p The Soviet Union was alone ready to lend a helping hand to China in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors. The Soviet government had no particular contractual obligations to China. Nevertheless, true to its policy of supporting the victims of imperialist aggression, it was ready and willing to come to the aid of the Chinese people in their .struggle against foreign intervention.

p The Soviet government took advantage of Anthony Eden’s visit to Moscow in 19r>5 iu order to talk the issue of a Pacific Pact over with him. What the Soviet Union offered to conclude was no longer a non-aggression pact but one of mutual assistance. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said on the eve of Eden’s visit: "We are prepared to co-operate with Britain as well as with other nations in securing peace in the Far East.” "In concrete terms we contemplate a regional Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance involving the USSR, China, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, Holland.. .” The Pact meant essentially that "Japan’s further aggression would be resisted by the forces of all the other parties to the Pact." ^^122^^

p On March 28, 1935, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs emphasised in a conversation with Anthony Eden that for a lasting peace to be ensured in the Pacific "there must be collective efforts by all the interested nations”. However, Eden did not go along with that proposal. He questioned the United States’ readiness for active cooperation in safeguarding peace and security in the Far East.^^123^^

p The British government was not inclined to share in setling up a collective security system in the Far East, but it sought to put the blame for abetting the Japanese aggression on the United States.

p The U.S. government still preferred a different, way of ensuring its interest in the Far East. That was stated quite openly by Walton R. Moore, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State, in a conversation with the Soviet Charge d’ 124 Affaires in the United Stales A. F. Neuman. ft will take several years, he said, for the United States to gain superiority over Japan. "It hoped,” Nenman commented, "that the USSR would make things easier for it by starting a war against Japan." ^^124^^

p The Chinese Head of Government Kung Hsiang-hsi ( President of the Executive Yuan) asked the Soviet Ambassador 1). V. Bogomolov in October 1935 whether China could count on getting any war equipment from the USSR in case it needed to put up armed resistance against Japan. On November 20, 1935, the Soviet Ambassador informed Kung about the Soviet consent to supply China with war equipment. ^^125^^ The Chiang Kai-shek government, however, hoping to avoid an outright armed conflict with Japan through concessions, had itself begun stalling negotiations on the enforcement of that accord.

p In the meantime, the Japanese militarists were increasingly aggressive. Japan’s expansionist plans were still directed against the USSR as well. The German Ambassador to Japan, von Dirksen, reported to Berlin on December 28, 1935, that Japan was hostile towards the USSR and " determined" to settle her differences with the Soviet Union "by force of arms as soon as she feels militarily strong enough".^^126^^

p The Japanese octopus began to stretch out its tentacles towards the Mongolian People’s Republic as well, intent on capturing it as a stepping-stone in preparation for war against the USSR. On March 28, 1936, the Kwangtuug Army Chief of Staff, General Itagaki, in a conversation with Foreign Minister Arita, explained what the seizure of the MPR could mean to Japan: "Should Outer Mongolia be annexed to Japan and Manchuria, the security of the Soviet Far East would be struck hard. . . Therefore, the Army is planning to extend the influence of Japan and Manchuria to Outer Mongolia with all the means at its disposal". ^^127^^ In view of the threat of Japanese aggression, the Soviet government had concluded a gentleman’s agreement with it back on November 27, 1934- at the request of the MPR government—providing for "reciprocal support by all measures in preventing or forestalling the threat of an armed attack and also in lending one another assistance and support in the event of any third party attacking the USSR or the MPR".^^128^^

p Since the danger from Japan continued to grow (it came to full-scale lighting across the MPR border), the USSR and the MI’H signed a protocol on mutual assistance on March 12, 193(>. Referring to the import of that protocol, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs pointed out in a letter to the Soviet, Ambassador in Japan that it "is a new link in the chain of consistent actions whereby we are curbing the aggression against the MPR. Now Japan is, of course, in no doubt that her conquest of Mongolia would lead to a war against the Soviet Union." ^^129^^ That protocol, just as the gentleman’s agreement, was of tremendous importance for safeguarding the security of the MPR and strengthening peace in the Far East.

p On March 1, 1937, Litvinov took the question of a I’ acilic Pact of Mutual Assistance up with the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jiang Ting-hi. "It is my conviction,” he said, "that such a pact alone can definitely stop Japan’s aggression and ensure peace in Ihc Par East.” lie went on to point out that this had to be brought home to the other powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, and that both Chinese and Soviet diplomacy had to work towards that end.^^130^^

p The Soviet Ambassador to China (Nanking), 1). V. Bogomolov received detailed directives in mid-March for his negotiations with the Chinese government. The directives proposed concluding a treaty of friendship with the Nanking government providing for "either party to refrain from taking any step or concluding any agreement which could benefit a third state threatening to attack the other contracting party”. It also provided for both parties to take steps "with a view to protecting their common interests”. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude a military and technical agreement with the Nanking government providing for the sale of aircraft, tanks, and othermilitary and technical equipment to be paid for out of a 50 million dollar credit granted to this end, as well as for Chinese airmen and tankmen to be trained in the USSR.

p The Soviet Union called for the treaty of friendship to incorporate a pledge by both parties to do their utmost towards the early conclusion of the Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance. On April 1, Bogomolov passed these proposals to Kung Hsiang-hsi.^^131^^

p However, the Chinese government was still wavering. On 126 June 16, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador in China reported to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Chinese government looked askance at the idea of a Pacific Pact because it, was afraid of arousing Japan’s displeasure and "iinally closing the door to a bilaterial agreement witli Japan which Chiang Kai-shek was still hoping for”. The Chinese were giving no reply Lo the proposal for concluding a treaty of non-aggression and helping China with supplies of war equipment.^^132^^

p On May 14, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia also came forward with a proposal to conclude the Pacific Pact, which, however, was a pact of non-aggression, rather than one of mutual assistance. The Soviet government decided, therefore, to try once more to get the Pact concluded.

p In the latter half of May, Litvinov while in Geneva for a session of the Council of the League of Nations, was negotiating the Pacific Pact with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the President of the Executive Yuan of China, Kung Hsiang-hsi.^^133^^ The Soviet Ambassador in London I. M. Maisky was instructed to talk the matter over with Lyons. The Ambassador was asked to inform the Australian Prime Minister about the Soviet Union’s positive response to his proposal, but along with suggesting a pact of mutual assistance.^^134^^

p On June 15, Maisky had an appropriate conversation witli Lyons. The latter reacted favourably to the idea of concluding a pact of mutual assistance, but suggested that neither Britain nor the United States were prepared to conclude such an agreement. ^^135^^

p The Soviet Ambassador in Washington Troyanovsky was asked to find out where the United States stood on the matter. "True,” the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote to him, "we meant a Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance, while Lyons is reducing the whole thing to a pledge of non-aggression." ^^138^^

p Roosevelt, however, showed no desire to join the pact. He told Troyanovsky on June 28 that the U.S. could not enter into any alliances or any similar agreements. As to Lyons’ proposal for concluding a Pacific Pact of NonAggression, Roosevelt did not second it either on the plea that there was no point in concluding such a pact with no Japan in it.^^137^^

p When the Japanese invasion of China began on July 7, 127 1937, Ihe Soviet press roundly condemned that action of the Japanese aggressors. "This is a new and important stage in the imperialist struggle in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific”, the Izvestia wrote, "and a new and essential stage in the aggression of Japanese imperialism seeking to subjugate the Chinese people." ^^138^^

p It was on July 19, 1937, that the Chinese government finally ventured to accept Soviet aid. It asked the USSR through the Soviet Ambassador to provide war equpiment and grant appropriate credits.^^139^^ The Soviet government responded to China’s request for aid. On July 29, the Soviet Ambassador to China was instructed to inform the Chinese government about the Soviet consent to meet its request.^^140^^

p While expressing its readiness to supply China with war equipment, the Soviet government found it necessary for the USSR and China to conclude, tentatively, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression because there had to be a guarantee that "our weapons will not be used against us”. The Soviet Ambassador raised the matter several times with representatives of the Chinese government. ^^141^^

p Meanwhile, China was pressing hard for the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty of mutual assistance. The matter was raised with the Soviet Ambassador on July 16 by the President of the Legislative Yuan of China, Sun Fo. Chen Li-fu, who was negotiating with the Soviet Ambassador on instructions from Chiang Kai-shek, insisted on such a treaty being signed when he conferred with him three days lat- er. ^^142^^ Explaining the sum and substance of those Chinese proposals, the Soviet Ambassador wrote in his dispatch to Moscow: "Banking on a Japanese-Soviet War remains Chiang Kai-shek’s idee fixe." ^^143^^

p As China was already in a virtual state of war with Japan, the Soviet government, naturally, did not find it possible to conclude a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance with her.^^144^^ Maxim Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador that "the idea behind the Chinese insistence on this issue at the present moment is, in point of fact, that we should get involved in a war with Japan right now".^^145^^

p On August 21, 1937, the USSR and China signed a treaty of non-aggression which was, under the circumstances, one of supreme importance for strengthening China’s international position. In an editorial on the treaty, Pravda emphasised that the treaty was a fresh expression of the 128 friendship which the peoples of the USSR had for the Chinese people in hattle for their freedom and independence. The Soviet-Chinese treaty, the article pointed out, practically confirmed and anchored the principle of the indivisibility of peace and the need to defend peace both in the West and in the East. "The Soviet-Chinese Treaty shows to all nations the way to oppose the war threat... It is a new instrument of peace." ^^146^^

p The conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Non- Aggression, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan Slavutsky pointed out, produced a "tremendous impression" in Japan.^^147^^ Tokyo qualified the treaty as a diplomatic setback for Japan.

p Agreement on the actual deliveries of war equipment to China on account of the Soviet-granted long-term credit was reached as early as September 14. The delivery of the first batch of aircraft was to be within the shortest possible time-limits at the request of the Chinese delegation. The Soviet side undertook to ship the first 225 aircraft, including 02 medium bombers and 155 fighter planes to China by October 25, 1937. ^^148^^ The Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jian Ting-fu declared in a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Stomonyakov that the Chinese were most pleased with the spirit and outcome of the negotiations which had given China even more than they had expect- ed. ^^149^^

p By the middle of 1938, the Soviet Union had delivered to China 297 aircraft, 82 tanks, 425 guns and howitzers, 1,825 machine-guns, 400 motor vehicles, 360 thousand shells, 10 million cartridges and other items of war equipment. ^^15^^° Soviet aid made it possible for China to hold out, avoid being defeated arid having to surrender, and to keep up resistance to the Japanese aggressors.

p Because of Soviet aid to China, however, the danger of Japan attacking the USSR had increased. The French Foreign Minister, Delbos, told the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, on August 26, 1937, that he had received a message from the French Ambassador in Japan saying that "Japan is likely to declare war on the Soviet Union”. The British Ambassador to Japan Craigie also pointed out that the Japanese "would have to square their accounts with the USSR”. The U.S. Assistant Military Attache in Japan Weckerling wrote to Washington that "the Japanese Army regards Soviet Russia as its principal enemy”, and that there 129 was a feeling of certainty that "nothing can prevent another Russo-Japanese war.”^^151^^ The Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Slavutsky, states that the Japanese militarists were trying with might and main to make the Japanese people accept the "inevitability of an imminent war with the Soviet Union".^^152^^

p What complicated the Soviet Union’s international position even more was that in the event of war in the Far East, it would have to reckon also with serious complications across its Western border. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin told the French Ambassador A. Francois-Poncet that the German and Italian governments had promised to Japan "active military aid in the event of the USSR being involved in a Far Eastern conflict on China’s side".^^153^^

p The position of Poland also aroused grave apprehension. The Japanese military attache in Poland General Sawada asking the Polish government on August 24, 1937, to support the Japanese during the discussion of the Japan-China conflict in the League of Nations, stressed that China was co-operating with the USSR while Japan and Poland had "common interests" in respect to the Soviet Union. The Polish government readily responded to that request in the belief that "Japan is Poland’s natural ally".^^154^^

Japan did not venture, however, into a war against the USSR. Along with the rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union, its defence capability was mounting. Besides, the Soviet government had been constantly giving most careful attention to strengthening the defences of its Far Eastern border. This could not but produce a sobering effect on the Japanese aggressors.