p In mid-September 1937, the Chinese government officially asked the Council of the League of Nations for sanctions against Japan under the terms of the Covenant. The Soviet government informed China that it would support its request.^^155^^

p The governments of Britain and France found it undesirable for the Japanese aggression to be considered in the 130 League of Nations, first of all, because they did not propose to take any measures against Japan. Besides, if there was no way at all of avoiding a discussion of this issue, London and Paris wauled it to involve also the United Slates of America. Therefore, Britain and France preferred to see the Japan-China conflict considered in any agency representing the United States as well, rather than in the League of Nations.

p Speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations on December 21, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov emphasised that aggression was manifesting itself in new and more violent forms. However, the League of Nations stayed out of those events, without reacting to them. The People’s Commissar called on all nations to pool efforts in working for peace and opposing aggression. Ho pointed out that the "League’s resolute policy in dealing with one case of aggression would spare us all other cases. And then, only then, would all nations come to see that aggression does not pay and that aggression is not worth making.” ^^156^^

p The Soviet Union has gone down in the history of the League of Nations as the most consistent champion of the victims of the German, Italian and Japanese aggression, and as the protagonist of those forces in it which demanded the full maintenance of the Covenant.^^157^^

p In advance of the League of Nations’ discussion of Japanese aggression, scheduled for September 27, the People’s Commissar had received the following directive: "It is desirable for us both to see Japan voted aggressor and most effective sanctions applied against her. However, in case of an obviously passive reaction of other states . .. we do not consider it politically expedient for the Soviet delegation to be the pace-setter risking to strain still more the Soviet Union’s relations with Japan and to give more food for charging us with incitement. Should, however, the other members of the League of Nations show a serious intention to raise the question of Japan’s responsibility and of declaring her to be an aggressor, you ought to be active in supporting this effort. Since it takes a unanimous vote for her to be found guilty of aggression, it is doubtful that such a vote could be obtained. If, after all, in spite of all expectations, such a decision were taken and the question of sanctions automatically arose, nothing would prevent you from 131 declaring ... for the application of most effective sanctions against Japan." ^^158^^

p The representatives of Britain and France in the League of Nations did not conceal that the two powers did not intend to take any steps against the Japanese aggressor.^^159^^ They referred to the fact that they did not know the position of the United States.

p Under instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires in the United States, Oumansky, approached Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles asking him to explain the position of the United States. The latter replied that the U.S. government was not in a position to draw any distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression and "to sympathise with the victim on any ground whatsoever". ^^16^^° After hearing Welles make his point, Oumansky described the U.S. policy as "very discouraging".^^161^^

Under those circumstances, the League of Nations’ decisions on Japanese aggression adopted on October 6 turned out to be extremely inconclusive. The League limited itself to stating that Japan had broken its commitments under the existing treaties and to declaring "moral support" for China. It recommended to the Powers concerned to call a special conference on the matter.^^162^^