p As the subsequent events had shown, the expectations of reactionary elements in Britain, France and the United States for aggression to be turned towards the Soviet frontiers were found to have been built on quick-sand. The aggressors had a fairly good idea of the strength and might of the Red Army and could not venture into anti-Soviet gamble. Besides, Japan got bogged down deep in the war against China. Before that war was over, she could actually consider attacking the USSR only in the event of a Soviet-German conflict. Germany, on her part, did not consider herself to be prepared sufficiently enough in the military sense to venture into a war against the USSR.

p At a conference with Keitel and Brauchitsch on November 16 Hitler set out his plan to sign a military alliance with Italy for a war against France and Britain. Italy would confront them in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, while German forces would attack France.^^238^^ One of fascist “experts” on the problems of Eastern Europe, W. Markert had information that prior to November and 201 December 1938, the Nazis had intended to hasten a "clash with Moscow and to that end get Poland to serve as an ally against the Soviet Union”. Ribbentrop and Rosenberg "were in favour of war against the Soviet Union by exploiting the Ukrainian question. The decisive change in the evaluation of the political situation and the chances for war in Eastern Europe came about somewhere around Christmas.” After his long sojourn in Obersalzberg, Hitler declared, referring to war against the USSR, that some time was still needed for its thorough preparation.^^239^^

p The progressive change in the alignment of forces in Europe in favour of the aggressive powers and more particularly, the swelling tide of information that Germany was preparing to direct her blow not against the USSR, but against Poland, France and Britain, ultimately began to worry the Western powers.

p However, in the Diaries of Oliver Harvey, personal secretary of the British Foreign Secretary, wo find the following anxious entry dating from as early as November 13, 1938: "Every scrap of information, secret and public, we get from Germany now shows that the German Government is laughing at us, despising us and intending to dispossess us morally and materially from our world position." ^^24^^° On the following day Lord Halifax, addressing a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee, made a summary of confidential reports indicating that the Nazi Reich was "becoming increasingly anti-British and that their intention was to work for the disintegration of the British Empire and, if possible, for the domination of the world by the German nation." ^^241^^

p The First Secretary of the British Embassy in Berlin, I. Kirkpatrick, arrived in London in mid-December with some material to prove that the Nazis were planning aggression not only eastwards but westwards as well.

p Chamberlain, however, still hoped for a success of the course he had mapped out. With reference to the proposed measures to strengthen Britain’s ability to resist German aggression, he declared at a Cabinet meeting that these proposals "did not tally with his impression of Hitler’s next move, which would be eastwards, in which case we might well not be involved at all.”^^242^^

p A Foreign Office memorandum submitted to the British government on January 19, 1939, summarised the available 202 information about the Nazi plans which was obtained from various secret sources. In the introductory note to the memorandum Halifax pointed out that "hitherto it had been jgenerally expected that Hitler’s designs would lead him (eastward, and more particularly that he was planning something in the Ukraine. More recently, we have been receiving reports showing that he has decided that the moment is propitious for dealing an overwhelming blow at the Western powers."^^243^^ The Foreign Office had information at the lime that the Nazis intended to start large-scale armed action by smashing Poland.^^244^^

p The French General Staff also arrived at the conclusion that Germany would rather launch an attack in the West than a war against the USSR.^^245^^

p Nevertheless, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, told Hitler on March 2, 1939 (on his return from a trip to London) that Chamberlain and Halifax "are still thinking on lines of Munich”. Henderson expressed his readiness to start negotiations with Fiihrer on that basis.^^246^^ The Nazi Chancellor, however, did not honour the Ambassador with a reply. He did not want any agreement with Britain, nor did he intend to concert any of his action with her. Still less so since Henderson’s offer clearly indicated that the British government did not mean to put up any resistance lo the Nazi Reich’s aggressive aspirations.

To sum up, by early 1939, the Nazi Reich, enjoying the benefit of the policy of abetting German aggression that was pursued by Britain, France and the United States, came to occupy the dominant position in Central Europe. The expectations of Chamberlain and his fellow thinkers that they could strike a deal with the Nazis so as to push them into an act of aggression eastwards, against the USSR, turned out to have been unfounded. The Nazis, while planning their further land-grabbing plans, preferred to have to deal with weaker opponents for the time being. They did not as yet make as bold as to confront the USSR.