p The British rnling establishment was increasingly inclined to surrender the Sudetenland to Hitler Germany in the hope of reaching an accommodation between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich in that way. The Times of London openly suggested in a leading article on September 7 that the Czechoslovak government ought to think of turning the Sudetenland over to Germany.

p A Conservative Party leader, Henry Channon, pointed out in his diary that the Times article had been produced in agreement between Halifax and the Times publisher, Geoffrey Dawson, and was definitely a "ballon d’essai" to see how the public would react, and to prepare them for the Runciman Report containing similar proposals.^^135^^ Halifax said on September 11, 1938, that the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the only hope to avoid war. He considered it desirable for a conference of four powers— Britin, France, Germany and Italy—to be called to settle the matter.^^136^^

p The prospect of calling such a conference was discussed on the same day by the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, with the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, Alexis Leger. The French diplomat expressed his full agreement with the idea of calling such a conference, stressing that there was no point in the Soviet Union being invited to attend.^^137^^ On September 13, the decision that this international conference was well worth-while was taken at a French Cabinet meeting. The news was immediately communicated to London. Bonnet considered that the object of the conference must be to decide on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and that it should be attended by the four Western powers.^^138^^ That was the final abandonment of the struggle against aggression and of the allied 177 treaties with the USSR and Czechoslovakia by the government of Daladier-Bonnet, and their surrender to the Nazi Reich.^^139^^

p A conference of the British Premier with his "inner group”, called on Chamberlain’s initiative on September 13. with the international situation further strained because of acts of provocation by fascist agents throughout the Sudetenland, decided on the Premier making an urgent trip to Germany. ^^14^^° On the same day, the British Premier sent a letter to King George VI to inform him that the object of his journey would be "the establishment of an Anglo- German understanding" and the settlement of the Czechoslovak question. He emphasised that his intention was to sketch out to Hitler "the prospect of Germany and England as the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism". ^^141^^

p It was realised in Berlin, quite naturally, that the only thing Chamberlain’s visit could mean under the circumstances was Britain’s willingness to make serious concessions. Besides, the Nazis had succeeded in deciphering some foreign codes and were informed of the negotiations between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Prague on the other. For that reason, the Sudeten Germans came into the open (naturally, on instructions from Hitler) to demand the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany, while Hitler was just “playing” with Chamberlain.^^141^^

p H. Chamberlain, accompanied by H. Wilson and W. Strang, arrived in Berchtesgaden on September 15. The British Premier opened his conversations with Hitler by declaring his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement and for an exchange of general views on the policies of both countries. Hitler, however, demonstrated a manifest reluctance to discuss problems of that kind at all. He reduced the entire negotiating process to a consideration of one particular question that was of interest to him. Being aware of Chamberlain’s position, Hitler emphatically demanded that the Sudetenland should be turned over to Germany, threatening a world war otherwise. Besides, he demanded the abrogation of Czechoslovakia’s treaties of mutual assistance with other countries. Chamberlain accepted these demands, but said he had yet to get the official sanction of his government, and talk the matter over with the French government.^^143^^

p The Berchtesgaden rendezvous gave Hitler an opportunity lo draw the conclusion that there was no reason for him to J’oar any British opposition to his plans lor the takeover of the Sudeterdand. Moreover, shortly alter that meeting the German Foreign Ministry representative at Hitler’s headquarters, Hewel, received information that "Hitler is further planning the capture of all Czechoslovakia. He is now quite sure that this objective can be achieved without any intervention by the British government.”^^144^^

p After informing Lord Halifax, Simon and Hoare about Ins talks with Hitler, Chamberlain said he thought Hitler’s demand for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany could be met. He stressed as the only important point that this had to be done "in an orderly manner”, that is, so as not to provoke an armed conflict. Chamberlain expressed the conlidence that the settlement of the Sudeten question would open the way to Anglo-German understanding.^^145^^

p It is the summit conference between Britain and France in London on September 18 that decided in favour of Hitler’s demand for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. That embarrassed even some representatives of the British ruling establishment. "One of the extraordinary things to me is how we, with calculated cynicism, sign away the liberty of 9,000,000 people," ^^146^^ said General Ironside in his Diaries. The French Charge d’Affaires in London, R. Cambon, admitted that the decisions taken by the British and the French were "the most painful possible experience for his government for many years." ^^147^^

p On the following day, the British and French accomplices of the Nazi aggressors handed the Czechoslovak government their notes which amounted to a joint ultimatum from Germany, Britain and France demanding that the Sudeten region should be turned over to the Reich. At the same time, the British and French governments urged Czechoslovakia to agree to her treaties of mutual assistance with other nations being replaced by a common guarantee against unprovoked aggression, expressing their willingness to share in giving such a guarantee.^^148^^

President Roosevelt, having invited the British Ambassador for a top secret conversation on September 20, could not hut admit that Britain and France wanted Czechoslovakia to make "the most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had ever been demanded of a state”. At the same time 179 Roosevolt declared that if the policy the British had embarked on proved successful, "ho would be the first to cheer”. ^^149^^ When, however, the Czechoslovak Charge d’Affaires asked the U.S. government on the same day to publish any statement whatsoever in support of Czechoslovakia, the request was left unheeded. ^^15^^°