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p Nazi Germany followed Italy in striking out at peace and the security of the nations. She decided to make short shrift of the provision of the 1925 Treaty of Locarno whereby Germany had pledged herself to have no troops on the left bank of the Rhine and inside a 50-km strip along the right bank (these restrictions were imposed by the Peace Treaty of Versailles). For Germany the whole point of that action was, above all, that by building military fortifications in that region, she would have made extremely difficult an invasion by French forces, should France have decided to come to the aid of her allies in Central and Eastern Europe in case of German aggression against them. At the same time it was a kind of test for Hitler to see how Britain and France would behave in similar circumstances at a later date.^^50^^

The French Ambassador in Berlin Andre Francois-Poncet stated on February 4, 1930, that the Nazis were increasingly vocal and their claims increasingly defiant. What was emerging into the foreground with growing evidence was their fanaticism, the spirit of domination, the persistent striving for revenge and the theories of racial superiority.

97 Plans for establishing German hegemony in the Danubian region were being hatched and colonialist demands made.^^51^^

p The British government, too, realised the whole complexity of the situation. On January 17, 1936, the new British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden submitted a circumstantial memorandum "The German Danger" to the government containing a wealth of indisputable evidence of the Nazi Reich’s aggressive designs. However, Eden’s idea was not to oppose the danger of aggression from Germany, but "to consider whether it is still possible to come to some modus vivendi . . . with Hitler’s Germany".^^52^^

p The Foreign Office Central Department Chief, William Strang urged in a memorandum he had prepared on the subject that some far-reaching concessions should be made to Germany so as to "deprive her of an excuse" for acts of violence. He considered it possible to agree to Germany establishing her economic domination of Central and Southeast Europe. The Foreign Office economic adviser, F. Ashton-Gwatkin called for giving her financial support to the same end along with allowing her an access to sources of raw materials, and perhaps, even returning some of her former colonies to her; giving Germany a free hand in developing her economic relations with the countries of Central and Southeast Europe; and economic co-operation of Britain and Germany, for instance, in the exploitation of the natural resources of Russia.^^53^^

p The question of a possible occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland by German troops became one of particular relevance at the time. The matter was considered by the British government back in January 1935 when it was decided that "demilitarisation of the Rhineland was not a vital British interest".^^54^^ At the same time, as Foreign Office records indicate, it was realised perfectly well in London that as a result of that action "the Russians, Poles and Czechs will find their alliances with France materially depreciated”. But that did not worry the British ruling circles too much. On the contrary, they showed a clear interest in having those alliances scrapped to make it easier for the Nazis to expand eastwards.

p Once informed, on March 5, 1936, about the occupation of the Rhineland the Nazis had planned to begin in a matter of days, the British government re-examined the issue in detail. All opposition to that action was out of the question. 98 Anthony Eden urged the immediate resumption of negotia tions with Germany. He called lor talks to he opened with her about an Air Pact before proceeding to discuss the abolition, of the demilitarised Rliiuelaiid zone and other problems. ^^55^^ On the following day Anthony Eden invited German Ambassador L. Hoesch and, declaring himself for Anglo-Franco-German co-operation, proposed the conclusion of an Air Pact as the first question to take up. On hearing such an offer, the Nazis felt themselves definitely assured that there was no reason to fear any opposition from London and Paris to the Reich’s action in respect of the Rhineland. The “reply” to that offer had been framed by the Nazi Reich in advance.

p The demilitarised Rhineland zone was occupied by Germany on March 7, 1935. The German government demagogically declared that it was not under obligation to honour the terms of the 1925 Treaty of Locarno because of France’s ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the USSR.

p To soften the reaction of other nations, the Nazis came forward with a statement of their "commitment to peace”. They expressed their readiness to conclude a non- aggression treaty with France and Belgium instead of the Pact of Locarno and also to consider bringing Germany back into the League of Nations.

p The violation of the existing treaties by the Nazi Reicli and the consolidation of its strategic positions constituted an immense danger to the cause of peace and security in Europe. The Soviet Union, guiding itself consistently as it did by the interests of peace in its foreign policy, lost no time in roundly condemning the aggressive action by the Nazi chieftains. A leading article in Izvestia on March 14, 1936, stressed that the USSR "is opposed to the violation of the Treaty of Locarno by Germany, which cannot but increase the danger of war".

p The invasion of the demilitarised Rhineland by German troops was a serious test for France to pass. The French ruling elements did not want to resist Hitler’s venture, although they had every opportunity to do so. France was militarily the strongest state in Western Europe at the time. Germany, on the other hand, had just started to create her major armed forces. So it was by no accident at all that the German units entering the Rhineland should have got 99 an order to withdraw to tiieir starting positions forthwith in the face of any counter-measures by France.

p The French government, could also have resorted to collective sanctions, with reliance, among other things, on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the USSR. On March 7, 1936, the French Foreign Minister communicated to Soviet Ambassador Potemkin that, with German forces in the Rhineland zone, the French government called for the Council of the League of Nations to meet, and hoped that the USSR would give its full backing to France in it.^^56^^ On March 9, 1936, the Ambassador, acting on instructions from the Soviet government, replied that France could rely, wholly and entirely, on support from the Soviet Union in the League of Nations.^^57^^ French diplomats highly appreciated that expression of solidarity.^^58^^

p A number of France’s allies among the small nations of Europe, such as Belgium or Czechoslovakia, also declared themselves ready to help her, since they realised that the matter at issue was, to all intents and purposes, one of their own fate.

p France’s ruling circles understood perfectly well that her position was crucial at the moment to the subsequent external political orientation of all of those countries because in the event of a German victory in the impending conflict, they could defect into the victor’s camp. "The question now being decided,” said one of the documents of Quai d’Orsay, "is whether Europe will be German or not." ^^59^^ Representatives of the French ruling establishment, although they did make some threatening speeches, were hesitant in actual fact and did not make bold to take more or less drastic action by way of resisting the aggressors.

p The British government found it necessary to discourage any military action by France against Germany.^^60^^ It insisted on France taking no steps pending a conference of the Locarno powers and the consideration of the matter at issue in the Council of the League of Nations. The only thing that preoccupied London, rather that of fighting the aggressive policies of Germany, was that of sitting down again with Nazis at one table as soon as possible. An effort to find ways towards agreement with the Third Reich was launched by the British Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee consisting of the Premier and most influential ministers, which was set up at about that time. The British raised the 100 question of concluding a new Pact of Locarno while dropping all reference to the demilitarisation of the Rhineland. The members of the committee showed themselves to be keen, too, on the question of bringing Germany back into the League of Nations.^^61^^ The problem of giving Germany back her former colonies was carefully studied.

p The British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Cranborne took the matter up with the Soviet Ambassador. He pointed out that the British government "would like to restore the old Locarno without the demilitarised Rhineland”. Maisky objected to London’s intentions and declared that "the only worthy reply to Hitler would be by an all-round consolidation of collective security, including some measures of repression against Germany which the League of Nations would consider possible".^^62^^

p One of the basic reasons behind such a position of the British ruling quarters was the fear that a policy aimed at resisting Hitler might crush fascism and establish Bolshevism.^^63^^

p A conference of the Locarno powers (Britain, France, Italy and Belgium), without Germany, however, among them, opened in Paris on March 10, 1936. It produced no positive results whatsoever. It was decided to refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. The British representatives succeeded in getting the Council to meet in London this time, rather than in Geneva, and to have representatives of Germany invited to it. That was a clear effort to come to terms with the Nazi Reich rather than oppose its violation of the existing treaties.

p As it considered, on March 11, the situations thus shaping up, the British government, on Anthony Eden’s motion, opposed all sanctions against Germany and urged the resumption of talks with her to achieve an under- standing. ^^64^^

p At a League of Nations session on March 14, the British government did all it could to prevent any sanctions being applied against the Nazi Reich. British diplomats argued that to have broken some treaties did not yet mean aggression. The Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in London for the Council’s deliberations, cabled to Moscow his own observations of the mood in the British capital. He reported that "the British are trying to involve the French in the talks with Hitler as soon as possible." ^^65^^

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p At a meeting of the Council on March 17, the People’s Commissar reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to express—together with the other Council member-countries their common disgust at Germany’s violation of her international commitments, condemn her action and join in using the "most effective means of preventing any similar violations in the future”. While denouncing Hitler’s Germany for having broken the treaties she had signed, the People’s Commissar criticised the policy of connivance at such moves. He opposed the collective surrender to the aggressor and the collective rewarding of the aggressor by taking decisions to suit and benefit him, and the decisions which, on the grounds of avoiding an imaginary danger of war today, would be creating the requisites for a real war tomorrow.^^66^^

p The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, V. M. Molotov also confirmed that "all the aid essential to France in case of a possible attack . . . would bo offered by the Soviet Union.^^67^^ The Soviet Union’s adamant stand on the matter arose from its persistent effort for peace and collective security. It was realised quite well in the Soviet Union that one could not work for peace without working to uphold the inviolability of international commitments. It was impossible to assure collective security without taking collective measures against the violations of the existing treaties.

p Still British diplomacy managed to get the Council of the League of Nations to limit itself to stating the fact of Germany having broken her treaty obligations. No sanctions against her were applied, and that decision suited the Nazis perfectly well because their action remained unpunished. Reporting to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the views and moods in British government quarters, the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out that these could be summed up as attempts to keep Britain’s military commitments limited to France and Belgium and, eventually, to seek an accommodation with Germany. ^^68^^ While counting on the conclusion of a new pact with Germany to guarantee once again the so-called "Western security”, the British government was ready to leave the nations and peoples of Eastern and Central Europe at the mercy of the Nazis. That was the policy which, as we shall yet see, subsequently led to the Munich sell-out and then to war. France followed in Britain’s footsteps in treading the 102 same path of danger to the cause of peace. The French Foreign Minister P. Flandin, setting out the basic principles of his country’s foreign policy in the circumstances that had emerged after March 7, 1936, declared: "We shall have to make the best terms with Germany we can get, and leave the rest of Europe to her fate." ^^69^^ A mere four years later that policy brought France to her defeat and disgraceful surrender.

p The search of accommodation among the Western powers, and on the anti-Soviet grounds at that, had the support of the reactionary circles of the United States. For example, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, urged "reconciliation between France and Germany" in opposition to the USSR.^^70^^

p By the remilitarisation of the Rhineland the Nazi Reich strengthened its strategic position for further acts of aggression. As a matter of urgency, the Nazis set about putting up the so-called Ziegfried Line along the German-French border. The Nazi Reich sought to reinforce its rear to launch aggressive action in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time the Ziegfried Line was to serve as the starting point for a subsequent invasion of France.

p France’s positions in Europe were badly undermined, and so was her allies’ confidence in her. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland by the Nazis signified that in the event of the Nazi Reich attacking France’s allies in Central and Eastern Europe, she would now find it far more difficult to help them out by full-scale action on the Western Front. It was precisely at that time that the French ruling quarters definitely embraced the concept that in the event of the Third Reich attacking France’s allies, the French Army would stick to a defensive strategy, that is, sit it out behind the Maginot Line. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Molotov, pointed out in an interview with the editor of the French Le Temps newspaper Chastenet on March 19, 1936: "The remilitarisation of the Rhine Region lias, certainly, intensified the threat to the nations east of Germany, notably, the USSR. It would be wrong to fail to see that".^^71^^ The Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, even not in force as yet, was losing much of its significance as a military-strategic factor.

While urging the French government to resign itself to the acts committed by the Nazi Reich, Britain expressed her willingness to assume certain obligations in relation to 103 France. On April 1, the governments of Britain and France exchanged official letters whereby the British government declared that should the attempts at concluding a new agreement involving Germany, instead of Treaty of Locarno, prove fruitless, Britain would come to France’s aid in the event of a German attack on her. As the British-French military negotiations, which followed soon afterwards, showed, the British government had no serious intention, in fact, to lend any effective military assistance to France. Those commitments of Britain’s did no more than create the impression that France could rely on her support. In actual fact, there was no reason at all for France to count on any British aid to speak of.