach to history is mirrored in the Maoists' territorial claims and in their exhortations that "cultural revolutions" should be started in all countries if possible. All this flagrantly contradicts fundamental democratic principles, to say nothing of the socialist principles of international relations. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Demagogic Theory Maoist propaganda daily preaches
people's war as the central task of the struggle against
imperialism. Here the implication is not that a people, for
example, the Vietnamese people, should rise as one man to
fight a foreign aggressor. Moreover, it is not a question of
military tactics but of definite aspects of the Maoist policy
which throw light on the attitude of Mao Tse-tung and his
group to the problems of national and social liberation.
Revealing in this respect are the reproaches hurled by Mao
Tse-tung at Liu Shao-chi, President of the People's Republic
of China and Vice-Chairman of the CC CPC, who was the
central target of all the attacks during the "cultural
revolution''. Judging by the article carried by the magazine
Peking Review, one of the accusations levelled at Liu Shao-chi
was that he helped elements seeking to "extinguish the flame
of revolution throughout the world" and that this help was
tantamount to capitulation to reactionaries. The magazine
explains:
``He [Liu Shao-chi---G.W] went so far as to advise the Communist Party of Burma to lay down arms. He said: 'You can do without weapons, you can bury them or include your detachments in the national liberation forces . . . you may co-operate with Ne Win. For what purpose? For the purpose of accomplishing the socialist revolution.' "
Thus---renunciation of civil war against the progressive Government of Burma, co-operation with Ne Win for the purpose of accomplishing the socialist revolution. This is precisely what Mao does not want, what he is fighting with all the means at his disposal.
This characterises the substance of Mao Tse-tung's policy with accentuated bluntness. There is a reason behind the Maoist denunciation as heresy of any statement to the effect __PRINTERS_P_151_COMMENT__ 15* 151 that non-capitalist development is possible. This is regarded as ``revisionism'', ``betrayal'' and so forth. In the given case we witness more than the Mao group's voluntaristic approach to urgent problems of social development, we see its inability to show how to resolve pressing problems.
``On the agenda of these countries [countries which won political independence after the Second World War.---Ed.] today is the struggle to build up a national, non-capitalist economy and society,'' Comrade Walter Ulbricht said in his report to the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.^^*^^
Mao Tse-tung wants a so-called people's war against, for example, the progressive Ne Win Government of Burma. But such a war would be directed against all the progressive gains of the Burmese people. It would be, I should say, no less dangerous to Burma's further social development than the neocolonialist intrigues of the USA and other imperialist states.
To clear up any vagueness about the intentions of the Peking leaders, Peking Review wrote in another issue that "Right opportunists" were active in the Communist Party of Burma and that when Chiang Kai-shek forces invaded North Burma^^**^^ they ``wrongly'' contended that the main contradiction was between US imperialism and the popular masses. This, the magazine asserted, led "to errors in policy''.
Here the implication is that the Mao group condemns the calls to destroy the Chiang Kai-shek forces in Burma and, for its part, urges an armed struggle against the Burmese Government. What then remains of the exhortations to fight US imperialism? For Mao Tse-tung a struggle against the progressive Government of Burma is more important than the struggle against US imperialism. To act differently means, according to the Mao group, to make "errors in policy''.
During a tour of some African countries in 1964, Chinese _-_-_
^^*^^ Walter Ulbricht, = Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bis zur Vollendung des Sozialismus, Dictz Verlag, Berlin, 1967, p. 21.
^^**^^ After the victory of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949 remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army penetrated into North Burma. Chiang Kai-shek's army units are fighting the independent Burmese state to this day.
152 Premier Chou En-lai declared: "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent.''^^*^^In many countries the legitimate question asked at the time was: Against whom must such a revolution be directed? Against the progressive governments of newly-independent countries, which had just shaken off the yoke of colonialism? The Chinese leadership did not give a convincing reply.^^**^^ However, an analysis of the words and actions of the Mao group today will clearly show what this group means by "people's war" and "revolutionary situation''.
The Mao group urges not a consistent continuation of the struggle for national and social liberation, not a struggle against imperialism, not the further cohesion of the antiimperialist national states with the socialist countries, but an armed struggle and the overthrow of the governments of these states in order to put Peking's menials at their head and secure Mao Tse-tung's Great-Power chauvinistic aims in the African and Asian countries. Such is the publicly proclaimed policy of the Mao group.
The strength and vitality of the national liberation movement are shown by the fact that it successfully continues the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism despite the pernicious policy of the Peking leaders.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Anti-SovietismThe most salient distinguishing feature of the Mao group's policy is its undisguised and unbridled anti-Sovietism. This feature also underlies the Maoists' _-_-_
^^*^^ Peking Review, No. 7, February 14, 1964.
^^**^^ The magazine Revolution in Africa was published in some African countries beginning in early 1965. Published in the name of a certain A. M. Kheir, it frequently referred to the above-mentioned statement by Chou En-lai in its calls for a "socialist revolution in Africa'', declaring that the task of the African peoples "is to remove the bourgeois puppets, who pose as national leaders''. Although a denial appeared in the Chinese press at the close of 1965 (Peking Review, No. 45, November 5, 1965), it is a fact that until 1965 this Kheir was permanently resident in Peking and was everywhere spoken of highly by the Chinese leaders as a representative of the revolutionary movement in Africa. Besides, these ``calls'' fully dovetail with the concepts of the Mao group.
153 policy towards the national liberation movement and the anti-imperialist national states.In the slander campaign that it is conducting against the Soviet Union in Asian and African countries the Mao group does not stop before anything. During the preparations for "another Bandung" (the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference was scheduled to open in Algiers in the autumn of 1965), the Peking leaders regarded their Opposition to Soviet participation as practically their main task.
This was largely the reason that this important AfroAsian conference was not held. Most Afro-Asian countries came out against the plans of the Chinese leaders. The Mao group preferred the conference to fail rather than see it attended by representatives of the world's first socialist state.
An inalienable internationalist duty and prime task of all Marxists-Leninists, particularly of the working class of the socialist countries, is to help the peoples of the developing countries finally to smash the chains of national and colonial oppression and render them every possible assistance in their struggle against imperialism, for the right to self-- determination. On this point Lenin enunciated the following passionate words before the Soviet state was founded: " Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining in strength. . . . Hundreds of millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom. What delight this world movement is arousing in the hearts of all class-conscious workers... .''^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, pp. 99--100.
154The Great October Socialist Revolution initiated the conquest of power by oppressed and exploited masses. It showed the way to social and national liberation and laid the cornerstone of united action by the victorious socialist countries, the working class in the developed industrial countries and the colonial, oppressed nations fighting for liberation. Lenin explained the substance of this unity with the slogan "Workers of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!" Today the socialist and national liberation movements are part and parcel of the great historic torrent leading to social progress. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries, headed by Marxist-Leninist Parties, wholly and completely conforms to the tasks set them by history.
The Mao group has deviated from the principles of socialist internationalism. Moreover, it has utterly renounced the Marxist-Leninist policy of alliance with the national liberation movement, with the anti-imperialist struggle of the new national states.
``One who has adopted the standpoint of nationalism naturally arrives at the desire to erect a Chinese Wall around his nationality, his national working-class movement; he is unembarrassed even by the fact that ... by his tactics of division and dismemberment he is reducing to nil the great call for the the rallying and unity of the proletarians of all nations, all races and all languages.''^^*^^
The Chinese leaders preach ``self-reliance'' as a universal means of their policy. They calculate that this demagogic slogan will hold the new national states back from co-- operating with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and obscure the Great-Power chauvinistic substance of their own policies.
Instead of supporting the national liberation movement they seem to subordinate it to their own political aims. In this connection they are making a special effort to give this movement an anti-Soviet orientation. This is nothing less than an attempt to divest the national liberation movement of its main, anti-imperialist content and its key bastion. The Chinese leadership is thus impeding the development of democratic, anti-capitalist tendencies in the Afro-Asian countries and clearing the way for an enhancement of imperialist influence in these countries.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Against Social Progress It goes without saying that the Maoist
policy of ignoring the right to national self-determination is
running into growing resistance in the countries concerned.
At the time of the Bandung Conference the People's Republic of China exercised extensive influence in the world. Today, as a result of the Maoist policies, this influence has declined considerably.
What influence is there to speak of when, for example, the bloodthirsty Haitian dictator Francois Duvalier orders the _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 521.
155 import of thousands of copies of Mao Tse-tung's Book of Quotations in order to use the "thought of Mao" to teach his gendarmes how to deal summarily with the people.On the other hand, many African and Asian countries have categorically denounced the attempts of the Chinese leaders to interfere in their internal affairs.
The policies of the Maoists do not in any way contribute to world progress. On the contrary, being in fact reactionary, they retard that progress.
The malign influence of the Chinese leaders on the Communist Party of Indonesia gave the reactionary forces the possibility of dealing the progressive movement in that country a crippling blow and starting a reign of terror against Indonesian Communists. A few months before the reactionaries seized power in October 1965, a member of the Peking leadership visited Indonesia. Utterly distorting the situation in that country he declared that "in active response to the Indonesian Communist Party's fighting call for arming the workers and peasants . . . the broad masses of the Indonesian people are heightening their vigilance and are prepared to deal crushing blows at any imperialists and colonialists.''^^*^^
This is a blend of subjectivism with putschism, a proposition which passes off the desire for reality. The calamitous results of all this show the depth of the abyss between the Mao group and the Marxists-Leninists. This group's policy clashes with the interests of all the peoples of the world and, last but not least, the interests of the Chinese people.
This was clearly demonstrated by the Mao group's attitude during the Middle East crisis, which flared up as a result of the aggressive policy of Israel. Instead of taking effective steps to help the Arab states defend themselves against imperialist aggression, the Peking leaders concentrated on casting foul aspersions on the Soviet Union and its policy of supporting Arab countries. The Mao group was evidently more interested in spreading the war in the Middle East than in halting aggression. They urged the Arab countries to keep a "firm grip on their weapons" and continue the armed struggle "until final victory''.^^**^^ Thus, instead of endeavouring to put an end to Israeli aggression they did everything _-_-_
^^*^^ Peking Review, No. 23, June 4, 1965.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, June 7, 1967.
156 in their power to encourage it, allegedly acting in a revolutionary spirit. In the situation obtaining at the time their calls would have exposed the progressive governments of the United Arab Republic and Syria to danger, while Israel would have attained her key military objectives. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Services to Bourgeois The Chinese leaders are endeavouring
to establish a theoretical basis for their reactionary views
and actions, which they cloak with revolutionary verbiage.
Contrary to reality, they maintain that it is not the
international working class and the world socialist system but the
liberation struggle in Asian, African and Latin American
countries which is in the centre of the present epoch. This,
they contend, is where the main contradiction of the modern
world lies. On this point Peking Review wrote: "... the
contradiction between the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa
and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United
States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary
world.''^^*^^
This is obviously an unscientific theory, which deliberately sets aside the conscious class approach to present-day problems of social development in favour of the Mao group's racist views with their clear-cut hegemonistic ambitions. It counterposes the national liberation movement to its natural ally, the world working class, and thereby deprives it of its socialist perspective.
The views of the Maoists are characterised by their discriminatory name for Asian, African and Latin American countries, which they call the "rural areas of the world" in opposition to the so-called rich countries---the "cities of the world''. Peking Review openly writes: "On a world scale, Asia, Africa and Latin America are the village of the world, while Europe and North America are the town of the world.''^^**^^
The socialist and imperialist states are thereby placed virtually in the same category, and both are counterposed _-_-_
^^*^^ Peking Review, No. 24, June 11, 1965.
^^**^^ Ibid.
157 to the African and Asian countries. This approach contains not a trace of a class assessment of the international situation.Peking propaganda speaks of the encirclement of the "cities of the world by the rural areas of the world''. By voicing views of this kind the Peking theoreticians find themselves in the same camp with bourgeois ideologists, who likewise divide the world into ``poor'' and ``rich'' countries, regardless of their social system, in order to divert the masses from the class struggle and safeguard imperialist rule.
From their unscientific and anti-Marxist positions, the Maoists have advanced the thesis of "intermediate zones''. In their opinion the first "intermediate zone" consists of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the second embraces the capitalist states of Western Europe and North America with the exception of the United States of America. .. .
In the light of the policy pursued by the Chinese leaders headed by Mao Tse-tung, the socialist countries and the international communist and working-class movement face the important task of constantly strengthening and developing the close alliance with the national liberation movement and with all anti-imperialist states.
Recent developments lucidly demonstrate that the reactionary policy of the Mao group is doomed to failure.
[158] __ALPHA_LVL2__ N. K. Krishnan The disruptive intervention of Peking
Radio on Naxalbari and their fulminations against the West
Bengal and Kerala Ministries sharply underline the
intensification of the undermining activities of the Chinese
leadership headed by the Mao Tse-tung group against
national liberation movements all over the world since the
so-called "cultural revolution" began.
The ideological basis for these activities was the theory they initially propounded in opposition to the Moscow 1960 Statement---firstly, that the main contradiction in the world today is the contradiction between imperialism and the national liberation movement and that the focal point of all contradictions is in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and secondly, that guerilla war is the obligatory form of struggle for the success of all national liberation movements.
The essence of this theory in practice was to ignore the decisive role of the world socialist system and the workingclass movement in the present epoch in relation to the national liberation movement, to alienate the national liberation movement from the world socialist system and the working-class movement, to pit one against the other. Again, only one form of struggle, guerilla war, was recognised and all other forms---taking into consideration diversity of conditions in the various fighting countries---were ignored.
Due to various factors, both objective and subjective, it was difficult in the beginning for certain leaders in the national liberation movement to recognise the serious error of the Chinese ideological positions and to see to what disastrous results such positions would lead in practice.
_-_-_^^*^^ New Age, August 27, 1967 (India).
159But the experience of the last three years, and particularly since the so-called "cultural revolution" was started by the Mao Tse-tung group, has brought home very valuable lessons in this respect.
Nowadays we can see the steady failure of the attempts of Maoism to isolate the national liberation movement from the world socialist camp and the working-class movement. Equally marked is the failure of China to impose guerilla war on every country irrespective of actual conditions there.
The Chinese leaders, who preach revolutionary people's war for everybody else, are themselves extremely flexible wherever their own positions and problems are concerned. Even now they maintain extensive trade with South Africa and Rhodesia utilising for this purpose the help of Japan and the Chiang Kai-shek regime.
According to official figures published by the South African Government, South Africa's trade with China increased ten times in the period 1961--63. Last year the South African Government refused publication of trade figures with People's China saying that it would adversely affect the state interests of South Africa.
The tragic developments in Indonesia unabled many to see to what disastrous consequences the Chinese line would lead the national liberation movement in practice and dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the Mao Tse-tung group in the Asian states.
The incendiary role played by China during the IndoPakistani war in 1965 and their opposition to the Tashkent agreement served as still another eye-opener to many. Their entire line was directed towards delivering a blow against the policy of non-alignment and Afro-Asian unity. In sharp contrast the constructive and realistic approach of the Soviet Union to such complicated problems stood out, as well as its anti-imperialist role, in practice.
The failure of China to convene the Afro-Asian conference in the manner dictated by it and to block the participation of the Soviet Union in it meant still another defeat for the policies of the Mao group.
The Chinese policy in relation to Vietnam has met with almost universal criticism and has shocked many responsible leaders in the democratic and socialist movement throughout the world.
The refusal of the Chinese leaders to co-operate with other 160 socialist states even on a minimum programme of concerted action to aid Vietnam has encouraged the American aggressors to escalate the war. This became marked especially after the Chinese rejection of the initiative taken by 17 nonaligned countries in regard to Vietnam. Indeed, every time the American aggressors further escalated the war the Chinese stepped up their anti-Soviet campaign, thus objectively giving the green light to the aggressors.
This policy has continued even up to the present. It seems that the Chinese leaders are not interested in the end of the Vietnam tragedy but that they want the war in Vietnam to continue, trying to make use of it for the furtherance of their nationalistic ambitions and for continuing their antiSoviet propagandist campaign.
The prestige of People's China in the Third World fell further as a result of the so-called "cultural revolution''. Typical in this respect was the command of the Morning Post of Nigeria: ".. . You can hardly imagine anything going more against the interests of the developing countries than this 'cultural revolution'.''
The bourgeois press throughout the world has widely utilised the latest developments in China for discrediting the ideas of socialism and communism especially among the peoples of colonial and newly-liberated countries.
After the failure of their efforts to win over the national liberation movements to their side, the Mao group began concentrating their attention on activities directed against the leaders of the liberation movement who are interested in co-operation with the socialist world. In a number of countries they support small Trotskyite and factionalist groups which attack the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Communist Parties of Latin America and so on.
In fact the Chinese leadership is now more isolated than before from the real struggle of the working masses in the national liberation movement and its activities result in only objectively strengthening the influence of imperialism and internal reaction.
In the African State of Lesotho the Chinese leaders support the Right-wing nationalist Party Basutoland Congress while opposing the local Communist Party. In South Africa they support the racist organisation Pan-African Congress which is conducting a struggle against the African __PRINTERS_P_161_COMMENT__ 11---2466 161 National Congress in which the South African Communists and other progressives are working together and which commands great influence.
In the UAR the Embassy of People's China indulged in activities directed towards overthrowing the Nasser Government, so much so that in February 1966 the UAR Ambassador in Peking delivered a special note of protest. In 1965 a group of so-called ``Communists'' whose activities were directed from Peking were arrested in UAR and charged with organising a terrorist plot.
In Congo (Brazzaville) the Chinese leaders tried to corrupt some public functionaries with supply of money, etc., and through them attempted to secure their control over the youth organisation as well as some well-known journals.
Burma also needs special mention. There, the Communist Party of Burma which is influenced by the Chinese leadership is carrying on an armed struggle against the Ne Win regime and in fact takes up the same anti-government position as the reactionary separatist groups. Things have gone so far that in the recent period Peking Radio has openly come out denouncing Ne Win's regime as ``counter-revolutionary'', "a stooge of imperialism" and so on. Provocative demonstrations have been organised against the Burmese Embassy in the same manner as was done against the Indian Embassy.
The disruptive intervention of the Chinese leadership in the domestic affairs of some other newly independent African states is also well-known. In Tanzania they tried to gain the confidence of military experts of the Tanzanian government and with their help to ensure that fighters of African liberation movements obtained exclusively Chinese-made weapons with the propagandist aim of being considered the only country which renders real assistance to the liberation forces in Africa.
In Cambodia the Chinese leadership tried to block local organisations from economic co-operation with the Soviet Union especially in matters of supply of equipment. When the Cambodian leaders refused to fall in line with this policy, the Chinese leadership started undermining activities against them.
In Nepal too the Mao Tse-tung group, during the recent period of the "cultural revolution'', started blatantly interfering in the domestic affairs of that country and imposing the cult of .Mao on the Nepalese people. The result has been 162 angry demonstrations by the Nepalese people against such interference. Discontent against the interfering policies of the Mao group has begun to spread widely in Nepal.
As to the recent developments in West Asia, the Chinese leaders also did their best to aggravate the situation. They called upon the Arabs to ignore the Security Council call for cease-fire. Chou En-lai sent a special message to the Arab leaders calling upon them not to stop hostilities but to continue the war---a course of action which under the circumstances would have been suicidal for the Arab world.
In many African countries the Chinese leaders are trying to fan hostility between different political organisations and thus disrupt and weaken anti-imperialist unity. In Southern Rhodesia, they support the ZANU against ZAPU which has established contacts with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Representatives of the ZAPU were told that they would receive Chinese support if they condemned "Soviet revisionism''.
In ``Portuguese'' Guinea, the Chinese leaders were trying to press upon the Guinean people to adopt the Peking political line. When this was rejected, they tried to split the nationalist party of Kabral.
In Angola, where active struggle is carried on against imperialism by the National Movement for Liberation of Angola Party headed by Neto, the Mao Tse-tung group supported rival leaders of the type of Viriato da Cruza, although it is well-known that these leaders have contacts with Western imperialist circles.
The Chinese activities have also contributed to split in the ranks of the African Party of Independence of Senegal which carries on a very difficult underground struggle against the neocolonialist regime of Senghor. In May 1965 the pro-Chinese splitters declared establishment of a socalled "Senegal Communist Party'', and in October 1966 they founded still another rival group, the so-called "New Organisation of African Party of Independence''. It is worth noting that the Senghor Government of Senegal which persecutes and represses active members of the African Party of Independence of Senegal allows full freedom for the activities of the new splitting organisation.
Generally speaking the splitting activities of the Peking leaders in the African countries have so far not resulted in much damage. They have been able to collect only such __PRINTERS_P_163_COMMENT__ 11* 163 followers or the representatives of the Swanu Party from Southwest Africa consisting mainly of students who arc studying in West European countries and have no real contact with their motherland.
As for the other African Parties which are carrying on a political course corresponding to their national interest they are rejecting the Chinese pressures. Typical is the statement of Mondlane, leader of the Frelimo Party of Mozambique that carries the main brunt of the struggle against Portuguese imperialism: "My Party has no desire to get embroiled in disputes and fights with the socialist countries and the Frelimo Party has other tasks before it--- the struggle for liberation of Mozambique and co-operation with all those countries which sincerely support this struggle.''
Significant are the attempts of the Chinese leaders to split the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and in case they fail, to establish a rival organisation in Peking itself. During the last four-five years Chinese representatives have been trying to develop this movement into a kind of an antiSoviet platform. When they failed in this, they tried another method---to block the activities of its main executive body, the Permanent Secretariat.
In the background of the fall of Chinese prestige due to their wrong policies and undermining activities, the representatives of many African and Asian countries demanded that the Fifth Conference of the organisation should not be held in Peking as had been decided at the previous conference in Ghana in May 1965, but should be held in some other place. This question was put on the agenda at the Nicosia session of the Council of this Organisation in February 1967. The Chinese leaders realising the prospect of complete isolation decided to boycott the session and China was the only Asian country which refused to participate in it. Instead of mandated delegates only two so-called ``journalists'' were sent by China.
These with the help of some others tried their best to disrupt and paralyse the conference but these attempts were rebuffed. The unanimous decision of the participants of this session not to hold the Fifth Conference in Peking is of great significance. In reply to this decision the Peking group announced that they would withdraw from this organisation and form a new organisation---an organisation which, 164 significantly enough, will fight not imperialism but the AfroAsian Solidarity Organisation.
Nowadays we can see that the Peking leaders have learnt some lessons from their failures and are trying to adopt a more flexible line. They are enlarging the scale of their propagandist activity and trying to activise Chinese economic contacts with certain selected newly-independent states which they try to develop into a kind of exclusive stronghold in furtherance of their policy.
The main goal of this new line is to conceal from world public opinion and from the Chinese public itself the fact of the growing isolation of China on the international arena and the sharp fall of its prestige among newly-independent countries. For such tyep of activities they are selecting what they call certain ``reliable'' countries such as Tanzania, Mali, Guinea and a couple of others. But this aid is very limited and has more propagandist than economic significance. In fact many enterprises built in these countries with Chinese help have proved to be uneconomic.
At present the Peking leaders are elaborating new plans for the spread of the "cultural revolution" in Afro-Asian countries. There is increasing evidence of their activities in this direction such as restaffing the diplomatic missions of China ni Africa and sending red guards to them. The Press has also reported the decision of the Mao Tse-tung group to found on the African continent a so-called "United Revolutionary Front under the Great Red Banner of Mao's Revolutionary Ideas''.
The disruptive activities of the Mao Tse-tung group have in practice resulted in some harmful consequences for the national liberation movement. First, the Peking line of developing the newly-independent countries as a battleground for their struggle against the world socialist camp has resulted in some at least of the leaders of these countries expressing a general desire to keep aloof from the socialist camp and avoid too close contacts with it.
Secondly, the Peking line has resulted in considerable harm being caused to the prestige and the prospects of furtherance of the ideas of socialism and communism in some of the newly-liberated countries.
Thidly, the Peking line has created great difficulties in some newly-liberated countries for the movement fighting against neocolonialism and feudalism due to the disruptive activities 165 of certain groups and elements influenced by the adventurist line of the Mao Tse-tung group.
The experience, both positive as well as negative, of the last four years has conclusively proved that the stronger the union between newly-independent countries and the world socialist camp the greater are the successes of the national liberation movement. And every attempt that weakens this union is a blow against the national liberation movement itself and strengthens the hands of imperialism.
[166] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Peter BurschikOn January 8, 1968 the Chinese and United States Ambassadors in the Polish People's Republic had their 134th meeting in Warsaw. As usual, nothing was said about what was discussed by them. The Mao Tse-tung group evidently has good reason for keeping the content of the negotiations secret. But if one closely follows the reports in the Western press one can get a fair idea of what is discussed at these talks. By comparing official statements in Peking and Washington and the actions of the two governments, one will realise that Peking and Washington are engaged in a sustained dialogue on major international issues. The negotiations in Warsaw are part of this dialogue. A probing study of the Maoist attitude towards the United States of America brings one round to the conclusion that this attitude is changing, a development which is being noted with satisfaction in Washington.
In this article we shall deal in brief with the history of Chinese-American relations.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ China's Role After the Great October Revolution in
Russia and the formation of the world's first socialist state,
China's strategic importance grew immensely for the USA,
which set out to turn China into a close ally and a bastion
against the Soviet Union. The US ruling circles were
determined under no circumstances to permit China to follow
_-_-_
^^*^^ Deutsche Aussenpolitik, No. 5, 1968 (German Democratic Republic).
167 the example of the Soviet Union. Besides, China's economic importance to the USA was growing steadily.When in 1931 the Japanese invasion threatened US interests, the US Government supplied Chiang Kai-shek with weapons and funds. While the Chinese people were fighting for liberation from Japanese tyranny, Chiang Kai-shek used United States assistance to combat the Communist Party of China. This too fell in with the interests of the United States, which would not hear of a victory by the People's Liberation Army of China. But that victory was inevitable. After the Soviet Army compelled the Japanese invaders to surrender on September 2, 1945, the Chinese people continued their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and his United States allies until they were driven out of the continent.
The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. Already then attempts were made in the USA to initiate negotiations with the Mao Tse-tung group. At the time the possibility of co-operating with the USA was not ruled out by some of the Chinese leaders either. An American report of those days pointed to the Chinese leadership's strong nationalistic tendencies and to its desire to promote relations with the United States. However, the objective situation forced the Chinese leaders to orient themselves on an alliance with the Soviet Union.
In January 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's position grew hopeless, he ordered the transfer of part of the Kuomintang Government's gold reserves to Taiwan, where he later set up his headquarters. In June 1950 when aggression was started against Korea, the USA turned Taiwan into a military strongpoint.
The US Government refused to extend recognition to the Government of the People's Republic of China, was opposed to the PRC occupying its lawful seat in the United Nations Organisation and enforced an embargo on trade with the People's Republic of China.
The PRC Government made several attempts to ease the tension in its relations with the USA. The initiative was taken by Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference, where he declared: "The Government of the People's Republic of China is prepared to sit down at the same table with the Government of the USA and begin talks in order to discuss the question of easing tension in the Far East and, in particular, the question of relaxing tension in the region of Taiwan.''
168In the end the USA agreed to negotiate, and the first Chinese-American meeting at ambassadorial level was held on August 1, 1955 in Geneva. Since 1958 these meetings have been held in Warsaw.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ End of the Policy Early in the 1960s the Chinese leaders
abandoned the general line of the international communist
and working-class movement formulated at the 1957 and
1960 Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties. They
came forward with their own "general line'', hoping to take
the leadership of the international communist and
workingclass movement into their hands. They failed to make the
Marxist-Leninist Parties accept their anti-Marxist,
antiLeninist adventurist theories, with the result that they
started an open fight against these Parties. Their main target
was the Soviet Union as the main obstruction to the
attainment of their Great-Power chauvinistic objectives.
The llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC endorsed this anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist policy. In the communique issued by this plenary meeting the struggle against "Soviet revisionism" was proclaimed as a prerequisite of the struggle against imperialism, in other words, practically the main task of the Mao group. In the same communique, the Maoists categorically rejected all the proposals of other Communist and Workers' Parties for joint action, first and foremost the proposal for united action to halt US aggression against the Vietnamese people.
The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany emphatically denounced the anti-Sovietism and divisive policy of the Chinese leaders.''^^*^^
Maoist policy induced reactionary circles in the USA to reconsider their attitude towards China. They began more and more frequently to discuss the prospects and possibilities of a detente with her. Numerous facts indicate that the Maoists responded to these intentions.
Hope soared in Washington, where it was quickly appreciated that the anti-Soviet line of the Chinese leaders can _-_-_
^^*^^ Neues Dcutschland, September 4, 1966.
169 be used to implement US global strategy. For this purpose the US imperialists began exploring ways and means of establishing contact with the PRC.In mid-1964 the US press, which formerly would not hear of contacts with Peking, changed its tone. Leading businessmen and senators influencing US policy reconsidered their views.
This was mirrored in an article by George F. Kennan, a foreign policy expert, published on November 22, 1964 in The New York Times Magazine. It must be noted that after the Second World War Kennan became an exponent of the anti-communist policy of the USA. In this article he analysed US policy towards the PRC and urged the US Government to reconsider it. He regarded the policy of the Mao group as being the most favourable to the USA in the past 20 years. He wrote: "It would be foolish, of course, for us to fold our hands and ... disregard the Chinese-Soviet conflict entirely and to fail to take advantage of any favourable effects it may have.''
On April 28, 1965 the businessmen who gathered at a meeting of the US Chamber of Commerce unanimously voted for a resolution calling on the US Government to examine steps that might be taken to create effective channels of contact between the United States of America and the PRC.
In March 1965 the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Senator William J. Fulbright, started discussing US policy towards China. At that discussion there were voices urging the PRC's de jure recognition, its admission to the United Nations Organisation and the normalisation of trade with China.
On May 3, 1966 Senators Edward M. Kennedy and George McGovern proposed that President Johnson appoint a blue-ribbon commission to help develop a more effective policy towards China. Senator McGovern criticised US foreign policy towards China, declaring that as a result of this policy the USA was underrating the powerful forces of nationalism and allying itself with corrupt, stupid and ineffective dictators.^^*^^ This was an indirect attack on US policy oriented on an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek.
A new "Chinese lobby" thus took shape in the USA in _-_-_
^^*^^ The New York Times, May 4, 1966, p. 6.
170 mid-1966 in opposition to the "Taiwan lobby''. It consisted of scientists and congressmen and it set out to create the conditions for a gradual and steady improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China.On March 16, 1966 Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined to the Senate Subcommittee on the Far East the main features of US policy in Asia. He formulated ten principles of US policy towards China, proposing a "policy of containment without isolation" with the ultimate objective of gradually vitalising US-Chinese contacts. He proposed the establishment of unofficial contacts with the PRC. He stressed that the restriction on travel to the PRC was not very hard and that libraries in the USA could receive literature from China. "We have in the past indicated,'' he said, "that if the Chinese themselves were interested in purchasing grain we would consider such sales.''^^*^^
He suggested organising reciprocal visits by journalists and scientists. Early in 1968 in a State of the Union message to Congress, President Johnson reiterated that the USA would not hinder reciprocal visits by journalists and cultural exchanges.^^**^^
Such is US policy as evoked by the openly anti-Soviet line pursued by the Mao group.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ "Gentlemen's Agreement" The Mao group superciliously calls
itself the most consistent champion against US imperialism.
Deliberately misrepresenting facts it calls the USSR the ally
of US imperialism. Day-to-day developments show the
absurdity of this foul slander. The Soviet Union has been
and remains the main force in the struggle against
imperialism, bearing the greatest burden of this struggle, and it is
primarily due to the USSR that the imperialists do not
venture to start another world conflagration.
No objections, naturally, can be raised to normal relations between states with different social systems, to relations between China and the USA, if these relations contribute to _-_-_
^^*^^ The Department of Stale Bulletin, Washington, May 2, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1401, p. 694.
^^**^^ The New York Times, January 18, 1968.
171 peaceful coexistence and cannot be used by imperialism against socialism and peace.However, this negative aspect comes to the fore in the stand of the Mao group on relations with US imperialism. Official Chinese propaganda attacks the principles of peaceful coexistence, going to the extent of extolling tension in international relations. The Chinese leaders make no tangible contribution to the struggle against imperialism. On the contrary, their activities are damaging to the antiimperialist struggle.
This is demonstrated, first and foremost, by the Mao group's stand in the question of the struggle against US aggression in Vietnam. It rejects every effort to secure united action by socialist countries against US aggression in Vietnam, and for this it bears an immense historical responsibility.
While continuously speaking of the "paper tiger'', meaning US imperialism, the Maoists cherish the hope that an atomic conflict breaks out between the USSR and the USA. Yet an analysis of the policies pursued by the Mao group shows that it turns a blind eye to the possibility of making an effective contribution to the struggle against US imperialism. This cannot be concealed either by bombast or by the 448 "serious warnings" issued in connection with violations of Chinese frontiers by US aircraft and ships. The words and `` warnings'' of the Chinese leaders to the USA only strengthen the impression that Peking wants others to take the chestnuts out of the fire for it or, as a Chinese proverb has it, "to sit on a hill and watch the tigers fight''.
This is the angle from which the dialogue between Washington and Peking on the Vietnam issue must be scrutinised. In February 1965, when the USA was escalating its aggression against the Vietnamese people, Mao Tse-tung told the American journalist Edgar Snow:
``China had no troops outside her own frontiers, and had no desire to fight anybody unless she was attacked. China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight. That was clear enough. Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight. Wasn't that clear?''^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao'', The New Republic, Washington, February 27, 1965, p. 22.
172The USA could thus go on escalating its aggression against the Vietnamese people. Mao Tse-tung assured it that he would remain neutral.
To this and other utterances by the Maoists, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied as follows in the above-- mentioned statement: "...We should continue our efforts to reassure Peiping that the United States does not intend to attack mainland China. . .. We do not intend to provoke war. There is no fatal inevitability of war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists have, as I have already said, acted with caution when they foresaw a collision with the United States. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. I hope that they will realise this and guide their actions accordingly.''^^*^^
For their part the Chinese leadership continued its dialogue with the Americans. In an interview given to a correspondent of the Pakistani newspaper Dawn on April 10, 1966, the Chinese Prime Minister made a statement on the four points of China's policy towards the USA. He said: "China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States: China has not sent any troops to Hawaii; it is the United States that has occupied China's territory of Taiwan Province. Nevertheless, China has been making efforts in demanding, through negotiations, that the United States withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits, and she has held talks with the United States for more than ten years, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw. . .. All this serves as a very good proof.''^^**^^
These words by Chou En-lai likewise elicited a quick response from the ruling circles of the USA. Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defence, gave a series of interviews to various American and foreign newspapers, reiterating the USA's peaceful intentions towards the PRC.
``I can give the assurance,'' he said in one of these interviews, "that we have not stinted and shall not stint any effort to make it clear to the leaders of Communist China through direct and indirect diplomacy, publicly and confidentially, that American limited objectives in Vietnam do not threaten them. Our statements on this score are _-_-_
^^*^^ The Department of State Bulletin, Washington, May 2, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1401, p. 694.
^^**^^ Peking Review, No. 20, May 13, 1966.
173 clear and serious. We call upon the leaders of China to heed and understand this.''^^*^^In Peking they paid heed and understood. On September 6, 1966, Foreign Minister Chen Yi received a group of Japanese parliamentarians and made a statement which attracted considerable attention in the world press. On September 22, 1966 the Soviet newspaper Izvestia published a France-Presse report quoting Chen Yi as saying in an interview that he did not think the tension in Chinese-American relations would last eternally. He declared categorically that China did not reject the idea of a treaty settlement in Vietnam. He gave trie opinion that neither China nor the USA wanted matters to go to the point of conflict. Chen Yi thus confirmed the view of many political observers that China was aggravating her relations with the Soviet Union in order to prepare the ground for direct negotiations with the United States.
These are only a few examples from the public dialogue between Peking and Washington. Elsewhere, namely in Warsaw, this dialogue continues in the strictest secrecy. For a long time nothing was known of the content of the talks between the Ambassadors of the USA and China. American diplomats maintain that these talks are the hardest in the history of international relations. But on August 23, 1965 Dean Rusk suddenly drew world-wide attention when in an interview he declared: "Well, I think we have had more discussions with Peiping over the last 10 years on more important subjects than has any government that recognises Peiping... .''^^**^^
A further insight into the US-Chinese talks has been given by the United States Ambassador in Warsaw John Gronouski in an interview published by the magazine US News & World Report on July 4, 1966. "They [the talks],'' Gronouski acknowledged, "provide a forum for discussing a whole series of issues that confront both nations, in Southeast Asia particularly----The very seriousness of the situation in Southeast Asia makes these meetings even more important''.
Fresh revelations were made by the United States diplomat Kenneth T. Young in the magazine Foreign Affairs (October 1966).
_-_-_^^*^^ Frankfurter Rundschau, September 6, 1966.
^^**^^ Department of State Bulletin, Washington, September 13, 1967, p. 437.
174Young writes: "The crucial feature of the talks is that they provide a workable channel for reducing miscalculations, clarifying intentions and explaining proposals. The President has a dependable `switchboard' immediately available to talk with the Politburo in Peking about Vietnam, nuclear disarmament, the improvement of relations or anything else. The responsible leaders in Peking have the same facility in reverse when they choose to use it.''
What have the talks in Warsaw touched on so far? According to available information they concerned the destiny of Americans in China and the position in the USA of Chinese nationals without American citizenship. A noteworthy point is that the USA has permitted the departure for China of a number of Chinese experts in nuclear and missile problems. Before their departure these experts held important posts in the American nuclear and missile development programmes. Other issues discussed at the talks included Taiwan, contacts and disarmament. In 1962, for example, the crisis over Taiwan was settled through the mediation of both ambassadors. At present the main point on the agenda is Vietnam. Young writes about this: "While the exchange has not reduced tensions on the surface, it has communicated official intentions, delineated the options open to both sides and prevented careless or ignorant miscalculations.''
Kenneth Young made it clear that every step in the American escalation in Vietnam was taken only after thorough exploration of possible counter-measures by Peking.
On January 23, 1967, US News <& World Report carried a long interview with Rene Dabernat, Paris-Match diplomatic correspondent, who returned from a tour of Southeast Asia and the Far East. Asked if he thought China would get into a war with the USA, he replied that the PRC and the United States had given each other assurances not to extend the war in Vietnam. This understanding was reached as a result of an open dialogue, examples of which have been given above and also as a result of the meetings between the ambassadors in Warsaw.
For example, United States airmen have been ordered to avoid flying close to the Chinese frontier, while the Chinese agreed to regard ``errors'' by American pilots as "unhappy accidents''. These ``accidents'', i.e., violations of the Chinese frontier by US aircraft (such intrusions take place from time to time) and the ensuing Chinese protests and then, of 175 course, the ``apologies'' of the US authorities leave a bitter aftertaste and the consciousness that a game is being played with marked cards: in other words, the ``dependability'' of the gentlemen's agreement between the USA and the Mao group is being tested.
This policy has unequivocally proved the hypocrisy of the Chinese leaders. While posing as the sole champions of the Vietnamese people, they reached a tacit agreement with the Americans on non-interference, thereby enabling the latter to escalate their aggression. It is but one short step from an agreement of this kind to assistance. As a matter of fact, the Mao group is rendering the USA such assistance not only in its aggression against the Vietnamese people but in the implementation of its reactionary global strategy.
Mao Tse-tung propagandists have long been maintaining that the USA had switched the orientation of its global strategy from Europe to Asia, because, the Maoists claim, the ``revisionists'' have no intention of fighting US imperialism in Europe. Moreover, they would have liked to bury in oblivion the fact that their anti-Soviet, divisive policy has given US imperialism manoeuvring space for their piratical aggression against the Vietnamese people and for its escalation. Mao's propagandists simply say nothing about the political, economic and ideological struggle which the Soviet Union, the GDR and other socialist countries are waging against imperialism. On the other hand, they fabricate all sorts of fables about "capitulation to imperialism''.
US global strategy is so called because it embraces the entire range of US policies towards socialism and all other democratic and progressive forces on a world scale. Chinese propaganda wants people to overlook the fact that Maoist policy plays an inglorious role in US assessments of the situation and that the nationalism and anti-Sovietism of the Maoists and their "agreement on non-interference" with the USA are factors serving the interests of US imperialism.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Growing Contacts In words the USA rigidly enforces an
embargo on trade with China. But trade with the British
colony of Hongkong shows the reverse side of this coin. US
176
trade with Hongkong is steadily increasing; it reached the
sum of 534 million US dollars in 1965. Hongkong, as
everybody knows, serves as a transshipment point for China's
foreign trade. The Peking leaders close their eyes to the
fact that this port is used as a stopping place by the US 7th
Fleet. In Hongkong the warships are supplied with drinking
water from Chinese territory. They receive food, which
comes mostly from the PRC. Besides, the port has become a
"recreation centre" for American murderers and
warmongers.
In Hongkong the USA has a consulate with a staff of 150, which is approximately the number of American personnel in the US Embassy in Paris. The reason for this is chiefly the intention of the United States to maintain the closest possible contact with China and keep an eye on developments in that country.
A new revealing fact came to light in mid-1965, namely that on July 20 of that year Li Tsung-jen, an avowed enemy of communism and once a close confidant of Chiang Kaishek and Vice-President in the Kuomintang regime, was given a warm reception in Peking by Chou En-lai and other responsible officials.
Li Tsung-jen fled from China in 1949, barely escaping with his life. He had to flee because he was responsible for the murder of thousands of Chinese Communists during the counter-revolutionary coup in 1927. His name is second in the list of war criminals published by the Communist Party of China in 1948. Yet upon his return from the USA he was given a hospitable welcome. In Peking he was treated as an ardent patriot and was given the opportunity to state his views publicly. It turned out that he had not changed his political credo, having remained an inveterate antiCommunist.
At an international press conference sponsored by the Peking leaders on September 26, 1965, Li Tsung-jen frenziedly attacked the Soviet Union and these attacks were eagerly and delightedly printed and disseminated by the official press.
Moreover, Li Tsung-jen meaningfully declared that, properly speaking, Taiwan was the only bone of contention between the USA and the PRC. Could it be that the aged Li had gone to China precisely to make that statement? Who authorised him to make it? American journalists believe __PRINTERS_P_177_COMMENT__ 12---2466 177 that Li had previously worked behind the scenes to draw the USA and China closer together.
The Mao group has to give the Chinese people a reply to all these questions because in the long run it is a matter of the interests of the Chinese people, who had made incalculable sacrifices during the liberation struggle against imperialists and feudal lords.
Mao's zealous thugs, who manhandled and killed Chinese Communists in the course of the "cultural revolution'', did not touch a hair on the head of Li Tsung-jen.
Since the beginning of the "cultural revolution'', approval of the Chinese leadership's present policy has been appearing more and more frequently in the American press. On January 30, 1967 US News & World Report wrote that United States officials were inclined to prefer victory by Mao Tse-tung, feeling that this would mean the continuation of difficulties for the Soviet Union.
The magazine noted with deep satisfaction that in China the campaign against the Soviet Union was more vicious than against the USA.
Also characteristic of the attitude of the US ruling circles to the policy of the Chinese leaders is the fact that they suddenly ceased to regard Chinese publications as a threat to "Western freedom''. These publications now circulate freely in the USA with official sanction. The US Treasury has issued licences to two firms for the purchase of books and magazines from the People's Republic of China. The book of Mao's utterances and other pamphlets are openly sold in bookshops and are in great demand. This has come about only because the US ruling circles realised the value of Chinese publications to anti-communist propaganda. The Mao group's policy is being used on a growing scale by the proponents of US imperialism in their anti-communist campaign.
Naturally, the Peking leaders are trying to conceal or at least mask this result of their policy. To this end they come out from time to time with sharp statements and protests against the US imperialists. But in the United States nobody takes these protests seriously any more. Dean Rusk assessed the ``protests'' of the Chinese leaders as follows: "They have been somewhat more cautious and prudent in their actions than they have been in their words.''^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ Department of State Bulletin, Washington, May 16, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1403, p. 774.
178On September 18, 1964 The New York Times went one better in characterising Chinese propaganda statements, writing that the language of the official statements had lost all meaning, having become more a propaganda weapon. The newspaper wrote: "Words that formerly signalled significant attitudes or portentous events have lost much of their impact through repetition without concomitant action.''
The author of this article obviously meant the empty phrases which may be read daily in the Peking press. However, this hue and cry about a "war threat" plays an important part in domestic policy.
In order to justify their anti-democratic practices and gradually establish a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, the Mao group impresses on the Chinese people that there is a direct threat of war.
On February 2, 1968 Chou En-lai repeated the statement that "this year the People's Republic of China must complete all military preparations against the contingency of an attack on its territory by US imperialism''.^^*^^
The purpose of statements of this kind is to justify the material privations suffered by the Chinese people and, above all, to provide the pretext for the most brutal suppression of any opposition to the Maoist policies. The inevitable outcome of these nationalistic and Great-Power chauvinistic policies is that in some issues of world politics it expresses views similar to those of the US ruling circles. Although different interests underlie the actions of these two countries, their policies now have points of contact which increasingly influence the relations between them. They have virtually assured each other of non-aggression. Both have turned anti-Sovietism into the foundation of their foreign policy. While the Johnson" Administration seeks to shatter the unity of the European socialist countries by a policy of " building bridges'', the Mao group is doing its uttermost to disunite them by a selective policy and by trying to isolate them from the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, both Washington and Peking are pursuing a policy aimed at splitting the world socialist system, which is the main force in the struggle against imperialism, in the struggle for peace and social progress.
_-_-_^^*^^ DPA Agency, March 11, 1968.
__PRINTERS_P_179_COMMENT__ 12* 179The United States is making every effort to crush the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this it is objectively assisted by the Mao group, which is trying to isolate the national liberation movement from the international working-class movement and its nucleus---the world socialist system---and thereby deprive it of its main ally.
Lastly, the Mao group provides new material for anticommunist propaganda. By conducting the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China it shockingly discredits the humanistic ideals of communism in its own country.
It is a fact that the unprincipled policy of this group has inflicted enormous damage on the international communist and national liberation movements. This policy weakens the struggle against US imperialism, and in the present situation is harming the Vietnamese people in particular. The sabotage of united action in support of the Vietnamese people is one of the injurious consequences of contacts with the United States. At the same time that the Maoists intensify their campaign of slander against the Soviet Union, they are secretly coming to an arrangement with the ruling circles in the USA.
This policy has been condemned by the majority of the socialist countries. It has been rejected by a number of newlyindependent national states, too. It has thus resulted in the unprecedented isolation of the People's Republic of China and has jeopardised the reyolutionary gains of the Chinese people.
[180] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ III __ALPHA_LVL1__ "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"---^^*^^ Pravda, January 11, 1969 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
[181] ~ [182] __NOTE__ LVL2 and footnote moved back. Developments over the past few years
provide evidence that by their Great-Power adventurist
policy, founded on petty-bourgeois nationalistic ideology,
which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism, Mao Tse-tung and his group are undermining
the positions of socialism in China. This group has realised
that conventional methods will not turn the Chinese working
people into "mute cogs'', into "obedient buffaloes" or enable
it to achieve the objectives of its anti-popular, anti-socialist
line. It therefore decided on violence against the Party and
the people. In the spring of 1966, under the smoke screen
provided by the "cultural revolution'', Mao Tse-tung and
his entourage began to steer towards the establishment of an
absolute dictatorship. Characteristically, they concealed their
intentions with slogans about a revolution on the cultural
front. Today this camouflage has been discarded and the
organisers of the present events in China bluntly call them
a "political revolution''.
Reports coming from Peking indicate that Mao Tse-tung and his henchmen are determined to secure the earliest possible legalisation and stabilisation of the "new order" set up by them during the "cultural revolution" and consolidate their positions.
At the cost of a great effort the Maoists concentrated all power in the hands of a centre, which they call the " headquarters of Mao'', while in the provinces they have completed setting up "revolutionary committees'', which have replaced 183 the people's committees, elected in accordance with the Constitution of the PRC, and the provincial committees of the CPC, which existed in accordance with the Party Rules. In the "revolutionary committees" all power is concentrated in the hands of Army officers supporting the Maoists.
What we are witnessing in China today is a long reactionary campaign veiled by ``Left-revolutionary'' verbiage and having as its real objective the establishment of a militarybureaucratic regime that has nothing in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat, with genuine socialism and democracy and with the basic interests of the working people of China.
Using the authority won by the CPC
in revolutionary struggle and by the labour of millions of
Communists, the Maoists cynically continue to pose as "
revolutionary Marxists-Leninists''. The indications are that
they intend to go on operating under the flag of the
Communist Party and use the name of the Central Committee of the
CPC. Testimony of this is the convening of the "12th (
extended) plenary meeting of the CC CPC'', which, according
to the Hsinhua News Agency, was held in Peking from
October 13 to 31, 1968.
This "plenary meeting" was nothing more than a manoeuvre by the Maoists, for it had no legal force from the standpoint of the CPC Rules. Of the 174 members and alternate members of the CC CPC, elected at the Eighth Congress in 1956, and in office when the "cultural revolution" started, more than 130 have been publicly discredited or repressed on the charge of being ``agents'' of Liu Shaochi, President of the People's Republic of China. This "plenary meeting" was called ``extended'' to give it the appearance of being representative and to conceal the absence of a quorum of CC CPC members and alternate members. The place of defamed prominent Party members was taken by members of the notorious "group for cultural revolution affairs" (in the communique it was underscored that all the members of this group were present), representatives of the "revolutionary committees" of provinces, major cities and 184 autonomous regions aftd also by "leading responsible comrades from the PLA''.
Mao Tse-tung and his supporters needed this "plenary meeting" as a means of using the name of the Central Committee to bolster the shaken prestige of the "great helmsman" and post factum ``approve'' his activities and the arbitrary rule and excesses of the "group for cultural revolution affairs" in the course of two and a half years of political struggle, and thereby absolve themselves of the responsibility for the persecution of prominent members of the CPC and many hundreds of thousands of honest Communists who opposed the anti-popular policies.
At the close of 1966 and beginning of 1967 the Maoists removed from office or repressed many members of the Political Bureau, secretaries of the CC CPC, members of the Government, secretaries of provincial, town and country Party committees, chairmen of the provincial and town people's committees, and so on. Using the name of the CC, they now have, in contravention of the CPC Rules, "expelled Liu Shao-chi from the Party" and removed him "from all posts in and outside the Party''.
For the Maoists the political significance of the "12th plenary meeting of the CC CPC" is that it sanctioned post factum the massacres in the Party in the course of the " cultural revolution''.
The documents of the "12th plenary meeting" and the assertions of Peking propaganda about the "decisive victory in the cultural revolution" show that the Maoists consider as complete the destruction of the former political structure and the dispersal and discrediting of Party and Government cadres in one way or another upholding the line laid down by the Eighth Congress of the CPC.
Indeed, as a result of pogroms sustained over a period of nearly three years the Maoists have paralysed the Communist Party of China, including both its central and local organisations. The Party committees in the counties, towns and provinces have been abolished. The authority of the Central Committee has been usurped by a small group headed by Mao Tse-tung. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CC CPC no longer function. The National Assembly of People's Representatives and its Standing Committee have been crippled. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League and other public organisations 185 have been disbanded. With the backing of a hand-picked top echelon of military leaders the Maoists have taken over key posts in the leadership of the country's political, social and economic affairs.
The "revolutionary committees" are regarded as the backbone of the new political structure in China. The "12th plenary meeting" assessed the establishment, completed in September 1968, of 29 provincial "revolutionary committees" as a "great and decisive victory" in the "cultural revolution''. Notwithstanding the declarations that the new organs of power "must be elected by universal elections after the pattern of the Paris Commune" (decision of the llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC of August 8, 1966), the " revolutionary committees" are formed of appointees from the Army, so-called "revolutionary masses" and Party cadres. Steps are being taken to form such ``committees'' in the counties, rural communes, factories and offices. According to the Chinese press this work has been completed in 20 provinces.
However, the planting of "revolutionary committees" is encountering serious obstacles. The unceasing internal strife frequently takes them to the verge of dissolution. Even the official press does not stop complaining of attacks against the ``committees'' from the "Right and Left" and urges that an end should be put to the "class enemies'', who "use every means in an effort to infiltrate into the revolutionary committees of all levels" and "openly dispute their authority.''
Actually, the "revolutionary committees" are a weapon of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, and their role is to give the "new order" in China the appearance of being representative.
The communique of the "12th plenary meeting" is worded in such a way as to give people the impression that Mao Tsetung and his group have the support of the working class and make them forget the hungweiping and tsaofan terror that was brought down primarily on the working class and its vanguard---the Communist Party---and the trade unions. The Maoists now claim that the "cultural revolution" is directed by none other than the working class.
The "12th plenary meeting" called for the "resolute implementation" of this line, demanding that the workers "carry out the tasks set by Chairman Mao Tse-tung at all stages of the struggle, criticism and transformation, and consummate the great proletarian cultural revolution''. In practice this 186 was reduced to the setting up of ``workers' teams for the propagation of the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. These teams are sent to educational establishments, "to all spheres of the superstructure" and "places where intellectuals congregate"(!) with the mission to put an end to the internecine strife, which is leading to anarchy, and to continue the "cultural revolution" where it has bogged down.
Thus, having used politically immature, fanatically-minded young people to destroy Party organisations, the Maoists now send ``workers' teams" against the hungweipings in order to secure a stabilisation of the situation in the country. Formerly Mao had deceived young people and with their help had terrorised the working people. Now the Maoists are endeavouring to dupe the workers, confuse them with flattering appeals, make them deal summarily not only with a section of the youth but also with their class brothers and thereby screen the key role played by the Maoist military units in the repressions and other unpopular acts.
The "leading role of the working class" and "the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat" are mentioned repeatedly in the communique. This is nothing more than Mao Tse-tung's usual juggling with Marxist terminology. In reality the power in the ``teams'' is in the hands of the military, who determine the composition of the ``teams'' and direct their actions.
In a message to Lin Piao in May 1968, Mao Tse-tung demanded that the Army play "a bigger part in the great proletarian cultural revolution''. The Peking press calls the Army a "powerful mainstay" and a "great wall''. The Maoists are well aware that they can remain in power only by maintaining and increasing their control of the Army. Army representatives occupy key posts in the "headquarters of Mao" (eight of its 14 members are professional soldiers) and in the " revolutionary committees''.
However, judging by reports from China, Mao and his entourage are becoming increasingly worried by the growing discontent in the Army over the fact that it has been turned into a punitive instrument of their anti-popular policy. This has induced the Maoists to step up the purge among the military. In the course of this operation, which is being carried out with the utmost caution so as not to provoke "undue discontent'', the Army is being purged not only of those who disagree with the "Mao line'', but also of those who were " 187 insufficiently active" in implementing present policy. "Suspicious elements" are demobilised and sent to the villages for `` reeducation''. Other measures are being taken to strengthen Maoist control of the Army. One of these is the formation of special units subordinated directly to the "headquarters of Mao''. These units are entrusted with all sorts of punitive operations not only against the population but also against other PLA units.
As in previous decisions and instructions of the Mao group, the documents of the "12th plenary meeting" do not contain a positive economic programme aimed at restoring and promoting the economy. This in spite of the fact that the Maoists have plunged China into a desperate economic situation. The management of the economy has been seriously dislocated.
Agriculture, the main branch of China's economy, does not satisfy the country's food and agricultural raw material requirements.
Industry and transport have been hard hit by the "cultural revolution''. At many factories work has been brought to a standstill or disorganised. The unceasing calls to "carry out a revolution and stimulate production" have done little to end the anarchy and disorder at the factories. Economists estimate that in 1967 gross industrial output fell by 15--20 per cent. The output of coal, which constitutes 90 per cent of China's fuel, dropped by 40 per cent, electric power by 30 per cent, and steel by 25--30 per cent. Latest reports indicate that in the localities efforts are being made to restore production and normalise economic life, but this is proceeding slowly and encountering enormous difficulties.
Nothing is said in the documents of the "12th plenary meeting" of the prospects of China's economic development. All one finds in them are general statements to the effect that "production must be stimulated against the contingency of war''. The communique claims that the "cultural revolution" "facilitates and will facilitate another leap in socialist construction in our country''. Forecasts of this kind can hardlybe expected to gladden the Chinese working people, who have experienced the tragedy of the "big leap" of 1958--59. The vagueness of the wording in the communique is evidently due not only to economic setbacks but also to serious differences among the Maoists on questions of China's further development.
188 The questions of "adjusting and
building up Party organisations" and "purging the CPC" occupy
the central place in the documents of the "12th plenary
meeting''.
While raising these questions the Maoists insist that they by no means imply the restoration of the CPC in its former shape. At first the intention was proclaimed of "infusing the Party with new blood" by bringing hungweipings into it. But this intention had to be abandoned because in this period the Maoists had lost much of their control of the hungweipings, whose outrages evoked discontent among the population and in the Army alike.
While the "plenary meeting" was in session, the Chinese press published Mao Tse-tung's instructions on a new purge of the CPC and the mass admission into it of new members under the demagogic slogan of "throw out garbage and bring in new blood''. The stake was now put on the so-called tsaofans, whose organisations, it will be recalled, were formed of politically immature, unsteeled workers indoctrinated in a spirit of fanatical devotion to Mao. In publishing Mao's instructions, the magazine Hungchih wrote: "The Party organisations must accept tsaofans, who are boundlessly devoted to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.''
Actually this was not a measure aimed at revitalising the Party. It had been disorganised and its members had been subjected to merciless persecution by the Maoists with the definite purpose of ``building'' a new political organisation, which would retain only the external appearance of the CPC and part of its former members.
By paralysing and destroying the network of Party organisations and abolishing the people's committees, Mao Tse-tung and his henchmen undermined the Party's leading role in society and disrupted its direction of social affairs. The military control established throughout the country could make good this loss only temporarily and partially. In the autumn of 1967, therefore, the Maoists began to speak of "reorganising the Party" and preparing for the Ninth Congress of the CPC. However, the plan to hold the congress in the spring and then in the autumn of 1968 did not materialise.
Mao Tse-tung intends to use the so-called Ninth Congress 189 of the CPC to legalise the "new order" and consolidate his military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
In the name of the "12th plenary meeting" it was officially announced that the Ninth Party Congress had to be held "at a suitable time''. Jenmin Jihpao recently specified that the congress would be convened in 1969. In the Chinese press, as in the communique of the "12th plenary meeting'', it is stressed that "the ideological, political and organisational conditions have now been fully prepared for the Ninth AllChina Congress of the Party''.
By "ideological conditions" they mean the final legalisation of the replacement of Marxism-Leninism by Maoism. In the communique it is stated that the ``thought'' of Mao Tse-tung "is for our whole Party, our whole Army and our whole country the guide in any work''.
The present CPC Rules, in which it is recorded that "in its activities the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism" and which, according to Party norms, can only be amended at a Party Congress, have long ago been labelled as ``revisionist'' by the Mao group.
The draft Rules of the Maoist party contain a provision stating that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung is the theoretical foundation of the CPC''. It will be recalled that in 1945, when the Maoists set out to gain complete control of the Party they compelled the Seventh Congress of the CPC to include in the Rules the provision, under the guise of " Sinicising Marxism'', that the "thought of Mao" plays the leading role in the Party. This provision was deleted from the Rules in 1956 by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. Today, having destroyed the Communist Party, Mao and his henchmen have proclaimed this ``thought'' the theoretical foundation not only of the CPC but of the entire international communist movement. This has been made plain by Yao Wen-yuan, a Mao henchman, who said: "In China the question of the absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung has been settled. The task is now to establish its absolute authority throughout the world.''
The programme provisions of the CPC, adopted at the Eighth Congress, have been expunged from the draft new Rules drawn up by the "group for cultural revolution affairs" and, as is reported, discussed at the "12th plenary meeting''. Similarly, the Maoists have swept overboard all the fundamental decisions of the Eighth Congress on home and foreign 190 policy, planned economic development, industrialisation, the utmost satisfaction of the people's material and cultural requirements, the surmounting of Great-Han chauvinism, a peace-loving foreign policy, and so on. The programme introduction to the draft Rules contains no mention of any positive tasks in socialist construction in China.
Chauvinism and anti-Sovietism occupy a major place in Mao's ideological platform. In contravention of the decisions of the Eighth Congress calling for closer friendship and solidarity with the CPSU, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the draft Rules of the emergent Maoist party demand that its members fight the Soviet Union and the CPSU. The hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet policies of Mao Tse-tung are thus raised to the level of an official Party programme.
This reactionary platform is reiterated in the communique of the "12th plenary meeting''. It overflows with abuse at the Soviet Union and the CPSU. Possessed with the idea of achieving hegemony, the Maoists have broken completely with the class approach. They place the USA and the Soviet Union in one and the same category and call upon their supporters to "organise a broad united front" against US imperialism and the Soviet Union. They have abandoned the idea of friendship and solidarity with countries of the socialist community.
Recent actions and statements by the Maoists, like the documents of the "plenary meeting'', demonstrate that GreatPower chauvinism underlies their general line and that they are determined to legalise this line at the Ninth Congress of the CPC and start a broad ideological offensive against the socialist community and collective organisations of fraternal countries.
The communique of the "12th plenary meeting" mirrors the intention of the Maoists to continue setting up proPeking groups in opposition to the international communist movement. Meanwhile, the Mao group is persevering in its savage attacks against the preparations for an international meeting of fraternal Parties.
Acceptance of the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic, antiSoviet platform as the ideological foundation of the Party implies a complete break with proletarian and socialist internationalism. The Maoists want other peoples to recognise Mao Tse-tung as "leader, teacher, helmsman and general''. 191 Hegemonism, chauvinism, anti-Sovietism, subversion and divisive activities in the communist movement are the basic principles behind the international activities of the Maoists.
The "political conditions" for convening a congress of the Maoist party are created by eliminating unsuitable Party cadres, who are now called agents of Liu Shao-chi. The demand of the "12th plenary meeting" that "accounts should further be settled" with Liu Shao-chi and "his accomplices" pursues the purpose of intimidating Communists. The sharp edge of the new Party purge, which has been intensified since the"plenary meeting'', is directed mainly against Communists upholding the general line approved by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. The "plenary meeting`s'' sharp condemnation of the attempts to exonerate a section of the Party cadres shows that Mao and his entourage are not making any concessions on this issue. The Communists and working people of China have been placed before the accomplished fact of a radical turn in China's political line, illegal from the standpoint of the Constitution of the PRC and the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, and of the creation of a military-bureaucratic regime.
The "organisational conditions" for the Ninth Congress of the CPC are being created by militarising the Party. The Party is being organised on Army principles. A striking picture of the Maoists' rupture with the organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party is given by the abovementioned draft Rules, which are to be submitted to the Ninth Congress of the CPC. From the CPC Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress, the Maoists have struck out the provisions on democratic centralism, inner-Party democracy, collective leadership, the cohesion and unity of the Party and the impermissibility of divisive, factional activity and of attempts to set an individual above the collective. " Absolute devotion to Chairman Mao, to his thought 'and political line" (Lin Piao) has been declared the criterion of Party membership.
There is not a hint of inner-Party democracy in the draft Rules. To all intents and purposes, the Maoists have renounced the electivity of all leading Party bodies from top to bottom. According to this draft, the Party committees of all levels, including the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, are not elected but ``formed''. 192 The significance of the Party National Congress and its Central Committee as the highest collective leading organs of the Party has been minimised. Their powers have not been defined, and nothing is said about the procedure for convening a congress. The reservations about "special conditions" introduced into the draft Rules make it possible to postpone convening congresses indefinitely. No time limit is set for holding plenary meetings of the CC. The CC Secretariat is done away with. In the preamble to the draft Rules Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao are named as the candidates for the post of CC Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. The Maoists have thereby adopted the monarchist principle of succession. The preamble officially names Lin Piao as the "successor of Comrade Mao Tse-tung''.
As understood by Mao Tse-tung and explained by Jenmin Jihpao, proletarian discipline means the following: "We must carry out Chairman Mao's instructions regardless of whether we understand or as yet do not understand their meaning. We must consolidate the absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.. . . This is the highest discipline.''
The Leninist principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority is denounced as ``opportunist'' and `` revisionist''.
The whole course of the preparations for the congress lays bare the anti-Leninist designs of its organisers. In a notification issued by the "group for cultural revolution affairs" it is pointed out that "it would be better to appoint the delegates to the congress from the top''. The selection of delegates has been entrusted to Kang Sheng and Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's wife. In this they are guided by Mao Tse-tung's statement: "What is democracy? I do not believe in elections generally.'' A directive to select a definite number of delegates, chiefly Army representatives and tsaofans, has been issued from Peking. The Maoists thus renounce all democratic principles of Party activity, replacing them with absolute centralism. This is turning the Party into a bureaucratic organisation and leads to its degeneration.
The practical work of ``adjusting'' and ``reorganising'' the Party and of preparing for the Ninth Congress is directed by the "group for cultural revolution affairs" in the centre and by the "revolutionary committees" in the localities. Reports have appeared in the Chinese press to the effect that the __PRINTERS_P_193_COMMENT__ 13---2466 193 admission of tsaofans into the Party has begun. This is handled not by Party organisations but by the "revolutionary committees''.
The "adjusted and reorganised" Party is thus accorded the role of a tool of Mao Tse-tung's military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
Recent developments make it obvious
that in China the foundations of socialism are being steadily
eroded. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the Mao
group diverted the Party and the nation from the political
line of the Eighth Congress of the CPC aimed at building
socialism in China in close co-operation with the USSR and
other fraternal countries. A considerable number of Party
and Government cadres objectionable to Mao Tse-tung have
been repressed and removed from public activity with the
help of the Army, the hungweipings and the tsaofans. The
political superstructure of the people's democratic society
has been superseded by a military-bureaucratic regime
founded on the hierarchy of "revolutionary committees''. At
present it is hard to say if the "revolutionary committees"
will remain as permanent organs of power or will be replaced
by other bodies more suitable for ensuring the power of Mao
Tse-tung and his group. For the time being they are described
as the "ideal and most perfect form of authority''.
Although the Maoists have temporarily attained their objectives they have come up against immense difficulties in administering China's political and economic affairs. This compels them to preserve some of the organisational forms and attributes that existed prior to the "cultural revolution''. In particular, this is explained by the Maoists' manoeuvres in connection with the "12th plenary meeting" and with the forthcoming Ninth Congress of the CPC. Their attempts to liquidate the CPC are encountering growing resistance from rank-and-file Communists and millions of other politicallyconscious people in China. This is demonstrated by the very fact that having demolished the Party organisations the Maoists nonetheless use the name of CC CPC as a cover. They are afraid of being exposed and, therefore, all mass media are used to dupe the Chinese people, to give them no 194 opportunity to see the actual situation in the country and the real reasons for their sufferings.
Renunciation by the Maoists of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC means that they have abandoned the planned building of the material basis of socialism. But the lesson of history is that evasion or disregard of economic problems does not mean that these problems disappear. Chinese society still stands before acute and vital problems such as industrialisation and the accumulation of means for its implementation, the modernisation of and the attainment of greater efficiency in agriculture, the training of scientific and technological personnel and the abolition of illiteracy. Recent years have shown that the ``thought'' and policy of Mao Tsetung cannot serve as the basis for the successful solution of these problems in the interests of the Chinese people, in the interests of socialism. Since such is the case, it means that Mao Tse-tung's victories over his adversaries, his ``triumph'', stand on a wobbling foundation.
__*_*_*__Having broken with Marxism, with scientific socialism, Mao Tse-tung is feverishly whipping up nationalism. He is particularly afraid of the impact on the Chinese people of the example of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He and his group regard slander against them as a major means of deceiving the masses and maintaining the class consciousness and political literacy of the people at a low level.
A great calamity has overcome the Chinese people. This cannot but disturb many Chinese Communists, who are pondering where the Mao group is leading China. In the different strata of Chinese society there are forces trying to counter the anti-popular line of the Maoists, safeguard the gains of the revolution and uphold the line adopted at the Eighth Congress of the CPC. This frightens Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. While ruthlessly repressing Communist-- internationalists and everybody else who cherishes the gains of socialism, the Mao group is compelled to camouflage its policy in an effort to confuse and split the healthy forces in Chinese society and prevent their consolidation on a Marxist-Leninist platform.
Impelled by their friendship for the great Chinese people, __PRINTERS_P_195_COMMENT__ 13* 195 Soviet people, like all other fighters for the cause of communism throughout the world, express the confidence that under the leadership of Communists the Chinese people will sooner or later surmount the pernicious consequences of Maoist policy and regain their place among the peoples building socialism and communism.
The policy and actions of Mao Tse-tung over the past period of a little more than ten years strikingly demonstrate the ideological bankruptcy of Maoism. The experience of present developments in their country is making the Communists and all working people of China see for themselves that they can return to the highroad of progress, fraternal co-operation with all socialist countries, peace and friendship with all nations only by following the path delineated by the internationalist teaching of Marxism-Leninism, resurrecting the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party and restoring it to its leading role in society.
[196] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Gyula D\'enes For many months world public opinion
and the press have been focussing their attention on the
developments in the People's Republic of China. A group of leaders
of the Communist Party of China have created a situation
and proclaimed a line in home and foreign policy which
depart farther and farther away from the building of a
socialist state and society and, in many respects, clash with
the principles and practice of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism.
The line adopted by Mao Tse-tung and his group has dislocated China's economy, caused a regression in social relations, artificially exacerbated contradictions and, in the long run, led to massacres and mass arrests. In the international arena Mao and his supporters have openly embraced a chauvinistic policy, ceased co-operating with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, separated and isolated themselves from the Third World and launched actions which increase international tension. Particularly grave consequences have ensued from the attempts of the CPC leadership to force the international communist and working-class movement to accept their special line and at present, instead of concentrating forces on the common struggle against imperialism, the main blow is being aimed at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal Parties.
The Communist and Workers' Parties and all other progressive forces in the world are watching these consequences with deep anxiety. They are, of course, affording satisfaction to the imperialist camp. In a recent issue the American magazine US News & World Report wrote that American officials _-_-_
^^*^^ Tdrsadalmi Szemle, No. 4, 1967 (Hungarian People's Republic).
197 were inclined to wish Mao Tse-tung victory on the consideration that this would cause the Soviet Union further embarrassment. On February 11--12, 1967 The New York "Times carried a report on an international conference in Chicago attended by more than 70 American, West European and Asian "academic specialists on China''. This conference discussed policy towards China. According to the newspaper, "several participants asserted that it was more in American interest in the short run to see the militant faction of Chairman Mao Tse-tung win Communist China's power struggle than his opposition''. Their basic argument was that Mao's supporters wanted a break with the Soviet Union and were not inclined towards united action with the USSR in matters related to assistance for Vietnam.Experts offer the most diverse viewpoints on the causes behind the tragic developments in China. Some explain everything as being simply the outcome of a power struggle between various groups in the Chinese leadership. Others believe that the "cultural revolution" was a necessary means of suppressing popular discontent deriving from the economic difficulties in China. Still others hold that the political objective of Map Tse-tung and his supporters is to build up a social and material foundation for their hegemonistic, Great-Power ambitions. According to other theories the recent developments have their roots in the past. The proponents of these theories refer to a series of factors such as China's inherited backwardness, the nature of Chinese society which is predominantly peasant and petty-bourgeois (the working class comprises about two per cent of the population), Great-Power nationalism deeply rooted even among the masses, and the hegemonistic aspirations of the leadership.
There are grounds for each of these theories. However, the most important factor is that instead of dedicated creative work and socialist principles and methods of education, a petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionary and adventurist spirit has come to the fore in the solution of the problems of Chinese society. The difficulties growing out of voluntaristic views and aspirations have evoked desperation and protests among part of the masses and Party cadres. The "cultural revolution" was used by the Mao group first to muzzle and then suppress these protests.
With the victory of the people's revolution China became a Great Power in the world if only by virtue of her huge 198 population and of the unity achieved for the first time in several decades. At the same time, this victory brought with it new problems: China had to fight the heritage of centuryold imperialist colonisation, backwardness, and the blockade enforced by US imperialism. Today one can clearly see the extent to which the plans of the Chinese leadership have been motivated by the determination to create in defence, economy and politics the means that would give China the status of a Great Power. In the early years this determination was of positive significance: China established a firm alliance with the USSR and, with its assistance, launched on mammoth industrialisation. The Chinese revolution put an end to the rule of the exploiting classes in the countryside, gave rise to agricultural co-operatives, limited the possessions of the national bourgeoisie, and then gradually turned these possessions into state property and created the conditions for building a socialist society. The result of this policy was that for the first time in a hundred years it became possible to put an end to famine and raise the people's standard of living. This line thus proved to be fruitful, enhancing China's internal strength and her international prestige.
However, instead of engaging in political and economic activity ensuring the country's development through further persevering work, a group of Chinese leaders, guided by petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionary sentiments, launched a drive for ostentatious successes and quick results. In 1958, on Mao Tse-tung's initiative, the Communist Party of China adopted a voluntaristic, Great-Power policy. The "big leap" was an attempt to achieve communism by the shortest route, bypassing all intermediate stages of development. Ignoring objective laws the Chinese leaders sought to outstrip all other countries in a "single leap" and create the material basis for their hegemonistic ambitions. These ambitions induced the Peking leaders to proclaim the Trotskyite programme of "world revolution''. Mao Tse-tung and his group advanced the slogan: "Three years of hard work and ten thousand years of prosperity''; but the "big leap" proved to be a fiasco from which the country has not yet recovered.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ In order to conceal the actual state of the economy, no statistics have been published in China for several years. Experts believed that the consequences of the "big leap" were not eradicated even as late as 1964: industrial output has in many ways remained at the 1958 level. The rupture of trade relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist __NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 200. 199 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1970/MTEC326/20080521/299.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.05.23) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+
The "big leap" was accompanied by the proclamation of Peking's "new revolutionary strategy" in the international communist and working-class movement. That was when the Chinese leaders began their ideological and then political debate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Parties of other socialist countries. In subsequent years they made increasingly open attempts to impose their ultra-revolutionary views on these Parties, and when these attempts failed they launched a vicious political campaign against the socialist countries, chiefly the Soviet Union, leaving imperialism alone. During the past few years Mao and his group have done everything in their power to split the international working-class movement and the socialist community.
The fact that the true implications of the many ideological ``delusions'' of the Chinese leaders have come to light, the fact that they have time and again grossly interfered in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties and countries, belittled the fraternal Parties and obstructed unity against the forces of imperialism, the fact that they have engaged in subversion and divisive activities in international democratic organisations has diminished China's prestige in the world and placed her in increasing isolation. Even those who had at first been misled have turned away from Peking. The Chinese theories are, almost without exception, adopted only by splinter groups, which have no influence to speak of. They have been rejected by the main forces of the international working-class movement, by the Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers' Parties.
The adventurist line in foreign policy and the collapse of the unrealistic plans at home have given rise to protests against the Maoist policies even in China. This is clearly demonstrated by developments in the Communist Party of China. Life developed normally in the Party in the initial years of socialist construction, when its general line was correct and expressed the united will of the leaders and the masses. Policies were charted and approved at congresses. But no congress has "been convened since 1956 despite the fact that a _-_-_ __NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 199. countries has seriously affected the Chinese economy. The development of atomic weapons, which has absorbed vast resources, is a heavy burden on the weak economy. Last year, the economy was dealt another blow, this time by the "cultural revolution''.
200 group of leaders has fundamentally revised the political guideline adopted in 1956. Moreover, even plenary meetings of the Central Committee have not been called for a number of years.However, the Maoists obviously regarded their encroachments on Party democracy as insufficient for the attainment of all their objectives. Therefore, parallel with these encroachments, they used Party and Government organs to enhance the role of the Army, which was under the command of Lin Piao. This prepared the military basis for the " cultural revolution''. Lin Piao became the most consistent exponent of the "thought of Mao''. He abolished ranks in the Army and then, in November, formulated the "five points'', the first of which prescribes the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung, and the fourth states that military leaders should be appointed to key posts.
When this proved inadequate, the Mao group started the "cultural revolution'', which, of course, has nothing in common with the Marxist interpretation of this concept, namely, that the working class and peasants master the cultural achievements and the knowledge which formerly the bourgeoisie regarded as its exclusive domain. Neither has the "cultural revolution" anything in common with culture: it began with attacks on intellectuals and went over to the rejection and destruction of cultural values, to the closure of schools for many long months. The "cultural content" of this movement consists in studying the works of Mao Tse-tung, the practical learning by heart of phrases from books of Mao quotations published in incalculable editions; the organisers of the "cultural revolution" believe that this replaces everything else. (``One can deny oneself food, and also sleep, but not the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung,'' wrote the newspaper Kuangming Jihpao.} Consequently, in the given case culture meant a means of mass influence for putting hegemonistic aspirations into effect, dealing summarily with doubters and dissenters and establishing an unparalleled cult of Mao Tsetung's personality.
But one no longer hears anything of revolution. True, for several months there were street demonstrations of mobs of hungweipings and tsaofans, but they were openly and officially directed from above by a group of leaders united around Mao Tse-tung. In continuing the struggle for power, these leaders dislocated production, removed Party and 201 government cadres from responsible posts, ordered free transport on the railways, provided free accommodation and food for several million hungweipings and thereby precipitated an economic crisis and the threat of inflation. They used the so-called red guards, recruited from among immature, inexperienced and politically illiterate young people, against their political adversaries. This has nothing in common with the concept of revolution.
Who are the sides in the political campaign called the "cultural revolution''?
Although this campaign was officially announced by Chou En-lai on April 30, 1966, it really got under way later when it became obvious that it was encountering stiff resistance. Much later it was ascertained who had initiated it, and only early this year it was officially stated who it was directed against. This makes preceding developments more understandable.
In the Mao group a key role is played by Defence Minister Lin Piao. The "group for cultural revolution affairs" is headed by Chen Po-ta, editor of Hungchih, the Party's theoretical journal. An important role is played by Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's wife.
Furthermore, it has come to light who the organisers of the "cultural revolution" regard as their principal political adversaries. This year, already in official documents, it was stated that the trend represented by the President of the Republic Liu Shao-chi and the General Secretary of the CPC Teng Hsiao-ping "must be crushed''. Peking's former mayor Peng Chen, former member of the Political Bureau Peng Tehhuai, Marshal Chu Teh and the former Chief of the General Staff Lo Jui-ching have also been denounced as enemies of the "cultural revolution''.
All the indications are that the adversaries of Mao Tsetung's line have clashed with him and his group for the most diverse reasons and that not all the divergences are over a principled line. According to available information, Mao and his group are fighting for personal power and this struggle is directed against individuals among the Party and Government leadership and also against persons who have stated dissenting views on various issues but have given no cause for believing that they desire a change of general policy.
It is becoming clear that a serious internal struggle over some basic issues of policy had been going on in the CPC 202 during the years preceding the "cultural revolution''. This was mirrored in the early 1960s by the policy of `` adjustment'', which, in effect, was no more than a modification of the "big leap" and the system of people's communes. Confirmation that this is so is to be found in the ``critical'' statements published in the course of the present internal struggle. For instance, in its issue No. 18 for January the newspaper Hungweiping Pao ``accused'' Lo Jui-ching of having opposed the line of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao in the Army. The same newspaper asserted that four former political and military leaders---Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun---"were preparing a counter-revolutionary putsch in order to seize control of the Party, Army and the Government''. This newspaper called Yang Shang-kun, Secretary of the Central Committee, a traitor and revisionist for considering the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung a piece of formalism and vulgarisation and stating that all problems could not be resolved by reading the works of Mao. Furthermore, he held that China's general political line was not in keeping with the spirit of the times and stressed that the years of the "big leap" have thrown China's economy back by at least five years.
Although there is at present no possibility of elucidating the nature of the various opposing forces and the actions of individuals and groups, the reports in the Peking press in any case show that the former associates of the CPC Chairman are precisely the people against whom, according to the leaders of the "cultural revolution'', "Chairman Mao must be protected''.
The entire course of the "cultural revolution" is evidence of the strong resistance encountered by the Mao group. This is explained by the drawn-out nature and dramatic consequences of the campaign. As soon as it started so-called workers' groups were sent to all Party committees and government organs on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi. Formally, the task of these groups was to implement the " cultural revolution'', but actually the exact opposite took place, namely, the nullification of Mao Tse-tung's plans. Later, therefore, instructions were issued on the recall of these workers' groups.
Press reports are making it clear that when, after a long interval, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee was convened in August 1966, the Mao group was strong enough 203 to obtain approval of the home and foreign policy that it had been pursuing for a period of four years and to ensure official sanction for the "cultural revolution''. However, they failed to get an absolute majority of the votes on each issue for they were unable to remove all their adversaries from the Central Committee. But the Central Committee's approval of this campaign created a situation enabling the organisers of the "cultural revolution" to attempt to do away singly with those they had been unable to cope with at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee.
In the autumn of 1966, simultaneously with the appearance of many millions of hungweipings, the Communist Youth League was, in effect, liquidated and an offensive was started on Party organs and Party cadres. It was then clear that there were large forces resisting the "cultural revolution''. Many Party and Government organs in the provinces denounced the "cultural revolution" and strong resistance was offered by workers at factories and in the trade unions, for they were also attacked by the hungweipings. Even the leaders of the campaign were cautious in their approach to the rural areas. Various opposition forces used the situation to form their own "red guards''. In its January issue the magazine Hungchih lists a numerous group which "was pursuing an erroneous line''. Counter-revolutionary groups evidently could and did emerge and became active in that situation, and this further intensified the incredible political muddle. Consequently, confusion mounted in this period and internal creative work was jeopardised. However, even at the price of all this the Mao group failed to break the internal resistance.
The leaders of the "cultural revolution" were thus compelled to bring in the Army to achieve the objectives of the campaign. Prior to this they had endeavoured to avoid making open use of armed force. On the one hand, they were kept in check by the unseemliness of this step and, on the other hand, they took the following circumstance into account: a far-reaching reshuffle had been necessary in the preceding months because Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao felt they had not had the unanimous backing of the Army.
At the close of January Hungchih called on the hungweipings and the Army supporting them to "seize power" from the former Party and government organs and set up "new organs of power''. This absurd idea of setting up "new 204 organs of power" by ``smashing'' the Party and administrative organs of a socialist state demonstrated the Mao group's determination to deal summarily with tested fighters of the socialist revolution and dedicated builders of the new society, and it showed its readiness to sacrifice key organs and gains of the revolution on the altar of their ambitions.
This, evidently, was not fortuitous. The experienced, old cadres had a knowledge not only of the "thought of Mao" but of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, while the mobs of young people, who were brought out into the streets under the slogan of "cultural revolution'', had been raised in the Maoist aggressive nationalistic spirit and had no inkling of the theory of scientific socialism. These young people could therefore be easily deceived with demagogic slogans and used for any purpose.
In mass agitation the stress is on the propagation of Mao Tse-tung's nationalistic and voluntaristic views on an unprecedented scale, the whipping up of Great-Power chauvinism and the encouragement of anti-Soviet sentiments. The organisers of the "cultural revolution" are out to prepare the Chinese people for further sacrifices for the sake of the Mao group's Great-Power ambitions. The Maoists ar.e bent on creating the means for their policies and building up China's military capability, and to these ends the Chinese people are required to agree to a lower living standard, to a growth of the intensity of labour, to the abandonment of their modest material blessings. The protest of the workers was expressed in strikes and in actions against the hungweipings. The Mao group has accused veteran workers defending the people's interest of ``economism'', charging that "they are trying to bribe the working class with economic benefits''. Here the Maoists underscore their demand that a "rational low wage must be established'', that "in production the striving must be for high results, while in life one can be content with little''.
The baiting of Party and government cadres has had an adverse resonance throughout China. This compelled the Mao group to undertake a new manoeuvre. It made haste to give the impression that it did not approve the campaign against Government and Party cadres, that it wanted to draw closer to them. Jenmin Jihpao called on the tsaofans to refrain from indiscriminate attacks on veteran cadres, to refrain from persecuting those "who have made mistakes but are prepared to reform''. The Mao group withdrew the 205 fanatic mobs of hungweipings and tsaofans from the streets and called for the "unity of broad circles''.
There were two reasons behind this change. First, the Maoists were forced to manoeuvre because the hungweipings and tsaofans proved to be unable to crush the resistance they were encountering all over China. The change of tactics pursued the objective of politically dividing the opposition and giving the leaders of the "cultural revolution" the possibility of mustering their forces for the next ``coup''. The second reason was that months after the beginning of the "cultural revolution" China found herself in greater economic difficulties than ever before. Production was dislocated as a result of the attack on Party and economic leaders accused of revisionism and as a result of the ensuing anarchy. Factories remained idle for long periods of time. The railways were brought to the verge of paralysis. In many provinces the communes were pillaged and the peasants were unable to start the spring sowing. Consequently, it was found impossible to do completely without experienced cadres, to avert the looming catastrophe without them. In March Prime Minister Chou En-lai made a series of public statements in which he urged the "revolutionary masses" to "unite the three forces'', ensure the continuity of production and press forward with the ``revolution'' on a more civilised and higher political level than hitherto. These statements expressed a certain striving for consolidation.
The slogan calling for the "unity of broad circles'', proclaimed by the magazine Hungchih, implies that in order to "seize power" the three forces---the Army, the tsaofans and the Party cadres devoted to Chairman Mao---have to unite. In practice this line has given the Maoists key positions in the Army. Army representatives have the decisive say in the "provisional leading organs" formed in the towns and villages and embodying both state and Party authority. Economic and political life throughout the country is controlled by the Army. At mass rallies organised by the Army sentences are passed on "counter-revolutionary elements" openly opposing the "thought of Mao''. The press, radio, the post and all sorts of offices are under the direct control of Army representatives. The military were the main organisers of the spring sowing and took a direct part in the opening of the new school year in March.
However, basic policy did not change. The "cultural 206 revolution" is a sweeping attempt to' give Chinese society a military orientation. At the same time, it eradicates the principal features of socialist democracy and suspends the functions and role of the proletarian dictatorship. Moreover, it sustains bellicose sentiments among the population.
The divisive, anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy grew more aggressive than before in the course of this political campaign, and this artificially exacerbated Soviet-Chinese relations and led to unprecedented provocations. Abusing the Soviet Union's exclusively patient and restrained behaviour, the Maoists laid siege to the Soviet Embassy in Peking in February; elsewhere they fomented all sorts of provocations against the Soviet Union and against its citizens and diplomats. The hungweipings organised provocations against diplomatic representatives of other socialist countries, Hungary among them. The Maoists want to make the Chinese believe that they are ``threatened'' and thereby unite the masses by playing on unbridled nationalistic feelings. Another reason for the growing antiSoviet sentiments is that the Soviet people's labour achievements bring out the failure of Mao Tse-tung's policy in striking relief. That is why the Chinese leaders attack the policy of the CPSU, demand that the socialist countries scale down their standard of living and abandon their policy of promoting socialist democracy and building socialism.
During the "cultural revolution" the Chinese leaders brought into prominence other negative features of their foreign policy. The brutal US aggression against the people of Vietnam demands that the socialist countries should act together in helping the victim of aggression. The Chinese leaders, however, not only refuse to take joint action against aggression but impede military and political assistance to Vietnam from the socialist countries. By so doing they play into the hands of US imperialist policy, pouring grist on the mill of the Washington extremist circles, who are going all out to escalate the barbarous aggression against the Vietnamese people.
While stepping anti-Soviet sentiments the Chinese leaders are establishing ever broader contacts with leading imperialist countries, the USA, for example. China's trade with capitalist countries is growing while her turnover with socialist countries is diminishing.
The leaders of the "cultural revolution" turn a blind eye 207 to the fact that their home and foreign policy line is being increasingly condemned by the international working-class movement and other progressive forces and that in recent months this line has alienated even those who had supported Mao Tse-tung's policies.
Everything that the Maoists proclaim and carry out in the name of the CPC concerns not only China. It affects other countries because the Chinese leaders proclaim their experience universal and compulsory for socialist countries, for the international communist and working-class movement. At the same time, in the eyes of many people this theory and practice discredit the ideals of socialism. They are alien to Marxism-Leninism, inflict enormous harm on the international communist and working-class movement, undermine socialist unity and are a terrible ordeal for the fraternal Chinese people.
The socialist forces throughout the world are therefore anxiously following the developments in China, developments that may for a long time influence the future of the Chinese revolution. On the one hand, it is a fact that in China the Communists and the broad masses of the people have set their hearts on socialism, that public ownership of the means of production and the existence of agricultural co-operatives have created the objective conditions for the building of socialism. On the other hand, the general line of the present leaders of the CPC---petty-bourgeois adventurism in home policy and chauvinistic, Great-Power hegemonism in foreign policy---threaten achieved results and the possibility of socialist construction, and their further tenure of power would mean a deviation in the development of Chinese society.
The political struggle goes on. Two prospects face China: the continuation of the anti-Leninist, adventurist policy of the Mao group, which can only bring China further grave difficulties at home and abroad, or a return to MarxistLeninist principles, which would lead to an economic upsurge and the normalisation of relations with the socialist community and other progressive forces in the world. It is our firm belief that the healthy forces in the Communist Party of China will sooner or later gain the upper hand and once again lead their people along the road of socialism, along the road of the joint anti-imperialist struggle of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties.
[208] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Mitsugu Hashimoto The specific situation that has taken
shape in China as a result of the "great proletarian cultural
revolution''; the Great-Power divisive activity,
unprecedented in the international communist movement for its extreme
brazenness, against the Communist Party of Japan and the
Japanese democratic movement; and the violent ``militant''
activity in the international communist movement with the
purpose of establishing the absolute domination of the Mao
Tse-tung group and the so-called "thought of Mao
Tsetung" and of spreading discord have arrested the attention
of Marxists-Leninists throughout the world, of all those who
strive for independence and democracy, for peace and
socialism. Today we are witnessing a grave threat to the
development of the Chinese revolution, in the course of which
epochmaking successes have been scored; we are witnessing tragic
developments which should not have taken place in the life
of the Chinese people who created People's China at the
price of colossal sacrifice and as a result of a long
revolutionary struggle; we are witnessing new trials in the
international communist movement.
What gave rise to this situation in socialist China where power is concentrated in the hands of the proletariat and is exercised through the Communist Party of China, which led the great Chinese revolution to victory? Why is this unusual situation assuming such a colossal scale? Why are ultra-Left-opportunist, Great-Power errors multiplying without end?
This must evidently be elucidated by an analysis of the _-_-_
^^*^^ Zen-el, No. 3, 1968 (Japan).
__PRINTERS_P_209_COMMENT__ 14--2466 209 problems affecting many spheres. However, it has now become clear which problem is the most important, so to say, most essential. It is the problem deriving from the renunciation of the Marxist-Leninist Party itself, which, as the Statement of the 1960 Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties declares, is "accountable to the international working-class movement for the successful building of socialism and communism''.^^*^^ What we are witnessing in China is the undermining of the Communist Party and its conversion into a domain of the Mao Tse-tung group.On October 10, 1967, in an editorial headed "The Present Line of Mao Tse-tung and the International Communist Movement'', Akahata, organ of the Communist Party of Japan, characterised the true situation in connection with the "great proletarian cultural revolution" and pointed out that its basic objective was "to establish the Mao group's absolute domination" over the Party and the state. The editorial said:
``In the course of the so-called 'great proletarian cultural revolution' the Mao Tse-tung group has flagrantly trampled on Party discipline and carried out on a large scale the liquidation and conversion into its domain of various organisations of the Communist Party of China, the leading contingent of the Chinese revolution.''
The liquidation of the Communist Party of China and its conversion into the domain of Mao Tse-tung's personal entourage are the most essential aspects of the "great proletarian cultural revolution''. It is the ``key'' to understanding the present abnormal situation and the ultra-Left-- opportunist and Great-Power errors that are being committed in the name of the Communist Party of China on a steadily growing scale. The fact that the liquidationist ``theory'' and practice of the Mao group is not confined to China is of extremely great significance. The Mao group and the foreign elements blindly following it are extending their subversion and divisive intrigues with the ultimate aim of establishing the domination of the Mao group over the international communist movement. As regards the situation in Japan, the liquidationist assaults on our Party through the "great _-_-_
^^*^^ The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, p. 52.
210 proletarian cultural revolution" are, it goes without saying, being made by elements blindly following the Mao group as well as by anti-Party revisionists, a section of the Right Social-Democrats and anti-communist intellectuals.It is consequently of extremely great importance if in the struggle against the Mao group's subversion against our Party and the democratic movement in our country, against the international communist movement, we expose and smash its liquidationist ``theory'' and practice.
In the following section, on the basis of the lessons of Lenin's struggle against liquidationism, we shall try to show the substance and some salient features of the Mao group's liquidationist policy.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 2. Lenin's Struggle Against The struggle against liquidationism
occupies an exceedingly important place in the history of
the Marxist-Leninist Party. This is particularly true of the
period when, in accordance with the demands of the epoch
of the proletarian revolution, Lenin formed and
strengthened a Party of a new type, a genuinely revolutionary
Party. In those years liquidationism came forward in various
extreme forms of opportunism. The Leninist Party was
created and strengthened in bitter struggle against
liquidationism. This enabled Lenin exhaustively to show the
substance and basic features of liquidationism.
Naturally, the present liquidationist policy of the Mao group has features distinguishing it from earlier liquidationism and requiring attention. This liquidationism manifested itself in a socialist country, in a Party in power. Moreover, far from rejecting the need for a revolutionary Party, the Mao group, which has adopted liquidationism as its political line, acts in the name of the "Party CC" and defines the "great proletarian cultural revolution" as a struggle against "a handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road'', a handful which is "trying to seize the Party and the Government..., turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, turn __PRINTERS_P_211_COMMENT__ 14* 211 the Communist Party into a revisionist party''. This struggle is defined as "a great revolution called upon to prevent the degeneration of the political Party of the proletariat into a revisionist political party" (Hungchih, November 1967). The Mao group is going forward with the "great proletarian cultural revolution" under the screen of "great principles and moral obligations" requiring the "purity and strengthening of the proletarian Party''. However, the real course of events over the past two years has shown that despite the Mao group's frantic efforts to embellish it, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in practice represents pure liquidationism directed at rejecting and disbanding the Party. Further, both in substance and by virtue of its principal feature, the Mao group's liquidationist line is, as far as the Marxist-Leninist Party is concerned, nothing less than a revival of the obvious errors which Lenin had so exhaustively exposed and criticised.
Consequently, it must be said that repeated explanations of the basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism, which Lenin brought to light in connection with the struggle against liquidationism, are today particularly instructive.
While resolutely upholding and strengthening the revolutionary Party and uncompromisingly fighting liquidationism, Lenin exhaustively exposed its substance and features, no matter what shape it took---Menshevist liquidationism of the Right in the period of the Stolypin reaction after the first Russian revolution of 1905 (the liquidators), or the liquidationism of the ``Left'', which at the time manifested itself in the form of petty-bourgeois vacillation among Bolsheviks (the otzovists), or the most pernicious liquidationism of Trotsky, who sought to set up a liquidationist ``party'' by uniting anti-Bolshevik factions, including the liquidators and others.
Drawing a distinction between the general substance of liquidationism and opportunism as a whole, which can exist as a trend in the Party, and underscoring the special importance of the struggle against it, Lenin wrote:
``Of course, liquidationism is ideologically connected with renegacy, with the renunciation of the programme and tactics, with opportunism.... But liquidationism is not only opportunism. The opportunists are leading the Party on to a wrong, bourgeois path, the path of a liberal-labour policy, but they do not renounce the Party itself, they do not 212 liquidate it. Liquidationism is that brand of opportunism which goes to the length of renouncing the Party.''^^*^^
Renunciation of the revolutionary Party implies renunciation of the revolution. One can, therefore, probably say that in a certain sense liquidationism is an extreme form of the ``development'' and downfall of opportunism, that it is the most blatant opportunism. Analysing the history of opportunism in Russia, Lenin pointed out that it appeared "first in the form of `economism' and 'legal Marxism' (1895-- 1902), then in the form of Menshevism (1903--1908) and, lastly, in the form of liquidationism (1908--1914)''. He further stressed that it was necessary to distinguish clearly between the Menshevism of 1903--1908, which "wanted to be---and in effect was---an inner-Party trend, one that sought to defend opportunist slogans in 'programmatic discussions' within the workers' Party'',^^**^^ and the liquidationism of 1914.
Some of the features of the liquidationism in Russia exposed and criticised by Lenin are important in laying bare the embellished liquidationist line of the Mao group.
Firstly, the liquidationists in Russia sought to renounce the ``old'' and already existing revolutionary party and strove to create another, ``new'' party, which cannot be called a party. They strove to implement liquidationism in practice with the purpose of disbanding the existing revolutionary Party: the Mensheviks demanded the disbandment of all illegal organisations and insisted on the creation of a ``legal'' Party within the limits to which it would be permitted to exist by the tsarist autocracy; the otzovists demanded the creation of a sectarian ``Party'', which would renounce all legal activity; Trotsky insisted on the creation of a ``Party'' founded on the ``unity'' of factions and thereby losing all semblance to a revolutionary Party.
Lenin wrote that liquidationism stood for direct violation of Party discipline and waged an open factional struggle.
One of the features of liquidationism is its striving to bring the Party down to the level of the unorganised sections of workers. Criticising Vera Zasulich, who had propounded a theory of creating "a broad section of workers" instead of a party and requiring that the party should be regarded as "a broad section of workers .. . who lack _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, ]>. 151.
^^**^^ Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 270.
213 only (!) the opportunity of formally joining a party to found one (!!)'', Lenin assessed this as "saying frankly what all the liquidators are wandering about on the verge of"^^*^^ The merging of the Party with the broad unorganised masses of workers was one of the basic demands of the liquidators in Russia.Another feature of liquidationism, which rejects the principle that the Party should be linked with the class it represents, is that its proponents come out against the Party, relying on the support of workers outside the Party. Criticising the liquidators who had united around the liquidationist newspaper Luch, Lenin wrote: "Thus in opposing the Party, Luch refers to the non-Party workers, or those who are outside the Party. This is the usual method of the liberal who tries to separate the masses from their classconscious vanguard. Luch does not understand the relation between Party and class. . . .''^^**^^
One can say that basically an analogous error was committed by the ``Leftists'' in the Communist Party of Germany, who were subsequently criticised by Lenin, on the subject of the liquidationist debate that flared up as a result of incomprehension of the Marxist-Leninist view on relations between the Party, the class and the masses. They raised questions in vague form: "dictatorship of the Party or dictatorship of the class; dictatorship (Party) of the leaders or dictatorship (Party) of the masses?" and repudiated the "Party principle and Party discipline" by opposing the "dictatorship of the Party'', which meant also the renunciation of the vanguard role of the Party and in the end led them to proclaim "that in general political parties are unnecessary and `bourgeois' ''.^^***^^ Lenin wrote that this was " tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat in the interests of the bourgeoisie. It all adds up to that pettybourgeois diffuseness . .. which, if encouraged, must inevitably destroy any proletarian revolutionary movement'',^^****^^ and subjected it to withering criticism.
Above we examined the substance and some features of liquidationism which were laid bare by Lenin. If in this light we assess the "great proletarian cultural revolution" _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 405.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 165.
^^***^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 41, 43.
^^****^^ Ibid., pp. 43--44.
214 it will become clear that despite the Mao group's claim to being the ``orthodox'' and ``revolutionary'' heir of the CPC, and despite its using the name of the Communist Party of China, one of the essential aspects of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" is unquestionably that it is a reproduction of old liquidationism under new conditions and in a new form. What we are witnessing is clearly nothing but a repetition of the basic features of the liquidationism that was unequivocally exposed by Lenin.In the next section we shall try to review and analyse the practice and ``theory'' of the Mao group's liquidationist policy.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 3. LiquidationSetting the tone for all the propaganda organs in China and claiming to act on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Mao group orders "great proletarian cultural revolution''; similarly, acting in the name of the Communist Party of China and in pursuance of its ultra-Left, opportunist, sectarian policy it engages in Great-Power interference in and subversion against our Party and the Japanese democratic movement.
However, we cannot agree that in its present shape the Mao group, which styles itself the "Communist Party of China'', is the Communist Party of China that led the great Chinese revolution to victory. This is nothing but a specious name given by the Mao group to a party which is not a party, which emerged as a result of the efforts of Mao's immediate circle to disband the CPC and ``re-create'' it in the shape of a personal party exercising absolute domination; it is nothing but a false name for a personal ``leading'' group, which has nothing in common with the Communist Party of China, the heir to revolutionary traditions.
Even on the basis of available information on the situation in China it is obvious that the organisations of the Communist Party of China in the centre and in the localities are being destroyed by the Mao group and are, in fact, on the verge of liquidation; this was made clear by the 215 concrete facts cited in the articles "Peking This Year" written by Junichi Konno and published in the newspaper Akahata since November 5, 1967, and in his "The Course of the 'Great Chinese Cultural Revolution' Such As It Appeared in Seething Peking" published in the February and March issues of our magazine, and in Hiroshi Tatzuki's article " Essence of the So-called 'Struggle for Power' and 'Armed Struggle' " published in the February issue of our magazine.
We, therefore, should like to deal here not with the destruction of the Party by the Mao group but with only some indisputable indications of the fact that the Communist Party of China, which has a revolutionary tradition of more than forty years, is being undermined and liquidated by the Mao group.
Firstly, the Mao group is undermining and seizing the CC CPC, which is the Party's "highest leading organ" in the interim between congresses.
A provisipn of the Rules of the Communist Party of China states that in the interim between congresses, the Central Committee elected by the National Party Congress is the highest leading organ; the question of removing CC members or alternate members from the CC is decided at the National Party Congress; in the event of an emergency "this question may be decided at a plenary meeting of the CC by a majority of more than two-thirds of the votes''.
However, of the 172 members of the CC (excluding deceased) elected at the Eighth Congress, the number attacked by the Mao group during the "proletarian cultural revolution'', removed from office or forced to ``confess'' has, according to the latest information, already reached 107; the Mao group consists of only 15 persons; even if those who support them are added the total will only come to 48. Twothirds of the members and alternate members of the Political Bureau and all members and alternate members of the Secretariat, with the exception of one, have been criticised and attacked by the Mao group and more than half have been removed.
In contravention of the Party Rules and ignoring the legal Central Committee, the Mao group, which numerically does not comprise even one-third of the CC, attacks and removes from office leading- cadres of the CC comprising more than two-thirds of that body; this may be regarded as indisputable proof of the fact that the Mao 216 group, which is a minority body, has abandoned innerParty democracy in favour of violence and completely liquidated the legal CC, that had been formed by the common will of the Party.
Indeed, in August 1966 the Mao group convened the llth plenary meeting of the CC, which approved the "leadership of Mao Tse-tung" and adopted the "great proletarian cultural revolution" as its line. This was done in order to make it appear that the situation had been normalised. However, unilaterally convened by the Mao group in the above-- described situation, when as distinct from the past not even the number of CC members present could be openly announced, in a situation in which the hungweipings were in attendance despite the fact that as members of a non-Party organisation they had no right to take part in the work of a plenary meeting, in a situation in which the hungweipings held political demonstrations and, according to reports, pressure was brought to bear by the section of the Chinese Army controlled by Lin Piao, this can by no means be considered a normal plenary meeting of the CC.
Evidently, one can say that the undermining by the Mao group of the CC CPC, which is the highest leading organ of the Party, and the usurping of its name without adhering to legal procedure in which the common will of the Party is concentrated are a major sign that the Communist Party of China is being demolished, a major indication that the Mao group is liquidating the CPC "from above" and turning it into its own party.
Secondly, in the course of the "struggle for power" waged by the so-called hungweipings and tsaofans, the Mao group attacks Party organs of all levels from without, forcibly undermines them and totally abolishes local Party organs elected at legal Party meetings.
This is graphically described in the article " Revolutionary Experience of the Struggle for Power by Red Tsaofans in Heilungkiang Province" published in the magazine Sekai Seizi Siryo No. 272, in which this experience is called "an outstanding example of the seizure of power''. "Before seizing the higher leading authority of the provincial Party committee'', the tsaofans, organised by the Mao group, "gained control of Left newspapers and radio stations functioning in the name of the proletarian revolution, seized the public security bureau, which is an organ of the dictatorship, 217 and moulded public opinion for the final capture of the citadel of reaction (the provincial Party committee, which is a nest of a handful of people in authority taking the capitalist road); thus, resolutely crushing the counter-revolution, they ensured a normal advance of the struggle for the seizure of power''.
Speaking of this ``experience'', the article tells how with the ``intervention'' of Maoist-controlled troops stationed in this area, the tsaofans organised by the Mao group forcibly "requisitioned and took over control of" newspapers, radio stations and provincial and urban organs of public security, took into custody and imprisoned leaders whom the Mao group considered ``counter-revolutionaries''; after disbanding the provincial Party committee, the tsaofans set up in its stead a "provisional organ of power'', which swore fidelity to the Mao group. Further, the article tells us that this is ``revolution'', that this is "seizure of power''. However, this "seizure of power" is a ``revolution'' directed against the legal leading organs of the Party in a socialist country. Consequently, it is nothing but the forcible liquidation of the Party itself. The Communist Party of China no longer exists after this "seizure of power''. All that remain are the " provisional organs of power"---the "revolutionary committees" that serve as the vehicle of the absolute domination of the Mao group. (Even before the "struggle for power'', at the very outset of the "great proletarian cultural revolution'', the local organisations of the CPC ceased, in effect, to fulfil their functions; here we give only the most striking examples of the actions taken to liquidate the Party.)
Thirdly, according to its Rules the CPC is a proletarian Party, which "in its activities is guided by Marxism-- Leninism" and regards "democratic centralism as its organisational principle''. But this guideline and the organisational principle are flouted by the Mao group.
The Mao group, which calls itself the "Party CC'', is guided not by Marxism-Leninism as prescribed by the CPC Rules, but by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', which is something quite different from Marxism-Leninism. This group, which deifies Mao Tse-tung, eliminates the majority of the CC who do not support the "thought of Mao Tsetung'', and undermines local Party organs, may call itself the "Central Committee of the CPC'', it may talk of " restoring the Party" and, in future, may create a "Party 218 organisation'', but unquestionably this will be a personal party of Mao Tse-tung differing fundamentally from the Communist Party of China, whose activities are guided by Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, nothing can hide the criminal acts of the Mao group, which is undermining and liquidating the Communist Party of China.
Further, the Mao group openly flouts the Party's organisational principle as laid down in its Rules. In a proletarian Party, democratic centralism is, first and foremost, the organisational guarantee of the Party's existence. The obliteration of this organisational principle signifies the undermining and liquidation of the Party. No matter how they implement their temporary ``domination'' and call themselves the "Central Committee" the Maoists stand exposed as the destroyers of the Party, for they have destroyed the principle by which the Party is organised.
An analysis of even the few extremely characteristic moments cited above makes it clear that the Mao group is undermining and liquidating the Communist Party of China and moving forward the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in order to replace the Communist Party of China with a personal party of Mao Tse-tung.
Further, we should like to examine the ``theory'' of liquidationism as expounded by the Mao group in connection with the unprecedented undermining of the Party, and also some salient features of this phenomenon.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 4. "Revolt Is a Just Cause" In order to achieve their design of
establishing absolute domination over the Party and the
state, Mao Tse-tung and his group, who have clashed with
the majority in the CC and, consequently, with the entire
Party, had to come into sharp conflict with and flout the
Marxist-Leninist teaching on the Party. While pursuing
their aim of liquidating the CPC and establishing their
domination over it, the Maoists have evolved various ``
theories'' and ``slogans'' in order to camouflage the anti-Marxist,
219
anti-Leninist substance of these actions and give them the
appearance of being ``revolutionary''. However, as we shall
show below, despite their new formulations and features all
of them are fundamentally nothing more than ``theories''
and ``slogans'' of the petty-bourgeois and anarchist
liquidationism which Lenin had exposed.
The most pronounced element is the flouting of the Marxist-Leninist principles of Party discipline backed up by the slogans "revolt is a just cause" and "a great democracy'', which give free reign to attacks on the Party and to undermining it from without.
Mao Tse-tung's words that "there are many truths in Marxism, but by closely examining them they may be reduced to one, namely that 'revolt is a just cause' " and the signboard "great socialist democracy" have become the slogans of the hungweipings and of the "struggle for power'', which, with contempt for Party discipline, the Mao group had put forward in order to start a ``revolt'' in the Party from without. The Mao group has been propagating these slogans for the past two years. It is known that in this country, too, elements blindly following foreign forces have promptly imported the slogan "revolt is a just cause" to use it against our Party.
`` 'Revolt is a just cause.' This is the standing slogan of proletarian revolutionaries. The question of the attitude to this slogan and the question of a person's attitude to revolutionary tsaofans is the touchstone determining whether he is a true or a pseudo-Marxist" (``Long Live Revolutionary Revolt---a Just Cause!'', editorial in Wenhuai Pao reprinted in Jenmin Jihpao on January 19, 1967 and in the second issue of Hungchih for 19.67).
It is not necessary to explain that this ``reduction'' of Marxism to the single phrase "revolt is a just cause" is a vulgar, anti-scientific simplification. It is hardly necessary to point out that the use of just this phrase out of context emasculates the content and class nature of a ``revolt'' and leads to the recognition that all ``revolts'' are just. Depending on the situation this slogan may be positive or reactionary. To avoid raising the question of whether a "revolt is justified" and to approve any ``revolt'' from behind a facade of abstract ``arguments'' is evidently what lies at the root of the Mao group's slogans implying contempt of Party discipline, of its slogans of an anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist 220 ``revolt" aimed at destroying the Party by legal means. Incidentally, what does the slogan "revolt is a just cause" represent if it is ``applied'' in a Marxist-Leninist Party? It can only be a liquidationist slogan founded on petty-- bourgeois anarchism. There is not place for ``revolts'' of any kind in a Marxist-Leninist Party organised on the basis of democratic centralism.
Divergences of views within the Party must and can be settled only on the basis of inner-Party discussion, by using generalised experience to test Party decisions founded on the opinion of the majority. This is the principle of the proletarian Party. What is termed a ``revolt'' within the Marxist-Leninist Party can be nothing but anti-Party divisive activity stemming from personal vainglorious plans to impose on the Party a minority's stand and demands, which the Party cannot be persuaded to accept because they lack the backing of practical experience. Divergences of views are inevitable in the Party. Consequently, implementation of the slogan "revolt is a just cause" in the Party leads to anarchy in it caused by unbridled ``revolts'', undermines Party discipline, solidarity, unity and militancy, and can bring about the liquidation of the Party as such.
Lauding the slogan "revolt is a just cause'', the Mao group has repeatedly called on "revolutionary leaders'', ``devoted'' to Mao Tse-tung personally, to organise the masses outside the Party and attack and destroy the Party organisations to which they belong.
``Revolutionary leaders of Party and government organs must smash the various onerous rules and all bounds fettering the revolution, go to the masses and together with the workers, peasants and revolutionary students criticise the bourgeois reactionary line, and fight' the handful of Party persons following the capitalist road" (``Let Us Consummate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!" Hungchih, No. 1, 1967).
It goes without saying that for the Mao group, which seeks to undermine, liquidate and seize control of the Party, the Party rules and the discipline of a revolutionary Party are "bounds fettering the revolution" or "onerous rules''.
The Maoists use the slogan "revolt is a just cause" not only in the Party. They use it to attack the Party and they have disseminated it through the muzzled mass media in order to organise the masses, young people in particular, 221 outside the Party. Here is what is said in "Long Live Revolutionary Revolt---a Just Cause!'', an editorial in the newspaper Wenhuai Pao reprinted as an "outstanding piece of writing" by the magazine Hungchih in January last year, when beginning in August 1966 the hungweiping outrages started, when veteran revolutionary leaders were humiliated and manhandled:
``With all the fibres of their hearts the hungweipings are aware that revolution is not an invitation or the regaling of guests, that it is not a literary exercise. Revolution is a revolt, a violent action through which one class deposes other classes. In order to defend the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao, the hungweipings have accomplished many socalled `deviations'. A `deviation' is none other than a revolution. A `deviation' is none other than a revolt. These ' deviations' are the first grandiose revolutionary deeds.. .. They must be welcomed with cries of approval---'Very good!'; nobody should stick to people and say that this is `confusion' and so on" (Peking Hsiuhuo, No. 5).
From the numerous reports that have been received it is evident that calls of this nature have resulted in a huge wave of petty-bourgeois anarchy sweeping across the whole country. This is eloquently shown by the undermining of socialist state discipline by the Mao group and the hungweipings, the anarchist disorders, the endless ``revolts'' and rivalry among the tsaofans themselves, a rivalry that is continuing despite the numerous appeals of the Mao group for a "great association" of tsaofans. It is clearly shown by the contradictions within the Mao group, which calls for " revolutionary discipline" among the tsaofans yet continues to propagate the slogan "revolt is a just cause'', which rejects all discipline in general.
Thus, the propagation among the masses of anarchist ``deviations'' on the basis of the slogans "revolt is a just cause" and "a great democracy" has been turned by the Maoists into a liquidationist weapon for assaults on the Party and is used by them to attack it from without, and by means of the so-called ``revolution'' to place it under their personal control.
One of the most serious errors of the "movement of hungweipings" and tsaofans organised by the Mao group is its utter contempt for the principles of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, which means that problems that should 222 be settled internally are taken outside the Party; Party members holding an opposing view are denounced as `` enemies'' subject to overthrow by revolution; and the methods of revolutionary struggle are employed in an inner-Party struggle. This liquidationist line is by no means new.
In a previous section we spoke of Lenin's struggle against Russian liquidators, who used the slogan of a Party revolution in an attempt to destroy the existing Party and set up a new, non-revolutionary party. To this end they tried to use non-Party, backward workers. Lenin criticised their liquidationist verbiage as "arguments of liberal intellectuals, who, unwilling to join the actually existing Party organisation, try to destroy that organisation by inciting the nonParty, scattered, unenlightened mass against it''.^^*^^ A parallel may apparently be drawn between the present actions of the Mao group and the arguments of the Russian liquidators.
The organisation of the masses outside the Party, the assault on the Party from without is more than liquidationism in the sense of flouting inner-Party discipline. It is a violation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which guide the Party's relations with the masses. This is analogous to what was attempted by the Russian liquidators and the German ``Leftists'', who were scathingly criticised by Lenin. It is typical liquidationism also in the sense that it mixes the Party with the masses, and, consequently, in the sense that it virtually renounces the vanguard role of the Party as such. On this point Lenin writes:
``Victory over capitalism calls for proper relations between the leading (Communist) party, the revolutionary class (the proletariat) and the masses, i.e., the entire body of the toilers and the exploited.''^^**^^ "Marxism teaches . . . that only the political party of the working class, i.e., the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organising a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass and the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow craft unionism or craft prejudices among the proletariat, and of _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 165.
^^**^^ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 187.
223 guiding all the united activities of the whole of the proletariat, i.e., of leading it politically, and through it, the whole mass of the working people. Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.``The wrong understanding of the role of the Communist Party in its relation to the non-Party proletariat and in the relation of the first and second factors to the whole mass of working people is a radical theoretical departure from communism and a deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism. .. .''^^*^^
The slogans "revolt is a just cause" and "a great democracy'', which the Maoists are using in their attempts to ``resolve'' inner-Party problems through pressure on the Party and with the assistance of hungweipings and other non-Party masses, obviously signify not only a "wrong understanding" (criticised by Lenin) of the Party's leading role and of the relations between the Party and the masses, but the total rejection of this role. Further, Mao Tse-tung had himself, for example in the work On the Uprooting of Erroneous Views in the Party, warned against "attacks on the Party from without the Party''.
It must be underscored that the Mao group's liquidationism "from the Left" fits in both theoretically and in practice with the liquidationism of modern revisionism, which this group itself admits must be combated resolutely.
Believing that the days when the movement for socialism was led and directed only by the Party calling itself Marxist-Leninist are passing (Noboru Sato), the anti-Party revisionists in Japan have advanced the "theory of a multiple vanguard" and launched liquidationist attacks on our Party. It may evidently be said that there is more than a common pattern of logic between the standpoint of the liquidationists from the camp of the modern revisionists, who recognise as the ``vanguard'' not only Marxist-Leninist Parties but also other organisations, oppose the Marxist-Leninist Parties and seek to divest them of their leading role, and the views of the Maoist liquidators, who have counterposed themselves to the Party by organising the "hungweiping movement" outside the Party, setting up other mass organisations, and proclaiming that the hungweipings and other contingents _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 246.
224 of the youth are the "vanguard of the great proletarian cultural revolution''. Both also fully agree that the nonParty masses and organisations can play the vanguard role of the Marxist-Leninist Party. __ALPHA_LVL3__ 5. Liquidationist ``Revision''It is quite apparent that the undermining of the Party on the basis of the slogans "revolt is a just cause" and "a great democracy'', whose objective is to give the Mao group complete control of the CPC, clashes with the organisational principle of democratic centralism, which in the past had been the basic principle underlying the structure of all Marxist-Leninist Parties, including the Communist Party of China. The Maoists consider this principle "an onerous rule" and "bounds fettering the revolution'', and insist on its total rejection. At the same time, in order to camouflage their liquidationist crimes they have introduced a number of major amendments into the organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party.
After holding a "plenary meeting of the Central Committee" in August 1966 on the model of a coup and calling itself the "Party CC'', the Mao group began inciting all sections of blindly obedient hungweipings and tsaofans to attack Party organisations and put forward a ridiculous theory of Party organisation. Naturally, the attacking hungweipings, among whom the central role was played by students, met with stiff resistance from the Party organisations concerned and from a section of workers who regarded these attacks as anti-Party, counter-revolutionary actions. In this connection, the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao, which had by then been ``requisitioned'' by the Maoists, wrote in an editorial:
``In no region, even in no individual Party organisation ... is it under any circumstances permitted to reject or suppress criticism from the masses; it is all the more absolutely impermissible to represent the masses criticising you as 'counter-revolutionary elements' acting 'against the Party, against the CC'. The CC of the Party is the CC of the Party. One region or a separate Party organisation is one region or __PRINTERS_P_225_COMMENT__ 15---2466 225 a separate Party organisation. Take the Party organisation of any region, or any link. If it goes against the correct leadership of the Party CC headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, against the thought of Mao Tse-tung, why cannot it be criticised for this? Why cannot we come out against this?...'' (``Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Must Resolutely Support the Revolutionary Students'', Jenmin Jihpao, August 23, 1966).
The vanguard Party of the proletariat is an integral body organised on the principle of democratic centralism. The Party organisations of all levels, from the Central Committee down to the primary cell, are a united militant contingent following a single road. This is the basic spirit underlying the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPC, when Mao Tse-tung was Chairman of the CPC. Consequently, as Lenin taught, in the Communist Party "every Party member is responsible for the Party, and . . . the Party is responsible for every one of its members".^^*^^ The Central Committee and the organisations of all levels fulfil relatively different tasks within the Party. But where the revolution and the struggle outside the Party are concerned they must bear an equal responsibility, as a single whole. The theory of Mao Tse-tung and his myrmidons that attacks on lower Party organisations are not attacks on the CC or attacks on the Party as a whole is an undisguised piece of liquidationism. In the abnormal situation created by the Mao group, which, defying the entire Party, has usurped the name "Party CC'', this group, in order to gain control of the Party, is seeking to undermine the Party organisations of all levels that do not blindly accept its leadership.
Further, the Maoists publicly declare: "The fact that our Party exists does not mean there is no other Party outside it. We have a party outside the Party, while in the Party there are factions. Such was the situation before. It is quite normal" (statement by Lin Piao, Sekai Seizi Siryo, No. 266). This is devoid of even the most elementary propositions of the organisational theory of the Marxist-Leninist Party. It is obviously not necessary to explain that this open admission of factionalism means abuse of the principles of the Leninist Party.
In their drive to destroy the Party and turn it into their _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 503.
226 domain, the Maoists spread and export to other countries their liquidationist theory of Party organisation as a means of destroying the Communist Parties which refuse to follow them blindly. This theory denounces as ``slavish'' the organisational principles of the Leninist Party.As early as 1965 this group declared: "The intensification of the struggle against revisionism will always be accompanied by a new differentiation in the ranks of the revolution. Some people will necessarily drop out of the revolutionary ranks" (Hungchih, November 6).
The Maoists incite the elements blindly following them to anti-Party factional activities against Parties rejecting their line. It will be recalled that soon after the discussion in Yamaguchi prefecture and other regions of our country, the anti-Party elements blindly following foreign forces put forward the eroding "organisational theory'', which says that "since the Party CC has sunk into revisionism there is no need to abide by organisational principles''. The Maoists are now revising the organisational principles of the proletarian Party, giving their arguments new ``theoretical'' embellishments.
``In the course of the great proletarian cultural revolution . . . Chairman Mao ... has pointed out that 'erroneous instructions harming the revolution should not be accepted unconditionally, they must be resolutely rejected'.'' " Marxism-Leninism has long considered that the prime condition of the subordination of an organisation is that this should be justified from both the political and the principled points of view. The organisational line of the proletariat must follow the political line.'' "To prattle about discipline in organisation and so on, while sacrificing inner-Party political principles, is treachery pure and simple" (Jenmin Jihpao, June 16).
The Maoists thus consider that to speak of the `` necessity'' of demanding absolute organisational subordination, of the necessity of strictly abiding by the decisions of the majority, of the higher organs and the Party CC, of "enforcing discipline and subordination to the majority, to higher organs and the CC even if their decisions are wrong. . .'' means to sink into ``slavery'' and enforce "bourgeois discipline" (Jenmin Jihpao, April 6).
.
It would be useful for the Mao group and the theoreticians who laud and blindly follow it to recall what Mao __PRINTERS_P_227_COMMENT__ 15* 227 Tse-tung had himself said in the period when the Communist Party of China was correctly leading the Chinese revolution:
``Party discipline requires, among other things, that the minority should obey the majority. The minority, after their suggestion has been rejected, must support the decision adopted by the majority. If necessary, they can bring up the matter again for discussion at the next meeting, but they must not show any opposition in their activities.''^^*^^
``In view of Chang Kuo-tao's serious violation of discipline, we must affirm anew the discipline of the Party: (1) that individuals must subordinate themselves to the organisation; (2) that the minority must subordinate itself to the majority; (3) that the lower level must subordinate itself to the higher level; and (4) that the entire membership must subordinate itself to the Central Committee. He who violates any of these articles of discipline disrupts the Party's unity.''^^**^^
Here Mao Tse-tung made no reservations regarding the subordination of the minority to the majority, of lower to higher organisations. Let us lay aside the question why the Maoists shamelessly put forward demands which contradict their former standpoint. Let us examine whether their assertions that the "prime condition of the subordination of an organisation is that this should be justified both from the political and the principled points of view" and that " erroneous instructions ... must be resolutely rejected" are really Marxist-Leninist as they claim. The Communist Party is, unquestionably, the vanguard of the working class whose purpose is to build socialism and communism. In other words, it is a voluntary association of Communists. It is hardly necessary to say that the Party cannot exist organisationally if these principles are not observed. However, the MarxistLeninist Party is an organisation founded not merely on ideological and political unity. The principal feature and condition of the existence of the revolutionary Leninist Party is not only unity on the basis of a common main aim---the accomplishment of revolution---but also the fact that due to its aim of accomplishing a revolution the Party is _-_-_
^^*^^ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, London, 1954, Vol. I, p. 110.
^^**^^ Ibid., Vol. II, p. 254.
228 inevitably an organisational whole. The simultaneous recognition of ideological and organisational unity on the basis of communist philosophy is the idea of Marxism-Leninism and the principle of Party organisation founded on this idea. This is one of the essential distinctions between all sorts of pettybourgeois ``socialist'' parties and the Marxist-Leninist Party.Exposing the liquidators who, in the difficult period of the Stolypin reaction, defied the decisions of the Party which was forced to retreat, and sought to mask their divisive activities, Lenin wrote:
``The liquidator newspaper writes:
`` 'Social-Democracy constitutes a definite ideologically united body and those who do not subscribe to its ideaa do not belong to it.'
``That is the truth, but not the whole truth, for SocialDemocracy is not only an ideologically but also an organisationally united body. This can be forgotten only by liquidators, i.e., by those who refuse to recognise precisely the organised body, who ignore its will, flout its decisions, etc. . ..
``Operating in complete isolation from the organisation, flouting its decisions, making its very existence the subject of derision, the liquidators, naturally, prefer not to remind the workers of this... .
``Social-Democracy is a definite organisationally united body and those who refuse to submit to the discipline of this organisation, who ignore it and flout its decisions, do not belong to it. Such is the basic rule.''^^*^^
Thus in building up the Party, Lenin repeatedly laid stress on strict discipline and solidarity, making no allowance, for factions. This was concrete solidarity and it was the only factor making unity possible, and it lay in scrupulous fulfilment of decisions based on the opinion of the majority.
``The working class needs unity. But unity can be effected only by a united organisation whose decisions are conscientiously carried out by all class-conscious workers. Discussing the problem, expressing and hearing different opinions, ascertaining the views of the majority of the organised Marxists, expressing these views in the form of decisions adopted _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, pp. 466--68.
229 by delegates and carrying them out conscientiously---this is what reasonable people all over the world call unity. Such a unity is infinitely precious, and infinitely important to the working class.''^^*^^If the question is put whether to obey or reject a Party decision, whether to use a personal criterion or a group standpoint "right or wrong'', there will never be unity and solidarity in the Party. Moreover, in the long run this would lead to the liquidation of the Party as a result of interminable differences and splits. Such is the inevitable logic of the organisational principles of the Party as ``modified'' by the Maoists.
A requisite of the "organisational principles" ``modified'' by the Maoists is that the decision on, as they say, whether there is "justification both from the political and principled points of view" must be made by some individual or a small group, for in these "organisational principles" the main ``principle'' is the non-recognition and rejection of the need for the unconditional fulfilment of majority decisions and of instructions issued on the basis of such decisions, the non-recognition of the authority of the Party's collective consciousness founded on the experience of the Party as a whole. Such is the situation not only from the logical point of view. It is clearly shown by the fact that the Maoists categorically "do not recognise" and ``revolt'' against all instructions, including the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC. They consider that "everybody who attacks and slanders the great leader Chairman Mao and his closest militant associate Comrade Lin Piao is an active counter-revolutionary and must be punished by law" (Decision on Enhancing the Activity of the CC CPC and the State Public Security Council in the Cultural Revolution, January 1967).
In the past, in order to screen their opportunist and divisive stand, the Russian liquidators avoided mentioning the principle of the Party as an integral organised body. Today, in order to establish absolute control over the Party, the Maoists openly reject this Party principle, going to the extent of denouncing it as "bourgeois discipline''. In this respect the Mao group is evidently more insolent and more bellicose than were the liquidators in Russia.
_-_-_^^*^^ Ibid., p. 519.
230 __ALPHA_LVL3__ 6. Deification of Mao Tse-Tung Among the elements comprising the
Maoist brand of liquidationism mention must be made of the
deification of Mao Tse-tung, the fountain head of the
negation of collective leadership and the suppression of
innerParty democracy.
Much has been said about the absurd extent to which the deification of Mao Tse-tung's personality has reached, and we shall therefore not dwell on this aspect of the question. All we should like to point out is that in itself this deification symbolises the despotic rule of an individual or a group over the Party, and that this is itself a manifestation of liquidationism. Moreover, we should like to point out that all this is happening in China, which was only recently a semi-feudal state and where the peasants formed the vast majority of the population, while Mao Tse-tung was the Party leader heading the great cause of the liberation of these peasants. That is why the deification of Mao Tse-tung has assumed such incredible proportions and, in the hands of the Mao group, has been turned into the main ideological weapon for smashing and gaining complete control of the Party.
In connection with the deification of Mao Tse-tung we must lay special stress on and draw a lesson from such features of the Mao group's liquidationism as the destruction of collective leadership and the suppression of inner-Party democracy.
It will be recalled that in contravention of the Party Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPC no Party congresses have been convened for 11 years since 1956; as regards annual National Congresses of the CPC, none have been held for nine years since the 2nd session in May 1958. Although, according to the Rules, CC plenary meetings, which are the highest leading Party organ in the interim between congresses, must be convened at least twice a year, they were held at irregular intervals until the 10th plenary meeting in September 1962 and since then none were held for nearly four years until the llth plenary meeting which was 231 convened unilaterally and in an abnormal way by the Mao group in August 1966.
For a Marxist-Leninist Party, which represents a conscious alliance of Communists both ideologically and organisationally, regular meetings at all levels preserve its character, guarantee collective leadership and inner-Party democracy, ensure a correct policy by the Party and provide a firm foundation for centralised leadership. A long absence of congresses, which are the Party's highest leading organ, and of CC plenary meetings, which are the highest leading organ in the interim between congresses, is a violation of the principles of collective leadership and inner-Party democracy and harbours the danger that the will of an individual or a group will inescapably supersede the collective will of the Party as a whole.
If we take a close look at the wall newspapers of the hungweipings we shall find that in the period when Party congresses and CC plenary meetings are not convened, Mao Tse-tung and others hold numerous so-called "working Party meetings" and other gatherings. These "working Party meetings'', which are a kind of Party conference, cannot have authority exceeding that of consultative organs and defined by congresses. Moreover, if in addition to the disregard for or total neglect of Party congresses and the Central Committee, which are guided by the Rules, these "working Party meetings" are abused by some leaders they may likewise become a means of factional activity by a section of the Party leadership. It may be said that the developments in China in fact show that this was precisely how the Mao group prepared the ground for the "seizure of power''.
From the standpoint of the common sense of MarxistsLeninists it is hard to understand the suppression of innerParty democracy that has been enforced by the Mao group since 1966. We have not seen any fact-founded criticism or discussions that could convince people. On the other hand, we have watched the Mao group forcibly create a situation in which the hungweipings held drum-head tribunals, and changes and replacements occurred among Party cadres with kaleidoscopic speed. The "great democracy'', which has forcibly put an end to all criticism of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, is nothing but the complete suppression of democracy.
In this respect it is exceedingly important that we should learn on the example of how Lenin valued collective 232 leadership and inner-Party democracy and, consequently, of the great significance he attached to Party congresses and to their decisions; of how Lenin personally in a difficult and complex situation was the first to demonstrate in practice his serious attitude to Party congresses. Even after the Great October Socialist Revolution under conditions of capitalist encirclement, in a period of economic difficulties, the armed intervention of imperialist states and the Civil War until Lenin's death, Party congresses were convened regularly once a year: the 7th in March 1918, the 8th in March 1919, the 9th in March 1920; the congresses scrutinised general Party problems and passed decisions on them.
In keeping with the Leninist principles of the proletarian Party and its own experience, our Party has since the 7th Congress regularly convened congresses in accordance with the Rules on a democratic basis. As long as Party congresses are held regularly and in accordance with democratic procedure and the decisions of these congresses are regarded as binding, and as long as the regularly convened plenary meetings of the Central Committee direct the Party on the basis of these decisions there will be a guarantee that domination of the Party by an individual or a group can be averted in an organised manner, that errors deriving from the shortcomings of an individual or a group can be precluded and that the ideological and organisational unity of the Party and its militant spirit can be enhanced. The fact that in the course of the recent period of nearly ten years our Party has strengthened its solidarity and unity as a MarxistLeninist Party and steadfastly pursued a correct line and a correct policy is indubitably linked with the great attention it accords to the leadership of its affairs and life on the basis of Leninist principles and, in particular, to its highest leading organs---congresses and the Central Committee.
As a consequence of the deification of Mao Tse-tung, the undermining of Party discipline by the Maoists and their rejection of collective leadership and inner-Party democracy naturally become still more pronounced. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that the key condition making possible the destruction of the Party and its conversion into a domain of Mao Tse-tung through the above-mentioned unscrupulous methods was the liquidationist distortion of the relationship between the Party and the Army.
It is commonly known that the planting of the Mao 233 personality cult was started first in the Army under the leadership of Lin Piao. As soon as Lin Piao was appointed Defence Minister in 1959 to replace Peng Teh-huai, he began to stress that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" had to be studied, and published an article under the heading "Let Us Move Forward Boldly and Energetically, Holding High the Red Banner of the Party's General Line and the Military Thought of Mao Tse-tung!" (Hungchih, No. 19); in 1963 the Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao began systematically to print ``dictums'' of Mao Tse-tung, which in 1964 were put out in a single volume. In 1965 tire newspaper published a "book of quotations of Mao Tse-tung''. Thus, under the slogan "politics is the commanding force" the Chinese Army was consistently "educated in the spirit of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" and campaigns were launched to teach the troops on the example of ``soldiers'' and ``heroes'' "devoted to Mao Tse-tung''. Having filled the Army to the brim with veneration of the personality of Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao turned it from a political instrument of the Party into a weapon of the Mao group. In this connection the editorials and other articles carried by Chiehfangchun Pao over the past year are filled with assurances of fidelity to Mao Tsetung, with not a single word expressing devotion to the Party. Also symptomatic is the abnormal situation where in the "great proletarian cultural revolution" a leading role is played by the Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao, which should normally be directed and controlled by the Party, while the Party newspaper Jenmin Jihpao, which should have provided the Army with leadership, is criticised and given orders by Chiehfangchun Pao (for instance, during the criticism of the "Sanchiatsun group" in May 1966 the first attack was made by Chiehfangchun Pao, while Jenmin Jihpao criticised Teng To belatedly, six days later; moreover, Chiehfangchun Pao editorials criticising the articles in Jenmin Jihpao were printed by the latter without amendments, and so on and so forth).
Another important point is that the Army, which the Maoists took into their hands through Lin Piao, became the mainstay of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" and, particularly, of the violent struggle for the "seizure of power''. A Chiehfangchun Pao editorial early in 1967 stated:
``Mao Tse-tung says: 'Had the People's Army been 234 nonexistent, the people would have had nothing.' This is a great truth. Such was the case in the period of the revolutionary war and such is the case during the great proletarian cultural revolution. The Liberation Army is a major weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the mainstay of the great proletarian cultural revolution.''
Repeated calls are made that the Army should resolutely "defend Chairman Mao'', "support the tsaofans and take part in the great proletarian cultural revolution''. In fact, the "struggle for the seizure of power" has been made possible by the intervention of the Chinese Army. For example, in a Jenmin Jihpao report on this struggle in Shantung Province it is stated: "The troops of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Shantung Province stood firmly and unshakably on the side of the proletarian revolutionaries in this great and decisive battle. Having taken determined measures, the broad masses of commanders and men firmly suppressed counter-revolutionary elements and defended proletarian revolutionaries.. .. The decisive and obviously timely powerful support of the People's Liberation Army played the key role in achieving victory in the struggle for the seizure of power" (Peking Hsiuhuo, March 14).
It may be said that the most brutal destruction of the Party on a colossal scale is possible when Army units normally subordinated to the Party are used as a personal weapon by the Maoists and when the pressure resulting from forcible measures spreads to the Party. This, it may further be asserted, is one of the cardinal features of the liquidationist Mao group and here lies the difficulty in resolving this problem. On the other hand, this shows how weak this group is---there is nothing in its ideology except the deification of Mao Tse-tung, and the Army is, without exaggeration, its only ``bulwark''.
Lenin laid bare and denounced the criminal nature of liquidationism, which "renounces the existence of the Party as such''. The anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist substance of the Mao group stands exposed by its liquidationist theory and practice aimed at destroying and gaining control of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Evidently there is hardly any need to speak of the wretched role of mummers played by the antiParty elements, who blindly ape the Mao group and are bent on destroying our Party and splitting the democratic movement.
235The latest reports, which are given out as utterances by leaders of the Mao group, give one the impression that the Maoists intend to admit the tsaofans, i.e., their blind followers, into the Party en masse, hold a "Party Congress'', and set up a party, which would differ qualitatively from the smashed Communist Party of China and proclaim the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as its guide. Moreover, there are rumours of a ``plan'' to attack the international communist movement through the creation of an international organisation of splitters blindly subscribing to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. The Maoists have thus not only approached ``perfection'' in their liquidationist practice of "destroying the old Party and creating a new one" but are trying to ``implement'' this practice on an international scale.
Our Party makes it clear that the Maoists use their theory of "revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" to back up and justify their liquidation of the Communist Party of China and their efforts to place it under their control. They thereby demonstrate that their actions and theories are a new edition of the Trotskyite "theory of permanent revolution" and the "theory of a second supplementary revolution''. That explains why present-day Trotskyites regard the ``overthrow'' by the Maoists of the group "of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" and the "struggle for the seizure of power" as the "complete liquidation of the Communist Party of China, which had united Mao and Liu, and the creation of a new Communist Party'', as the "process of transition from Maoism to Trotskyism" (Shigemi Ota), as the "overthrow of bureaucracy in a workers' state" (J. Posadas). That is why they welcome these developments, expecting that the dreams of the Trotskyites, who have for more than thirty years been working to overthrow the Communist Parties of all countries, including the socialist states, "are coming true" thanks to the Mao group.
We cannot nor will we permit the Mao group to carry out its liquidationist intentions on an international scale. We shall resolutely oppose its interference, attacks and subversion against our Party and the democratic movement in our country. We shall uphold the principles of the MarxistLeninist Party. We shall fight with greater determination for the Marxist-Leninist development and strengthening of our Communist Party of Japan, which is the guarantee of 236 the victory of the Japanese revolution. This is an important part of the struggle for the liberation of the Japanese people and, at the same time, it is a struggle to defend the international communist movement against the liquidationism and divisive activities of the Maoists on a world scale.
On the basis of the decisions of the 10th Party Congress we shall intensify the struggle on two fronts; we shall fight for the fulfilment of our Party's honourable historic mission and shall do everything in our power to make a still greater contribution towards the development of the revolutionary movement in our country, towards the Marxist-Leninist cohesion and genuine unity of the international communist movement.
As stated in our Party's document entitled "The Present Line of Mao Tse-tung and the International Communist Movement'', we consider that "although today the impression is conveyed that the ultra-Left, opportunist, GreatPower elements in the CPC headed by Mao Tse-tung have seized the leading position in the country, even if only temporarily and superficially, it is only a manifestation of one aspect of the historical ups and downs of the communist movement" and we "have no doubt that however difficult and tortuous the course of developments may be, the ultraLeft, opportunist, Great-Power trend will ultimately be surmounted and genuine Marxism-Leninism will triumph in China, too''.
[237] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Goro HarumiOne of the features of the anti-- imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in China is the long struggle of the armed revolution against the armed counter-revolution. This feature stemmed from the entire complex of internal and external political and economic, and also geographical, conditions in which the Chinese revolution was accomplished. At the time China was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal dependent country ruled by imperialist states and by the internal feudal reactionary forces subordinated to them. Until its liberation by the Chinese Army, Northeast China was virtually a Japanese colony.
The feudal-militarist clique and the landowners, and also the compradore-feudal Kuomintang bureaucratic capital linked up closely with them, enjoyed unrestricted power in the country. With the help of the Army and the police they pursued a policy of brute force, exploiting the workers, peasants and other working people. Every time there was an upsurge of the people's struggle against internal and external. enemies, the imperialist forces intervened on the pretext of helping the reactionary government to fight the "red threat" and of ``protecting'' the "rights and interests" of their citizens, and suppressed popular actions by force of arms. As the leading force of the revolution, the Chinese working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party of China, steeled in the struggle against oppression and exploitation by foreign and local capital, were confronted with difficult tasks.
In a country where even the most elementary bourgeoisdemocratic rights and freedoms were almost non-existent, _-_-_
^^*^^ Zen-ei, No. 12, 1968 (Japan).
238 the working class had to rally and draw into the revolutionary struggle politically and culturally backward peasants, a disunited intelligentsia and a politically weak national bourgeoisie, which was prone to vacillation and inconsistency. Under these conditions the struggle of the Chinese people took the form of a violent struggle, while the revolution became a struggle between armed revolutionary forces and armed counter-revolutionary forces.The Communist Party of China became aware of this in the process of a long and bitter struggle, drew the necessary lessons and evolved new tactics. The essence of these tactics was that reliance had to be placed not only in the numerically small working class; broad sections of the peasants had to be won over and organised, a people's revolutionary army had to be formed, the peasants had to be turned into the main force of the revolutionary army and support had to be drawn from the rural areas, with whose help the towns had to be surrounded and the enemy attacked. The revolutionary army educated and trained and then admitted to its ranks not only workers and peasants, but also lumpen-proletarians, prisoners-of-war and defectors; it emerged victorious in the great revolutionary war---in the revolutionary war for land, in the anti-Japanese war and in the national liberation war---and finally liberated the 600-- million strong Chinese people from imperialist and internal reactionary rule.
Under the leadership of the CPC, the Chinese Army played an exceedingly large role in the Chinese revolution. Indeed, had the revolutionary army been non-existent, the Chinese people would hardly have been liberated and there would hardly have been progress in China's development after liberation. Ever since its formation the Army has been strictly controlled by the Communist Party of China. It not only fulfilled its revolutionary, political duty, that of fighting the enemies of the revolution, but strengthened its bonds with the masses, conducted revolutionary propaganda among the people, organised and armed them, and helped them to establish popular rule. Its high level of political consciousness and its consistence in fulfilling its duty of serving the people are generally known. This high level of political consciousness and dedicated service to the people spring from the Army's unbounded devotion to the Party, the revolution and the people. However, this devotion must not and 239 cannot mean devotion and blind subordination to some one individual or group. On the basis of its experience and lessons of leading the Chinese revolution in the course of decades, the Communist Party adopted Rules and, at its Eighth Congress, determined the principles of collective leadership. In order to preclude the danger of deification and a personality cult, the Eighth Congress deleted from the Rules adopted by the Seventh Congress a paragraph stating that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is regarded as the Party's guiding ideology in all spheres. As was pointed out in the report delivered by Teng Hsiao-ping "On Amendments in the Party Rules'', this amendment did not imply renunciation of the role of leaders, or disregard of leaders.
The principle that the revolutionary army is led by the Party was adopted in 1929 at the 9th Party Conference of the 4th Corps (so-called resolution of the Kutien Conference). Gradually this principle was adopted by the revolutionary Army as inviolable. Consequently, leadership of the Army by the Party, particularly after its Eighth Congress, was founded on the principles of collectivity so that the Army could not be used for the deification of an individual, for mercenary aims or for placing the Party and the state under the control of an individual or a group. However, as it turned out, the Chinese Army began to be used precisely for these purposes, this becoming particularly clear-cut and assuming a huge scale during the "cultural revolution''. Flouting the country's Constitution and the Party Rules and having recourse to illegal methods and means, the Mao group started the "cultural revolution" and used the Army to restore its authority and leading position in the Party and the state, which it had lost on account of its erroneous policy. Relying on the Army, the Maoists are setting up in China a cult of Mao's personality, a system by which he is deified, establishing his absolute authority in the Party and the state, and forcing upon the Party and the people the absolute authority of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. With the help of the Army, all leading cadres, all persons opposing these developments are removed from their posts in the Party and state apparatus and their rights are curtailed. On the other hand, those who laud and blindly accept the "thought of Mao" are illegally appointed to high posts in the Party and state apparatus and are given illegal functions and powers.
In the process of carrying out the mercenary designs of 240 an individual leader and of establishing his absolute rule, the Chinese Army has become a weapon of an absolute regime. Ever since Lin Piao became Mao Tse-tung's first lieutenant and, using his position, occupied the post of Defence Minister, the process, if it can be called that, of the Chinese Army's qualitative transformation has been steadily intensified.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 2. The Army as the Mainstay In the preceding section we have noted
that in order to preclude damage to the Party through the
deification and personality cult of any leader, the Eighth
Congress of the CPC (1956) struck off from the Party Rules
the provision on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. Mao
Tsetung himself evidently agreed with this decision. But from
1958 onward, in contravention of the Party Rules, some Party
leaders close to Mao (Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and others)
started a campaign to restore the absolute authority of Mao
Tsetung and his ``thought''. In 1958 Chen Po-ta published an
article in the fourth issue of the magazine Hungchih, in
which he openly launched a drive to "restore the authority
of the thought of Mao'', writing that the "thought of Mao
Tse-tung combines the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism
with actual practice in the Chinese revolution''. The second
session of the Eighth Congress of the CPC was held in May
1958, shortly before this article was published. The
communique stated in part: "The delegates stressed the need to
learn from Comrade Mao Tse-tung, to study his works and
learn from his brilliant example in integrating the
universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with actual practice in the
Chinese revolution.''^^*^^
Reporting to this session on the work of the CC CPC, Liu Shao-chi said: "We must learn from Comrade Mao Tse-tung and from many other comrades who keep in close contact with the masses (including the many leaders of the Party at the central, provincial, special administrative regional, _-_-_
^^*^^ Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking, 1958, p. 11.
__PRINTERS_P_241_COMMENT__ 16---2466 241 county and township levels). We must follow their example in invariably applying Marxism-Leninism, dialectics and materialism to practical work, in combining the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, and combining a serious and principled stand with a lively, creative spirit, in identifying themselves with the millions, seeing the correct direction, grasping the truth, and throwing themselves into the struggle for that truth, dauntlessly braving all difficulties.''^^*^^Here the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is not yet defined as a "development of Marxism-Leninism'', and no hint is given that it determines Party policies. The term "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', now widespread in China, has the same meaning as ``Maoism'', while the thought itself is regarded as a "development of Marxism-Leninism, the pinnacle of modern Marxism-Leninism''. In no country have Marxists, Communists ever adopted such an attitude to their finest leaders, not even to the founders of Marxism-Leninism. The leaders themselves made sure that this attitude was not taken towards them by the masses. Lenin was particularly noted for this.
In a lecture "Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Tsetung'', delivered in July 1958 at Peking University on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of the CPC, Chen Po-ta made an open attempt to belittle the Party's leading role in the Chinese revolution, claiming that the revolution was led solely by Mao Tse-tung, and in violation of the Party Rules absolutised the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and his role as a leader. He said: "In the course of the battle to integrate the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, in the course of the battle for the victory of the two revolutions in China, for the triumph of socialism, Comrade Mao Tse-tung waged a determined and uncompromising struggle against antiMarxist, anti-Leninist ideological orientations, against Right opportunism and revisionism, against `Left' adventurism and sectarianism. He won because truth was on his side, because he charted the correct course for the Party and advanced great ideals in keeping with the interests of the Chinese people and inspiring them to move fearlessly forward. If the task of integrating the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., pp. 63--64.
242 with actual practice in the Chinese revolution had not been carried out, if the thought of Mao Tse-tung had not won in the struggle against all sorts of erroneous ideological currents, if the Chinese revolution had not achieved successes under the banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the people's revolution in China would not have secured its present successes and there would have been no achievements in the building of socialism.''This statement attributes all the Party's successes in leading the revolution exclusively to Mao Tse-tung and his capable leadership. Thus, only two years after the Party Rules were amended by the Eighth Congress, the spirit in which the amendments were adopted was trampled on and a drive was started to absolutise the "thought of Mao Tsetung" and turn it into the sole guide of Party activity. This absolutisation is proceeding parallel with the deification of Mao Tse-tung, with the whipping up of the cult of his personality. Everybody and everything disagreeing with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" gets the label of bourgeois ideology and philosophy. In the nineteenth issue of the magazine Hungchih for 1958, Lin Piao published an article headed "Having Raised the Banner of the General Party Line and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung We Shall Achieve Great Successes" in which he gives a clear picture of the views of the group associated with Mao. The purpose of this article was to prove that the "military thought of Mao Tse-tung" was a guide to action for the Army, absolutise the ``thought'' of Mao and boost the cult of his personality in the Army. In 1960 Lin Piao started the absolutisation of not only the military but all "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and the deification of his personality. In 1961 he formulated the "four rules of political work''. The rule concerning the "work of the platoon political instructor" determines the tasks of a leader as follows: "Guided by the thought of Mao Tse-tung give a political education, carry on ideological work, conduct work in the Party cells and improve the 'style of three and eight' (three principles and eight rules).'' Here Lin Piao no longer confines himself to the "military thought of Mao Tse-tung''. He goes to the extent of asserting that all the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" are a guide to action for the Army. Here the "style of three and eight" is represented as a guide to action, in accordance with which the main thing is to select the correct political line, to be conscientious and __PRINTERS_P_243_COMMENT__ 16* 243 modest, strictly abide, by living, flexible strategy and tactics, and so forth. This was one of Lin Piao's first directives on the Army's combat and political training since his appointment to the post of Defence Minister. In October 1960, applying the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', he put forward four principles of political work known as the "four key factors": 1. "In the relationship between the weapon and the man, the key factor is the man''; 2. "Among all forms of work the most important is political work''; 3. "In political work the main thing is ideological work''; 4. "In the relationship between the abstract and the living thought the key factor is the living thought''. Such is the content of the principles that were offered as a model application of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
At first glance it would seem that the above-said really helped the officers and men of the Army to apply their personal views and Marxist-Leninist theory flexibly. But it is now quite obvious that this is not the purpose of the Army training programme evolved by the Mao group. A movement for the title of platoon of "four merits"^^*^^ and soldier of "five merits"^^**^^ was launched in the Army on the basis of the "style of three and eight" and the "four key factors''. This was, in effect, a drive to form Army units loyal to Mao Tse-tung.
Other standards of combat training and ideological and political education were also established. What, according to these standards, is the ideal personality, the ideal man? It is hardly necessary to say that men like Lei Feng, Wang Tse, Liu Ying-chun and Mei Hsien-teh can be reared on the basis of these standards. All of them are "boundlessly devoted to Mao Tse-tung''.
In the past Mao Tse-tung said that "a distinguishing feature of the Chinese people is their poverty and the fact that they are a clean sheet of paper''. Since this paper had not been painted over, any beautiful, ideal pictures may be drawn on it. That was his line of thought. Very many of the _-_-_
^^*^^ "Four merits"---an emulation movement in the Army between platoons for the attainment of the best possible results in: (a) political and ideological training, (b) the "style of three and eight'', (c) combat training, and (d) behaviour in everyday life.
^^**^^ "Five merits"---an emulation movement among troops for the best personal results in the above indices plus physical training.
244 recruits from the villages were open-hearted young people utterly devoted to Mao Tse-tung, the Party and the state. They had no doubts as to the correctness of the policy and line pursued by the Party and the Army leadership, made no attempt independently to analyse the actual situation, to adopt an independent decision on the policy of the Party and the state or to take any action on these issues. Besides, nobody trained them to adopt such a decision or action. They unconditionally accepted on its face value the policy laid down by their leaders, particularly Mao Tse-tung. That was the spirit in which they were trained. This has been accentuated in political work in the Party ever since Lin Piao became Defence Minister. The Party's "absolute leadership" of the Army has been enhanced. But in China the Party implied Mao Tse-tung and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. By these means the deification of Mao Tse-tung's personality and the absolutisation of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', virtually drummed into the head of every soldier and officer, were consistently effected in the Army. Wang Tse writes in his diary:``I want to do everything in accordance with what I have read in the works of Chairman Mao, in accordance with what Chairman Mao says, in accordance with the instructions of Chairman Mao. I want to be a good soldier of Chairman Mao. I want to serve people honestly. It is possible to accomplish great deeds only by becoming a never-rusting cog. Then I want to learn from Lei Feng, and serve meritoriously as a rank-and-file soldier. I want to be as good fighter of Chairman Mao as Lei Feng. I want to become a cog that does not rust for a long time. If a train runs off the tracks it will not move a single millimetre. If a revolutionary fighter does not study the works of Chairman Mao he will feel giddy and fall. A flower does not open without sunlight. Plants do not grow without rain. A revolutionary fighter loses his bearings if he is not armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. In studying the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, we must, like Liao Chu-chian, read them every day, learn every day, apply them every day and be guided in all our actions by the thought of Mao Tse-tung. This is the only way to withstand any storm and become a worthy continuer of the cause of revolution.''
It will be no exaggeration to say that the minds of soldiers are filled only with Mao Tse-tung, with the works of Mao Tse-tung, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. For them Mao 245 Tse-tung is a special deity, while the "thought of Mao Tsetung" is an infallible truth. This is indoctrinated into them.
In 1961, aiming to absolutise the "thought of Mao Tsetung'', Lin Piao compiled and published a Reader for the Study of the Works of Mao Tse-tung, which contained 12 articles from the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung necessary for the training of soldiers. In 1963 he compiled a "book of quotations" from the works of Mao Tse-tung. This became a standard reference book for the officers and men of the Chinese Army. This Book of Quotations contains relatively short phrases and paragraphs from the Selected Works and other writings of Mao Tse-tung. They are arranged not in chronological order but by problems, which makes it quite impossible to learn when and where they were said or written. Moreover, every separate phrase or paragraph is listed in such a way as to be regarded as an aphorism. It is perceived in complete isolation from the political and social conditions in China before and after liberation and serves as a weapon for the further deification of Mao Tse-tung and the absolutisation of his ``thought''.
The Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao, whose editorials and articles propagating the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" are frequently signed by senior Army officers, is conducting a campaign to deify the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. For example, on May 8, 1963 it printed an article---"Rules of Political Work in the PLA"---which states:
``These `Rules' embody the thought of Mao Tse-tung, they are permeated with the thought of Mao Tse-tung from beginning to end. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the guideline of the Chinese people's revolution and their socialist construction. As is pointed out in the `Rules', the thought of Mao Tse-tung is the guideline which we must uphold in all our actions.''
It is hardly necessary to say that definitions of this kind clash with the spirit of the Party Rules. In the Army, on the eve of the "cultural revolution'', statements were made and action taken which were not only at variance with the Party line but undermined its organisational principles. In the communique of a conference on problems of political work in the Army, held at the close of 1965 and beginning of 1966, it is noted:
``To move politics to the foreground means to move to the foreground the thought of Mao Tse-tung and to regard 246 the works of Mao Tse-tung as the supreme guide to action for the entire Army.... We must firmly put into effect all Mao Tse-tung's instructions and fearlessly secure their implementation. Everything that contradicts the instructions of Mao Tse-tung must be resolutely rejected and combated.'' Here it is not only a matter of placing politics and ideology in the forefront and regarding the "line of Mao Tsetung'', the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the supreme guide to action for everybody. It is also a call to combat everything that comes into conflict with the political line of Mao Tsetung, with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. Under the guise of the "cultural revolution" the Mao group declared war on the opponents of Mao Tse-tung in the "Message of May 16, 1966'', which was written under his personal guidance, and in Mao Tse-tung's appeal of March 28 to all hungweipings in the country to gather in Peking. But even prior to this, as we have seen, the Army had been engaged in spreading propaganda demanding the destruction of the antiMaoist grouping.
Outside the Army, parallel with giving wider publicity to divergences with the "Soviet revisionists'', the Mao group in 1964 began its attacks on the theory of "integrating two in one" advanced by Yang Hsien-cheng and others, alleging that it called for class conciliation and compromise with revisionism. Moreover, as a prelude to the "cultural revolution" the Mao group organised a movement for socialist education in all towns and villages. This movement was directly bound up with other movements---"movement for the study of the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', "movement for the assimilation and practical application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', the "philosophy to the masses" movement. Among scientific and cultural workers this movement took the shape of a sharp class struggle between the " proletarian line" in the theatre, the cinema, literature, history, etc., and the "bourgeois reactionary line, bourgeois authorities''. Rank and decorations were abolished in the Chinese Army in 1965. This was one of the steps aimed at intensifying political and ideological work in the Army, a measure directed towards turning the Army into a dependable base of the "great proletarian cultural revolution''.
As we have noted above, the Mao group's preparations for the "cultural revolution" in civilian spheres, in which an important role was played by Chen Po-ta, lagged behind 247 similar preparations in the Army, where the consistent deification of Mao Tse-tung was started much earlier as was the purge of those who criticised or disagreed with the "line of Mao Tse-tung'', and the foundation was laid for the "great proletarian cultural revolution" with the object of establishing the absolute rule of Mao Tse-tung. A noteworthy fact is that the movement to absolutise the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was conducted as a nation-wide movement to "learn from Lei Feng'', a "movement to popularise the Book of Quotations" and so on. At a conference of top Army officers in August 1967 Lin Piao declared: "In setting the cultural revolution in motion we relied, firstly, on the great authority and popularity of the thought of Mao Tsetung and of the Chairman Mao himself, secondly, on the might of the People's Liberation Army. We firmly caused huge masses of people to rise and exposed many disgraceful things. We would have been unable to achieve this without these factors, particularly without the wise leadership of Chairman Mao, without the absolute authority of his thought.''
From this it is obvious that the Army, led by Lin Piao, played the main role in creating the conditions for the "great proletarian cultural revolution''. A very notable role was played by Lin Piao and the Army as the initiators of the "cultural revolution" in the period directly preceding the beginning of this ``revolution'' (spring and summer of 1966).
A landmark leading up to the "cultural revolution" was the conference on problems of political work in the Army which was held at the close of December 1965 and beginning of January 1966. The thesis of "moving politics to the forefront" was advanced at this conference. The substance of this thesis was that it called for "giving first place to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, regarding the works of Chairman Mao as the supreme instructions for the Army, and using the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the guide in everything''. In other words, this conference not only took a further step towards the absolutisation of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" but called for a "determined struggle against and rejection of everything contradicting the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', thereby declaring war on leading Army cadres who held antiMaoist views, passively resisted the absolutisation of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and were critical of the " 248 cultural revolution" or adopted a passive attitude towards it. This conference was an ominous indication that during the "cultural revolution" there would be a violent campaign in non-Army circles against those leaders and forces who were critical of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" or were passively resisting the "line of Mao'', an indication that the deification of Mao Tse-tung and the absolutisation of his ``thought'' would be further intensified.
Lin Piao began propagandising the "thought of Mao Tsetung" not only in China but in foreign countries (July letter). In this letter he wrote:
``The thought of Mao Tse-tung mirrors the objective laws of the internal and external class struggle. It reflects the vital interests of the proletariat and all other working people. It was not formulated by the working people spontaneously. On the basis of extensive revolutionary practice Chairman Mao brilliantly developed the teaching of Marxism-- Leninism, generalised the new experience of the international communist movement and raised Marxism-Leninism to a totally new level. Such is the thought of Mao Tse-tung.''
These words become particularly meaningful if it is recalled that at the time a delegation of the Communist Party of Japan was on a tour of the People's Republic of China, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
However, in this period not all the Chinese leaders were showing "sufficient understanding" for the deification of Mao Tse-tung and the absolutisation of his ``thought''. This was demonstrated by the dialogue in April-May 1966 between the Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao and Jenmin Jihpao on the subject of "moving politics to the forefront''. In April Jenmin Jihpao carried three editorials on this subject. In the first of these (April 6) the newspaper wrote: "In their actions all comrades working in the various spheres, on the different fronts, must give preference to politics, to the thought of Mao Tse-tung.'' Here, as distinct from the Army conference on problems of political work, the newspaper did not go to the extent of asserting that "to give preference to politics" meant "to give preference to the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. In the second editorial (April 14), we find the words: "To give preference to politics, to give first place to political actions means to put the thought of Mao Tse-tung in the leading position and revolutionise the people's way of 249 thinking.'' In this editorial it was emphasised that the "unity of politics and economics, the unity of politics and technology, and the unity of politics and production" was an eternal, immutable law. Thereby, while "moving politics, the thought of Mao Tse-tung to the forefront'', it did not recognise that the priority and authority of this ``thought'' were absolute. Soon after this, on April 18, Chiehfangchun Pao officially defined all the hitherto existing forms of the popular movement as a "great proletarian cultural revolution" and emphasised that this "revolution must be regarded in its direct connection with the struggle between two classes, with the class struggle between two lines, between two ideologies''.
Evidently taking these veiled attacks of the Army newspaper into account and, it seems, frightened by them, Jenmin Jihpao wrote on April 22, for the first time, that "priority of politics is the priority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung''. On May 17, hitting out post-datedly, Chiehfangchun Pao carried an editorial denouncing as erroneous the concept calling for the integration of "politics and efficiency''. A sharper criticism of this concept appeared in this newspaper on May 20. On May 18 Jenmin Jihpao reprinted the Chiehfangchun Pao editorial of May 17, thereby admitting its mistake. The "Message of the CC CPC" of May 16 (it was written on orders from Mao Tse-tung) was being circulated in the Party at this time. It explained the substance of the "great cultural revolution" and charted its further development, proclaiming that this ``revolution'' was a struggle between two classes, two lines, two ideologies; that anti-Party, anti-socialist elements, class enemies had infiltrated into the Party and were coming out under the red banner against the red banner; that having taken seats at the side of the leader (Mao Tse-tung), they were cosily dreaming and waiting for their hour, and that the struggle against them was the "cultural revolution''. However, on looking back we can see that the idea of this ``Message'' was clearly expressed earlier, in editorials in Chiehfangchun Pao on April 18 and May 4; that this "cultural revolution" was an expression of the fact that having turned the Army into their bastion and armed it with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and their supporters used this circumstance gradually to deify Mao chiefly in the Army, place the "thought of Mao Tsetung" in a position of incontestable authority and, at the 250 same time, prepare the ground for the "cultural revolution" on a general Party and national scale, i.e., for a movement to establish the absolute rule of Mao Tse-tung.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 3. Army Intervention As evidenced by the above-quoted Lin
Piao statement of August 9, 1967, the Mao group used the
backing of the Army to establish the absolute "authority of
Mao Tse-tung" and his ``thought'' and to prepare the ground
for the "cultural revolution''. When the preparations were,
in the main, completed, the Maoists started an offensive
(counter-offensive, as they called it) against "bourgeois
elements in authority, revisionists, anti-Party, anti-socialist,
anti-Mao Tse-tung elements" in the Party CC on the pretext
that "in pursuance of their bourgeois reactionary line" "
people in authority" in Peking and the CC CPC had sent
workers' groups to suppress the revolutionary movement of
students and other young people. The llth plenary meeting
of the CC CPC was held in August 1966 to give this offensive
the semblance of legality. Breaking down the resistance of
many CC members, the plenary meeting passed a 16-point
decision on the "cultural revolution'', the nature and
objectives of which were stated in extremely vague terms. Hardly
had this ``decision'' been adopted than, in accordance with
prearranged plans, students and other young people were
organised and set in motion as so-called hungweipings, a
movement was launched to destroy the "four old elements"
(old customs, habits, culture and morals) and a general
offensive was started against "bourgeois elements in power'',
against exponents of the "three antis''. This movement
embraced the entire country and until the possibility for a new
stage of the struggle arose, in other words, until the
prearranged struggle for power (which flared up in January 1967)
started, the fight was confined to the "cultural sphere" and
the Chinese Army remained on the sidelines. Limiting itself
to assistance in guard duty, transportation and the
maintenance of order, it externally adopted a stand of "non--
interference''.
In the 16-point ``decision'' the Army was not named among 251 the objectives of the "cultural revolution'', and no active struggle took place in its ranks at the initial stage of this ``revolution''. The reason for this was that the Army was accorded an "important role" in the "cultural revolution" and also that the Maoists were quite certain there was no need for such a struggle because the "thought of Mao Tsetung" was rooted deepest of all in the Army and that political awareness was highest among the troops. "We have an invincible weapon---the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Our hearts, hot as fire, are filled with devotion to the Party, to socialism, to the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Truth is in our hands. The position of our commanders and men is firm, their slogans are clear, their sense is sharp and their eyes are keen and clearly distinguish friend from foe. . . .''^^*^^
However, it would be hard to deny the fact that when it became increasingly more obvious that an assault had been started against the Army leadership in the centre and in the localities, against high-ranking cadres in the Defence Ministry and against Army commissars of all ranks, manifestations of which were the criticism and attacks of the hungweipings on Ho Lung and Chu Teh, the removal of Lo Jui-ching, the rumours of the February counter-current (1967) and so forth, anxiety and vacillation mounted among the Army leadership---this was, after all, China, where personal and service ties could easily be regarded as political.
From the end of 1966 to January 1967 one or several organisations of "revolutionary tsaofans" were set up at factories and offices, chiefly in Peking and Shanghai, soon after the hungweiping organisations were established. In a drive to take over the administrative functions of control at their own or other factories and offices, these organisations attacked cadres and also the organisations led by these cadres, with the result that Government offices and factories were paralysed. A situation arose where these offices and factories passed into the hands of so-called `` revolutionaries'', while the ``reactionaries'' organised a counteroffensive, regaining what they had lost, starting regular battles, and so on. Middle and lower Party bodies were also paralysed, and this, in turn, was accompanied by differences and a struggle in these Party organisations. Furthermore, as in Shanghai, for example, the "revolutionary tsaofans" _-_-_
^^*^^ Chiehfangchun Pao, May 4, 1966.
252 sought to unite on a district scale and seize the administrative power.This was precisely when the Mao group announced that from the very beginning the "cultural revolution" had been a struggle for the "seizure of power'', and on January 22, 1967 openly proclaimed that this was its policy line. At the same time, the Army was ordered to intervene in the " cultural revolution" and support the ``revolutionaries'' in the struggle for power. These orders were issued by Lin Piao on Mao Tse-tung's insistence. They stated in part: "The Army is to be sent to support the broad masses of the Left''; "if subsequently true revolutionaries request support and aid from the troops, this support is to be rendered''. On the basis of these orders a "Message on Firm PLA Support of Proletarian Revolutionaries" was published on January 24, 1967. There were five points:
1. All preceding instructions on the Army's non-- intervention in the "great cultural revolution" in the localities (i.e., outside the Army) and also other instructions contradicting the spirit of the above were rescinded.
2. The struggle of the broad revolutionary ``Left'' masses for the seizure of power was to be actively supported. In cases where genuine proletarian ``Left'' groups requested Army support, troops were to be sent to render these groups active assistance.
3. Counter-revolutionary elements and organisations combating proletarian ``Left'' groups were to be resolutely suppressed.
4. The previous instructions that the Army was not to be used as a refuge for a handful of people in Party authority following the capitalist road and for diehard elements stubbornly following the bourgeois reactionary line were reiterated.
5. The question of the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping was to be thoroughly analysed in all Army units.
The "seizure of power" from "bourgeois elements in authority" in the Party had been the Mao group's objective from the very beginning; it had been the objective of the first stage of the "cultural revolution" in the broad sense of the word. Why then had the line of ``non-interference'' been 253 changed? According to Chiehfangchun Pao the Army had proclaimed its active participation in the "cultural revolution" at the very outset. But Army interference would have been a much too heavy psychological blow to the people and that was why initially unarmed hungweipings were used. However, the logic of the hungweipings was: from the very substance of the "cultural revolution" it was obvious that the "revolution could commit no sin, and revolt was a just cause''; therefore, without wasting words force should be used to remove those in the Party who held different views, i.e., not only those who opposed the policy and line of Mao Tse-tung but also those who, though not necessarily in active opposition to this policy and line, were discontented and worried over the Mao cult, over his deification and the absolutisation of his ``thought'', those who refused to align themselves or keep in step with him; an end should be put to all contradictions among the people and in the Party as being antagonistic; to believe, not only in words but by action, in their own infallibility, to have no doubts on this point and to regard everything directed against Mao Tsetung as being erroneous, anti-Party and counter-- revolutionary.
This logic inevitably aggravated differences, gave rise to discord and armed clashes, and demonstrated the failure of the "cultural revolution''. Actually it was due to the hungweipings that material values were massively squandered, transport was brought to a standstill, production was disorganised, cadres were brutally persecuted and bloody incidents broke out on a huge scale. This brought to the fore a problem which the Mao group could not afford to ignore.
The "armed struggle" thus inevitably stems from the very substance of the "cultural revolution''. However, when it was appreciably exacerbated by the "struggle for the seizure of power'', Mao and his supporters had no alternative but to establish their absolute rule, scale down the hungweiping movement and bring in the Army.
An extraordinarily grave military-political situation had taken shape in China when the Army was ordered to intervene and vigorously support the ``Left'' groups. Heavy fighting occurred as early as January 3 in the Nanking District between tsaofans, who supported the Mao-Lin group, and their adversaries---"worker red guards''. An Army division was sent to that district, where it crushed the "worker 254 red guards'', arresting more than 2,000 of them. On January 12, with the support of the lo«_al garrison, the "revolutionary tsaofans" of Shansi Province seized control of the Provincial Committee of the CC, the town committee in Taiyuan, and the provincial and town people's committees. On January 15, in the town of Changsha, Hunan Province, troops suppressed the Hunan Red Banner Detachment and arrested its leaders. On January 22, the Peking garrison command sent troops to suppress anti-Maoist elements in Fangshan District, in the environs of Peking. In Harbin on January 23, Yungfuchun, an organisation opposed to the Mao-Lin group, attacked a "detachment of revolutionary tsaofans'', supporters of Mao and Lin. The Yungfuchun organisation was disarmed by troops of the Harbin garrison. In Chengtu in mid-January the military district Party committee used 3,000 troops to attack the hungweipings sent from Peking. This gave the hungweipings the grounds for criticising Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Li Ching-chuang. In the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region several tens of thousands of retired Army men and troops of the production-building teams attacked and killed tsaofans. The so-called events of January 26 were particularly bloody. In mid-January an "armed struggle" broke out in Northeast China---Talien, Lushun, Shenyang---during which 600 people were wounded, 300 arrested and three killed. Several hundred people were wounded during the "armed struggle" in Chihli Province. Far from ending the "armed struggle'', Army intervention fanned it and even turned it into a savage civil war. In Sian and in Tsinghai Province an "armed struggle" raged for ten days in February between the Maoist "August 18th" hungweiping organisation and anti-Maoists. Many people were killed or wounded, and many hungweipings who had come from other places were arrested. Moreover, according to tatsupao (wall newspapers) hung in Peking on February 8, local garrisons suppressed tsaofan actions in Heilungkiang, Shantung, Shansi, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Kwangtung, Szechuan and elsewhere. In February there was bloody fighting between usurping and anti-usurping groups in Fuken Province, too. In mid-February several score of people were wounded in the "armed struggle" between rival groups in Kansu Province. Moreover, in mid-February troops opened fire on "revolutionary masses" in Hunan Province and made numerous arrests. In Chenchow conservative "red guards" 255 attacked hungweipings, with the result that one was killed and more than seventy seriously wounded. In this period attention was drawn particularly by the "armed struggle" of the anti-Maoist forces. This ``struggle'' bore the stamp of resistance. At a meeting with tsaofans from Kweichow Province on February 15, Chou En-lai said: "The present situation in the country is reminiscent of the period of military control in 1949.''
This situation obtained from April to July, when the bloody "armed struggle" spread and grew in intensity. Despite the repeated directives from the centre forbidding this "armed struggle'', it continued and grew increasingly fierce. According to Hsieh Fu-chin, Chairman of the Peking "revolutionary committee'', in the period from April 20 to May 10 there were 133 clashes and bloody incidents, involving nearly 63,500 persons, in Peking alone. This, of course, affected production.
Clashes between rival groups became more and more frequent in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region, with the result that oil production came to a standstill in Urumchi. In Chinghai and Kansu there were clashes between troops and hungweipings, the latter suffering many casualties. In Shihchiachuang 245 people were wounded and 120 arrested as a result of similar clashes. In mid-May troops suppressed tsaofan actions in the town of Chihsi, Heilungkiang Province; there was much bloodshed, and 1,000 people were arrested. In Chiamussu troops attacked the hungweipings, killing 11, wounding 40 and arresting 150. In Shenyang, on the contrary, at the close of May hungweipings surrounded the security administration and attacked troops, but were beaten back. A series of "battles for power" were fought in Hsuchow; troops attacked Maoist organisations, killing or wounding more than 1,000 persons. In Anhwei Province security forces supported anti-Maoist actions in late May. In protest 1,200 hungweipings staged a hunger strike. In Kiangsi Province anti-Maoist organisations gained the upper hand at the close of April; as a result of the "armed struggle" in Nauchang in mid-June of the town's 54 factories only 33 were operational, while the ``struggle'' itself spread to more than 400 villages in the province. At the Anyuan pits the "armed struggle" went on for several months: more than 100 tsaofans and hungweipings perished and over 500 persons were wounded.
256There had been differences in the town of Wuhan earlier, but in May and June the "armed struggle" grew particularly sharp with the result that the Great Wuhan Bridge was closed. In Honan Province the rival factions were the "February 7th Commune" and the "United Command of Revolutionary Tsaofans''. The former was supported by the CC CPC "group for cultural ervolution affairs" and the latter by the local garrison. More than 2,000 persons were wounded in the clashes between them in the course of April, May and June. In Honan Province in this period the atmosphere was as inflamed as in Szechuan Province. In the "armed struggle" between two revolutionary groups mainly in Chungking and Chengtu, one group had the support of the Army and the other of the CC CPC "group for cultural revolution affairs''. Clashes flared up repeatedly, and in Chengtu alone over 10,000 persons were killed or wounded. In May the "group for cultural revolution affairs" passed a "decision on the settlement of the Szechuan problem'', but tension mounted and the "revolutionary committee" was not formed until August 1968.
The "armed struggle" reached its summit in the "Wuhan incident''. In that town, too, the mass revolutionary organisations split up into two large groups. The so-called "Million Heroes" and the organisation of employees of the security organs, the procurator's office and the courts were supported by the local garrison headed by Chen Tsai-tao, while the workers' and students' organisations were backed by the "group for cultural revolution affairs''. The former were called conservatives and the latter revolutionaries. Actually, it was hardly possible to distinguish between these two groups in the "armed struggle''. The "armed struggle" between the two factions grew in intensity in June and July. On July 14 the "group for cultural revolution affairs" sent Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li as its representatives to settle the conflict. They visited and supported only one of the sides, the ``revolutionaries'', and tried to check the "Million Heroes" and the troops backing them, for which they were thrown into prison and beaten. They escaped with their lives only after armed pressure was exerted by the "group for cultural revolution affairs'', the Army, Navy and Air Force.
After these events a fierce "armed struggle" broke out in Kwangchow, too. The warring factions consisted of " __PRINTERS_P_257_COMMENT__ 17--2466 257 revolutionary masses''. Chou En-lai went to Kwangchow in April 1968 where he made futile attempts to act as mediator. The Kwangchow garrison supported the ``conservatives''. On July 21 the ``conservatives'' attacked the ``revolutionaries'' and many people were killed or wounded. The "armed struggle" continued even after this clash, with both the Army and the "group for cultural revolution affairs" completely losing control. In other areas, too, where the "armed struggle" had already started and was continuing, the situation was growing from bad to worse with no sign of abatement. The "armed struggle" was particularly violent in regions where the Army and the "group for cultural revolution affairs" supported different sides.
The above facts demonstrate that an "armed struggle" is the inevitable outcome of the divisive policy expressed in the words "revolt is a just cause''. In Wuhan, Kwangchow and elsewhere the events strikingly show that the Army intervenes on a large scale; where the "group for cultural revolution affairs" and the local garrisons support different mass organisations and seek to destroy each other the "armed struggle" is further aggravated.
In this explosive situation the Mao group had somewhat to modify its policy. It called for a "broad coalition" where the contradictions between rival organisations of `` revolutionaries'' could be settled by negotiation, excommunicated "ultra-Left elements" ``devoted'' to Mao who consistently pursued the line of "revolt is a just cause'', and acted more prudently towards cadres, i.e., where possible it used military cadres in the localities and reinstated expelled cadres, forcing them, as far as it was possible, to come forward with self-criticism. In September and October 1967 the Mao group began creating the impression in China and abroad that the "armed struggle" had somewhat abated, and clamped down on tatsupao reporting armed clashes and disorders.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ 4. The Army's Role in Establishing In order to establish their absolute
rule the Maoists first trampled on the Party Rules and the
country's Constitution and, evidently, tried to set up an
258
apparatus of power on the model of the Paris Commune.
When from the experiments in Peking, Shanghai and other
cities it became obvious that this form was unsuitable, Mao
and his supporters set about building up so-called
provisional organs of power founded on the integration of the three
sides---Party and Government cadres, the Army and the
revolutionary masses.
At present organs of power called "revolutionary committees" are being set up as a convenient form of the absolute rule of Mao Tse-tung. These "revolutionary committees" disbanded the Party and people's committees, dispersed the Party and government cadres opposed to the Mao group and united cadres loyal to the Maoists, representatives of the Army units devoted to Mao, and representatives of the hungweipings and tsaofans. The key objective of the power struggle was the creation of these " revolutionary committees" as organs of absolute rule. Initially the Mao group adopted a ``democratic'' pose in order to give the impression that it was setting up organs of power from below, by the will of the ``masses''. Actually, it concentrated all its forces on forming these organs with the Army providing the nucleus. The situation was such that the Maoists could no longer permit the anarchy started by the hungweipings and tsaofans to continue, and to put an end to it established a system of military control throughout the country in June 1967. There were two variants of this system, whose ultimate objective was to enforce absolute rule. The first was that in the process of forming " revolutionary committees" "from below'', the "groups for the formation of revolutionary committees'', with the Army playing first fiddle in them, should be set up in each province, town and autonomous region. The second envisaged a system of military control planted by compulsion from above in order to halt the unrest in the localities and preserve public order and administrative authority. This implied taking control of the situation by armed force on the pretext that there were disorders and thereby speed up the organisation of the "groups for the formation of revolutionary committees" and the "revolutionary committees" themselves, In effect, the Maoists hastily moved towards the formation of the "revolutionary committees" in both these ways. The military control established in each province prior to June 1967 was of the first type, while the military control __PRINTERS_P_259_COMMENT__ 17* 259 that was set up on a fairly large scale after June was control from above with disorders given as the justification for them. Moreover, the central and local government apparatus (ministries, boards of the State Council of the PRC, public security organs, courts, radio stations, civil airlines, banks, warehouses, offices, ports, railways and so on) were from the very beginning placed under military control for long or short periods. In many cases, this control remains in force to this day. Besides, from the fact that in the name of the State Council and without preliminary discussion in official organs Chou En-lai issues circulars, orders and instructions and passes decisions on the appointment of government cadres, it would be natural to surmise that the ruling group has a free hand in ministries, government organs and so on.
Let us now examine other general duties performed by the Army, which is the mainstay of absolute rule in the period of disorganisation and, at the same time, a link of this rule.
First and foremost, it must be stated that in the " revolutionary committees" the Army representatives form the backbone and take part in the administrative and other functions of the local organs of power; the number of members in these "revolutionary committees" has no significance whatever. The chairmen of 70 per cent of these ``committees'' are Army representatives. In addition, Army representatives carry out tasks such as the "two military" (military control and military-political training) and the "three supports" (``support of Left groups'', "support of industry" and "support of agriculture'').
Incidentally, "support of industry" by the Army boils down to sending "teams of propagandists of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" to the factories and setting up in all military districts organisations for the implementation of the slogan "accomplish the revolution, stimulate production''. "Groups for the study of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" have been set up at all enterprises of the mining industry, too. Army "support of agriculture" involves the organisation of field work in the spring, the harvesting, the movement " accomplish the revolution, stimulate production" and the study and propagation of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
Moreover, the Army supervises the military training of secondary school pupils and of students of institutes and 260 universities. The efficacy of this training is very much open to doubt.
In reality discipline in trade and industries has in general dropped, and goods are making their way to the black market. The living standard is steadily declining. The Party organisations are paralysed and have been almost completely disbanded. Most of the veteran trade union activists have been removed from their posts. The tsaofans have taken over the leadership of the trade unions and the management of factories and offices, and are forming "revolutionary committees''. Mutual distrust, antagonism and hostility are naturally mounting between them and those who have been persecuted and, from time to time, this still develops into an "armed struggle''. Persons who have been persecuted insistently demand to be reinstated; being discontent with the methods employed by the new leadership they sabotage their work wherever possible. It frequently happens that new cadres do not know the ``secrets'' of production or have no experience of management. As a result, this leadership, consisting of representatives of the three sides (in the "revolutionary committees'') finds itself isolated from reality. In particular, this is true of the representatives of the "revolutionary masses" and the Army, who have only been given extensive rights to state their minds and direct affairs and loudly call for the study and application of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', but cannot come down to earth. It is not clear to what extent their words influence the lower-echelon leadership and administration of enterprises, offices and organisations, but most frequently this is expressed solely in words pledging ``support'', ``assistance'' and ``advice''. It seems to us that the greater the rights accorded to the representatives of the "revolutionary masses" and the Army, the more abstract and formal becomes the leadership and management provided by them. In this situation the Army with its "support of Left groups" and "support of industry" evidently encounters many contradictions and difficulties. The "simplification of the administrative structure" and "reduction and strengthening of the Army and administrative apparatus" are not rapid and smooth processes either.
The same situation obtains in the countryside. The link forces in the people's communes have grown weaker and even if it is surmised that agricultural production is proceeding normally, there are many signs that in the rural areas 261 the tendency towards non-socialist, bourgeois, individualistic thinking---distribute more, stock up less, deliver less to the state, pay smaller taxes---is on the upgrade. The Chinese press reports that the reorganisation of the administration is proceeding slowly, that the number of activists who could take over leading posts is dwindling. Moreover, there is a tendency to turn the leadership over t6 the poor and middle strata, and inasmuch as the Army's support of agriculture is attended by many complex and extremely diverse problems it will be difficult to satisfy the peasants' real demands. Army activity is reduced chiefly to providing labour assistance during the field work and harvesting seasons, aid against elemental calamities and help in the propagation and study of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''. If this is discounted, it will be seen that the Army has failed to win popularity among the people and organise production. The attempts to use pressure to organise the "accomplish the revolution, stimulate production" movement have had the reverse effect. In any case, as regards the "three supports" it is quite obvious that compared with the situation prevailing formerly, the establishment of the absolute rule of the Mao group, for which purpose old traditions and armed force have been used, has only led to the "restoration of order" and ``control''.
However, as we have pointed out, the Army was not unanimous and did not act in a united front in establishing the absolute rule of the Mao group. To say nothing of the attacks on and persecution of distinguished Army leaders such as Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Peng Teh-huai, the command of five of the ten major military districts of China and of nine of the 27 ordinary military districts were relieved of their duties as early as August 1967. In particular, Hsu Hsiang-chian, chairman of the "All-Army Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs'', was removed from his post, while the other members, whose number is believed to be about 20, disappeared from the scene one after another. When this group was considered virtually disbanded, Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, and Yeh Chun, Lin's wife, occupied special places in it.
``Unification" within the Army on the basis of the "thought of Mao" thus encountered violent resistance and counteractions. However, Mao and his supporters, who continue to regard the Army as the mainstay of their absolute rule, 262 have forbidden any "seizure of power" "from below" or nonArmy "seizure of power" which might lead to the Army's disorganisation and endeavoured to create ``unity'' in the Army.
The military put up their strongest resistance to the Mao group in March 1968, this being expressed in the persecution of Army cadres regarded as the most devoted to the Maoists: Chief of the General Staff Yang Cheng-wu, Commissar of the Air Force Yu Li-chin, commander of the Peking military district garrison Fu Chung-pi, to name a few. The very fact of the reappearance in this period of the slogan "defend to the end'', which the Maoists proclaimed whenever the situation became extremely critical for Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, indicates that the opposition to the Mao group was undoubtedly very strong indeed.
Enhancing the ``unity'' of the Army in this manner, the Mao group sought to complete at all costs the last stage in the establishment of "revolutionary committees" before October 1968, and to this end it sent "central detachments in support of Left groups" to areas where these ``committees'' had not yet been set up. These detachments, sent to all parts of the country in June 1968, had the task of ordering the troops in the various localities to "support Left groups" and of making sure these instructions were carried out. The substance of this support was to crush the actions of the ``counter-revolution'', confiscate weapons and ammunition from local "revolutionary masses'', avert bloodshed and help to form a "broad coalition" through negotiation. The Mao group thus began to take steps to use this as a pretext to form detachments directly subordinated to it and enforce its rule throughout the country (``Some instructions of the CC CPC, the State Council, the Central Military Council and the CC CPC group for cultural revoltuion affairs regarding the dislocation of 'central detachments in support of Left groups' in all large and small military districts'', June 10, 1968).
Many troops are needed to keep in check the military forces in the provinces with the help of such detachments subordinated directly to the centre. However, the facts seem to indicate that far from bringing the situation under control, the use of troops has only further exacerbated the contradictions between the Army of the ``centre'' and the Army of the ``provinces''. In a "lecture on strategic dislocation'', delivered evidently in September or October 1967, Mao Tse-tung said: 263 ``As regards the convocation of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, it seems to me that this could be done at this time next year. Know no fatigue and don't take it into your heads to retreat.'' In order to make sure his strategic plan was carried into effect, he said: "Changes, which have turned the Celestial (China) upside down, as it were, have taken place this year. Naturally, there have been considerable disorders everywhere. Disorders here and there. This is not to be feared. Things like an armed struggle are also excellent. When contradictions are laid bare they can be easily settled.'' Mao thereby showed that he was frightened and worried that the cadres and masses were tired of the struggle and their enthusiasm was waning.
It may be asserted that Army activity, which has assumed a colossal scale already, has been increasing steadily after the seizure of power. Its leading position in the system of the absolute rule of the Mao group has grown steadily stronger during and after the "cultural revolution" and the struggle "for the seizure of power''. Its authority seems to be stable but, on the other hand, Mao Tse-tung's dependence on it is growing, and the contradictions between it and the people are becoming increasingly aggravated as are the contradictions between the Army of the ``centre'' and the ``provinces''. The Mao group's growing dependence on the Army is a process of the Army's degeneration and an indication of the widening gulf between the Army and the people.
[264] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Jean-Emile Vldal The liberation struggle went on for
more than a quarter of a century, and the main contradiction
bringing the Chinese people into opposition to the rule of
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic Kuomintang capital
was settled when a people's democratic system was established
in China.
The Communist Party of China, which headed this struggle, gradually mobilised huge masses of the poorest peasants (comprising 70 per cent of the population) who aligned themselves with the proletariat.
After liberation the workers, peasants and intellectuals started remaking the country's economy with enormous enthusiasm. In eight years (1949--57) under the leadership of the Communist Party semi-feudal and semi-colonial China was turned into a rapidly developing socialist country. Industry was placed under state or mixed ownership controlled by the state. As a result of a far-reaching agrarian reform the land was distributed among the peasants. Later there appeared agricultural mutual-assistance teams, lower type co-operatives and, lastly, higher type co-operatives.
An end was put to famines, an eternal scourge that used periodically to take a toll of millions of lives. The standard of living began to rise. The countries that had taken the road of independent development closely followed the achievements which the Chinese people attained thanks to their dedicated labour and considerable assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
This was a new victorious experience of applying _-_-_
^^*^^ L'Humanite, September 30, IOCS; October 1, 1968 (France).
265 MarxismLeninism in an underdeveloped country and, to a large extent, it helped to change the face of the globe.At the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 Mao Tse-tung said: "Every nation, big or small, has its own strong and weak points. Even if we had achieved extremely great successes, there is no reason whatsoever to feel conceited and complacent. Humility helps one to make progress, whereas conceit makes one lag behind. This is truth we must always bear in mind.''^^*^^
Mao Tse-tung was the first to forget
this truth. In 1958, when people's communes were set up
throughout China within a few weeks, the leadership of the
CPC plunged the country into a Utopian adventure for which
the people had to pay bitterly in the course of four years,
from 1960 to 1964. In 1962 gross output was only 54 per cent
of the 1959 level.
In a report to the National People's Congress on December 30, 1964, Chou En-lai said: "Agricultural output grew in 1962--63, and in 1964 it showed even better results, rising to the level of the best years.
``It is planned to exceed the 1957 level in the output of grain, cotton, raw tobacco and cane sugar, in the number of pigs, goats, sheep and so on.''
This was an official admission of the failure of the people's communes and, in practice, meant that from 1960 to 1963 food production was below or at best equal to the level of 1957, and that in some spheres it would exceed that level only in 1964, i.e., six years after the "big leap" was initiated. However, it should be borne in mind that compared with 1957 the population of China had increased by many millions.
Yet since 1966, when the "cultural revolution" was launched, Mao Tse-tung and his group have been attacking and persecuting precisely those who effected the country's reorganisation.
The "cultural revolution'', that has been rocking China for the past two years, has passed through several stages. First school children and students and then the Army, as the _-_-_
^^*^^ Eighth National Congress of Ihc Communist Party of China, Vol. I, Documents, Peking, 195(i, p. 10.
266 main force, were used to destroy Party organisations and the trade unions. At the same time, use was made of an ideological lever---the cult of the "red sun'', the ``infallible'' Mao. The Party committees were replaced
by "revolutionary committees" consisting of persons devoted
to Mao and appointed from above in the total absence of
control by the working class. But the working class put up
a determined resistance to the actions of the hungweipings,
entrusted by the Peking leaders with carrying through the
"cultural revolution" at the factories. Bloody clashes took
place in all parts of the country. The fragmentary reports
from China do not make it possible to sum up all these
developments, but the results are obviously quite lamentable.
While the proletariat has been kept away from the "great proletarian cultural revolution" as long as it was possible, the Army, on the contrary, has played and continues to play the main role in it.
On August 1, 1968, the newspaper Jcnmin Jihpao, the magazine Hungchih and the Army newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao reminded the country that the Army was helping the ``Left'' forces in industry and agriculture, establishing military control and ensuring political and military training. The "revolutionary committees" were the "result of the joint efforts of the military and civilian forces in the country''.
These committees, consisting chiefly of Army representatives, "revolutionary tsaofans" and ``repentant'' and ``reinstated'' old Party cadres now function throughout China. In Sinkiang and Tibet they were set up much later than elsewhere, early in September 1968.
From the reports published in the course of 1966 and 1967 the conclusion can be drawn that a more intensive development of the "cultural revolution" was expected in that period. However, it only proved possible to mark the national anniversary with the fanfare of a "complete victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution" with a delay of one year.
Actually, this ``victory'' has all the earmarks of being extremely formal. The authority of the Maoist committees is constantly threatened. In provinces where it was supposed that the "revolutionary committees" have been in power for 267 more than a year there have been counter-offensives by Party leaders "taking the capitalist road"---the terminology used to designate Mao Tse-tung's adversaries---during the past few months.
These ill-assorted committees, set up under the most diverse conditions (depending on the place and time), but in which the Army is indispensably accorded the role of maintaining the minimum order, have turned into an arena of factional struggle, which for China harbours a dangerous phenomenon---the trend of provinces and even districts within provinces to adopt independent decisions.
This tendency is spurred also by the fact that the Communist Party of China, leader and sentinel of the revolution, has been routed and the central authority has been weakened by contradictions reflecting the differences sparked in the country by the "cultural revolution''. These differences are bringing about a head-on collision between factions, one of which, believed to be more moderate and represented by Chou En-lai, and the other consisting of ultra-``Left'' elements.
Despite all the efforts which Mao Tse-tung and his associates have been making for some time, the internecine struggle continues to rend the ranks of the hungweipings; in a speech on September 7, 1968, Mao Tse-tung's wife Chiang Ching mentioned ``lamentable'' clashes between them.
This centrifugal tendency, so dangerous to the country's unity, was noted in the August issue of the magazine Hungchih: "The theory of `polycentrism' must be combated because it stands for non-recognition of a single centre; we must combat the clan spirit, sectarianism and all other reactionary bourgeois tendencies directed at undermining the dictatorship of the working class.''
__ALPHA_LVL3__ IIThe latest stage of the "cultural revolution" is characterised by the formation of "propaganda teams" consisting of ``loyal'' persons selected on the principle 268 of unconditional compliance to orders from Mao Tse-tung. But now these people are soldiers, workers and peasants.
Today it is no longer the "red guards"---hungweipings--- who are bringing the "cultural revolution" to the factories and the villages. "Propaganda teams" are being sent to universities and schools to put an end to anarchist outrages. Now these teams "must constantly direct schools'', control the study process and make sure that it is founded on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
In its August issue Hungchih pointed out:
``Workers and soldiers must go where intellectuals congregate---to the schools and offices---in order to put an end to their domination, and occupy big and small domains where exponents of the theory of 'several leading nuclei' are hiding.. ..''
The sun of the "red guards"---hungweipings---is setting. Where they have been active, set in motion and encouraged by Mao Tse-tung and his group, they have encountered resistance from the working class and the peasants. Even the magazine Hungchih has admitted that their reign is coming to an end: "Facts demonstrate .. . that by relying solely on the students and intellectuals it is impossible to carry out militant tasks on the education front such as criticism and transformation and also many other tasks if workers and men of the People's Liberation Army do not participate in them and if firm leadership by the working class is lacking.''
The new instructions of the "great helmsman" are thus that the "working class must provide leadership everywhere''. Mao Tse-tung unquestionably plans to use the working class after the Party and the trade unions are destroyed.
However, the role which, officially at least, has been reallocated to the working class---which, incidentally, did not wait for ``directives'' to take action and oppose the distortions of the "cultural revolution"---may have disastrous consequences for the ill-starred apprentices (the hungweipings) and the reverse effect to what Mao Tse-tung and his group desire, namely, to occupy a privileged position with regard to the rest of the proletariat and totally isolate themselves from it. This seems difficult but it is quite feasible because by virtue of their origin and class solidarity the ``workers' propaganda teams" will seek to restitute China's true revolutionary character.
269But if this tendency manifests itself, Mao Tse-tung will turn necessity into a feat attributed to himself and plunge into new adventures. It is worth noting that the failure of the utopian people's communes of 1958 is once again given out as a triumph of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung'', who succeeded in imposing his views after several years of complete silence.
A series of articles, the gist of which is
that "it is necessary to re-educate many intellectuals of the
old school, strive to win them over and secure their
participation in our cause'', was published in September 1968. The
implication is that the removal of a large number of
engineering specialists and administrative cadres---after all, to replace
them in any post it was enough to master the "thought of
Mao Tse-tung" to perfection---has seriously hit China's
economy. Their return is becoming increasingly more
imperative.
New ``instructions'' were issued by Mao Tse-tung in January 1968 "on strengthening the Party organisations''. Then, for several months, nothing at all was said on that score. Then, in August, the press again began to speak of the Party as the "leading link in our cause''. This may be a sign that a congress of the Communist Party of China will be held in 1969. The last congress was held ten years ago, in 1958, despite the fact that the Party Rules, adopted in 1956, require that the CC CPC convene a session of the National Congress annually.
However, if it is convened it will sooner be a congress of the Maoist "revolutionary committees" rather than a Party congress. The flouting of the Party Rules and illegal actions are a feature of the "cultural revolution''.
What are those people now thinking who once maintained that the purpose of the "cultural revolution" was to " overthrow the bureaucracy" and establish a "new proletarian democracy"? If the bureaucracy has been swept away what has replaced it when without control by the proletariat and the organisations set up by the revolution a group decides everything?
270 How can the workers, peasants, the
whole Chinese people, misinformed about the domestic and
international situation, take part in discussing real
developments?
The press in China gives a caricature of the world, where all Parties, with the exception of the CPC, are ``revisionist'' to a larger or lesser degree, where the European socialist countries, with the exception of Albania, "have returned to capitalism'', where tiny Maoist groups, scattered about in various countries and cut off from the people, are "large Marxist-Leninist Parties'', while all the peoples of the world "revere the thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
Moreover, the Peking leaders disseminate peremptory orders as to what this or that nation or this or that Party must do. Jenmin Jihpao carried an editorial levelling insults at the Communist Party of Japan and calling for "the creation in Japan of a really revolutionary Party''.
On September 20, the newspaper Akahata printed the reply of the Communist Party of Japan, stating that " interference and action of this kind by the Mao Tse-tung group only play into the hands of the enemies of the revolution in Japan" and accusing the Chinese leadership of Great-Power chauvinism in politics, of subversion and ultra-``Left'' opportunism.
Jenmin Jihpao assessed the events of May-June in France as "a revolutionary storm inflicting a crushing blow at the rule of the French monopolistic bourgeoisie and the world capitalist system''. Then the newspaper was filled with all sorts of insults not at the Gaullist regime but at the French Communist Party.
Or take another example: the Chinese people, who have not been informed of the opening of official negotiations on Vietnam in Paris, are told that the talks between the Vietnamese and the Americans are a ``conspiracy'' woven by the "Soviet revisionists and US imperialism" "in the hope that the Vietnamese people will give up the war against the aggressor''. Peking lays claim to the right to teach the Vietnamese people, who, the Chinese leaders contend, must "show perseverance in a long war and oppose capitulation and compromise''.
But if any Party, Government and people stand in no 271 need of precepts of how to fight the aggressor they are the Party, Government and people of Vietnam. They have proved their ability to apply Marxism-Leninism to the conditions in their country, build socialism in the North, offer heroic resistance throughout the whole of Vietnam and conduct talks with their enemy firmly and in a principled way.
In Peking it is considered impermissible that the Vietnamese should come forward in a second front, the front of diplomacy. In the Chinese capital they confine themselves to verbiage about the occupation of the Chinese territory of Taiwan by the Americans.
The actions of Mao Tse-tung and his group continue to be aimed at splitting the international communist movement. The Maoists ignore the independence of other Parties and weave propaganda against them throughout the world. They want to be the centre of the world revolutionary movement and make the Chinese people believe that that is really the case.
This distorted picture of the world is imposed on the Chinese proletariat by people who have been neither elected nor appointed by any revolutionary organ. They have been co-opted by Mao Tse-tung and his associates. At the will of Mao Tse-tung and those whom he has named as his disciples, these people can vanish. How, under these conditions, can proletarian democracy be implemented in China?
[272] __NUMERIC_LVL1__ IV __ALPHA_LVL1__ ANTI-LENINIST^^*^^ Wirtschaftswissenschaft, = No 6, 1968 (German Democratic Republic).
[273] ~ [274] __NOTE__ LVL2 and footnote moved back. The Chinese leaders grouped around
Mao Tse-tung are trying forcibly to suppress the growing
discontent of Party cadres, workers and peasants, and also
of progressive intellectuals with the abortive home and
foreign policy. By spreading terror and increasing political
tension in the country, the Mao group sought to force the
discontented people into silence and make them easy prey
for the young thugs, for the youth storm detachments of Mao.
This, it was calculated, would prepare the ground for
another "big leap''.
Today it is obvious that this ``cultural'' action of the Mao group has placed a still heavier burden on the Chinese people, and that China's progress towards socialism has been greatly retarded. The economic and social achievements scored as a result of the dedicated labour of the Chinese people are now in jeopardy. During the past two years the proletarian organisations---the Party and the trade unions--- and also other organisations of the advanced sections of the Chinese population have been systematically undermined and then destroyed. This was accomplished under slogans and signboards calling for a "struggle against bourgeois elements'', a struggle against persons "planning to restore bourgeois-capitalist society''.
China's economic development could not remain unaffected by the whirlwinds started by this political chaos, particularly in view of the fact that in their activities the Maoists largely ignored the significance of the objective economic laws governing the building of socialism. They tried to __PRINTERS_P_275_COMMENT__ 18* 275 achieve their voluntaristic objectives by force, in contravention of the interests of the country's population.
While the official Chinese press prints countless statements to the effect that the "cultural revolution" stimulates production and the advance of science and technology, the real picture is quite different. During the past few years China has moved from one economic failure to another and the standard of living has registered a further drop.
At a mass rally in Wuhan on October 9, 1967, Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, was forced to make an indirect admission on this point. He spoke of the certain price that had to be paid "in certain places and in certain departments'', and of the decline of production, taken into account in advance, at factories where matters reached the extent of disturbances.^^*^^
No exact statistics have been available in recent years on industrial and agricultural production in the People's Republic of China. The Chinese press has long ago ceased to print summaries of output figures in the various branches of the economy and of key industrial products. However, on the basis of fragmentary reports and by closely following developments in China the conclusion may be drawn that in recent years industrial production has remained stagnant, while in some branches, particularly in the sphere of raw materials, there has been an appreciable decline. Despite the favourable weather, food production has grown only insignificantly, hardly surpassing the 1957 level.
The reasons are obvious, and they are:
1. The leadership of the economy has been paralysed for a long time. The third five-year plan for 1966--70 was announced, but no specific figures have been published, and there has been a general absence of planned activity in the economic life of the provinces and at the factories. There were 23 ministries. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the leadership of at least 13 of them has been attacked, removed or simply scattered. Even persons belonging to the Party top echelon directly responsible for the leadership of the economy like Po I-po, Li Fu-chung and others, have been the targets of fierce attack by the "Mao detachments''. Members of various organisations of the "revolutionary youth'', many of them very young and totally inexperienced, _-_-_
^^*^^ Peking Review, No 43, October 20, 1967.
276 took over the direction of ministries and other key economic levers---banks, supply organs and so forth.2. Strikes at industrial enterprises and bloody clashes between young people from the "storm detachments of the cultural revolution" and workers defending their factories and Party committees swept the whole of China particularly beginning in the winter of 1966--67. Army units also took part in these clashes, which were particularly violent in January-February and July-August 1967 in Central and East China, and also in the Northeast and Southwest. Many thousands of workers and entire Army units were involved. On the whole, in 1967 factories worked more or less normally for five months at the most. But even during these five months there could be no question of industry working at full capacity or of a balanced intensity of labour. It is believed that in 1967 industrial output reached about 80 per cent of the 1966 level, while the 1958--59 level was exceeded only in some strategically important industries.
3. The most serious consequences of the "cultural revolution" are undoubtedly to be observed in the scientific and technological fields. According to the decision of the llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC (August 1966) on the launching of the "cultural revolution" (16 points), the scientists and leading engineering cadres were not to be affected by the call to "smash and destroy" bourgeois forces. However, the general uncertainty and the absence of law and order had, naturally, a very adverse effect on the creative activity of cadres working in scientific institutes and industrial research centres. Special subjects were not taught at general education schools, at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning for more than 18 months, and even when they were re-opened the slogan was advanced that it was more important to receive a "diploma in the ideological sphere" than a diploma in technical sciences. All this had far-reaching consequences for young scientific and engineering cadres, who could see no future in the obtaining situation.
The Chinese leaders confined their efforts to achieving a high scientific and technological level in industries which they felt were important for the attainment of their GreatPower chauvinistic aims. Priority was given first and foremost to the war industry, chiefly the production of missiles and nuclear weapons, and affiliated branches of science and the economy.
2774. The measures of compulsion in the economy and the massive political-ideological campaign conducted in recent years with the aim of completely eradicating incentives in industry and agriculture have had an extremely adverse effect on labour productivity. Under the slogan of uprooting survivals of "bourgeois rights" and the trend towards " bourgeois profit'', and of combating all forms of ``economism'', bonuses were stopped, wages were reduced, differences in remuneration in various industries were diminished and, in general, remuneration for labour was brought down to a "low rational level''. Any aspiration of the working people for an improvement of their status at their place of work and for a better standard of living is suppressed by force because it does not fall in with the aims of the Chinese leaders. In order to achieve its aim of turning China into a "world power" the Mao group needs the largest possible accumulation fund and not the aspiration for ``satiety''. As early as 1958 Mao Tse-tung said: "Poverty is a good thing. It makes people think of changes.''
On March 11, 1967 the Shanghai newspaper Wenhuai Pao complained that the workers were coming out against the denial of rights and were fighting the deterioration of the conditions of life, which had already been reduced to a primitive level. The newspaper wrote: "Instead of denouncing the bourgeois line in principle, the workers put forward numerous complaints about the social position in their trades. First and foremost, they make purely economic demands of various kinds regarding their wages and material condition. ... At present this is a serious obstacle to the seizure of power by the proletariat.''
5. Through the all-embracing militarisation of social life, particularly the country's economic life, and relying on the dictatorship of the Army, the Mao group has recently been trying to build a "new revolutionary state system''. It was the Army's participation in agricultural work that made it possible to avert a further deterioration of supplies to the population. For a long time the rural population was not drawn into the convulsions of the "cultural revolution'', but the peasants protested against the infringements of their vital interests by concealing foodstuffs subject to delivery to the state, damaging roads leading to the towns and passively resisting Army control of field work during harvesttime.
278In this connection the circular of the CC CPC of July 14, 1967 concerned the "inciting of peasants" to go to the towns and resort to violence. In the circular it was pointed out that persons inciting peasants "to put up obstructions on railways, motor roads and waterways will be sternly punished''.
Throughout the country the production and distribution of commodities have been placed under military control on the pretext that the Army had to help the peasants and workers understand the new elements being introduced by the "cultural revolution" and free themselves of the ideological ballast of bourgeois views about property. Small wonder that the workers and peasants resisted in every way they could.
6. It must be remembered that in the period from August 1966 to September 1967 exactly 20 per cent of the means of transport in China were diverted for the conveyance of millions of young people travelling all over the country with the purpose of "sharing experience" of fighting so-called bourgeois elements. There was, therefore, a shortage of means for the transportation of raw and other materials, equipment and food. Young people gave up study and their jobs, received free clothes and food---medical care was also free---and went to all parts of the country to "share experience''. Moreover, transport structures and bridges were destroyed in the course of the armed clashes, with the result that the transport service was seriously disrupted.
In 1966 the llth plenary meeting of the CC CPC announced that another "big leap" was pending. Two years later one could say with absolute certainty that the Chinese economy was farther away from any upsurge than ever before, that the crisis was growing deeper and the economic disproportions had grown, that the lag in production, science and technology had become more pronounced and that the people's standard of living had fallen still lower.
The statement made on the situation in China in the report of the Political Bureau of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to the 13th plenary meeting of the CC SUPG in September 1966 may be repeated because it holds true to this day, two years later.
This statement pointed out that the policy pursued by the Chinese leaders was jeopardising the socialist social system in China. The working class and other progressive forces throughout the world were worried that the considerable successes achieved by the PRC in the initial period of its 279 existence, in 1949--56, were being nullified as a result of the anti-Marxist-Leninist, nationalistic policy of the Mao group, a policy with the conquest of world domination as its objective.
This situation in China's economy gives rise to two questions:
1. How did it come about that an economic programme of this kind was formulated as part of a broad petty-bourgeois nationalistic programme?
2. What forces were at the back of this programme?
To answer these questions we must examine in retrospect the principal stages of the economic development of the People's Republic of China.
An analysis of the policy and alignment of forces in the leadership of the Communist Party of China shows that there has been an unending struggle between two orientations: internationalist, Marxist-Leninist and petty-bourgeois, nationalistic. Since January 1935 the latter orientation has been steadily winning positions in the Party leadership. In the course of many years there have been serious discussions of the question of the leading role played by the working class in the liberation movement and in the building of socialism, and on the attitude towards proletarian internationalism. The arguments over the appraisal of MarxistLeninist teaching began not in 1957 but as early as the 1940s. The reason behind this was that already in 1942 there were signs of attempts to proclaim the teaching and "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the theoretical foundation of the CPC and of the whole of Chinese society. The economic policy and theory of the ruling group in China can only be understood against the background of these debates and discussions (space does not permit us to analyse them in detail).
In 1949, when the Chinese people's revolution culminated in victory, the Chinese people and the CPC, as the leading force of the people's democratic state, were confronted with the task of rapidly delivering the country from the heritage of the semi-feudal and semi-colonial past. Within a period of several decades the imperialist powers, primarily Japanese imperialism, in alliance with internal feudal exploiters and the reactionary forces of the Chinese bourgeoisie, pushed the Chinese people into the abyss and privations of civil wars, foreign military intervention, and inflation.
After the Second World War, the international situation 280 and the world socialist system then emerging and gathering strength gave China the political and economic possibility of safeguarding her newly-won independence. It was obvious to the group of leaders round Mao Tse-tung that the economy could not be restored and the political and economic blockade enforced by the imperialist powers could not be breached without a firm alliance with the socialist camp. This understanding of the real situation determined the policy of the Chinese leaders during the initial years after they had seized power.
The Chinese people had every reason to trust the extensive assistance rendered to them disinterestedly, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This assistance made itself felt in all spheres: the experience gained by the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries ensured the Chinese working people with a rapid improvement of the conditions of life. The nationalistic plans of the Mao group, which was out to win hegemony, had to be moved to the background. The objective course of events in China---the economic upsurge, the rising standard of living and the growing prestige in the world--- clearly demonstrated that this was made possible because the laws of socialist construction were being observed and China's policy had an internationalist, Marxist-Leninist foundation. In those years development was positive, and it attracted the attention and respect of the whole world.
The figures given below show that with assistance from the USSR China built a reliable economic foundation for development for a period of several decades. On the basis of a number of economic agreements concluded in 1954--59, the USSR and the PRC signed treaties on the building of 304 large industrial projects. Of these 200 projects, equipped with the most up-to-date plant, were built and turned over to China before 1961. This provided the capacities for the annual production of 8,700,000 tons of pig iron, 8,400,000 tons of steel and 32,200,000 tons of coal and shale.
The installed plant accounted for 70 per cent of China's tin, 100 per cent of her synthetic rubber, 25--30 per cent of her electric power and 80 per cent of her lorries and tractors.
An identical picture was to be observed in the oil, heavy engineering, turbine- and generator-building and defence industries.
The Soviet Union sent 10,830 specialists, who passed on 281 their experience in almost all branches of the Chinese economy. The People's Republic of China was given, free of charge, 24,000 sets of scientific and technological documentation, including the blueprints for 1,400 large factories. A total of 11,000 young Chinese received under-graduate and post-graduate training at institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union.
In this connection mention must be made of the fact that the GDR likewise extended considerable assistance to the People's Republic of China in the building of nearly 40 industrial projects, chiefly in the power engineering and cement industries, and through extensive scientific and technological aid and the training of cadres.
The Chinese leadership unconditionally acknowledged this support in their statements in China. For example, back in 1959 Chou En-lai said that the "rich store of experience garnered by the Soviet Union since it was founded is another important source which we draw on to carry out our economic construction plan. This experience has been decisive in enabling China to advance successfully along the road of socialist industrialisation''.^^*^^
The policy successfully pursued by China after the establishment of popular rule was reiterated at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in September 1956. In addition to this endorsement, the Congress charted the road for the future, particularly as regards further economic development in the period of the second five-year plan (1958--62). The Congress formulated the general line in socialist construction as follows:
``... to bring about, step by step, socialist industrialisation and to accomplish, step by step, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period... .
``The Party's general line in the transition period is a beacon that guides our work in every field. Any work that deviates from the general line, immediately lands itself in mistakes, Rightist or `Leftist'.''^^**^^
The resolution passed by the Congress states:
_-_-_^^*^^ Chou En-lai, Report on the Work of the Government, Peking, 1959, p. 15.
^^**^^ Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Vol. I, Documents, Peking, 1956^ pp. 19--20.
282``To transform China from a backward agricultural country into an advanced, socialist industrial one we must complete the construction, within three five-year plans or slightly more, of an essentially comprehensive industrial system. That is to say, we must bring industrial production to a dominant place in social production as a whole; bring production by heavy industry to a markedly dominant position in the production of all industry; ensure that the engineering and metallurgical industries meet the needs of socialist expanded reproduction; and provide the necessary material foundation for the reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of modern techniques.''^^*^^
In a message of greetings to the Eighth Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung likewise noted that the building-up of industry must advance step by step and that exceedingly difficult work lay ahead. He stressed that China's experience was inadequate and that, therefore, in carrying on construction in China the experience of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies had to be taken into account.^^**^^
The Congress highly assessed China's co-operation with the USSR and other socialist countries, emphasised that the policy of sharing experience and international co-operation had to be continued, and proclaimed that the guidelines of China's foreign policy were friendship with countries of the socialist community and the policy of peaceful coexistence.
These and many other facts demonstrate that in those years the line of the internationalists, of the MarxistsLeninists could, in the main, take root in the Party leadership. However, this must not overshadow yet another fact, namely that as early as 1955--56 there was sufficient evidence to show that the adventurists in the leadership grouped around Mao Tse-tung had made attempts to change the line adopted by the Party.
In the report and in some of the speeches at the Eighth Congress special significance was attached to the question of the economic development rate and of the correlation between accumulation and consumption. There evidently were differences on these questions before the Congress, otherwise it would not have been necessary to draw attention to the tendencies towards adventurism, as was done in the political _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., p. 117.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 10.
283 report of the CC CPC and in the resolution passed by the Congress.In the political report it is stated:
The rate of development "must be forward-looking or else we shall let slip the good opportunities that we have today and fall into the error of conservatism. But it must also be feasible, or else it will not enable the economy to develop in the correct ratio, and will put too great a burden on the people, or result in divergencies among the different branches of the national economy, making it impossible to fulfil the plan, and causing waste. This would be an error of adventurism''.^^*^^
In the Congress resolution it is pointed out:
``If we fail to take these conditions into account [meaning the actual limitations of those years in the economic, financial and technological fields.---KM] and set too rapid a pace, this will in the end only hinder our economic development and the fulfilment of the plan.''^^**^^
These and many other points raised in the report on the work of the CC CPC and other leading Party organs and the criticism of subjectivist methods of leadership, of Right and ``Left'' deviations and the desire to build "socialism one beautiful morning" are indicative of the tensions that were rending the leadership of the CPC.
In On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation, published in 1955, Mao Tse-tung ``envisaged'' accelerated rates of socialist transformations on a nation-wide scale, particularly mentioning the years 1957--58. It was in these years and slightly later that 114 million peasant households were united in 688,000 rural producers' co-operatives of the higher type, and 28,600 people's communes were set up directly afterwards.
In 1956 the radical elements in the CPC leadership made their first attempt to accomplish a "big leap" over some stages of social development and thereby speed up the rates of socialist construction.
Indeed, towards the beginning of 1956 the socialist reorganisation of private industry and private wholesale trade and also the setting-up of a large number of stateprivate enterprises led to an economic upsurge, particularly _-_-_
^^*^^ Ibid., p. 47.
^^**^^ Ibid., p. 124.
284 in the production of consumer goods (group B). The latter enterprises were closely linked with general economic planning because their financial activities, material supplies and the distribution of their end products were handled by state organs. In 1956, after a period of stagnation, investments increased considerably over 1955, namely, by 51.1 per cent. Part of this extended reproduction was mirrored in the gross output of 1956, this being largely due to reserve investments from the state budget and state credits to consumer goods industries. The exceedingly large expansion of the economy in 1956 gave some adventurists the arguments for evolving the "big leap" theory.However, the Chinese leadership could not but admit that there had been many mistakes and shortcomings even as early as 1956. For example, that year the state budget was not balanced for the first time since 1952 on account of the huge capital investments. State budget expenditures on the means of accumulation began to show a decline in 1957. Compared with 1956 these expenditures diminished by 6.6 per cent.^^*^^
In 1957, as a result of the poor harvest in 1956 and also the sweeping measures in wage policy carried out in the spring of 1956, there was an appreciable diminution of vital necessities sold to the population. Disproportions took shape also in material supplies, particularly building materials, transport and food supplies to the towns.
The year 1956 did not, as was asserted in China in 1958, exemplify the "big leap" as the means of accelerating economic development. It was sooner proof that China's basis was much too weak, that her resources were much too small and that there was inadequate experience in planning and leadership. In these circumstances, it was unwise to go on with this uneven and unsteady economic development. But if, as was the case in China, the point of departure is that economic planning is largely determined by political considerations, the inevitable conclusion drawn from it is that already in those years there were embryos of economic adventurism although this was not shown openly, in the form of a general political line.
These events, which took place before the Eighth Congress of the CPC, enable us to draw the conclusion today that at _-_-_
^^*^^ Jcnmin Jihpao, February 2, 1956.
285 the time Mao Tse-tung did not have the support of the majority in the Party leadership and could not openly oppose it. It will be recalled that at the Eighth Congress in 1956 he did not publicly state his stand on the prospects of socialist society in China, on economic policy, on social reforms or on Party work.On the basis of an analysis of the PRC's development until 1956--57 it must be stated that during the initial stage after the revolution the CPC, on the whole, pursued a correct policy in accordance with the obtaining conditions for the country's advance to socialism. But it was still confronted with more complex tasks. In the economic sphere decisive progress had to be secured in stabilising the new society, promoting steady, planned economic development and raising the leadership to the level unquestionably demanded by the complex situation in China. In short, the advantages of the socialist system and of the socialist international division of labour had to be used rationally. The Chinese leadership failed to cope with these tasks. The line followed by the Mao group inexorably gained ground. The Maoists used in their own way the people's willingness to accomplish great deeds and their enthusiasm engendered by the rapid improvement of the standard of living. They demagogically declared that after several years of hard work there would be ten thousand years of happiness, that "a basic change in the features of most areas" would be achieved after three years of persevering labour.^^*^^
The forces opposing the policy of the Mao group were removed from their posts or intimidated or forced into silence during the campaign against "Right elements''. Unceasing and unbridled propaganda created the ideological foundation for unprecedented labour on the part of all sections of the population. Because of the weak material and technological basis for the mechanisation of agriculture and the modernisation of industry, an-attempt was made to mobilise additional productive forces by simply putting together a huge army of workers. Nearly 100 million people were mobilised in the winter of 1957--58 during the campaign to improve the irrigation network and increase crop yields. Thousands of small and tiny, mostly unprofitable, enterprises _-_-_
^^*^^ Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Peking, 1957, pp. 27--28.
286 were set up throughout the country. This was done to take the strain off central industrial enterprises and satisfy local requirements. But, as a result of this, millions of people were diverted from agricultural production. During the campaign to set up "small metallurgical plants" in 1958--59, 60 million people throughout China were drawn into the building of 600,000 small blast-furnaces and primitive steelsmelting furnaces. Thousands of carts and other vehicles were needed to transport ore and coal. These were diverted from agricultural production despite the fact that they were needed to bring in the harvest.From 50 to 60 working days per worker were required for the production of a ton of pig iron by this primitive method. The Chinese leadership calculated that after the initial difficulties were overcome, these tiny enterprises would annually produce 15 million tons of pig iron and seven million tons of steel.^^*^^
The "big leap" policy directed the energy of the hardworking Chinese into the wrong channels, with the result that the fruits of their dedicated labour were reduced to nothing.
In 1958--60, when social life was completely disorganised, sand filled the waterways that had been built at such a great outlay of labour, the smelting furnaces, left unattended, crumbled to pieces, and the peasants quit the workbenches in the tiny industrial workshops. Hunger made them look out for themselves and their families, and they returned to the fields in the hope of eking out a living. The extremely adverse weather deepened the crisis in which the unscrupulous adventurist policy of the Mao group had driven the Chinese people. In this policy a special place was accorded to the people's communes.
We do not have the space in which to trace the establishment and disintegration of these communes in detail. But two examples will clearly show how the people were deluded by the Chinese leadership.
In 1958, after Mao Tse-tung had visited Hsushui county, the local Party committee drew up a "draft prospective plan for accelerating socialist construction and advancing towards communism''. The aims of this ``plan'' were formulated as follows:
_-_-_^^*^^ Peking Review, No. 38, 1959.
287``To complete the building of socialism and begin the transition to communism in the main in 1960. To enter the great communist society in 1963. To complete the mechanisation of irrigation work and food processing in the winter of 1958--59 and start the mechanisation of field work and the electrification of the villages in the following year. To reach a high level of electrification in 1963.''
Under the influence of official decisions and of instructions from the Party leadership, the following notion of the road to communism was formed in one of the villages:
``In three years, from 1958 to 1960, or sooner, Chihling will become a new modern communist village with a high level of mechanisation, electrification and industrialisation. Unquestionably, the village will then surpass Britain and all other capitalist countries in the level of production and the conditions of life.''
It may be contested that these are only individual cases. Nonetheless, the personal influence of Mao Tse-tung was obviously instrumental in the formation of notions such as these. Owing to the clear-cut personality cult, this was precisely how Chinese society pictured the numerous similar "programmes of the building of communism''. The Chinese leadership proclaimed the people's communes as a suitable form of uniting society for the transition to communism. The communes, it must be remembered, did not develop spontaneously but on the initiative of the Mao group.^^*^^
The failures of the Maoist policies clearly showed that objectively existing reality cannot be superseded by wishful thinking or that the requirements of economic and technological development cannot be replaced by slogans no matter, how frequently such slogans may be repeated. The political and economic crisis, which grew to such formidable proportions, could not but aggravate the contradictions in the Chinese leadership. For the first time they burst out into the open in an extremely sharp form at the 8th plenary meeting _-_-_
^^*^^ At a working conference of the CC CPC held in Chcngtu, capital . of Szechuan Province, at the close of March 1958, Mao Tse-tung proposed a plan for gradually converting agricultural co-operatives into larger production units (Jenmin Jihpao, August 28, 1959). In April 1958 China first heard of the Weihsing People's Commune, which was set up in Honan Province. In July 1958 Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee gave the general name "people's commune" to the newlyformed large agricultural co-operatives.
288 of the CC CPC in August 1959. At that plenary meeting a group of Political Bureau members and alternate members headed by the then Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai criticised Mao Tse-tung's policy. Peng Teh-huai spoke against the accelerated, spasmodic economic development, the overestimation of the results achieved in agriculture in 1958, the mass campaign to promote "household metallurgy'', the setting up of people's communes and the Party leadership's line of accentuating mass ideological and political work and completely ignoring the means of economic management.^^*^^Tao Chu (First Secretary of the Central-Southern Bureau of the CC CPC in 1956--65, member of the Standing Commitee of the Political Bureau of the CC CPC in 1966--67, and then denounced as a "bourgeois renegade'') also criticised the "big leap''. He pointed out that the question of the rates of economic development could only be resolved by complying with objectively existing economic laws and the actual conditions of economic life. The "big leap'', he said, could not bring about a limitless acceleration of economic development rates. He characterised as spurious the reports on the results achieved in agriculture. His opinion was that in 1957 economic development was influenced by the "anti-- adventurists" with the result that the growth rates and plan indices showed a decline, but in the second half of 1958 the economic growth rates were too high and objective laws were disregarded.~^^**^^
Scientists like the economist Sun Yeh-fang, Deputy Chairman of the State Statistical Board and director of the Institute of Economy at the Academy of Sciences of China, wrote numerous articles criticising the economic policy and the planning which were based not on the law of value but on the subjective desires of China's leaders. Sun Yeh-fang had visited the USSR several times and had closely followed the economic debate in connection with the ideas put forward by Liberman, and had subsequently spoken in favour of employing economic forms of management and providing incentives in China's industry and agriculture.
By that time the Mao group had succeeded in pushing _-_-_
^^*^^ Peking Review, No. 34, August 18, 1967.
^^**^^ Jenmin Jihpao, June 18, 1959.
In China the economists who in 1957 urged the adoption of a proportionate economic policy in keeping with China's economic potentialities were branded as ``anti-adventurists''.
__PRINTERS_P_289_COMMENT__ 19--2466 289 its adversaries aside but the conditions for a further exacerbation of contradictions remained because the Maoists began to pursue their line with increasing vigour. Economic development was extremely irregular, while agricultural production declined, falling below the 1954 level in 1960 despite the population increment of 90 million in the course of these six years. In industry output diminished in almost all branches. In this connection the Maoists brought out a "scientific theory" blaming this development in the economy not on policy but on the laws of socialist economy. As early as 1958 the Maoists declared through Tan Chen-lin, member of the Political Bureau, that the economy was developing with ups and downs, that in the economy there were "high and low tides" just as there could be an upsurge or decline of the revolutionary movement.Chinese economists turned these views into a system after Li Fu-chun, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Po I-po, Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Political Bureau, declared:
``In the socialist social system it is quite possible and an objective law [my italics.---K.M.] that the economy should develop with the speed of a big leap. This development constantly moves from a state of unbalance to equilibrium and then to unbalance again. After every cycle production attains a higher level than before, and the national economy steadily advances along an irregular curve.''^^*^^
``The law of all things is to spiral upwards and develop by ups and downs. That is the situation in the economy as well.''^^**^^
Typical of these views is the link between military methods of economic management (``struggle on the economic front'') and the theory that the economy develops by ups and downs, spasmodically. Early in 1964 Po I-po declared when he was interviewed by the American journalist Anna Louise Strong:
``When a commander in war wins a battle, he pauses to let the troops rest, regroup and reorganise; he sums up experiences, studies the strength and weakness revealed and estimates what is needed for the next victory. Our economy moves ahead by a rhythm something like that. After every _-_-_
^^*^^ Li Fu-tschun, Benefit zum Entwurf des Volkswirtschaftsplans fur das Jahr 1960, Peking, 1960, pp. 13--14.
^^**^^ Hungchih, No. 3-4, 1961.
290 important period of action we sum up experiences and `readjust' for the next action. ... In 1958--60 we tried some ideas of our own under the name of 'Big Leap Forward'. We made some big achievements and also some errors.''^^*^^The Chinese theoreticians substantiated the "law of irregular development" of the economy as follows. In China agriculture accounts for a particularly large share of the economic output. Farming depends heavily on the weather and the crop yields fluctuate considerably, almost every year. For that reason the share which agriculture contributes to the country's national income likewise changes, and as a result the annual fluctuations of farm production affect extended reproduction on the scale of the entire national economy.
The basis for state investments is much too small to allow for an even expansion of the production capacities of industry every year. Therefore, all the forces have to be concentrated first to prepare for the building of new projects and then for the actual building, and for the consolidation of the achieved success. After this, the cycle begins again.
The reorganisation of production relations founded on private or co-operative ownership into semi-state or entirely socialist relations will decisively stimulate the initiative of the working masses. The changes in society take place unevenly, at long intervals, and this gives rise to waves of production upsurges. But such periods cannot be taken into account in plans. "Consequently, the uneven development of the economy is necessary, being the indispensable result of the operation of all factors.''^^**^^
The existence of the objective economic law of planned proportionate development was not denied. In scientific works it was stated that development could not proceed rapidly if it was not proportionate. But at the same time, disproportion was characterised as an inescapable element and as a factor facilitating the acceleration of the economic development rate.
Economists spoke of the struggle between the active and passive roles of proportionate development, but those of them who urged the observance of proportions when plans were drawn up were criticised by the Party leadership on _-_-_
^^*^^ Anna Louise Strong, The Rise of the Chinese People's Communes ---and Six Years After, New World Press, Peking, 1964, p. 210.
^^**^^ Kuangmin Jihpao, April 12, 1961.
291 the grounds that this would slow down development rates. Chinese theoreticians absolutised rates of development as the aim of economic activity under socialism and declared that proportionate plans were a method of achieving that aim. However, in socialist society both the one and the other are indisputably subordinated to the basic economic law of socialism, namely the steadily growing satisfaction of the requirements of man.In order to surmount the most adverse consequences of the "big leap" and the people's communes, the Mao group had no alternative but to declare at the 9th plenary meeting of the CC CPC in January 1961 that it was ``adjusting'' its erroneous policy. A turn was accomplished shortly after the 1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow. As the leader of the CPC delegation, Liu Shao-chi agreed with the Statement adopted by that Meeting. A few weeks later the Communist Party of China welcomed this document in a decision passed at the abovementioned plenary meeting.
At this plenary meeting the decisive role played by the socialist community in the development of human society and the need for a policy of peaceful coexistence were underscored. In the decision that was adopted it was stated that the Communist Party of China regarded the unity and solidarity of the socialist community as the key guarantee of the victory of the peoples in their struggle for world peace, national liberation, democracy and socialism, and the special role which the Soviet Union was playing in this struggle was underscored. The impression was thus given that the leadership of the Communist Party of China concurred broadly with the general line of the world communist movement..
This stand of Mao Tse-tung must be explained by the fact that the general political situation in China herself forced the Chinese leadership to make temporary concessions and tactically amend its mercenary, adventurist objectives. In order to make it possible to achieve the strategic aim while resolving specific tasks, tactics had to give the temporary impression of being in conflict with that aim.
Economic problems also received considerable attention at the 9th plenary meeting of the CC CPC. The programme of further economic measures to surmount the difficulties that had emerged was set forth in detail by member of the Political Bureau Po I-po in February 1961. The main 292 orientation was to step up development in agriculture and remove the disproportion between the processing and extracting industries. Po I-po declared that in order to secure better coordination with other branches of the economy, the investments in heavy industry and the rate of that industry's growth had to be reduced. There had to be a fundamental improvement of the quality of the output, the assortment of products had to be enlarged, labour had to be organised rationally and raw materials expended economically. This was a fairly realistic programme for 1961, and it was augmented with a whole system of measures in agriculture and industry. Subsequently, this programme was supplemented with various works on the theory of socialist economic management, which made it possible to expect that the Chinese leadership would accord more attention to economic laws than during the period of the "big leap''.
Levelling in remuneration for labour was condemned, and the principle of payment according to work was reaffirmed by a broad system of control figures, norms and calculation units. Po I-po spoke of the need for a "close integration of political and ideological education with the principle of material incentives''.
An editorial carried by the newspaper Takung Pao on July 30, 1962 touched on the question of the transition from collective to public ownership in agriculture. It noted that the period of collective ownership must embrace a whole phase of historical development.
This statement in contrast to the demand of 1958--59 (to complete the transformation of the types of ownership within three or five years) was in keeping with the development of the productive forces in Chinese agriculture. The result of these changes in economic policy was that in agriculture and industry output began to grow again, slowly it is true, and the immense difficulties in supplies were gradually overcome. In the course of this process, the people's communes practically disintegrated, some taking the shape of the developed co-operatives of 1957 (300 workers, an average of 200-- 300 families per co-operative), and others, in many cases, becoming lower-type co-operatives such as existed in 1955 (20--30 workers, 15--20 families per co-operative owning an average of 35 hectares of crop area).
As a whole this "period of adjustment" may be regarded as an indirect admission of success in the practical 293 management of socialist economy. However, the conclusion must not be drawn that an economic programme was produced which conformed to the objective requirements of life.
The period of economic ``adjustment'' witnessed the reactivation of forces demanding a radical change of the Mao group's pernicious line and thereby calling in question the infallibility of the "teaching and thought of Mao Tsetung''.
Taking this situation into account, the Maoists again decided on sharply curtailing the people's democratic rights, and strangling inner-Party democracy. The Chinese leadership began to condition the working masses for a military clash with the "imperialists of the USA, the revisionists of the North and the Indian reactionaries''. The resultant comprehensive militarisation of social life was accompanied by the unbridled laudation of the soldier's simplicity, ascetic dedication and the unconditional inclusion of every individual as a ``cog'' in the mechanism of the "guiding thought of Mao Tse-tung''.
A drive for the so-called socialist education of the masses was started throughout the country in 1962 under the slogans "learn from the Army" and "politics is the main force''. Mao Tse-tung's "creative development of Marxism-Leninism" was steadily moved to the forefront of all Party activity. In the last five years this drive for "socialist education" increasingly acquired a nationalistic, chauvinistic and anti-Soviet edge, and was part and parcel of the preparations for the "great proletarian cultural revolution''. The campaign to "learn from the Army, to learn from Lei Feng, to learn from Wang Tse" accentuated the deeds and moral qualities of the two soldiers. The purpose of this campaign was obviously to impress on the people that true socialism implied not the satisfaction of material requirements but utter, selfless devotion to the cause of the proletarian revolution.^^*^^
_-_-_^^*^^ The soldiers Lei Feng and Wang Tse were cited several times for exemplary service. It was reported that they diligently studied the works of Mao Tse-tung and kept diaries, in which they noted their impressions, conclusions and self-critical assessments. Lei Feng died in a road accident in 1963, and Wang Tse was killed in 1965 while handling explosives. Later these men were lauded and glorified, and it was given out that they had sacrificed themselves for the revolution and Mao Tse-tung. They were posthumously made members of the Communist Party of China in accordance, as was reported, with a wish they had expressed during their lifetime.
294There is little to distinguish between the massive campaigns of recent years. All that has changed is the accent of the various slogans and requirements. In 1965, for instance, the accent was more on slogans of an anti-Soviet nature. This gave a clearer insight into the aims of the Map group's home and foreign policy. In 1966 there was a further aggravation of the situation, when the Mao group set up the so-called "system of labour organisation''. At first this ``system'' envisaged only the combination of work in industry and agriculture. An industrial worker had to work for a certain period in agriculture, while members of agricultural teams had to work at a factory. Soldiers had to improve their handling of weapons and at the same time "work in industry, agriculture, transport, financial organs and also in trade''.
The absurdity to which this system led is shown by the examples lauded in China as worthy of imitation. These concern the oil region of Taching in Northeast China and the agricultural commune in Tachai. Take the first example. The Chinese press reported that 3,000,000 tons of oil, or about a quarter of China's total annual oil output, was produced in Taching in 1966. The district had gone over completely to self-supply and self-service. All men and women had been drawn into production. Bonuses had been abolished. Wages had been halved in order to create large accumulation funds. Normal housing had not been built in the district, and the workers had made dugouts for themselves in order to save funds for the state. Taching was proclaimed the model of the future communist society in China.
The Chinese adventurists believed that by inventing this ``system'' they had found a new way of rapidly erasing the distinctions between town and countryside, between physical and mental work and between workers and peasants.
Wall newspapers of extraordinary size, posted in Peking in June 1967, showed how quickly the venture at self-- sufficiency in Taching collapsed. These newspapers reported that in Taching matters reached the point of bloody clashes, that Taching was "drenched in blood''. This gave further proof that the Chinese working class is prepared to fight for its rights, for an improvement of its social position, and will not allow itself to be deluded with hackneyed demands "to deny themselves food, avoid peaceful sleep because other peoples suffer want"/^^1^^" This example shows how the concepts 295 of socialism and communism are emasculated. Every concern for material insurance is denounced as "base feeling'', as "sugar-coated shells of the bourgeoisie''. Marx characterised this sort of communism as vulgar and senseless for it demanded the rejection of education and civilisation, and a return to the unnatural simplicity of poor and unassuming people.
In conclusion, we can ask whether what we today designate as Maoism---the theses, thought and teaching of Mao---is a consummate theory valid as a guide at least in the building of socialism, particularly, in economic development? The answer must be a categorical "No!''
The Communist Party of China had never officially had a broad Party programme. The general line adopted at the last, Eighth Congress in September 1956 and concretised in the course of the second five-year plan (up to 1962) had never been implemented. The third five-year plan (up to 1970), announced with fanfare early in 1966, was not completely pieced together. It was carried out by orders from above as an independent long-term prospect of China's social and economic development. The "thought of Mao" is not an integral theory. It is a programme in which petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic and Confucian ideas are jumbled with MarxistLeninist propositions, which Mao had never reasoned out. This programme has always been applied in various tactical variants depending on temporary and local conditions, and also on the requirements of the international situation and the political situation in China.
The^^*^^ recipe offered by Maoism for the economy may be characterised as follows: forced labour organised along military lines; limited satisfaction of the most elementary requirements; concentration of all state funds for the purpose of creating a powerful military state pursuing a GreatPower chauvinistic foreign policy; forced levelling of all sections of the population and the abolition of their organisations and their right to participate in the country's administration; the establishment of a military dictatorship; increased power in the hands of individuals at all levels of the leadership. The fundamental principles of scientific socialism are denounced as ``revisionism'', ``economism'' and "bourgeois liberalism''.
_-_-_^^*^^ __NOTE__ No "*" in body. Jenmin Jihpao, February 2, 1964.
296The turbulent events in China have not abated. The process started by the Mao group with the purpose of securing absolute power and unconditional subordination has not ended. During the past several months fresh attempts have been made to control the situation, establish order and renew normal production. So-called "associations of the three sides'', which are growing into new organs of state power, are being set up in the provinces, counties and towns, and also at factories. These organs are composed of representatives of the Army, "revolutionary organisations of rebels'', whose number has considerably increased recently, and workers. Despite all its efforts the Mao group has not been able to set up so-called "revolutionary committees" everywhere. Even where they have been set up the disorders have not ceased. This indicates that the resistance encountered in various parts of the country will continue to disrupt social order and production in 1968 also. However, it must be borne in mind that the circles opposing the forces being formed by the Mao group are not united and have neither a common centre nor a common programme.
But neither Maoism nor any other ``theory'' of that kind will help to surmount the enormous difficulties which China's economy is experiencing.
Whatever Mao Tse-tung does to establish his anti-- Marxist views, which are at variance with the scientific approach to life, all his attempts will ultimately founder. They will be upset by the requirements of the development of modern productive forces in China, by the requirements of the scientific and technological revolution. They will be upset by the natural aspiration of the Chinese people for a better standard of living and a higher cultural level, by their aspiration for socialist democracy.
[297] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Wlodzimierz Wowczuk The turbulent events that have been
rocking China for several years, the heated political debates,
and the propaganda attacks and abuse directed against other
countries have given shape to the opinion that behind them
are the special ambitions of the Mao group. These ambitions,
allegedly engendered largely by a feeling of cultural
exclusivencess, historical development and also unbounded faith in
own possibilities and strength, intertwine in the most bizarre
manner with hurt national pride and a specific attitude to
the changes taking place in the world. Is that really the
case? The most favourable conditions arose in China after
the Second World War, when the regime with roots deep
in the epoch of Chinese feudalism was overthrown and the
people's revolution triumphed. The motive force of the
revolution was the peasantry but the ideological and political
leadership in the country, where four-fifths of the population
are engaged in agriculture, was provided by the numerically
small proletariat and its Party.
Unquestionably, the above-mentioned elements continue, as they had done in the past, to create the intricate mosaic of Chinese reality perceived in the most diverse ways by everybody whom this Great Power had always attracted. There was a time when it seemed that we were beginning to understand the problems of that vast country, that China's development would follow approximately the same stages as had been passed by other countries, that the image of an industrial China would appear on the horizon and that the wall separating China from the world would at last be pulled down.
_-_-_^^*^^ Polityka, No. 6, 1968 (Polish People's Republic).
298During the war with the Japanese invaders and internal reaction, the political programme called for the expulsion of the invaders, the demolition of compradore bourgeois power and the abolition of landowner ownership of the land. All progressive and patriotic forces in the country rallied around this programme. Understanding of general plans was universal, and determination underlay the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle. However, the impression one gets today is that there was no clear-cut long-term programme, which in addition to envisaging the socialisation of the means of production and the expropriation of the capitalists and rural usurers would have provided for the building of a new socio-political model. The seizure of power by the masses, where the peasants were overwhelmingly predominant, was the prime objective of the given historical moment, and that objective was attained.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The "Big Leap" and Its Impact Principled discussions were stopped in
face of urgent current problems. China's economy was in the
main rehabilitated in 1953. The period 1953--57 witnessed
the first five-year plan. This period may be considered as
one of major economic achievements. Industrial output grew
at an annual rate averaging 18 per cent with agricultural
output lagging far behind, its rate of growth never
exceeding 4.5 per cent. Nonetheless, grain output increased from
108 million tons in 1949 to 185 million tons in 1957.
However, these successes could not conceal the wide gap between the level of the productive forces and the rapidly growing requirements of the population.
While employment in industry rose annually by 1.5 per cent during the period of the first five-year plan, the yearly population increment averaged 2.3 per cent. China's eternal problem, which may be generally called the problem of the "third meal a day'', continued to await its solution. Official statistics claim that in 1953--57 consumption rose by 5.2 per cent, but foreign experts believe the increase did not exceed 1.9 per cent.
The elaboration of the tasks of China's second five-year plan was started in 1956 and the problems of a general longterm plan began to be studied. The discussion of economic 299 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1970/MTEC326/20080521/326.tx" __EMAIL__ webmaster@leninist.biz __OCR__ ABBYY 6 Professional (2008.05.23) __WHERE_PAGE_NUMBERS__ bottom __FOOTNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [*]+ __ENDNOTE_MARKER_STYLE__ [0-9]+ development over a longer period was resumed. Chinese economists agreed with the Soviet advisers and experts that another 15 years would be required to complete, in general outline, the process of industrialisation.
This was when definite divergences of views came to the fore.
The specialists proposed, as it seems to us, a moderate road, while the extremists demanded more drastic measures.
In 1958, in a situation marked by general hysteria, a new economic line, known as the "big leap'', was proclaimed. Recklessly sweeping overboard the plans and proposals of the specialists, the makers of the new policy and strategy of economic development announced that within the next few years China would overtake the economically developed capitalist countries in the basic indices. Evoking amazement, these strategists operated with astronomical figures in the sphere of the production of material blessings, saying very little or nothing at all about distribution and consumption. More, in November 1958 the newspaper Jenmin Jihpao wrote: "The big leap has wiped material incentives from the face of the earth.''
All difficulties had to be eliminated by political awareness and enthusiasm, and all dilemmas had to be resolved solely by the human factor, whose role was obviously overrated. No attention whatever was paid to the most elementary operation of economic laws. Huge masses of people were mobilised, and the results of their labour were sharply out of proportion to the outlays. In order to achieve inordinate rates of output in industry, equipment was overburdened, machinery depreciation norms were disregarded and the advice of Soviet experts and the warnings of own specialists were ignored. The lack of knowledge of long-term programming and the absence of a definite guideline for the country's economic development led to the introduction of special privileges for some industries. The adverse effect of this measure carried out without taking the development of other industries into account soon made itself felt.
In agriculture, where various forms of collective ownership and labour had already been introduced and were developing, a movement was started for the setting up of large associations---people's communes---which were organised by armchair methods. The purpose of these communes was to demonstrate that Chinese society was predisposed to enter 300 the era of communism quickly and that it was a model which other socialist countries should imitate.
An interesting characteristic of the plans of the makers and executors of China's economic development is given by A. Vladimirov in the magazine Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. He writes: "The Peking leaders intended the 'big leap' to take them into communism 'ahead of time'. To achieve this, they believed, it would be enough to organise throughout the country a network of 'people's communes', which would engage in industry, agriculture, trade, education and military training, and thereby create the conditions for 'erasing the distinctions' between town and country, between workers and peasants and between mental and physical work.''^^*^^ It should be recalled that in the Model Rules of the Weihsing People's Commune it is underscored that the "people's commune" is the "primary organisation of society''.
Agricultural production was intensified under the slogan "Sow less, harvest more''. In 1958, according to official statistics, grain production reached 375 million tons or double the output of the preceding year. After a lapse of time these statistics were substantially modified and the figure 250 million tons was named.
Moreover, China's fuel balance was seriously upset as a result of irrational management in industry.
In the Chinese economy huge disproportions arose between production and consumption. Crop failures and elemental calamities added the finishing touch.
Soviet economists believe that in 1962--63 as compared with 1956 per capita grain and vegetable oil consumption in China diminished from 202 to 135--170 kilos and from 6.4 to 1.5-1.2 kilos respectively. In 1961 food production dropped to 170 million tons, with the result that per capita daily consumption averaged 900-1,200 calories.
Japanese economists estimate that in 1964 China's gross national product only amounted to US$80,000--90,000 million, or 15 per cent below the 1958 level.^^**^^
In this period the basic principles of official economic strategy were obviously being revised. Although the "big leap" was not officially condemned, it was declared that a _-_-_
^^*^^ Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, (World Economy and International Relations), Moscow, 1967, No. 10.
^^**^^ The Japan Times, January 16, 1966, p. 6.
301 series of errors springing from "an incorrect understanding of the situation and inexperience" had been committed in 1959--60.Some notions about the measures being carried out and the further strategy of economic development underwent a radical change in China in the early 1960s. Possibly, the pragmatists made themselves heard and promptly set about correcting the catastrophic mistakes. In line with Chinese tradition, the new course was characterised as "adjustment, strengthening, reinforcement and heightening''.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Second Wind In keeping with the basic propositions
of the new course, agriculture was recognised as the main
branch of China's national economy. In other words, after
a period of ups and downs the cardinal problem remained
that of feeding China's enormous population. Here it must
be emphasised that China does not publish official statistics
or demographic forecasts which could give an idea of the
size of the population or make it possible to estimate, roughly
at least, its consumption and requirements.
Despite the various changes and upheavals in the Chinese countryside, its structure continues to rest on the farm, which remains a natural production unit. The personal plots of land have been returned to the peasants. These plots, comprising only 5-7 per cent of the crop area, yielded 80 per cent of the pigs, 95 per cent of the poultry and a huge quantity of vegetables and fruit.
As early as 1966 Neue Zurcher Zeitung wrote that " judging by everything, China has overcome the crisis in agriculture''. Nonetheless the population increment of 80--90 millions in this period made the annual import of 3-5 million tons of grain imperative (China herself produced 180--190 million tons). The increase in agricultural production due to the return of the personal plots of land markedly improved the supplies to the urban market, which in turn helped to strengthen the factories working to meet the requirements of the countryside.
The very fact that the peasants stopped their passive resistance to the various experiments in agriculture shows their attitude to the new conditions. They discontinued the 302 mass slaughter of cattle and pigs. Consumption was stabilised and contacts were established with purchasing organisations in the countryside. Besides considerably improving the supply in the home market, this yielded some surpluses for foreign trade in which, naturally, agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs continued to predominate.
We feel that some attention must be given to China's foreign trade problems---and not only because this trade plays a special role in the country's economy. Foreign trade, at present the only more or less dependable source of statistics, allows tracing some of the developments in China's economy. To all intents and purposes the publication of economic statistics was practically stopped in China as early as 1959--60.
Western experts estimate that in the years of China's "second wind" her foreign trade turnover presented the following picture (in millions of dollars):
1964 1965 1966
Gross trade turnover..... 3,235 3,715 4,215
Exports......... 1,760 1,970 2,125
Imports.......... 1,475 1,745 2,090
The geography of China's foreign trade is undergoing a definite reorientation. The share of the developed capitalist countries in Chinese foreign trade is systematically growing, reaching 75 per cent in 1966. At the same time, the volume of trade with socialist countries is steadily diminishing....
Nevertheless, some elements of the old plans of industrialisation remained topical and the realisation of some projects yielded tangible results. The West German newspaper Industriekurier gave a very comforting picture of China's industrialisation, maintaining that in addition to impressive achievements in electrification there was a series of positive signs in the metallurgical and engineering industries. Special attention was drawn to the development of the oil industry and to the building of chemical factories.
In the mid-1960s, despite the slogans calling for complete economic independence, Chinese economists in all probability put through the idea of selective economic development with the emphasis on strengthening certain branches of the economy. The system of material incentives was restored, 303 particularly in growing branches of industry, and this was largely responsible for the growth of labour productivity.
In this situation, at the beginning of 1966, the year that was to mark the beginning of the third five-year plan, the world awaited with interest somewhat more accurate information that would make it possible to predict the future directions of China's economic development.
Everywhere it was felt that discussion of the strategy of economic development would strengthen the pragmatist wing of the Chinese leadership both within that leadership and in the country as a whole. But these expectations proved to be illusory. Experts on Chinese problems experienced yet another bitter disappointment.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ "Cultural Revolution" In The People's Middle Kingdom and
the USA, Professor John K. Fairbank analyses the
development of Chinese thinking and asks an interesting question
which might be the key to explaining the source of some of
the events in that country: "Do Peking's leaders use the
terminology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism but express
sentiments inherited from the Middle Kingdom? Are they
unconsciously in the grip of their past, even when most explicitly
condemning it?''
One thing is indisputable, namely that the beginning of the "cultural revolution" and its entire further progress were controlled and conducted in a tempo depending on decisions taken in the centre. Its principal aim was to secure a fundamental change of the course of events stemming from the. failure of the "big leap''. It was a kind of ``counter-reform'' directed towards uprooting some of the "pernicious phenomena" brought about by ``economism'' and which ultimately might have led to the shaping of an economic model based on consumption. In accordance with Chinese specifics and tradition, the attacks on the intelligentsia and the endless hungweiping parades were a way of persuading the adversary through spontaneous reactions of the multitudinous mob, which knows nothing of the substance of the conflict and eagerly overthrows idols and authorities, naturally with the exception of the beginning of everything, of the real source inspiring any action.
304The "cultural revolution" was only outwardly, in its external manifestations, founded on the enthusiasm of young people. As a matter of fact, the parents of the children marching in the streets stood clear of the developments. Perhaps there was something they understood. Perhaps they subconsciously realised that the concepts being imposed on them had been formulated in another epoch, under totally different conditions, that they could not underlie present-day social and economic patterns, that the country needed a different programme whose authors could only be people who could draw the appropriate conclusions from the inevitable comparison between own strength and potentialities and the surrounding reality. In the great dispute over the strategy of China's economic development this silent but determined stand of most of society played a role that must not be underestimated. Despite the fact that in mid-1966 the newspaper Chiehfangchun Pao maintained that the aim of the industrial workers was revolution and not production, practical attempts to carry the "cultural revolution" to the countryside and industrial enterprises were made only in 1967. All the indications are that these attempts failed.
In 1967 all political observers, foreign correspondents, tourists and emigres reported clashes between the' numerous detachments of hungweipings and organised workers and peasants. This was a continuation of the struggle for the future' concept of economic development, for the preservation of the gains of the revolution, which had triumphed twenty years before.
It was inevitable that the upheavals which shook China in this period should have hit the economy, in which violations and stagnation can be seen despite Chinese official assertions to the contrary.
At the close of 1967 the journal Far Eastern Economic Review wrote: "In the course of 1967 the situation in industry and transport deteriorated sharply. ... In the iron and steel industry output fell drastically.. . . The consequences of the cultural revolution have hit the oil industry.''
Reports reaching us indicate that the situation in the major Chinese ports is serious: foreign ships have had to wait weeks on end to be unloaded or loaded. According to available information Chinese exports to European countries and to Japan have dwindled while imports have increased. In __PRINTERS_P_305_COMMENT__ 20---2466 305 contrast to the previous Canton fair, at the latest fair China did not display any machines or equipment.
Labour productivity is declining at factories in the key industrial centres. ``Accursed'' incentives have been superseded by a system under which wages are calculated on the basis of the "political maturity and activity, then quality and duration of work and, lastly, the worker's behaviour in society''.
It is impossible to check the authenticity of the information coming from China and that unfortunately makes it extremely difficult to sift facts or attempt to assess the actual situation.
It seems to us that the discussion of the strategy of China's economic development has come to an impasse. Will it be resumed? There is nothing on which to base an assumption that this will happen in the near future. On the contrary, there is talk of another "big leap''.
[306] __ALPHA_LVL2__ Hideo Yonezawa Destroying the Chinese Party and state,
and establishing, albeit temporarily, the absolute rule of the
Mao group, the "cultural revolution" is leading China's
socialist planned economy to collapse and seeks to plunge the
life of the people into darkness again. Such is the author's
personal conclusion drawn from his analysis of the present
situation and of the meagre information that has been made
available.
The "cultural revolution" is destroying
the socialist economy, which saved the Chinese people from
the penury of the past and rapidly raised their standard of
living. The advantages of the socialist economy lie in
conscious and planned management of production, in rapid
rates of growth and, at the same time, in proportionate
development. That is what distinguishes it from the capitalist
economy with its blindness and anarchy of production. In
other words, the socialist economy is a planned economy. Of
course, during the period of transition to the complete
_-_-_
^^*^^ Zen-ei, No. 12, 1968 (Japan).
__PRINTERS_P_307_COMMENT__ 20* 307 triumph of socialism, planning is not thoroughgoing. Nevertheless, the possibility of planning economic development is ensured by the leading role played in the state by the working class through the Marxist-Leninist Party.Such a socialist state is a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the power is in the hands of the working class and where socialist relations of production take shape. Consequently, collectivisation in agriculture and other measures leading to the transition to socialism are ensured through the persuasion mainly of the poor section of the population and the lower strata of the middle sections, who accept these measures more easily in struggle against the rich middle sections and the kulaks. In China, at least, that is how the Party implemented its leadership. For example, although in many localities the collectivisation schedule and the size of the collective farms were established arbitrarily by Mao Tsetung, the decision on this question was officially taken by the Party, and the whole Party embarked on this work and carried it out.
However, the present "cultural revolution" did not begin by decision of the Party. Feeling that there was discontent with the Party line (chiefly with the adjustment of the economy and the subsequent third five-year plan) and resorting to extraordinary measures, Mao Tse-tung and his group destroyed the Party organisations and the state mechanism, turning them into their own private domain. On this basis they plan to put into effect their ultra-``Left'' opportunist, petty-bourgeois, adventurist economic policy. First and foremost, this group has gained control of the Army and, using it and the artificially swollen cult of Mao Tse-tung to attack the Party, mobilise largely non-Party masses for this purpose, destroy Party-led organs of people's power, organs of state management of factories, and the trade unions, it is plunging China's economy into anarchy. The elements in our country blindly following the Mao group and some people who admire the cult of Mao's personality laud the outrages being committed by the ultra-``Left'' opportunist group, which is destroying the Party and the trade unions of the Chinese working class. They call the actions of this group "decisive measures'', extol the undemocratic seizure of power effected without the Party, and declare that this is "a wonderful historical development in which the people are establishing their own rule''. However, if this non-Marxist absolutist rule 308 of the Mao group is established even temporarily, the leadership of the working class in China will be in great danger, the socialist planned economy will be demolished and the people will find their standard of living miserable once again.
China's national economy was hit badly by natural calamities for three years in succession since 1959, and by the resistance of the workers and peasants to subjectivist leadership---the "big leap" and the people's communes. However, it slowly recuperated thanks to the ``adjustment'' policy pursued by the Party and the Government in the period from 1961 to 1965. Moreover, it was intended that long-term economic planning (the third five-year plan) should start in 1966. At this time the Mao group started the "cultural revolution'', kindling chaos, with the result that it proved to be virtually impossible to carry out this plan. Besides, how can the planned economy of socialism be preserved in the absence of normal activity by the Party and the Government?
The national economy of the transition period cannot develop through natural growth. For the first time in China's history the possibility was opened for promoting economic development through the conscious will of society, in other words, under the leadership of the Party and the Government. But even in a socialist state the economy cannot be promoted arbitrarily. To imagine that in China the Party CC and the Government can directly regulate all economic activity is to make a mistake. The socialist Chinese state directly managed and controlled only the key sectors of the economy. It only used indirect methods to regulate the vast sector dominated by collective ownership. In other words, control of industry, which was mostly state property, was direct, while in agriculture, where collective ownership predominated, control was indirect. Industry and agriculture exchanged their products chiefly through the market in the form of purchases and sales, while the state guaranteed the correctness of these transactions through a system of agreements with rural people's communes and production teams. In the rural people's communes there naturally also were primary Party organisations, which guided the peasants from within, helping to boost the planned nature of the national economy.
However, after the "cultural revolution" was started the Mao group seized control of the Party CC and the State 309 Council and smashed the local Party committees of all levels, with the result that the link between the state and the agricultural co-operatives grew weaker and parochial centralist and ``polycentrist'' tendencies gradually emerged. In the people's communes collective egoism is growing among the production teams. They are becoming autarchic and increasingly more isolated. Individual members of these teams are devoting more and more time to their own plot of land and to the family ancillary husbandry than to the collective husbandry. There are perceptible indications of delay in peasant deliveries of foodstuffs, of a diminishing supply of manufactured goods from the towns to the countryside, and of increasing stagnation in the processing and mining industries and on the railways as a result of armed clashes and wrecking. There has been a particularly acute coal shortage and this has influenced all branches of industry. Black market transactions have increased in the sphere of circulation, and it is said there even are "underground factories" in the towns. Stagnation in food production makes it impossible to satisfy the population's growing demand and create the necessary reserves, while the annual import of large quantities of foodstuffs is seriously affecting the foreign trade balance and narrowing down the possibility of importing machinery and equipment for industrialisation.
Besides the above-mentioned factors, which are destroying harmony and balance in the national economy, China's socialist planned economy is facing a crisis precipitated by the shortage of executive cadres as a result of the persecution of economic planners and "trade and financial" specialists (experts in finances, credits, and domestic and foreign trade).
__ALPHA_LVL3__ How the "Cultural Revolution" The "cultural revolution" spread to
the processing and mining industries in response to a call
made in a Jenmin Jihpao editorial of December 26, 1966,
and its impact began to tell on production from 1967
onwards, i.e., in the second year after it was started. At first,
responding to the calls of the tsaofans the factory workers
demanded a wage rise, better treatment, and so forth. There
310
were cases of workers quitting work and going to Peking with
petitions. In an effort to satisfy these demands the Party
organisations and managements of the factories agreed to
partial wage rises and paid for the collective trips to Peking.
The tsaofan organisers, sent by the CC "group for cultural
revolution affairs'', incited mainly non-Party workers,
regarding the Party leaders at the factories who strove to satisfy
the demands of the masses, as a "group in authority taking
the capitalist road'', as people sharpening their swords against
Mao Tse-tung. They tried to persuade the workers that
their demands for better treatment and so on represented
``economism'' and were at variance with the "thought of
Mao''. They forced them to abandon these demands,
claiming that the "group in authority" was resorting to ``
economism'' for provocative purposes.
Then the factories were filled with "groups of tsaofans''; fighting among themselves, they hastened to seize power, i.e., the management of factories, dispersing the Party and YCL organisations and the trade unions, and going to the extent of expelling the managements. At factories, however, under the strong influence of the Party organisations and the trade unions, particularly in the heavy industry, there were at first many cases where the "tsaofan groups" were crushed, and even where the management's position somewhat deteriorated an external tsaofan shell or the screen of obedience to the Mao group was used to sustain a tenacious resistance, and the struggle went on through participation in the fighting between the tsaofan organisations. In approximately February or March 1967, pressing forward with their plans, the Maoists sent to the factories troops, who were given the name "detachments for the propagation of the thought of Mao Tse-tung'', introduced military training for workers, suppressed the clashes between workers' organisations, clashes which from time to time took the form of an "armed struggle'', and charted the creation of "great alliances''. However, even where these "great alliances" were formed, the internal differences and conflicts did not cease. This held up the normalisation of management at factories and protracted the stagnation in production.
In 1967, in the metallurgical industry, the factories at Anshan, Wuhan, Paotow and Shihchingshang were idle for a period of from one to two months in 1967. How can the fires in the blast furnaces be kept up if an iron and steel works 311 is idle for longer than a month? If the fires are extinguished, the refractory brick cools and this creates additional difficulties. At the Anshan Iron and Steel Works, the secretary of the Party committee, former Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, Wang Chi-shou introduced the "rules of the Maonshan iron and steel works'', i.e., he implemented Soviet methods of management. The Maoists unfoundedly criticised him in a Party decision to the effect that these rules contravened the "Regulations of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works" as laid down by Mao Tse-tung to be followed as the line in managing that enterprise. It was even reported that violent clashes, in the course of which several blast furnaces were destroyed, took place between the workers defending Party committee secretary Wang and the tsaofan group (Tokyo Shimbun, August 22, 1967).
In 1967 some 30,000 ``anti-Maoist'' workers of the Changchun Automobile Works downed tools and attacked the proMao hungweipings from the Kirin Industrial Institute. Similar clashes occurred at other enterprises of the engineering industry (telegram based on wall newspapers in Peking). At a Shanghai factory manufacturing machinery for the production of glass, a large number of workers, the management and more than half of the engineering staff joined an anti-Maoist group calling itself a "red detachment''. They refused to turn the technical documentation over to the tsaofan group with the result that production was seriously affected (Jenmin Jihpao, January 14, 1967). It is reported that at a spare parts factory in Chengtu, the management, members of the Party committee and others---one-third of the personnel---quit work bringing production to a standstill ( Jcnmin Jihpao, February 6, 1967). At the Hunien Engineering Works in Chungking, only seven of a staff of over 20 remained in one of the departments, while in the foundry department one-third of the workers walked out, and the department superintendent, who looked on apathetically simply stopped production (Hsinhua report of January 23, 1967).
Violent clashes with enormous damage to production are taking place at the various mines, where there are many anti-Maoists among the workers. It is reported that as a result of clashes between workers of the two factions the Hsilu Tienchueh western open quarry in Fushung stopped work on July 14, 1967, and four large and nine small pits 312 and also the first and second oil refinery in the town suspended production on July 24. The situation grew much more serious by August 4, when armed clashes occurred in 90 small factories situated in the suburbs and production stopped altogether (Reuter report from Tokyo of August 7, 1967). On November 14, 1967, at a meeting in Peking with a tsaofan delegation from Hwangchow, Chou En-lai said: "Coal and the railways are the reasons the chemical fertiliser output plan has not been fulfilled.'' ( Collection of documents published on November 17, 1967 by the newspaper Hwangchow Jihpao, the magazine Hungchih and the Hwangchow Department of Propaganda and Industry). Coal is used by the thermal power stations generating roughly 80 per cent of the power needed by the railways and various industries. Moreover, considerable quantities of it are consumed by the peasant households. A coal shortage is, therefore, the underbelly of the entire economy and the population is strongly urged to economise. At the Taching oilfields, once considered the model in applying the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" to building and exploitation, more than 30,000 workers downed tools in 1967 and went to Peking. As a result, production was curtailed. At a press conference Chou En-lai let the cat out of the bag when he said that at the Taching oilfields production was stagnant (Asahi, January 13, 1967). After this the name Taching ceased to be mentioned altogether. Approximately at the close of last year the Mao group's propaganda organs trumpeted continuously that output at some mines was growing, that a number of regions were economising on coal and that the oil output was increasing. However, this was no more than wishful thinking.
It was reported that during the so-called Wuhan incident in July 1967 (when the "Million Heroes" organisation set up by ``anti-Maoist'' workers and supported by local Army units tried Wang Li and other leaders of the "cultural revolution'', who had come from Peking; the forces sent to quell this incident included even warships and paratroops) half a million people participated in the armed clashes; 240 enterprises of the mining and processing industries were involved, and light industry enterprises were also drawn into the conflict.
At the Peking Textile Mill the workers split into two hostile groups; in early 1967 of the 2,700 employees at this mill 600 left daily to take part in the struggle, making normal work impossible. Hungweipings came to the mill and it did __PRINTERS_P_313_COMMENT__ 21---2466 313 not operate for a whole month, with the result that its output of cotton fabrics decreased by 360,000 square metres. Workers of two textile mills in Shanghai went to Peking with petitions levelling accusations at the hungweipings. All this very adversely affected production.
There were reports of output growths in other branches of the light industry but it may be surmised that in reality many enterprises had difficulty obtaining raw materials. At some of the factories the workers participated in the armed clashes and this must have hit production very badly. In a statement published on May 14, 1967, Hsieh Fu-chih, head of the Peking revolutionary committee, said: "Energy must be devoted first and foremost to the revolution; but production is also vital. In April output has decreased by seven per cent below the March level. This is due to the armed struggle and to wrecking.''
According to the hungweiping press, Chou En-lai declared at a mass rally of tsaofans that on account of the disorders and wrecking instigated by the "group in authority taking the capitalist road'', the 1967 industrial output and freight carriage targets had not been reached. The rally in question was held in Peking on February 2, 1968 and was attended by 10,000 representatives of tsaofan groups in industry, transport, finance, trade, agriculture and forestry. This information is from the Kwangtung Collection of Materials compiled from reports in Kwangtung Province hungweiping newspapers received in Tokyo on April 24 (April 24, 1968, Associated Press, Sankei Shimbun, and the magazine Ana-no doko, published by the Institute of Asian Economy Research, No. 4, p. 52).
At the beginning of 1968 "revolutionary committees" began to be set up in all regions and at every factory, but order was not restored at the factories; there was a glaring absence of labour discipline. This was pointed out in an article by Jen Li-hsin published in Jenmin Jihpao on March 10, 1968. It stated:
``Today attention is drawn by the fact that under the influence of anarchist ideology some workers are not maintaining discipline. They ignore instructions and work in a slipshod manner, and when they feel like it they do nothing at all, saying that they are not bound to anything. They claim that this is the 'tsaofan spirit', that they 'are educating themselves'. The most terrible thing is that they tag 314 the label of `slaves' to comrades who observe labour discipline.''
In a letter to Jenmin Jihpao, the superintendent of Blast Furnace No. 6 at the Anshan Iron and Steel Works wrote that in his department labour discipline had been shattered, that some workers came late to work, others left early, that the eight-hour working day was no longer observed (Jenmin Jihpao, March 1, 1968). At the Peking Textile Mill, too, there were cases of workers reporting for work a whole hour late, doing their job negligently, shirking and giving illness as the excuse and demanding the prolongation to one hour of the intervals for nursing mothers (who were allowed half an hour) (letter printed in Jenmin Jihpao, March 3, 1968).
In an article printed in the magazine Gekkan Shakaito, No. 8, 1968, Junryo Niijima, one of Mao Tse-tung's disciples, discusses the above-mentioned "Regulations of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works''. He holds that Mao Tse-tung had evolved a method of management calling for the " participation of the two sides" (the participation of the factory administration in production, and the participation of the workers in the management), and that this method had been systematised by the CPC on the basis of experience gained during the period of the "big leap" of 1958. He writes that "70 industrial articles'', rejecting this system out of hand, had been drawn up in the 1960s by Liu Shao-chi, Po I-po and others, and inasmuch as these articles gave precedence to the engineering staff and banned workers from the management of production, these people were sternly criticised during the present "cultural revolution''. However, until almost the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the system of " participation of the two sides" was implemented as the Party line without any modification. Even the "Regulations of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works'', which are supposed to have been conceived by Mao Tse-tung, deal with such issues as the degree of political control over production, stronger leadership of the Party committee, the implementation of the line of the masses in the sphere of management and technology, "participation of the two sides'', and so forth. Nothing of this is at variance with the policy hitherto pursued by the CPC in industry. In a book entitled The Great Cultural Revolution in China Masahisa Suganuma describes the situation in the management of a sawmill in Peking "after the seizure of __PRINTERS_P_315_COMMENT__ 21* 315 power''. He writes that the tsaofans divested the mill director of his responsibilities and set up a revolutionary production committee, one of whose members was elected to run the mill. Thus a new method of management was created which could not ensure the implementation even of the formula " participation of the two sides''. The former system of the director bearing responsibilities under the collective leadership of the Party committee (introduced by decision of the Eighth Congress of the CPC) guaranteed the "strict unity of will"^^*^^ and protected the enterprise against the disregard of day-to-day work and the shirking of responsibility that stem from endless discussion. Moreover, it was "not contradictory to socialist democracy''. In short, for those in our country who follow the Mao group blindly and for the group itself, which is forcing the "cultural revolution'', the problem is really not in the system: they disagree with the leadership of the Marxist-- Leninist Party.
Moreover,^^**^^ in the above-mentioned article Niijima writes that in the initial period after the "cultural revolution" started, seasonal and contract workers joined the tsaofans and attacked the organs of administration. He demagogically asserts that the efforts of Liu Shao-chi, Po I-po and others to consolidate the system of brutal discrimination, making dismissal possible at any time, had become a social problem. However, this system was used in order to send to the mining and processing industries the people who streamed into the large cities from the villages during the period of the "big leap" and the elemental calamities of approximately ten years ago, and its purpose was by no means to establish low rates of pay and high profits. In that period the contract workers were people who by a contract concluded between rural people's communes and urban factories worked in the towns when there was nothing to do in the fields; in some cases their wages were turned over to the communes or to the production teams. There were people, brought to the fore by the present "cultural revolution'', who incited these workers. They shouted that the system of seasonal and contract workers was a new system of exploitation. Criticism rallies were held after January 1967 in Hunan and Chekiang provinces, and in Shanghai and other cities. _-_-_
^^*^^ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 239.
^^**^^ __NOTE__ Did not see "**" in body on this page. Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 503.
316 Lastly, during the latter half of April this system was abolished by the "revolutionary committees'', which had "seized power'', or by their preparatory committees. The seasonal and contract workers who sought to become permanent workers were now sent back to the countryside against their will. These incidents convincingly show to what torments the workers and peasants are doomed by the Mao group, which is pressing forward with the "cultural revolution'', and how inhuman are its blind disciples in our country. __ALPHA_LVL3__ Resistance of RailwaymanThe "cultural revolution" had a terrific impact on the railway transport in China, and the railwaymen, as a working-class contingent, put up a furious resistance to the Mao group.
In the early period of the "cultural revolution'', the number of hungweipings, whom Mao Tse-tung inspected on eight occasions in Peking's Tienanmen Square, reached ten million. Of these, nine million travelled free on the railways to Peking from all parts of the country, bringing their petitions. In addition, workers also streamed into Peking from all over China, likewise bringing petitions. On top of this people circulated between the provinces and the towns in order to share experience and information. As many passengers were transported by the railways during this period as during the whole of 1958, at the time of the "big leap''. The result was that usual freight was held up, mountains of it accumulating at the major railway junctions. A ".struggle for the seizure of power" broke out at the administration offices of the railway lines of the various provinces approximately in February L967, and the railwaymen put up a dogged resistance to this ``struggle''. As a result freight carriage diminished still further. On the Taiyuari Railway in Shantung Province the timetable was largely disrupted, in January the freight turnover amounted to only 80.4 per cent of the planned volume, and in February in the course of 13 days before the "seizure of power" more than 5,000 tons of freight piled up daily (Jenmin Jihpao, April 13, 1967). On the Harbin Railway many carriages were destroyed, more than 600 tons of freight piled up, the loading slackened, there was a shortage of 800 317 freight cars daily and the freight timetable was disrupted (Hungchih, No. 5, 1967).
When the "armed struggle" flared up, the railwaymen gradually and energetically demonstrated their organised strength, putting up a resistance, staging strikes and using force. According to various sources, this resistance on the main railways unfolded as follows:
Peking-Kwangchow Railway: in June 1967 traffic was stopped between Peking and Hankow; in July, as a result of the Wuhan incident freight and passenger traffic was suspended for a long time south and north of Wuchang; at the close of July communication was halted in the environs of Chiuchiang, Yingteh and Yuantang (Kwangtung Province) and traffic was stopped on the Kuangshen Railway, which is linked to the trunk line.
Tientsin-Pukow Railway: traffic was suspended for several days after mid-June 1967; a large-scale clash took place in Hsuchow on June 1 and traffic came to a standstill on all lines between Tientsin and Chinkou.
Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway: in August 1967 the provinces of Fukien and Chekiang were the central arena of an armed struggle during which clashes occurred frequently along the railways, the fiercest of these taking place in Chinhua and Shanshao, and on the Yinghsia line, which links up with the main trunk line. Two rival groups divided this railway and the carriages, obstructing traffic, with the result that traffic was suspended on both lines.
Szechuan Province internal railway: here the armed struggle lasted longest and damage to transport was most considerable. Since the fighting in Chengtu at the beginning of May 1967, traffic has been suspended at Chengtu, Chungking, Neichiang, Yingying, Wenchiang, Lushan and other junctions; on the Chengtu-Chungking and Paochi-Chengtu lines freight and passenger cars were likewise destroyed or damaged, and traffic ceased for a long time.
Northeastern internal railway: traffic between Shanghaikuan and Shenyang was continuously disrupted at the end of June 1967; in mid-July traffic was suspended between Shenyang and Chiamussu; in September traffic between Changchung and Talien, and Changchung and Harbin was obstructed.
On June 5, 1967 in a joint notification of the "Central Committee, the Military Committee, the State Council and 318 the group for cultural revolution affairs'', the Maoists instructed the local "revolutionary committees" and garrisons "to maintain order in transport and prevent the destruction of equipment on the railways and other means of communication''. The All-China Railwaymen's Conference was held in Peking from October 11 to 27, i.e., before and after the publication throughout the country of the directive of October 17 on the "great alliance''. It is reported that this conference called for an end to the armed struggle, urged that a "great alliance" should be formed on the railways and approved the reinstatement of leaders who had been criticised. An allChina conference was convened on January 5-13, 1968 to discuss the revolution and the introduction of incentives for railway workers. It was addressed by Chou En-lai, who said that a "great alliance" had been formed in all the railway administrations and departments. However, at the All-- China Railwaymen's Conference convened in mid-May it was stated that it had been possible to set up "revolutionary committees" on only 62 per cent of the railways (Jenmin Jihpao, May 19, 1968). Another conference of railwaymen and transport workers was convened on August 5 and it was attended by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. This indicates how much attention the Mao group gives to the situation on the railways. After this, the hungweiping newspapers reported on July 10 that an armed struggle, which was impeding freight traffic, had again broken out in Liaoning, Honan and Kwangsi provinces. In articles demanding the suppression of counter-revolutionary activity throughout the country, the Shanghai newspapers Wenhuai Pao and Chiehfang Jihpao admitted on July 24 that there had been cases of wrecking and disorder on the railways.
The Mao group's attacks on the Party, the YCL and the trade unions in the course of the "cultural revolution" were fiercely resisted by port workers also. This resistance has led to massive stoppages in ports throughout China. From the beginning of 1967 onwards freighters from Japan and other countries had to remain idle for various periods mainly at the new port of Tientsin, but after May this situation spread to Shanghai, Tsingtao, Talien, Lienyun and almost all other Chinese ports. In particular at the beginning of the summer season there were huge numbers of ships idle in the ports. In one way or another this affected all the Japanese ships sailing to China. The delays in the loading of ships 319 was due, apart from the disorders in the ports, to the stagnation in the production and delivery of steel, coal, salt, rice and other export commodities. According to Japanese shipping firms, of the vessels which sailed from Japan in July, 43 were held up in China for more than ten days (among them 21 for over a fortnight, and eight for 20 days). Ships were held up the longest at the new port of Tientsin and then at Shanghai and Talien in that order.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Peasants Begin to Withhold It looks as if with the start of the "great
proletarian cultural revolution" the Mao group encountered
certain difficulties in purchasing goods subject to "
centralised procurement and centralised sale'', and in levying the
grain tax. The commodities subject to "centralised
procurement and centralised sale" include foodstuffs, oil-bearing
crops and raw cotton. These commodities are purchased and
sold under plan. The Mao group claims that the tendency
of the peasants to withhold deliveries of food to the state is
due to incitement by inner-Party opposition groups and
reactionary elements. An observer in Jenmin Jihpao, for
example, wrote on December 21, 1967 that inner-Party groups in
authority taking the capitalist road and also landowners,
kulaks, counter-revolutionaries and subversive and Right
elements were using every opportunity to spread their
demagogical arguments with the purpose of inciting the peasants to
hold on to food and other farm produce and sell as little as
possible to the state. These forces, the Jenmin Jihpao
observer noted, were bent on disrupting the procurement of
agricultural output and have, therefore, to be seriously warned.
The very fact that this statement appeared in print indicates
that the procurement of agricultural products and the levying
of the tax in kind are attended by difficulties.
In a propaganda article in Jenmin Jihpao on March 11, 1967 it was claimed that the annual (1966--67) food procurement and tax collection plan, subject to fulfilment in March, was overfulfilled by 4.56 per cent in February. Who can say if that is true ? On June 22, 1967 Jenmin Jihpao carried an article stating that in the process of the distribution of foodstuffs and also during the summer procurement of food and 320 oil-bearing crops and the collection of taxes at the Huping Commune, Fuitung County, Anhwei Province, some people influenced by anarchist and individualistic ideas increased the distribution quotas, held up deliveries and tried to scale down the volume of food sold to the state and also of the food delivered as tax in kind. This brings one round to thinking that for its results in the purchase of agricultural products of the summer harvest and the collection of taxes the 1967/68 food year was not very favourable. In Kweichow Province the former landowners, kulaks, counter-revolutionary elements and profiteers, supported by the "groups in authority taking the capitalist road'', likewise tried to disrupt the procurement plan, the collection of taxes and the distribution of agricultural products. Slogans such as "let's leave more for ourselves, eat more and deliver less to the state'', appeared also in Heilungkiang (Jenmin Jihpao, September 14, 1967) and Kiangsi provinces.
The cutback of the flow of manufactured goods from the towns is one of the reasons the peasants are holding back food deliveries to the state. Another reason is that urban workers have been expelled to rural localities. However, it is felt that the main reason is that the peasants have begun to fear that the central policy might collapse and there will be a change of policy in agriculture under the impact of the "cultural revolution'', they are worried that a petty-bourgeois adventurist line might be revived and instructions handed down sharply changing the situation following the adjustment of the people's communes. These apprehensions, it is believed, are inducing the peasants to take illegal steps to ensure their self-defence: understating the harvest and overstating the number of people (by agreement between uncaring leaders of ordinary and large production teams, on the one hand, and the members of the commune, on the other). The peasants themselves, desiring to get and eat more, seek to hold up or at least decrease the deliveries to the state. Formerly, this was the tendency only of former landowners, kulaks and prosperous middle peasants. When the "great proletarian cultural revolution" go* under way, it is possible that more and more middle (lower strata) and poor peasants began to be worried by the absolutist policy of the Mao group and likewise sought to hold up food deliveries to the state.
The Mao group responded to this tendency by bringing 321 in the Army. Troops were sent on the pretext of assisting the people's communes. In addition to helping the production teams bring in the summer harvest, they ``helped'' to deliver foodstuffs to the state and collect the tax in kind. Thus, there was considerable confusion during the 1967 summer harvest season, but matters improved when the autumn harvest was brought in and it seems that the procurement of farm produce and the collection of taxes proceeded normally. However that may be, it is pointed out that peasants are again tending to hold up the deliveries to the state.
In Kiangsi Province ``traitors'' disrupted the food procurements and the collection of the tax in kind. Members of the Red Banner People's Commune, situated near Peking, refused to sell food or pay taxes and offered armed resistance to the officials sent to purchase food and collect taxes. As a result four peasants were killed and 18 gravely wounded. The Peking "Revolutionary Committee" demanded that this commune surrender the culprits.
Somewhat earlier, Li Ching-chuan, First Secretary of the Southwestern Bureau of the CC CPC, was attacked in the Peking wall newspapers; it was claimed that he was not heeding the demands of the Mao group and refusing to deliver the rice surpluses in Szechuan Province. If it is to be believed that the collective trend of the peasants to refuse to deliver food to the state is spreading from the production teams to the people's communes and then embracing entire counties and provinces, we shall find a most striking example of the emergence of ``polycentrist'' centrifugal tendencies so feared by the Mao group.
It is held that the abundant production of food in these areas is the reason for the emergence of such centrifugal tendencies. Szechuan Province has long taken pride in the fact that it "grows harvests large enough to feed the population of five provinces'', and it is therefore quite possible that in the province there was a concealed reserve of strength for the organisation of resistance. On the other hand, it was felt that the provinces, which are unable to ensure themselves with food despite the sending to them of envoys of the "revolutionary committees'', are weak politically, too.
The exchange of commodities between the towns and the countryside was disrupted when the "great proletarian cultural revolution" was started. Moreover, there was a pronounced trend towards the appearance in the urban and 322 rural free markets of forbidden commodities subject to planned procurement and sale, and of items whose purchase and sale are centralised (the free market functioned as an addition to the socialist integrated market; the purchase and sale of commodities not listed as vital were permitted in that market). On April 18, 1967, the Shanghai newspaper Chiehfang Jihpao published an article under the heading "Let Us Put the Free Market Under Control and Support Socialism'', in which it was pointed out that the appearance of commodities subject to planned procurement and sale, and of vital manufactured goods in a fairly large number of free urban markets, where farm products and subsidiary products should be sold, was being used by foreign journalists as material for their reports.
The Shanghai "Revolutionary Committee" published a communication stating that in 1967 additional measures had been taken to put an end to profiteering and reinforce control of the market. The main points of this communication are: there was illegal economic activity such as profiteering in food, raw cotton, oil-bearing crops, leaf tobacco, hemp and other controlled commodities, and also such as the establishment of underground enterprises and the hiring of labour, and the arbitrary raising of prices; persons engaged in this activity were to be punished in accordance with the law, but anybody giving himself up and ceasing such activity would be given consideration (Wenhui Pao, August 20, 1967, Nikon Keizai Shimbun, August 22, 1967).
Lately, reports which may be reduced to the following ten points have been released to the press, and it is believed that they give a good idea of the Mao group's economic line. It is still not quite clear whether these ten points are a summary of the various economic reports published in the period from January 1967 to January 1968, or whether they are a new integral report appearing in January 1968. The content of this report suggests that we are dealing with authentic material shedding light on the economic measures now being taken. Below we give the reported ten points.
1. The young intellectuals who have gone to the countryside are to keep firmly to the line laid down in the communications frequently published earlier and often appearing now; they are to remain permanently resident in the countryside and engage in promoting the revolution and the growth of production.
3232. The problem of raising wages and the standard of living has been thoroughly studied. Therefore, wait for the end of the "cultural revolution''. No arbitrary revision is to be accepted.
3. Until the decision of the Central Government is published, nobody is to be allowed to transfer seasonal and contract workers to the category of permanent workers. Moreover, the demand of the workers of collectively-owned enterprises to become workers of state-run enterprises is denied. Seasonal and contract workers are not allowed to set up organisations, share experience or start a petition movement. When any problem arises the advice of the local " revolutionary committee" or the military authorities is to be sought. Foodstuffs received earlier under distribution in the production team are not to be exchanged for food products received under government distribution.
4. The variable capital, reserve funds and public capital of collectively-owned enterprises may not be split up under any circumstances. What has already been divided is to be returned without delay. The special quotas allocated to the artisan artels are also to be immediately abolished.
5. The school leavers are to be given employment and their initial pay is to remain unchanged until the Central Government issues new instructions.
6. In cases where executives do not abide by established principles and agree with the economic demands of the masses, the question is to be reconsidered. If any incompatibility with the instructions of the Central Government is brought to light, the instructions of the executives concerned shall be promptly declared null and void. In cases where cash is appropriated by any organisation or private person, or accounts are arbitrarily withdrawn from the bank, such funds are to be promptly returned.
7. By intensifying propaganda and inducing the masses to self-education and self-liberation, we shall rally the masses to a movement aimed at putting an end to economism! The masses are to be taught to stay in their production sectors, stop mutual exchanges and make no complaints.
8. Stricter control of the markets must be established, and the masses must be mobilised to expose profiteers. In addition to political and economic punishment, punishment by a court of law is to be practised.
9. There must be strict control of the trade activities of 324 unauthorised pedlars and privately working artisans, and of the trade activity of the people's communes, of large and ordinary production teams and of individual members of the communes. Co-operative shops (or mutual-aid groups), artisan artels (or mutual-aid groups), pedlars, privately working artisans and so on must abide by the political line and laws of the state, operate under the direction of state enterprises, act under the guidance of industrial, trade and administrative organs and put socialist reforms into effect. Without the permission of the local authorities, no state enterprise, organ, organisation and so forth shall make purchases in the free markets, the people's communes or the production teams.
10. Industrial, trade and administrative inspections shall maintain order in the socialist market. All organisations and private persons must respect and obey the inspections. In their turn, the inspectors and tax collectors must heed the voice of the masses and eradicate shortcomings. Strict measures shall be taken against persons transgressing the law.
These ten points give the impression that while propagating the "great proletarian cultural revolution" they do not formulate a new political line and that their purpose is to restore order. A striking thing is that it seems that production difficulties are being used as a pretext to prevent excessive congestion in the towns. Also noteworthy is that it does not seem to be quite so easy to control profiteering. Also striking is the fact that cases occur when collectively-owned property and enterprises have been fragmented. In other words, what we are witnessing is the disbandment of socialist enterprises.
__ALPHA_LVL3__ The People's Communes In China the peasant households, of
which there are roughly 120 million, are divided into
cooperatives, each of which unites an average of 30 households
and is called a production team. Every 5-6 production teams
form a large production team consisting of 150--180
households. An association consisting of 10 large production teams
is called a people's commune and consists of an average of
1,600 peasant households. The people's commune is thus an
325
association of agricultural co-operatives. The land belongs
to the production teams, while, say, the tractors belong to
the people's communes because the production teams do not
have the funds for the purchase of machines of this kind.
A three-tier system of ownership of the means of production
exists in the people's communes: property of the communes,
the large production teams and the ordinary production
teams. The commune board also discharges the functions of
the former district committees. This plus the three-tier
system of ownership of the means of production now leads to
a growth of the scale of the economies through the gradual
amalgamation of the small co-operatives. It may be
considered that this is showing the way to the transition from
collective ownership to ownership by the whole people.
However, if the decline of the people's communes over the past
ten years and the present stoppages are borne in mind it will
be clearly realised that it is a mistake to idealise the
communes.
It would be extremely useful to refer to the following explanations relative to the people's commune which the Deputy Prime Minister Chen Yi gave to members of a delegation from Japanese news agencies and publishing houses which visited China during the early period of the policy of economic ``adjustment'', namely in May 1962. "First and foremost, things are running smoothly at 20 or 30 per cent of the people's communes. That does not imply that there are absolutely no shortcomings. Secondly, at 40 or 50 per cent of the communes the situation may be described as intermediate. These are the ordinary communes. Thirdly, 10 or 20 per cent of the communes cannot be said to be flourishing. We regard the 20--30 per cent of the communes which are doing well as models, and teach others on their example; we're raising the level of the middle communes and strive to draw the 10 per cent, where the situation is difficult, up to the middle level in order to do away with lagging communes. Certain conditions are needed for this work. Where things are going smoothly, the style of the work of the cadres is good, and the relations between the leaders and the masses are also good. At these communes they have good organisation, the work proceeds correctly, rich experience has been accumulated and major mistakes are, in the main, avoided. On the other hand, where things are going poorly, the attitude is, naturally, not conscientious, the work is done in far 326 from the best way and good relations have not been established with the people. The most terrible thing is that malignant elements have found a refuge there. ...''
To think that in their present state the people's communes ensure the creation of the socialist system of ownership and are developing in a direction leading to the final abolition of all ownership is to abandon oneself to doctrinairism, which has nothing in common with science. ... In the beginning it was attempted to set up communes as separate agricultural co-operatives, each of which would unite as many as 5,000 peasant households; today the co-operatives consist of not more than 30 households. This alone shows how remote is the transition to the system of ownership by the whole people....
__ALPHA_LVL3__ Conclusion Subjectively, the Mao group probably
wants another "big leap''. However, a practical study of
China and theoretical research show that it is utterly
impossible to return to the "big leap" policy in a manner that
would rouse the masses to develop production and
construction rapidly.
This becomes obvious if we analyse the reasons for the collapse of the "big leap" policy, the creation of the people's communes and the sources of the present economic chaos and stagnation... .
The "great proletarian cultural revolution" embodies forcible action by petty-bourgeois and ultra-``Left'' opportunists, who appeared on the stage as a result of the innerParty struggle aimed at establishing the absolute rule of the Mao group.... In China the "cultural revolution" rests almost solely on military strength because it can now be hardly saved even by means of the movement to deify Mao.
[327] __ALPHA_LVL0__ The End. [END]REQUEST TO READERS ~
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