p Fascist Italy set course for aggression to join Japan and Germany in this club in the mid-1930s. She had, potentially, less strength than the two other major aggressors. But by its very essence, Italian fascism was no less aggressive. The leader of Italian fascism, Mussolini, openly extolled war as mankind’s natural state.

p Italy picked Ethiopia, an independent, but militarily weak African state as a target for her expansionist ambitions. Mussolini proclaimed his aim to be the destruction of the Ethiopian Armed Forces and the full conquest of Ethiopia. In December 1934, the Italians provoked an armed clash between Italian and Ethiopian troops at the WalWal Fort. That was the forerunner of an impending storm.

p While preparing to attack Ethiopia Mussolini decided to get France neutralised by concluding an imperialist deal with her to divide their spheres of influence in Africa. That deal was struck by Laval and Mussolini in Rome on January 7, 1935. Laval agreed to turn over to Italy some of the French colonial territories bordering on Italian colonies in Africa, in exchange for the Italian fascists’ promise to maintain friendly relations and consult France in international affairs.   [89•*  He promised to Mussolini not to interfere with his designs on Ethiopia.^^30^^

p According to the information obtained by the Soviet Ambassador to France, V. P. Potemkin, from the French Ambassador to Italy, Charles Chambrun, Laval had told 90 Mussolini that France had no political interests in Ethiopia and that she would not object to the Italians reaching agreement with Ethiopia to establish Italy’s virtual protectorate over that country.^^31^^

p During the conference at Stresa in April 1935, the British representatives, in their turn, also made it quite clear to the Italians that they would not stand in the way of their capturing Ethiopia, although the British government had enough forces and resources to forestall the Italian aggression. For example, it could have prevented the shipment of Italian troops through the Suez Canal. That alone would have thwarted Italy’s aggressive plans.

p An inter-departmental committee, which was set up to identify the course for the British government to follow, issued a report on June 18, 1935, pointing out that Italy’s action did not affect such vital interests of Britain in and round Ethiopia "as would make it essential for His Majesty’s Government to resist an Italian conquest of Ethiopia”. ^^32^^ With this verdict to go by, the British government also started conniving at Italian aggression.

p The Italian intelligence service obtained all of its secret information about the policy of the British government through the British Embassy in Rome. For five prewar years, the British Embassy in Rome was a "sieve through which official secrets filtered to Mussolini and Hitler".^^33^^ Therefore, Mussolini knew very well that the British government expressed no particular concern over his plans to bring Ethiopia under Italian domination.

p Having virtually made sure of the consent of France and Britain, Italy began concentrating her forces near the Ethiopian frontiers. Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations for help. Although the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with Ethiopia at the time, the Soviet delegation consistently spoke up in the League of Nations for faithful observance of the terms of its Covenant related to the provision of aid to a victim of aggression. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Litvinov declared at a session of the Council of the League of Nations on September 5 that the Council bad no right to disregard the conflict, thereby giving Italy a "free hand”. That would amount to a violation of their commitments by members of the League and a breach of the Covenant of that international organisation, while strict observance of the Covenant was 91 essential to the slabiltiy of the entire edifice of international peace and security. The People’s Commissar called on the Council to spare no effort and no resources in order to avert an armed conflict and fulfil the obligations which were the "League’s raison d’être". ^^34^^

p Speaking in the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 14, Litvinov set forth, in particular, the Soviet Union’s attitude to the colonial policy of the imperialist powers in general. The Soviet government, he declared, is opposed, as a matter of principle, to the system of colonies and to the imperialist policy of spheres of influence. He stressed that the Soviet government attached paramount importance to whether or not the League of Nations would actually become an instrument of peace. That instrument of peace, he pointed out, might well come handy in the future too. Litvinov called on the members of the League to pledge themselves to allow no more encroachments on its Covenant as an instrument of peace, but use it in all cases of aggression, from whatever quarter.^^35^^ In a telegramme to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov emphasised that "the very fact of the League applying serious sanctions against Italy will be a formidable warning for Germany as well".^^36^^

p The Soviet government’s appeal for effective action to be taken to make fascist Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia impossible was not supported, however, by other members of the League of Nations, notably by Britain and France.

p The British Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare, assured the Assembly that the British government maintained its loyalty to the League of Nations and to the principles of collective security. He declared that Great Britain was ready to fulfil her obligations under the Covenant of the League but qualified this statement by saying that all the measures to be taken had to be collective.^^37^^ Even British historians admitted that the. speech did contain "a great deal of bluff, not to say duplicity”, because no one in London set any particular store by the League of Nations, let alone by its application of sanctions.^^38^^ Henry Channon also pointed out in his diaries: "Britain has asked the League for sanctions which, she knows, will never be given, and we have saved our face.” ^^39^^

p The French Foreign Minister, Laval turned out to be the best assistant of the Italian aggressors. Litvinov pointed out 92 that Laval was defending Italy’s interests in the League hetter than the Italians themselves did it. Laval’s position, the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow, will have tho effect of "playing down the League’s prestige and encouraging Mussolini’s aggressiveness".^^40^^

p When it hecame obvious that France and a number of capitalist countries would hardly agree to take an effective part in action against the Italian aggressors, somebody in the West began to “prompt” the Soviet Union that it could just as well come out against Italy single-handed. Naturally, the USSR could not fling itself into such a venture. The Soviet Union was prepared to play its part in good faith in collective sanctions. Should, however, the USSR have started to oppose the Italian aggressors alone, it could have found itself in an extremely precarious situation.

p No sooner had the Assembly of the League of Nations risen on October 3, 1935, than Italy attacked Ethiopia. The Soviet Union lost no time in speaking out in support of the victim of the aggression and for collective action by members of the League of Nations to curb it. Pravda in a leading article "War in East Africa" on October 5, underlined the tremendous danger of a new "devastating world imperialist shambles”. Having denounced Italy’s intention to turn Ethiopia into her colony by means of war, Pravda pointed out: "The position of the Soviet Union is well known—it is one of consistent defence of the peace and freedom of the nations. Our proletarian state is opposed to the imperialist ambitions of Italian fascism."

p The Council of the League of Nations met for an emergency session at short notice. On October 7, the Council found Italy guilty of aggression. It decided also on economic and financial sanctions to be applied against Italy, particularly on an embargo on the export of war equipment to Italy.

p As to the military sanctions, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Britain and France, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval agreed that they would oppose military sanctions.^^41^^

p Soviet diplomacy vigorously insisted in the League of Nations on the need for the strict fulfilment of the provisions of the Covenant concerning action to control aggression. Speaking at the emergency session of the Council of the League of Nations on October 10, the Soviet representative V. P. Potemkin declared that "the USSR considers 93 it to be its duty to reaffirm its readiness to fulfil all obligations, together with the other members of the League of Nations, which its Covenant imposes on all of them without exception.” He emphasised that the unity of action by the members of the League was the surest means of curbing the Italian aggression against Ethiopia. Such unity of action could serve as a gage, Potemkin stressed, of the early achievement of collective security which could forestall "further attempts from whatever quarter to break the general peace”. He called for "collective and determined" ac- tion. ^^42^^ The USSR consistently carried out all the decisions of the League of Nations concerning sanctions.

p The Soviet government’s official position was set out also in the note issued on November 22 by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the note from the Italian Embassy in Moscow objecting to the decisions taken by the League of Nations. The government of the USSR pointed out that "while consistently abiding by the policy of peace, it considered it necessary for the obligations it has had assumed under the Covenant of the League of Nations to be faithfully carried out. It could not agree, the note said, that Ethiopia "must be an exception and that she must not enjoy all those rights which have been granted by the League of Nations to the rest of its members ... A different line of conduct would amount to repudiating the fundamental principles of the League of Nations, renouncing collective organisation of security, encouraging aggression and rejecting the possibility of demonstrating international solidarity in maintaining and strengthening world peace, which is the bedrock principle of the policy of the Soviet Government." ^^43^^

p The so-called oil sanctions against Italy were of particular significance in action against Italian aggression. She had no oil resources of her own and to have cut off oil supplies for Italy would have virtually made it impossible for the Italian aggression to continue. The USSR and some other petroleum-exporting countries were prepared to stop exporting petroleum products to Italy. But for the oil sanctions to be effective, they had to be applied by all petroleum-exporting countries. The position of the United States was of particular importance under the circumstances. However, the U.S. government refused to cut off oil exports to Italy. And so did France.^^44^^

p Since Britain could have played an enormous role in opposing the Italian aggression, the Soviet government tried to come to terms with the British government ahout that. On instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Amhassador in London 1. M. Maisky met the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare on November 6, 1935. The Ambassador told him that Italy was a relatively weak aggressor. Other prospective aggressors were stronger and more dangerous. "We consider it extremely important,” he stressed, "for Italy to be used as an example to teach a lesson to all possible aggressors in general." ^^45^^

p The matter was thoroughly examined at a British Cabinet meeting on December 2. Some of its members expressed the apprehension lest the application of effective (oil or any other) sanctions against Italy should have caused the fascist regime in that country to collapse altogether with the result that Mussolini "would probably disappear from Italian politics and there might be a Communist Government in Italy and a complete alteration in the whole European situation”. Therefore, the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare went out of his way to prove that it was necessary to postpone the application of oil sanctions while pressing, in co-operation with Laval for "peace negotiations" to be opened as soon as possible. Hoare’s proposals were approved by the Cabinet.^^46^^

p The so-called Hoare-Laval agreement, whereby France and Britain expressed their consent to one-third of the territory of Ethiopia being annexed by Italy, was concluded on December 8, 1935. When the agreement came before the British Cabinet meeting later in the day, it was pointed out that it was extremely advantageous to the aggressor—Italy, and virtually unacceptable to the victim of the aggression, that is, Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the agreement was unanimously approved by the British government and it was decided to exercise "strong pressure" on Ethiopia to make her comply with the demands contained in the HoareLaval agreement.^^47^^

p Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia was ready to betray the interests of his people. On February 19, 1936, he sent a top secret message through the British military attache in Ethiopia to the British government to announce his readiness, first, to open negotiations with the Italian government, and second, "to tie Ethiopia to England either in 95 the form of a protectorate or in the form of a mandate".^^48^^ The latter proposal turned out, however, to be unacceptable to Britain since the incorporation of Ethiopia in the British Empire under the circumstances of the day would have automatically put Britain into a state of war against Italy.

p The Hoare-Laval agreement was so odious that it was kept top secret, yet its substance leaked into the press, touching off a storm of indignation in Britain and outside. Samuel Hoare had to step down as Foreign Secretary but that did not mean any change in the British government’s policies. Britain and France went on favouring the Italian aggressors.

p So did the United States, albeit in a different form. On August 31, 1935, the House of Representatives and the Senate of the U.S. Congress adopted a joint resolution to ban arms sales to belligerent nations. That started the notorious neutrality legislation which was to play so negative a role on the eve of the war. The position taken up by the United Slates was virtually playing into the aggressor’s hands. Italy was making all types of weapons herself. The victim of the aggression—Ethiopia, having no munitions industry at all, had to buy weapons and ammunition abroad. The American market, however, was now closed to her.

p The half-and-half sanctions announced by the League of Nations could not deter the aggressors. In spite of Ethiopia’s stiff resistance, Italian troops, resorting to the most bestial methods of warfare up to and including the use of poison gases, succeeded in defeating the Ethiopians. With Ethiopia annexed, Mussolini pompously proclaimed Italy an empire in May 1936.

p Reporting to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about his conversation on the matter with D. Lloyd George, I. M. Maisky wrote that Lloyd George cursed Prime Minister S. Baldwin and his ministers in the strongest terms he could find, insisting that should a policy of sanctions against Italy have been applied consistently from the very outset, Ethiopia would have remained intact and "a formidable precedent could have been created for any future aggressor, including Germany”.^^49^^

p The defeat of Ethiopia by Italy was a direct consequence of the policy of connivance at aggression pursued by Britain, France and the United States and a result of their imperialist collusion with the Italian aggressors. It was hoped 96 in London and Paris that in case of an amicable agreement with Italy at Ethiopia’s expense, the conclusion of a Four Power Pact could have been tried again.

The Soviet Union was the only one of the Great Powers to speak up consistently in support of Ethiopia’s just national liberation war. Britain and France, having failed to intervene in behalf of Ethiopia, left the League of Nations itself in sorry plight. From then on this organisation ceased to play any more or less essential role in international affairs. Small nations of Europe, which had earlier counted on the League of Nations supporting them in case of aggression against them, were coming round to the conclusion that it was not to be relied on. The plans for developing the League of Nations into an effective instrument of collective security were hit hard. At the same time, the aggressive powers came to the conclusion that they did not have to be afraid of that organisation any longer. All that did irreparable damage to the cause of peace.