p “Clear skies all over Spain”—these words broadcast by Radio Ceuta (Spanish Morocco) in the night of July 18, 1936, signalled a sweeping counter-revolutionary rebellion in Spain against the Popular Front government.

p The uprising began to be plotted right after the elections of February 16, 1936, in which the Popular Front parties scored a major victory. They won 269 seats in the newly-elected parliament. The right-wing parties gained 157 seats, and the centre parties—48. Having been defeated at the polls, Spanish reaction set out to gain political power through violence with the backing of German and Italian fascists.

p The fascist powers—Germany and Italy—were prepared to aid Spanish reaction both for political and strategic and for economic considerations. Hitler and Mussolini were extremely displeased with the consolidation of democratic forces in Spain and with the sweeping anti-fascist movement in that country. They feared that the Popular Front victory in Spain could lead to the growth of the forces of democracy and progress in other countries of Europe.

p Besides, Germany and Italy counted on the victory of reactionary forces in Spain helping them reinforce their own military and strategic positions for expanding aggression. The plans which the Nazi Reich had built on the intervention in Spain were revealed in a memorandum of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It pointed out that the situation in France would change radically because her Iberian frontier and lines of communication with her colonial empire would come under threat. "Gibraltar would be worthless, and the freedom of movement of the British fleet through the Straits would depend on Spain, not to mention the possibility of having submarines and light naval forces as well as the air force operating from the Iberian peninsula in all directions of the compass. A European conflict in which the Rome-Berlin Axis was aligned against England and France would take on an entirely different aspect if a strong Spain joined the Rome-Berlin Axis." ^^92^^

p Mussolini expected that by strengthening his foothold on the Iberian peninsula he would take a big step towards restoring the Roman Empire and transforming the Mediterranean into an "Italian lake”. He was already dreaming of the glory of ancient Roman emperors.

p What attracted Italy and Germany also was Spain’s wealth of natural resources such as coal, iron ores, mercury, tungsten, lead, etc.

p War equipment from Germany and Italy streamed thick and fast into Spain soon after the outbreak of the rebellion. That was because, among other things, as State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs Ernst von Weizsacker pointed out in his diary, Franco, who led the fascist uprising in Spain, could not "establish his rule in Spain with his own forces alone".^^93^^ Some 50 thousand German servicemen (including airmen and tankmen) were sent to Spain. The aid which Hitler gave to the Spanish rebels was estimated by German sources at 500 million marks 112 (200 million dollars).^^94^^ Italy supplied 1,930 guns, 7.5 million shells, 240 thousand rifles, 325 million cartridges, 7,633 motor vehicles, 950 tanks and armoured troop carriers. Close on 1,000 Italian planes were involved in the Spanish war, having made over 86 thousand sorties and dropped 11,584 tonnes of bombs. Around 150 thousand Italian soldiers fought against the Spanish Republic. As Italy’s Foreign Minister Ciano said in a conversation with Hitler, the expenses incurred by the Italian intervention in Spain amounted to 14,000 million lire (700 million dol- lars).^^95^^

p The British Conservatives also had all their affection for Spanish reactionaries. The class hatred of the British ruling circles for the Popular Front government was greater than their fear lest Spain should find herself, in the event of a rebel victory, in the camp of Britain’s prospective military adversaries.

p The diary of one of the British “die-hards”, Henry Channon had an entry dated July 27 which said: "For a few days, we had hoped that they (the rebels—Ed.) would win, though tonight it seems as if the Red government, alas, will triumph." ^^98^^

p The class sentiment of the British ruling circles proved to be particularly acute because a Popular Front government was formed also in France, following the victory of the left forces in the elections of the spring of 1936. If the infection of Communism, the British Conservative Daily Mail wrote, now spreading in Spain and France, overflows into other countries, the two governments—German and Italian—which had killed this infection on their own soil would turn out to be our most useful friends.^^97^^ The British government considered it undesirable to render even the least support to the legitimate government of Spain or somehow handicap the action of the Spanish rebels.

p The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pointed out in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador that a Franco victory would not be much of a danger to British inter- ests. ^^98^^ Neither did Winston Churchill conceal in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador that Franco’s victory was, in his opinion a "lesser evil" than the victory of the Republican government of Spain.^^99^^ In Paris, meanwhile, the British Ambassador made no bones of Britain’s sympathy for the rebels. ^^10^^°

p The French government of the day was headed by Leon Blum, the right-wing socialist leader who, in fact, shared the British Conservatives’ policy with regard to Spain. On July 25, 1936, the Blum government banned arms deliveries to Spain and ordered the French border with Spain to he closed. In common with the British “die-hards”, Blum was striving j’of an “appeasement” of Germany and for a Franco-German rapprochement. On September 12, 1936, the Soviet Ambassador to France, V. P. Potemkin, reported to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the aggravation of the internal situation in the country, the Spanish events, Britain’s indecision and the Germany’s growing might were strengthening in France the "trend towards an accommodation with Germany... Anti-Soviet sentiment is seen growing."^^101^^ French politicians G. Bonnet and G. Mandel admitted in a conversation witli Potemkin that I he Blum government toed the British line in seeking agreement with Germany.^^102^^

p Barely half a year after the Soviet-French treaty of nonaggression came into effect, the French government started to consider getting rid of it. The French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos said in November 1936 that "the chief aim of the French-Russian agreement was to draw Germany away from Soviet Russia, that is, to counteract a possible renewal of the Rapallo policy”. At present the signing of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact "definitely cancelled such a possibility. Therefore, the attitude of the French government toward an agreement with Russia might also be subject to certain alteration.” Delbos maintained that there was a majority opinion in France in favour of mutual understanding with Germany.^^103^^

p U.S. policy with respect to the Spanish issue differed but outwardly from that of Britain and France. Whereas the British and French governments pursued a policy of " nonintervention”, that of the United States adhered to the policy of isolationism. The U.S. neutrality legislation was extended to cover Spain on January 7, 1937. That went far towards complicating the position of the Republican government for it deprived that government of an opportunity to buy war equipment in the United States. The best evidence to that effect was provided by this statement of Franco: "Neutrality legislation ... the quick manner in which it was passed and carried into effect—is a gesture we, 114 nationalists, will never forget." ^^104^^ The fascist press rejoiced in this indication that "American neutrality means GermanItalian domination of Spain”,^^105^^ the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin William E. Dodd stated.

p Due to persistent efforts by Britain and France, 27 nations of Europe concluded an agreement on non- intervention in the affairs of Spain in August 1936. A Non- intervention Committee started to function in London in compliance with this agreement. The Soviet Union agreed to take part in its work at the request of France. The Soviet government guided itself, in so doing, by a desire to localise the civil war in Spain, to prevent it escalating into a world war. At the same time the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that without foreign intervention, the Spanish people, who were, as the election had shown, in their majority at the side of the legitimate Republican government, could uphold their democratic gains and bar the way to reaction and obscurantism. The Soviet representative in the London-based Non-intervention Committee in the affairs of Spain had instructions, notably, to try to hamper arms supplies to Spanish rebels and press for strict control over the action of Germany, Italy and Portugal.^^106^^

The participation in the Committee gave the Soviet government a chance of upholding the interests of the Spanish Republic in it, preventing it from taking any decisions likely to infringe its legitimate rights and interests and expose the German and Italian invaders.