p British diplomacy did everything possible to help Nazis carry through their plan for an international isolation of Czechoslovakia. The British Conservatives believed that the best means of achieving that end was by keeping France in every way possible from lending assistance to Czechoslovakia. The more so since French involvement in war could lead to Britain getting involved as well. ^^103^^

p Britain’s policy in relation to Czechoslovakia was set out in the above-mentioned statement by the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, to the French on May 22. Replying to it, Bonnet gave firm assurances that France would not resort to any military action without having consulted the British government. He emphasised that should Czechoslovakia turn out to be “unreasonable”, "the French Government might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond". ^^104^^

p Halifax brought the question of Britain’s subsequent political course before the British Cabinet meeting on May 25. After pointing out that the French government was constantly expressing its apprehension lest they should face a dilemma of having to choose between the risk of war and dishonour, Halifax considered it necessary "to obtain a release for the French from their obligation”. He suggested that Czechoslovakia should be made neutral. Britain found it inconvenient to urge that the treaties of alliance between Czechoslovakia and France and Russia should be scrapped, but, he said, with Czechoslovakia neutralised, "the Alliances would automatically disappear”. Chamberlain and the rest of the Cabinet approved the course of action Halifax had proposed.^^105^^

p The U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, back in London from a visit to the United States, assured German Ambassador von Dirksen that the U.S. government supported the Chamberlain cabinet, including "its desire for a settlement with Germany".^^106^^

p Paris, following in the wake of London, was increasingly inclined to seek agreement with Germany or, to be exact, to surrender to her. Quai d’Orsay gave no thought to any co-operation with the USSR in providing assistance for Czechoslovakia. In a conversation with Polish Ambassador, ..I. Lukasiewicz, Bonnet declared that the Franco-Soviet pact 170 was very “vague” and that the French government "was not at all inclined to rely upon it”. He personally "was no adherent of collaboration with Communism”. Bonnet pointed out that he would be very pleased if, on making sure of expanding co-operation with Poland, he could "tell the Soviets that France does not need their assistance".^^107^^

p When the Czechoslovak Minister in France, S. Osusky, took up with Bonnet the question of military negotiations with the USSR, the reply he got was that "in view of successful co-operation between Britain and France, such negotiations are inopportune now".^^108^^

p A British government representative Lord Runciman arrived in Prague early in August as a “mediator” in the negotiations between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten German Nazis. From then on, the British and French pressure on Czechoslovakia was intensified. As Assistant Foreign Secretary Oliver Harvey pointed out, " Runciman is being brought into action to help the Government in the dirty work." ^^109^^

p Naturally, the British government could not expect Runciman to settle the conflict. But it presumed that at a crucial moment he could have prepared some proposals which the British government would have backed and which could have been acceptable to Germany. In that case they would have been offered to Czechoslovakia as a “constructive” solution. Should the Czechoslovak government have refused to accept those proposals, the full blame would have been laid on it and there would have been the excuse for Britain and France to forswear assistance to Czechoslovakia.^^110^^

p American Ambassador in Berlin Hugh Wilson arrived in Prague almost simultaneously with Lord Runciman. His pronouncements in Prague boiled down essentially to the idea that the Czechs could hope for their relations with Germany to be normalised only if Czechoslovakia renounced her pact with the USSR.^^111^^ In that way U.S. diplomacy backed up the London plans.

p British and French diplomacy was bringing intensified pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia in an effort to get it to meet the Nazi demand about the Sudetenland. The London and Paris “appeasers” went oiit of their way to compel Czechoslovakia "to commit suicide in order to forestall murder".^^112^^

p Reporting the comments by the Czechoslovak Minister in 171 London, Masaryk, Maisky communicated to Moscow that "the British government had been pressurising Czechoslovakia in every way persuading her to make maximum concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Halifax summoned Masaryk to his office almost every week and advised him, called his attention, pointed out to him, warned him, and even threatened him, demanding more and more concessions" to the Czechoslovak Germans.^^113^^

The blow that France, Czechoslovakia’s ally struck at her was still more telling. On July 20, Bonnet told Czechoslovak Minister Osusky that "France would not go to war for the Sudeten affair. . . In no case should the Czechoslovak government believe that if war breaks out we will be at its side”. That was the first time the French government unequivocally warned the Czechoslovaks that it did not propose to honour its allied commitments.^^114^^