p The reactionary ruling circles of Britain and France expected that following the Munich sellout, Germany’s aggressive ambitions would be turned eastwards, ultimately against the Soviet Union.

p The Soviet Union did, in fact, find itself in a very precarious position. By the joint efforts of Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini, the USSR had virtually been forced into a state of total international isolation. The governments of Britain and France, hoping to push Germany into a war against the Soviet Union, stressed openly that they wanted no trucks with the USSR. After Munich, the Foreign Office cut off all contact with the Soviet embassy in London. Britain seriously considered breaking off her trade treaty with the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Bonnet intended to denounce the treaties of mutual assistance with the USSR and Poland.^^204^^

p French Ambassador Coulondre and British Ambassador Chilston were recalled from Moscow in October 1938 and November 1938 respectively, whereupon the French and British embassies in Moscow were in charge of Charges d’Affaires for several months.

p As the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out, political circles in Britain as well as the press set about discussing, right after Munich, the prospect of Hitler "going eastwards and having the Ukraine as his primary major target”. There is no doubt, the Soviet embassy pointed out, that a whole series of influential personalities (including some members of the Cabinet) "directly intimated to Hitler about this 193 eastern venture, promising at least, favourable neutrality to him..."^^205^^ The British News Chronicle said that the “die-hards” were seeking to make Russia and Germany take one another by the throat.

p British historian Middlemas, who thoroughly studied the declassified documents of the British government referring to the prewar years, had to admit that there was "evidence ... to justify the Soviet charge that Britain planned to set Germany at war with Russia".^^206^^

p The Soviet Ambassador to France, Surits, who held similar views, reported in a dispatch to Moscow on November 11, that the French ruling top leadership was " particularly enthusiastic about the Drang nach Osten version implying that Germany is to be given a free hand in the East. That, in the long run, naturally, meant giving her a free hand for action against the USSR".^^207^^

p The U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, referring to the post-Munich policies of Britain and France, said that they would like it to come to war in the East between the German Reich and Russia, a long and extenuating war between them. In that case, the Western Powers "could attack Germany and get her to surrender".^^208^^

p When a Franco-German declaration on non-aggression was signed on December 6, 1938, as a result of the visit to Paris by Germany’s Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Daladier and Bonnet became even more confident that the aggressor’s avid eyes would from now on be turned only eastwards. Back in Berlin, Ribbentrop was able to declare, with reference to the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, that the declaration signed in Paris finally " detached France from the USSR and prevents any last traces of risk of Russo-French collaboration." ^^209^^

p Having concluded this agreement with Germany, the French ruling circles went into raptures. Bonnet wrote, informing the French ambassadors about his talks with Ribbentrop, that "German policy is now more concerned with fighting Bolshevism. The Reich shows her will for expansion to the East". ^^21^^°

p To pay the ransom and push Germany into a “crusade” against the USSR, the British and French ruling quarters were prepared to leave all the nations of Eastern Europe at the mercy of German Nazis. The allied treaty with Poland, co-operation with the Little Entente and the Franco- 194 Soviet pact, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin pointed out as he conferred with the French Ambassador to the USSR Naggiar, on February 9, 1939, were "recognised already at the past stages of the foreign policy of France, something like an asset of history".^^211^^ The Foreign Office also had information that France proposed to get rid of her commitments under the treaties with Poland, and, above all, with the USSR.^^212^^ Such a course of the French and British ruling circles after Munich was still prompted by their hatred of communism whether in the shape of the Soviet state or in that of the revolutionary movement in their own countries. "England has groveled on its belly before Hitler because it is afraid of commun- ism," ^^213^^ U.S. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes pointed out in his Secret Diary. The British government even suggested Anglo-German military co-operation in the struggle against the Soviet Union.^^214^^

p The Munich dealers were backed up in every way by the most reactionary representatives of the U.S. ruling establishment. As a former U.S. President Hoover argued in his speech on October 26, 1938, the West European nations should not have to fear Germany because the opportunities of the dictatorships lie in expansion eastward; so such expansion should not be interfered with.^^215^^ The Soviet embassy in the United States noted in this connection that the reactionary sections of the Republican Party were still "dreaming of a closer relationship with fascist countries and nurturing the illusion and the hope that the European aggressors will act against us".^^216^^ From as early as the summer of 1938, the United States was represented by no more than a Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, and Washington was in no hurry to appoint a new ambassador.

p The British, French and American reaction in every way egged on the German, Japanese and other aggressors. The Western press carried no end of reports about the " weakness" of the Soviet Union in the military as well as economic respects.

Information was obtained in London to the effect that Germany had got down to a detailed study of the possibilities of "settlement of the Ukrainian question" and that Hitler had given orders to the German General Staff to start preparations for an attack on the USSR. The creation of a "Great Ukraine" which would have consisted of Soviet 195 and Polish regions inhabited by Ukrainians, as well as of the Transcarpalhian Ukraine, was viewed by the Nazis as the most important component of Gorman Eastern policy. The "Great Ukraine" by itself could exist in their opinion, "only if it unconditionally relied on Germany, which eventually must turn it into a German vassal".^^217^^