p Considering the policy of Britain and France to be extremely dangerous to the cause of peace in Europe, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said in its message to Soviet diplomatic representatives in Prague, Berlin, London and Paris on August 11, 1938: "We are extremely interested in the independence of Czechoslovakia being preserved and Hitler’s thrust southeast being checked.” However, the Western powers "do not find it necessary to seek our co-operation, are ignoring us and deciding among themselves whatever issues arise from the German- Czechoslovak conflict." ^^115^^

p Under instruction from the Soviet government, Ambassador Maisky in London said in a statement to British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax in August 1938 that "the USSR is increasingly disappointed about the policy of Britain and France" and considered it to be "weak and shortsighted”, capable of doing no more than encouraging the aggressor to make his further “leaps”. Thus, he said, the Western powers were "assuming the responsibility for another world war being brought nearer and launched”. The policy of Britain and France was described by the Soviet Ambassador as an attempt at "checking the victim of the aggression, rather than the aggressor himself”. In Prague, 172 British and French representatives, he said, "are speaking so loud that the Czechs see it, not without reason, as manifest unfairness, while in Berlin they are speaking so softly that Hitler is ignoring all their overtures. We cannot have any sympathy for such a policy and we believe that the fate of Czechoslovakia depends, first and foremost, on whether or not Britain and France prove capable of taking up a firm stand against the aggressor in this crucial hour." ^^116^^

p Unlike the Western powers, the Soviet Union was ready to fulfil its obligations under its treaty with Czechoslovakia. Maisky told the Czechoslovak Minister in London, on August 16, that if Czechoslovakia was attacked the USSR "will fulfil her treaty obligations." ^^117^^ A similar statement was made by the Soviet Ambassador to Lord Halifax on August 17.^^118^^ On the same day, the Ambassador met the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Britain, Johnson. After reaffirming the Soviet government’s readiness to fulfil its commitments under the treaty, the Ambassador pointed out that Czechoslovakia was the major factor behind the situation in Central Europe. Therefore, "Hitler should not be allowed to destroy Czechoslovakia and that the time to prevent that destruction was now".^^119^^

p As Zden\vek Fierlinger reported to Prague, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Chilston, informed him that he had once more found out what sort of action the USSR would take in the event of a conflict and received a "very positive reply that the USSR will fulfil its treaty obliga- tions". ^^12^^°

p The French Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, J. Payart, referring to a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin to the danger of an armed conflict, asked him, on September 1, 1938, what the Soviet position would be in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. In putting that question, he stressed that Poland and Romania were not willing to let Soviet troops pass through their territo- ry. ^^121^^ Informing the Soviet Ambassador in Prague about that conversation, Potemkin pointed out that what had attracted his particular attention was the special accent Bonnet made on the difficulties which Soviet military aid through the territory of Poland and Romania would have run into. In all probability, Bonnet, by underscoring those difficulties, wanted to get such an answer from the USSR 173 as the French government could use "as an excuse for its owji refusal to assist Czechoslovakia". ^^122^^

p On September 2, 1938, Payart officially raised the question of the Soviet .stand witli Lilvitiov. In that connection, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs remarked that "France is under obligation to help Czechoslovakia regardless of our assistance, whereas our assistance is conditional on French and, for that reason, we have a greater right to show interest in assistance from France".

p Replying afterwards to a question from the French representative, the People’s Commissar declared: "Provided French aid will be forthcoming, we are determined to fulfil all our obligations under the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact, using all avenues open to us for this purpose.” "So far as specifying aid is concerned,” the People’s Commissar went on to say, "we consider that a conference of representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak armies must be called to do it."

p The People’s Commissar went on to stress the need for "using all the means available to avert an armed clash”. He recalled that right after the AnschluB of Austria, the USSR recommended a conference of representatives of the nations interested in maintaining peace to be called. "We believe that such a conference, with the participation of Britain, France and the USSR, at the present moment, and the adoption of a general declaration . . . have more chances to deter Hitler from a war adventure than any other mea- sure." ^^123^^

p Referring to the above-mentioned “difficulties”, Fierlinger asked the People’s Commissar whether the USSR could give a guarantee of territorial inviolability in case of Soviet troops passing through the territory of Poland and Romania. The Soviet People’s Commissar replied that "this goes without saying".^^424^^

p The situation in Europe was growing more menacing day by day. On September 3, 1938, the Nazis decided to get their forces ready for action by September 28.^^125^^ Three days later, the British government received relevant information.^^126^^

p With a new crisis fast brewing, Chamberlain held the conferences of his "inner group" on September 8 and 9, and a full Cabinet meeting on September 12 to consider the worsening situation. However, at none of those 174 conferences and meetings were the Soviet proposals so much as mentioned. British historian Middlemas pointed out that they were ignored by the British Cabinet.^^127^^

p Having arrived in Geneva on September 11 for the Assembly of the League of Nations the British Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, R. A. Butler, told Bonnet that the British government would not, probably, agree to a joint Anglo-Franco-Soviet gesture.^^128^^ When the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs met Bonnet on the same day, the latter limited himself to stating that he had passed the Soviet proposals to the British, but they declined them. Bonnet did not even make any reference to the position of the French government itself. "Bonnet shrugged it off—nothing doing,” the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow.^^129^^

p So the Soviet proposals of September 2 were not seconded by the governments of Britain and France. Yet, to have carried out those proposals, providing for political and—if need be—for military measures, could have played an important part in forestalling aggression and strengthening the peace. That did not mean, however, that the ruling circles of Britain and France were not deeply worried both by the balance of forces and, to no small extent, by class considerations. For a German invasion of Czechoslovakia could have sparked off a war between the capitalist nations of Europe, and their own hopes for using Nazi Germany as a strike force to fight the USSR would have been dashed. Along with that, the reactionary forces of the Western powers were fearful of such a war generating revolutionary upheavals in the German-occupied countries involved.

p Things reached a point where French government spokesmen began appealing to the Nazis to take into account common class interests, before anything else. For example, the French Premier Daladier emphasised during his meeting with the German Charge d^^1^^ Affaires, on September 7: "After the end of a war, the outbreak of a revolution, irrespective of victors or vanquished, was as certain in France as in Germany and Italy." ^^13^^°

p British journalist and historian Leonard Mosley has pointed out with good reason that the French ruling circles were panic-stricken in fear of the menace of Nazi Germany, although the French Army was stronger than the German. "In France this clique [ruling],” he wrote, "was riddled with 175 corruption and defeatism; hagridden by the menace of Nazi Germany from outside their borders and by tho threat of domestic Communism within, many of them were increasingly ready to make an accommodation with Germany in tho hope that accord with National Socialism would throttle the threat of Red revolution." ^^131^^

p It would be wrong to believe that Paris underestimated the gravity of the German danger and the significance of Czechoslovakia as a military factor. This is what one can gather from the Memorandum of September 9, 1938, by the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin. The Czechoslovak state, he wrote, is of certain interest, from the French point of view, in the event of military operations in Europe. By its very geographic position, Czechoslovakia is an obstacle in the way of German expansionist plans against the East. Besides, the Czechoslovak Army is strong enough to pin down a large proportion of German forces, thus draining them off from the Western Front. Czechoslovakia has 17 infantry divisions—this number could be swiftly doubled, and 4 motorised divisions. Finally, Czechoslovakia has some airfields to threaten Germany, especially if she got some air force reinforcements. For Germany to occupy Czechoslovakia would mean appreciably expanding the German military potential (with Skoda factories, etc.); helping Germany take possession of the national wealth of Hungary and Romania; and giving her an outlet to the Black Sea ports.^^132^^ Yet, all these considerations notwithstanding, the French government was prepared to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to the Nazis.

It was not by the national interests either, but by their narrow class interests that the British ruling circles, too, guided themselves. Of course, none of their spokesmen ever revealed that in public, but some touched on that problem now and again, for example, in their diaries. British politician Harold Nicolson made the following entry in his diary on September 11, after his conversation with a Cabinet member, Oliver Stanley. "Oliver agrees that the conflict lias really nothing to do with Czechoslovakia. . . At the same time any reference to Russian assistance makes him wince, and at one moment he sighed deeply and said, ’You see, whether we win or lose, it will be the end of everything we stand for’. By ’we’ he means obviously the capitalist classes." ^^133^^ A similar entry could be found somewhat later 176 in the diary of Assistant Foreign Secretary Oliver Harvey: "Any war, whether we win or not, would destroy Hie rich idle classes and they are for peace at any price." ^^134^^