p In the meantime, the governments of Britain, France and the United States went ahead with the policy of abetting German aggression.

p The British government’s foreign policy course showed itself once again quite clearly in connection with the Anglo-French talks. A British Cabinet meeting on April 27 was to work out the British position at these talks. Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax proposed telling the French that Britain was "anxious to pursue the interrupted negotiations" with Germany.^^78^^

p The same Cabinet meeting heard a clear exposition of Britain’s attitude to the issue of military commitments in relation to France. We shall yet see how persistently Britain was avoiding any commitment to the USSR during the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks in the summer of 1939. It was reaffirmed at the Cabinet meeting that the Chamberlain government did not want to assume any commitments whatsoever with regard to France either. So, in summing up the discussion during the Cabinet meeting, Lord Halifax declared that, by common consent of the Cabinet members, Britain "could not undertake any commitment to send troops to the continent”. While considering it necessary to keep France on the leash, he pointed out that the French should not be told that the British would not send troops under any circumstances. It was likewise decided that should the British still find it necessary to send their troops to France, the strength of the troops to be sent at the start of the war would not exceed two divisions, although that would shock the French very strongly. As to Czechoslovakia, it was decided to tell the French once more that Britain could not undertake any military commitment to send troops to the continent.^^79^^

p A new French government was formed on April 10, 1938, with the key posts filled by the partisans of an accommodation with Germany—Edouard Daladier as the head of government and Georges Bonnet as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The position of France was increasingly defeatist.

p The Chief of the French General Staff, general Gamelin, told British War Secretary Hore-Belisha two weeks later that it was "impossible for France to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia".^^80^^

p The Anglo-French conversations, held in London on April 28 and 29, showed both countries to be inclined to stick to their former policies on the Czechoslovak question. Chamberlain, for example, flatly declared to the French that in case of France providing assistance to Czechoslovakia, Britain would stay out.^^81^^ The British ministers were also pressing for the French to "become more aloof from the Rus- sians". ^^82^^ Daladier and Bonnet declared that they were determined to press "any solution" on Czechoslovakia to the extent of making her neutral if only they could avoid war in that way.^^83^^

p It was agreed that the British would intensify their " 164 mediation" between Berlin and Prague with a view to " settling" the Czechoslovak question without war. The sum and substance of the agreement reached was formulated by Permanent Under-Secrelary of Slate for Foreign Affairs Gadogan in the following way: "Agreed we should both urge Benes to do his utmost and that we should ask Berlin what they want." ^^84^^

p The British government did intensify its “mediation”. Under its instructions, the British Minister in Prague, C. Newton, called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia and made a statement trying hard to prove the "absolute necessity" of yielding ground to the Nazis.^^85^^ On the other hand, the British embassy informed the German Foreign Ministry on May 9, 1938, that should the Germans confidentially advise what solution of the Sudeten German question they were striving after, "the British Government would bring such pressure to bear in Prague that the Czechoslovak Government would be compelled to accede to the German wishes". ^^86^^

p Although France had a treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, the French government considered it possible to honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia only if Britain declared herself to be willing also to come to Czechoslovakia’s aid. Since there was no intention in London to lend any assistance to Czechoslovakia, neither did France intend to come out in her support. The French government had virtually abandoned an independent foreign policy of her own by that time and was meekly following in the wake of Britain’s policy of seeking an accommodation with Germany. Yet the French ruling circles did not venture to renounce in public their obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia. Having admitted in a conversation with the U.S. Charge d’Affaires that without Britain France did not intend to afford any assistance to Czechoslovakia, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Bonnet said, however, that "publicly he would have to state the opposite" just as the French government did.^^87^^

p The Czechoslovak ruling circles were also increasingly inclined to take up a defeatist stance. On May 17, President Benes said in a conversation with British Minister Newton that Czechoslovakia’s relations with the USSR "had always been and would remain a secondary consideration, dependent on the attitude of France and Great Britain. 165 If Western Europe disinterested herself in Russia, Czechoslovakia would also be disinterested.”^^88^^

p While in Geneva in mid-May 1938, at a session of the Council of the League of Nations, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, met the French and British foreign ministers, Bonnet and Halifax. Bonnet, in particular, wanted to know what position the USSR would take in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. As the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow, the French Minister put the matter in such a way as to betray his desire to get an answer that would be tantamount to a Soviet refusal of assistance to Czechoslovakia. He clearly wanted to take advantage of that answer in order to make it easier for France to escape her commitments with regard to Czechoslovakia.^^89^^ Replying, the People’s Commissar said it was desirable for representatives of the French, Soviet and Czechoslovak General Staffs to consider some military action that could be taken by the three nations. ^^90^^ Yet Bonnet did not respond to that important initiative.

p Neither did Halifax display any interest in co-operation with the USSR. When Litvinov reminded him of the Soviet statement of March 17, 1938, about the Soviet readiness to join in collective action against aggression and to take part in a conference of the nations concerned in order to agree on the necessary steps to be taken, Halifax ignored them. After criticising Britain’s policy on Germany, the People’s Commissar set out the Soviet "concept of collective security which, if put into effect, would have saved Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and China".^^91^^

p Meanwhile, the Nazis set about their business with more dispatch. There was to be a municipal election in Czechoslovakia on May 22. With that date drawing nearer, the Nazi organisations of Sudeten Germans had drastically intensified their action. They attempted to make the election look like a referendum on the future of Sudeten region. In the meantime German troops began to be concentrated in secret across the border of Czechoslovakia.^^92^^ There was enough reason to fear that Sudeten Germans might provoke some disorder on May 22 which would come about together with a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. That entailed a quite natural, though partial, call-up in Czechoslovakia. It was carried through swiftly and in an organised way, and the Czechoslovak Army was determined to beat back the aggressors.

p Fearful of an armed conflict, the British and French ruling circles were in utter confusion. The French government found it necessary to make yet another public statement to the effect that it would support Czechoslovakia. The British government, too, had to react, willy-nilly, to the events which were taking place. It decided, however, not to go beyond its statement of March 24 whose essence was that Germany had to engage in “guess-work” about Britain’s position in case of war breaking out. The Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cadogan, had put it down in his Diaries that his discussion of Britain’s position with Halifax produced the following result: "Decided, we must not go to war.” After that, Cadogan pointed out, he sent the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, the text of a statement to the German government which did not, however, have any serious meaning.^^93^^

p The British government, therefore, virtually avoided considering the situation as it shaped up. There was no decision to change its earlier course. The British diplomatic service did not propose to warn the Nazis seriously about anything, still less threaten them with the possibility of Britain entering the war. Cadogan had a perfect idea that there was no point in one more British “demarche”.

p On May 21, the German government was handed a British statement saying that in the event of a German- Czechoslovak conflict, France would be obliged to intervene, and under those circumstances British government "could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved also. This point was quite clearly expressed by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on March 24.” Meanwhile, the British government assured Hitler that it was doing its utmost to promote a "peaceful solution" of the Sudeten question and for that reason urged it to "exercise patience".^^94^^

p Consequently, the British had virtually assured the Nazis that they would help them achieve their aims without war. Hitler’s aide, Captain F. Wiedemann, pointed out that the British had let the Germans know: "Bombs on Prague mean war. Tactics against the Czechs: not to shoot but to strangle." ^^95^^

p At the same time, Britain’s ruling establishment was doing everything to forestall possible assistance to Czechoslovakia from France. Having studied the French 167 government’s statement of May 21, to the effect that it was prepared to honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia, the British decided to call their French allies to order. Halifax told British Ambassador in Paris Phipps to warn the French that Britain on her part would not go beyond the statement made by the Prime Minister in Parliament on March 24." ^^98^^ On May 22, Phipps officially declared to Bonnet that the British government was not obliged or inclined to assist France unless she joined the war to defend Czechoslovakia from German aggression. Moreover, the British government demanded that, before taking any steps which were likely to exacerbate the situation and lead to war, the French should consult the British government.^^97^^

p The Chamberlain government undertook, besides, yet another demarche in Prague to force Czechoslovakia into surrender. Alluding to a meeting at the Foreign Office Cadogan said it had "decided to use big stick on Benes".^^98^^

p The French government was also exerting mounting pressure on Czechoslovakia. The Nazis were immediately informed about those moves and took them as evidence that Czechoslovakia would have to surrender even without war.

p The Soviet Union was still the only country that was, indeed, ready and willing to render assistance to Czechoslovakia under the terms of the treaty with her in that hour of danger.

p In a conversation with the Czechoslovak Minister in the USSR, Fierlinger, Litvinov welcomed the steps taken by Czechoslovakia. People’s Commissar of Defence K. Y. Voroshilov "earnestly spoke about the full readiness of the USSR for cooperation" when he met the Czechoslovak General 0. Husak.^^99^^

p The government of Czechoslovakia had more than once thanked the Soviet government for having supported Czechoslovakia in what were extremely hard times and dangerous circumstances for her. The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, pointed out in the transcript of liis conversation with Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister on May 30, 1938: "Krofta has repeatedly expressed his unreserved gratitude in rather warm terms for the steady and sure support he has had from the USSR during the recent critical period. The certainty that the USSR intends quite seriously and without any hesitation to offer assistance to 168 Czechoslovakia in case she should really need it, has a very reassuring and encouraging effect on Czechoslovakia.” ^^100^^

p The May crisis showed with striking evidence once again that the British ruling circles did not intend to offer any resistance to the Nazi aggressors. They had actually brought the action of the French and Czechoslovak governments under their own control. Chamberlain and his fellow thinkers thereby counted on acting as supreme judge capable of making the victim of the aggression surrender without any resistance.

p Although, as the material just referred to indicates, the British government did not exercise any restraining influence on Germany during the May crisis, after the crisis British propaganda worked hard to prove that Germany had yielded ground because of Britain’s resolution. Even British historians admitted that "British minister proved not unwilling to claim credit for the stand which they had not actually made".^^101^^

p To sum up, the May crisis confirmed that Britain and France, far from countering the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, were, in fact, aiding and abetting it. It became obvious that in spite of public declarations, the French government had actually recanted its treaties both with Czechoslovakia and with the Soviet Union.

With the position of Britain and France, as it was, the Nazi Reich went on preparing for its aggression against Czechoslovakia. At a conference with Goring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Brauchitsch, and some more of his associates, on May 28, 1938, Hitler declared that he was determined that "Czechoslovakia shall disappear from the map of the world”. That would, he said, "clear the rear for advancing against the West, Fngland and France”. Two days later, on May 30, Hitler endorsed a new plan to seize Czechoslovakia. It opened with his words: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."^^102^^ The issue of these directives was followed by feverish preparations in the Nazi Reich for an attack on Czechoslovakia. The precise date—"Day X"—was chosen and fixed for these preparations to bo completed so that Hitler could decide on the invasion at any moment afterwards, depending on the general situation. The original date was October 1, but the final "Day X" was September 28, 1938.