p The Nazis opened negotiations with Poland, in particular, on the "Ukrainian question”. Their hopes for success in negotiating a joint action against the USSR with the Polish government of the day were not unfounded. There lias already been a reference earlier on to German-Polish co-operation in March 1938 when, following the AnschluB of Austria, Poland was particularly anxious to capture Lithuania. The talks about co-operation, including military co-operation, for the "full dismemberment of Czechoslovakia" and its liquidation as a state began between Polish Ambassador Lipski and Goring back in the middle of June.^^218^^

p On September 27 Beck directed the Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski to come to terms with Goring about Poland being informed in advance of the start of the German military actions against Czechoslovakia. "For your confidential information”, Beck wrote, "I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict." ^^219^^

p Lipski met the State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs Weizsacker to concert action by the two countries and agree on the "military demarcation line in the event of a Polish-Czech war”. Right after the Four- Power Munich deal, in the night of September 30, Poland addressed an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia for the immediate transfer of the Teszyn region and on the following day started to move her troops into that region.

p The German and Polish aggressors concluded what amounted, in point of fact, to an anti-Soviet military alliance to come into force if, with the Soviet Union coming to Czechoslovakia’s aid in defence against Nazi Germany 196 and Poland, they would find themselves at war against the USSR. On September 30, the Polish government asked the Nazis whether it could count on Germany’s benevolent reaction in case of an armed conflict between Poland and the USSR arising from an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish troops. On the following day, Lipski relayed to Warsaw the reply he got from von Ribbentrop: "In the event of a Polish-Soviet conflict, the government of Germany would take a more than benevolent position in respect of Poland.” Besides, he made it quite clear that the government of Germany would be helpful. ^^22^^° Goring also assured Lipski on October 1, that "in the event of complications with Russia Poland can count on most effective assistance from Germany".^^221^^

p The "Ukrainian question" came under intense study in Poland right after Munich. The Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski, published by Polish elements close to Beck in the territory of the Western Ukraine, seized by Poland in 1920, carried an article on October 2, 1938, about the plans of Polish imperialists. It called for the Soviet Union to be divided into a number of independent state entities with Kiev, Tbilisi, and Samarkand as capitals.

p The question of a joint war of aggression by Germany and Poland against the USSR arose soon afterwards. Ribbentrop, speaking to Polish Ambassador Lipski on October 24, 1938, suggested "a general settlement of all possible points of friction between Germany and Poland . The suggestion implied the incorporation of Danzig (with economic privileges preserved in Danzig for Poland) to the Third Reich, the construction of a German extra-territorial autobahn and multiple track railroad through the Polish Corridor; the extension of the Polish-German Declaration of friendship and non-aggression to 25 years; the provision of guarantees by Germany relative to the Polish-German border. Ribbentrop suggested that, having thus reinforced Polish-German friendship, the two countries should conduct a "joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact”. ^^222^^

p Japanese imperialists, planning for a joint three-power war against the Soviet Union, were also extremely interested in German-Polish co-operation against the USSR.^^223^^

p The Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, maintained in a conversation with Poland’s Vice-Minister for 197 Foreign Affairs Szembeck that "Soviet Russia is getting progressively weaker" and "the Russian problem is looming”. Grzybowski declared that Poland "must have influence on this problem”, recalling that there had already been a historical precedent with Poland having "the final say in Russian affairs”. He also quoted Pilsudski’s words: "I shall march on Russia myself.” Grzybowski spoke up I’or the restoration of the Polish frontiers of 1772. Nazi Germany considered, not without reason, that—on a par with Italy and Japan—"Poland will be Germany’s natural ally in the future German-Russian conflict".^^224^^

p The settlement of the German-Polish imperialist contradictions, connected with the realisation of their conspiracy against the USSR, proved far from simple, however. Nazi Germany, while urging the continued consolidation of German-Polish “friendship”, saw it as Poland’s full submission to German domination. Whereas the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the first step towards the Nazis overrunning the whole of Czechoslovakia, the incorporation of Danzig was seen by the Nazis as a test of Poland’s readiness for co-operation with Germany as would mean voluntary surrender. The Soviet military intelligence officer, Richard Sorge reported to Moscow on October 3, 1938, that the "Polish question" was the next foreign policy problem for Germany, but Germany and Poland were expected to settle it "amicably because of their joint war against the USSR".^^225^^ The Commissar of the League of Nations in Danzig C. Burckhardt also wrote on December 20 after his visit to Germany that the Ukraine was much of a talking point there: "Poland is being associated with such plans to a certain extent on the understanding, of course, that Warsaw will have to pay for it, that it will submit, that it will be ’reasonable’ and will follow the way of the Czechs." ^^226^^

p One indicative statement was made by General Coestring, the German Military Attache in the USSR, in a conversation with the Lithuanian military attache: "Poland is a poor horse harnessed by Germany for a time. ... If Poland counts on Germany’s assistance in her war against the USSR, she must know anyway that German troops, once in the Corridor and Silesia, will stay there."^^227^^

p The ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with Germany in the imperialist plunder of foreign lands, particularly in action against the Soviet state. At the same 198 time they could not take delight in the prospect of Poland turning into a rightless vassal of Hitler Germany or of the Nazis capturing Polish lands. Still less so since it would have produced a storm of indignation among the Polish people. Nor did the Polish government like the idea of a German-controlled "Ukrainian state" being created because it feared that the Nazis would want to annex to it also the Ukrainian lands which formed part of Poland (that is, tho lands alienated by Poland from the Soviet state in 1920). Thus, the Vice-Director of the Political Department of Poland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, T. Kobylanski, emphasised in a conversation with the German Embassy Counsellor in Poland, von Scheliah, on November 18, that if the Germans refrained from their idea of creating a "Great Ukraine”, "Poland would be willing subsequently to join Germany in a march on the Soviet Ukraine”. Otherwise, such action could turn out to be impossible, he pointed out.^^228^^

p It was, therefore, the reverse side of the medal that began to show itself little by little as did the “price” which tho Nazi Reich wanted Poland to pay for her part in plundering foreign lands. Yet quite a few individuals among the ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with the Nazis almost under any terms. J. Beck declared, for instance, to U.S. Ambassador Biddle that Poland "might have" to co-operate with Germany in creating a Ukrainian state at the expense of some of the territory of Poland, the USSR and Romania.^^229^^

p Some pronouncements by Karszo-Siedlewski, a former Polish Embassy Counsellor in Moscow, who was appointed as Minister in Iran in December, were particulary noteworthy in this respect. Karszo-Siedlewski said in a conversation with von Cheliah on December 28, 1938, that in a few years Germany would be fighting the Soviet Union and "Poland will support . . . Germany in that war. It will be better for Poland to side with Germany quite definitely before the conflict breaks out since Poland’s territorial interests in the West and Poland’s political objectives in the East, above all in the Ukraine, can be secured only through a Polish-German agreement achieved well in advance". ^^23^^°

p The Nazis missed no opportunity, in meeting Polish diplomats afterwards, to raise the question of anti-Soviet cooperation between the two countries. Hitler remarked in his 199 conversation with Beck on January 5, 1939, that there was a full community of interests between Germany and Poland with regard to Russia.^^231^^ As he answered a question from Ribbentrop on the following day whether or not the Polish government had forsworn Pilsudski’s claims against the Ukraine, Beck, reaffirming Poland’s aggressive designs, stressed that the Poles "had even been in Kiev, and that these aspirations were doubtless, still alive today."^^232^^

p During his visit to Poland on January 26, 1939, Ribbentrop raised the matter again. Hitler’s Minister once more offered to Beck to establish collaboration between Germany and Poland with regard to the Soviet Union and also in creating the "Great Ukraino”. "Mr. Beck made no secret,” the transcript of that conversation said, "of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea.” On hearing such a statement from the Polish Minister, Ribbentrop raised the question of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, so that she could find herself "in the same boat" with Germany. Beck promised him that "he would give further careful consideration" to this question. ^^233^^ At the end of the visit, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, H. Moltke, declared, replying to the question about Poland’s position in the event of a clash between Germany and Russia: "The situation is quite clear. We know that Poland will be at our side in the event of a German-Russian conflict. That is quite definite."^^234^^

p Tn case of a joint war with Germany against the USSR, Poland’s ruling quarters preferred to see German troops moved against the Soviet Union through the territory of other countries, rather than through Poland. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed out on February 19, 1939, that Poland was dreaming of turning the Soviet Ukraine into hor own sphere of influence. "She will, however, be ready to give up her dreams, in case of necessity, and would not object to Hitler passing through Romania on his way to Russia. . . . Nor would Poland object to Hitler marching through the Baltic states and Finland to leave her free to act against tho Ukraino in time to coincide with the policy of Japan."^^235^^

p However, while in the first few months following Munich the Nazis did consider joint action with Poland against the Soviet Union, that did not prevent them from 200 circumstantially working out another version, that is, the plans of war against Poland as well as against Franco and Britain. By the end of December, 1938, the further Nazi plans of aggression had been, in fact, finally clarified. It was decided to do away with Czechoslovakia in the spring of 193!) and then with Poland so as to act against France and Britain in the subsequent year, having collected enough strength and strengthened the rear.^^236^^

p True, the German press went on discussing for a while the "Ukrainian question" but that was nothing short of misinformation designed to withhold the actual Nazi plans.

In the meantime the Nazis got down to some specific action in preparation for an attack on Poland. At a conference which Ribbentrop had with Nazi generals on January 22, it was stated that the German-Polish declaration of 1934 would be observed only as long as it was found worthwhile. It was envisaged that steps would be taken to "strain relations with Poland to such an extent as to make nothing but a military solution of the issue possible." ^^237^^