p Preparations began, under a decision of the League of Nations, for a conference of nations with a stake in the Far Eastern situation. Brussels had been chosen as the venue for it.

p The question of attendance arose right away. It was the United States, Britain and other sponsors of the conference that were particularly anxious to get the Japanese aggressors invited. Owing to this, Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States Troyanovsky that by urging the Japanese to attend the conference, they were assured in every way that "it will consider a reconciliation rather than any measures against Japan whatsoever." ^^163^^

p The Government of Japan declined, however, to attend the conference.

p In the opinion of the U.S. government, the conference was to have tried to reconcile Japan and China. Roosevelt told the leader of the American delegation at the conference 132 Norman Davis that the word "sanctions is to be rigorously avoided".^^164^^

p The British government also proceeded from the assumption that "the conference was not meeting in order to consider whether sanctions should be imposed against Japan,” but for "restoration of peace by agreement".^^165^^

p Only the USSR was still urging effective steps against the Japanese aggressors and for the defence of Cliina. The Soviet delegation in Brussels worked under instructions to press for a declaration or a resolution of the conference to recommend to all participants "to render China all possible and maximum assistance both individually and collective- ly". ^^166^^ Litvinov wrote on October 20, 1937 that the USSR considered it desirable for effective sanctions to be applied against the Japanese aggressor.^^167^^ In a conversation witli the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR on October 29, the People’s Commissar again stated that the Soviet Union was seriously interested in ending the aggression and establishing peace and collective security. The USSR was prepared to take up a resolute stand in co-operation with the United States, France and Britain, he declared.^^168^^

p It was the U.S. delegation that called the tune at the Brussels Conference, which opened on November 3, 1937, with its programme of “appeasement” of the Japanese aggressors. Norman Davis did not find it right and proper to point out in his speech who was the aggressor and who its victim. Japan and China, he said, "have come into conflict and have resorted to hostilities”. And he proposed that the conflict should be solved on a basis that is "fair to each and acceptable to both".^^169^^ That could mean only one thing: the United States was prepared to see Japan’s aggressive ambitions gratified at China’s expense, and the Chinese people humbly putting up with it. The British and the French followed in his footsteps. Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos declared that they subscribed to all Norman Davis had said.

p It was the Soviet delegation alone that took up a position of principle at the conference. The leader of the Soviet delegation in Brussels, Maxim Litvinov, in his speech on November 3 expressed his disagreement with the policy of the United States, Britain and France which advocated a peace "acceptable to both”. He pointed out that there was nothing easier than to say to the aggressor: "Take your 133 plunder, take what you liave seized by force, arid peace be with you,” and to say to the victim of aggression: "Love your aggressor, resist not evil”. But that can call forth nothing but more acts of aggression, he emphasised. In such a case, the conference could turn out to be a "tool of the aggressor”, instead of acting against aggression. Having reiterated the oft-stated position of the USSR regarding action to oppose aggression, Litvinov stressed the necessity of rallying the nations working to keep the peace. ^^17^^°

p The assessment of the Soviet delegation’s position given by Norman Davis is noteworthy. "Litvinov is arguing to me”, he wrote to Washington, "in favour of close co- operation and understanding between Britain, the United States and Russia on the ground that if Japan were confronted with such a combination, she would agree to stop hostilities.” ^^171^^

p On November 6, the conference drew up the text of another appeal to Japan inviting her to join it. Then it was adjourned pending her reply.

p In the meantime, Japan went on intensifying and expanding her military operations in China. On November 12, Japanese troops captured Shanghai, thereby appreciably strengthening their foothold in Central China. On the same day, the Japanese government once more rejected the appeal from the Brussels Conference.

p The Brussels Conference resumed on November 13. The Chinese representative raised the question of economic sanctions against Japan and assistance to China. However, the representatives of the United States, Britain and France turned a deaf ear to it. Norman Davis intimated that he was still hoping to get Japan to co-operate.

p The Soviet delegation again came out in support of the Chinese proposal. Potemkin, who now led the Soviet delegation, declared that to end the aggression there would have to be "co-operative and effective efforts by the powers interested in keeping the peace in the Far East. Every concrete initiative in this sense would be supported by the Soviet Union.^^172^^ Davis reported to Washington that Potemkin "was very insistent in urging us to recommend concrete measures against Japan" because there was no other way to stop the conflict. Potemkin reiterated that the USSR "would join in anything the British and ourselves might be prepared to do”.^^173^^

p On November 24 the conference adopted a declaration to say that it was suspending its sittings temporarily in order to afford the participating governments the time "to further explore all peaceful methods by which a settlement of the dispute may be attained.” ^^174^^ That was the last meeting of the conference.

p The breakdown of the Brussels Conference was a direct sequel to the policy of abetting the Japanese aggression which was pursued by the United States, Britain and France, While the major responsibility for “non-intervention” in the German-Italian invasion of Spain lay with the British and French “appeasers”, the main blame for the policy of abetting the Japanese aggression rested with the United States.

p The ruling circles of the United States, Britain and France considered that the best way out of the situation thus created was through an imperialist collusion with Japan for the “peaceful” plunder of China by all of them so as to have the Japanese aggression turn against the Soviet Union. Since the Japanese imperialists continued their acts of aggression in China, in violation of the interests of the United States, Britain and France, and showed no intention of attacking the USSR for the time being, the governing quarters of the Western powers tried to push the USSR into some kind of action against Japan. That came to light in the closing days of the Brussels Conference.

p Potemkin wrote from Brussels, reporting his conversation with the Chairman of the conference, Paul Spaak, Belgium’s Foreign Minister, that the latter had provocatively declared that "the best means to make Japan more tractable was by sending a few hundred Soviet aircraft to give Tokyo a scare”. Potemkin replied that there must have been some in Brussels who evidently were too fond of " having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them".^^175^^

p The Soviet government gave a sober assessment of the situation. It was prepared to undertake most effective measures in assisting China in its struggle against the Japanese aggressors, but it wanted to do so together with the United States, Britain and France. The Soviet Union could not fail to take into account under the circumstances the fact, in particular, that in the event of war with Japan, it could have run the risk of being attacked by Germany and even, perhaps, by some other of its Western neighbours who had 135 long been co-operating with Japan on an anti-Soviet ground.

p After the conference, Litvinov, writing to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Troyanovsky, pointed out that the USSR had, right from the start, been sceptical of the possible outcome of the Brussels Conference, and, therefore, had held a "rather restrained position" at it, but the conference ended "even more disgracefully than one could have expected it to".^^176^^

The utter futility of the Brussels Conference because of the position of the Western powers had the effect of intensifying the Japanese aggression in China. On November 27, that is, two days after the conference was over, Japanese troops launched an offensive against Nanking, which was the home of the Chinese government at the time. The city fell to them on December 13.