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p Early in 1935 the British government made yet another attempt to come to terms with the Nazi Reich and to reanimate the Four Power Pact. They realised perfectly well that the course of events in Germany and her rearmament, first and foremost, would lead her before long to attempting to redraw the map of Europe and, indeed, not only of Europe. Some serious thought was given in London to the ways of saving the British Empire from that danger.

p The general line of British policy was to ward off the danger menacing the British Empire through an imperialist deal with the Nazi Reich, as stated earlier on, and channel the aggressive designs of the Nazis eastward, against the Soviet Union.

p It was decided in London to begin negotiations with Germany, having first concerted the major issues with France. In mid-December 1934, the British government invited the French head of government Pierre Flandin and the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval to London to negotiate the subsequent political course of the two countries.

p At a meeting on January 14, 1935, the British cabinet debated its position on the coming Anglo-French negotiations. The British ministers proceeded from the assumption that the major objective of Britain and France was to achieve agreement with Germany, and, among other things, to bring her back into the League of Nations. To that end, they were prepared to acknowledge Germany’s equal rights in the arms field. London knew that France would not agree to Germany’s rearmament without some extra guarantees of her own security which would make it more difficult to reach an agreement with her, the more so since the British government held a negative position in the matter. It was 81 decided that Britain must not reaffirm the commitments she had under the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, and that there was even less reason to agree to consultations of representatives of the General Staffs of Britain and France. It was necessary to avoid admitting that demilitarisation of the Rhineland by Germany was a "vital British interest".^^1^^

p London was prepared to agree to the establishment of German land forces of a total strength of 300,000 (21 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) and an air force equal both to the British and the French, that is, with a total of 1,000 first-line aircraft.^^2^^

p In order to have the French government accept those plans, London decided to offer it to conclude a pact of instant mutual aid in addition to the 1925 Treaty of Locarno between the parties to this treaty in the event of an air attack (the so-called Air Pact). This treaty was of interest to Britain herself, first and foremost. But it would have a certain sense for France as well because under the Treaty of Locarno the provision of assistance to a victim of aggression was bound up with the cumbersome procedure of the League of Nations while the Air Pact implied instant aid.

p There were Anglo-French negotiations in London from February 1 to 3, 1935. The British government proposed finding common ground for the two countries to begin negotiations with Germany. London proceeded from the assumption that this could not be done without abrogating the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles limiting Germany’s armaments. It was prepared to grant the Nazi Reich the right to increase its armed strength. To “reassure” France, the British government expressed its readiness for an Air Pact to be concluded between the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno. ^^3^^

p The Anglo-French conference ended with a joint communique, being issued. With reference to the negotiations between France and Italy early in January in 1935, and subsequently to the negotiations between representatives of Britain and France in London, the British and French ministers came out for the “progress” thus achieved to be developed trough "the direct and effective co-operation of Germany”. They spoke up for a "general settlement" consisting of the Eastern Pact and the Danubean Pact (non- intervention in the affairs of Austria), agreement on armaments to replace the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles 82 limiting the arms forces oi Germany; and agreement on the return ol Germany into the League ol Nations, and, above all, the proposal lor concluding the Air Pact.^^4^^

p It was realised in London that the decisions taken at the Anglo-French conierence could not but cause concern in the Soviet Union. The Foreign Ol’hce even drew up a special memorandum on February 7 clearly demonstrating the foreign policy designs ol the British ruling circles. It emphasised: "Russia is really afraid that Germany, in combination with Poland, is planning to expand in the East" and is, therefore, interested in co-operation with France. Since France is also concerned over her security, she is prepared to co-operate with Russia. However, the projected "general settlement" with Germany and the Air Pact were designed to give France the security she wanted.

p Those who drew up the memorandum proceeded from the assumption that all that would be subverting Soviet-French co-operation and the forecasting of the subsequent course of events could be based on the following considerations: "If Germany and Poland had no plans for future penetration towards the East, they would not be so opposed to the Eastern Pact... The need of expansion will force Germany towards the East as being the only field open to her, and as long as the Bolshevist regime exists in Russia it is impossible for this expansion to take merely the form of peaceful penetration." ^^5^^

p This document clearly indicated the full meaning of the "general settlement" with Germany which the British and French ruling quarters had agreed on during their negotiations in London. That was the same old Four Power Pact in a new wrapping. The policy of the British government clearly revealed an intention to ensure "Western security" through an agreement with Germany and channel fascist aggression against the Soviet Union.

p Indeed, the London communique could not but worry the Soviet government. Soviet Ambassador in London I. M. Maisky pointed out that the position held by London was to be explained by the fact that "there has been revived hope in the British government quarters in recent weeks for a possibility of iinding common ground with Hitler."^^6^^ Neither could one overlook some articles by Lord Lothian and other British advocates of the “appeasement” policy which appeared in the British press in those days. In view of that, the 83 People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the "British concerned themselves only with security in the West without having any interest in the East or Southeast where they are prepared to give Hitler a free hand." ^^7^^

p Driven by their class hatred, the Britisli reactionary quarters were prepared to put even their own interests at stake just to prevent the international positions of the USSR from being strengthened and keep it internationally isolated so as to make it easier for the fascist aggressors to attack it. Being aware of the British government’s readiness to meet Germany’s demand for armaments, Hitler decided to confront it with an accomplished fact just before the projected Anglo-German negotiations.

p There was an announcement in Berlin on March 13, 1935, about the creation of a German Air Force and on March 10—about the introduction of conscription. In that way the Nazi Reich grossly violated the major provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and launched accelerated preparations for war. Nevertheless, the British government was still ready to negotiate with the ringleaders of the Nazi Reich. The matter was taken up at a British Cabinet meeting on March 18. It decided that in spite of the above-mentioned action by the German government there was no reason for abandoning the visit to Berlin by British representatives. ^^8^^

p The Soviet government considered it necessary to do everything possible to forestall the rearming of Germany and the preparations for, and launching of, another world war. The only way to do so was through joint action by all the nations under threat of aggression. The Soviet Union called for a conference of the states which had signed the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties, in which the USSR could also take part.

p The men in London, however, preferred to negotiate with the aggressor rather than oppose aggression. On March 25 and 26, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Simon, and the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony Eden, made a visit to Berlin for conversations with Hitler, Neurath and Ribbentrop. The conversations showed that the Nazi Reich leaders were in no way disposed to accept most of the proposals put forward by Britain and France on February 3, that is, they did not want to be bound by any commitments which could have subsequently hindered the implementation of their aggressive designs. Hitler announced that he 84 intended to create a 550,000-stroiig ai’my, that his Air Force had already achieved parity with Britain and claimed the right to have a Navy equivalent to 35 per cent of the British Navy. Fiihrer reacted positively to the offer to conclude the Air 1’act, expressing willingness lo continue negotiations on this subject with the British government. It was also agreed that bilateral Anglo-German naval talks were to be started before long.^^9^^

p The Berlin conversations provided striking evidence of the aggressive designs of the Nazis. The hopes of the British ruling circles to use the conversations for laying the ground for agreement between the four Western powers on all issues in dispute were dashed. In spite of the fact that the policy of the Nazis was increasingly aggressive, the British government went ahead with its policy of collusion with the aggressors in the hope of turning their aggression eastwards.

p The Berlin visit by John Simon and Anthony Eden suggested the possibility of their visiting also Warsaw and Moscow. The Soviet government favoured the idea.^^10^^ However, what created a predicament in London was the puzzle over the question of who of the British ministers was to go to Moscow. The matter was examined at a British Cabinet meeting on March 6. It was decided the visit to Moscow was to be made by Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden. ^^11^^

p While discussing the matter with Soviet Ambassador Maisky, John Simon did not conceal that far from everybody in Britain was sympathetic about the idea of a visit by a British Minister to Moscow; there were influential groups opposed to such a move.^^12^^

p Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov conferred with Anthony Eden on March 28 and 29. The Soviet representatives at these talks declared that, considering the aggressive aspirations of the Nazi Reich, the USSR found it necessary to continue pressing for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. At the same time Eden’s attention was drawn to the fact that the British government’s policy of conniving at the rearmament of Germany could have dangerous consequences for Britain herself. The Soviet Union, the representatives of the USSR declared, had not the slightest doubt as to the aggressive nature of the Nazi Reich because its foreign policy was guided by two basic ideas—that of revenge and that of establishing their own domination of Europe. 85 However, it would have been still too early to say in what particular direction Germany would be striking first. "Hitler, while pushing his plan for Eastern expansion into the foreground at the present time, wants to have the Western nations rise to the bait and get them to sanction his armaments. When these armaments attain the level Hitler wanted them to, the guns might well start firing in an entirely different direction."^^13^^

p Intense preparations got under way in London in the meantime for an Anglo-Franco-Italian conference in Stresa which was to be called because of Germany’s violation of the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The British government’s position at the conference was thoroughly examined at a Cabinet meeting on April 8, 1935. The general view of the members of the Cabinet was, as stated in the Minutes of the Cabinet meeting, that should France and Italy propose an end to negotiations with Germany and a tough line in the policy of the three nations towards her, Britain "should not agree to it”. Therefore, Britain’s position was: "We should not agree to make a complete breach with Germany and to take no action accept to threaten her. . . We should make clear that we should like to make more propositions to Germany.” Britain could not agree to the conference ending with a declaration to say that Britain "would not stand a breach of the peace anywhere. .. We ought not to accept further commitments. . . Having established contact with Germany we ought to keep it.” To cut it off "would be an obvious mistake”. ^^14^^

p The conference at Stresa raised the question of applying sanctions against Germany but the British representatives spoke out against them.^^15^^ The powers attending the conference limited themselves to expressing their regret over Germany’s violation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. John Simon declared that the British representatives "could not at Stresa enter into a new commitment".^^16^^

p With the conference over, some Western commentators referred to a "Stresa Front”. Yet that was nothing but a smoke screen to cover up the retreat of Britain and France in the face of German imperialism which was regaining its power.

p The Council of the League of Nations went into session immediately after the conference. It produced a resolution based on the conference decisions which was not surprising 86 because its participants called the tune in the Council. But the British representatives did their utmost to emasculate them. John Simon vaingloriously cabled from Geneva: "1 succeeded in considerably attenuating the terms of the resolution agreed at Stresa." ^^17^^

p Largely through the efforts of the British government, the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations was limited to deploring any unilateral breach of international commitments, noting that this could put the League of Nations in peril. The Council’s decision was not, naturally, sufficient to raise a dependable barrier in the way of the Nazi Reich’s aggressive policy.

p Meanwhile, London was pressing for negotiations about the balance of the naval forces of Britain and Germany. Any agreement on that subject meant that Britain would be legalising the Nazi Reich’s infringement of the respective articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The building up of the German naval forces spelled danger to many nations with navies not as large as that of the British Empire. That applied, for example, to France, the USSR, and other countries. To prove that Germany must have a Navy equivalent to 35 per cent of the British one, Neurath made it quite clear that only in that case would Germany have the possibility to dominate the Baltic,^^18^^ that is intimated in no uncertain terms that the proposed deal was anti-Soviet. While neglecting the rightful interests of many nations, Britain was unilaterally prepared to grant Germany the right to a sweeping build-up of her Navy.

p A German delegation led by Ribbentrop arrived in London for the talks. It was extremely truculent. The main topic to negotiate was the size of the prospective German Navy. However, Ribbentrop opened with a statement of Hitler’s intention to build a Navy 35 per cent the size of the British one. He said he was prepared to start negotiations only if the British officially consented to that demand right away.^^19^^ The rulers of the proud British Empire were quite disconcerted. Their protests were turned down out of hand, and London gave in. The preliminary condition laid down by the Nazis was accepted. On .Tune 6, John Simon declared that "His Majesty’s Government intended to recognise the Reich Chancellor’s decision as the basis of future Naval discussions.^^20^^ So there was practically nothing left to negotiate.

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p The Anglo-German naval agreement was signed on June 18, 1935. Germany was granted the right to enlarge her Navy by more than five times. The Nazi Reich now had the opportunity of expanding its Navy so that, although not in a position to rival Britain on the seas, it still could he, as Churchill put it, the "master of the Baltic". ^^21^^

p The effect that agreement had on the subsequent course of events in the Baltic and, more particularly, on the policies of the Baltic states, can be seen from a report by the German legation in Estonia in 1935: "This agreement is viewed as recognition of Germany’s hegemony on the Baltic which has led to a higher evaluation of Germany as a power factor. There has since been appreciable change in the position of the leading personalities relative to Ger- many."^^22^^ The German Minister W. Bliicher in Helsinki appraised the influence of the treaty on Finland in a similar way. ^^23^^

p The British government’s policy of encouraging fascist aggression against the East posed a tremendous danger to world peace, and to Britain. Winston Churchill, one of the few Conservatives who took a more sober view of the trend of developments in Europe, pointed out in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Britain on June 14, 1935, that Hitler Germany was a huge war machine with half a dozen gangsters in control. Nobody knew what they would do tomorrow and where they would strike at. He conceded that the USSR might not be Germany’s first target, because that would he rather dangerous for herself. "Other directions,” he said, "are more probable.” While criticising those British leaders who hoped to secure Britain’s interests by giving Germany a free hand in the East, Churchill said that their designs boiled down to this: "Germany has to fight somewhere, and she has to expand her possessions into some direction—so let her better carve out an empire for herself at the expense of the states situated in Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe! Let her comfort herself with the Balkans or the Ukraine, but leave Britain and France in peace." ^^24^^

p It is the trends Winston Churchill was so critical of that dominated Britain’s foreign policy. British journalist and historian Tan Colvin pointed out that the men in charge of British foreign policy were after an understanding with Germany and that was basic to the nation’s foreign policy. The 88 British ruling circles presented the policy of abetting fascist aggression eastward to ensure "Western security" as the “appeasement” of Germany. It gained wide currency in Britain in 1935, Colvin stated.^^25^^

p Subsequently Britain had to pay dearly for that policy of aiding and abetting the resurgence of the German Navy. ^^26^^

p Along with naval discussions, Britain opened negotiations with the Nazi Reich about the conclusion of an Air Pact between the Locarno powers. On May 24, 1935, John Simon instructed British Ambassador in Berlin Eric Phipps to find out whether Hitler was prepared to start negotiations with a view to concluding that pact.^^27^^ Since the German Air Force was still materially weaker than that of Britain, France and their allies and, besides, to have concluded such an agreement would have been tantamount to Britain and France recognising Germany’s right to have an Air Force (she was banned from doing so by the Treaty of Versailles), the Nazi Reich found the signing of the Air Pact to be of much benefit to it. It gave an affirmative answer immediately and submitted its own proposals. ^^28^^

p Britain’s interest in a Western Air Pact was due to the fact that the information she had obtained about the rapid growth of the German Air Force caused her to fear that in a few years she might well face a German air invasion. Under the Air Pact, France, Italy and Belgium were to have come out at her side in such a case. Besides it was hoped in London that the signing of the Western Air Pact would be a big stride forward towards concluding a "general settlement" with Germany.

p The major point of Air Pact for France in the military sense was that it guaranteed her instant aid from Britain in case of a German attack,^^29^^ whereas under the Locarno Pact Britain was obliged to aid her only after the appropriate decision by the League of Nations. But still there was a great deal of apprehension in Paris. It was the German Land Force, rather than the Air Force, that posed the main danger to France. She was interested also in concluding the Eastern and Danubian pacts. It was believed in Paris, and not without good reason, that in the event of a Western Air Pact being signed along with the signing of the Anglo- German naval agreement, Britain would lose all interest in other problems of paramount importance to the security of France. All that complicated and dragged out the talks.

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The facts just cited provide striking evidence of British diplomatic activity in pursuit of wide-ranging agreement with Germany. But the contradictions in Western Europe had grown so sharp as to make agreement between them extremely difficult and even impossible, as the subsequent events showed.