p With the danger of war growing, the Soviet government found it necessary to renew its attempts at rallying the forces of the nations which were the targets of German and Italian aggression. The Soviet Union was pressing for the consolidation of the League of Nations and for making it more effective in preventing war and keeping the peace. The Soviet Union proceeded in advancing its proposals from the assumption that the overall military and economic strength as well as the manpower resources of the nonaggressor nations were by far superior to any possible combination of aggressive powers at the time. It would have been enough for the non-aggressor nations to unite and to demonstrate the possibility for their joint action for peace, for the war danger to be averted and the security of all nations strengthened.

p The Soviet government, attached special importance to co-operation with France and Britain in various areas, including the League of Nations. It is worth mentioning in (his context the negotiations which took place early in 19.°)fi, notably, during the visit of Litvinov and Marshal Tnkhachevsky to London (for the funeral of King George V), as well as the Soviet Ambassador’s 104 conversations with British statesmen in London. Soviet Ambassador in London, Maisky conferred with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on this subject on January 11, 1936. Informing the British Ambassador in Moscow about it Anthony Eden wrote: "As to general policy, Mr. Maisky maintained that the essential thing was that His Majesty’s Government, the Soviet Government and the French Government should work together in leadership of the League. If they did that and if they used every opportunity to strengthen the League and if they remained firm, he believed that the German menace might be met at laid without war. . . That was why his Government attached such great importance to our close co-operation." ^^72^^

p Litvinov’s conversation with Anthony Eden on January 30 was even more important. The British Foreign Secretary wrote about it: "Mr. Litvinov emphasised his anxiety to do everything in his power to improve relations between our two countries. Was there not any further step that could be taken? If so, he would welcome it. I replied that I could think of nothing new. .. Mr. Litvinov . .. asked .. . was it not possible, for instance, to conceive of some agreement between Soviet Russia, France and the United Kingdom? I replied that I could not visualise how this could be pos- sible." ^^73^^ On February 5 Maisky talked it over, besides, witli British Secretary for War A. Duff Cooper.^^74^^

p On April 2, 1936, the Soviet Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that in the opinion of the Soviet government, to save Europe, "it is extremely necessary to establish closer co-operation between the USSR, France and Great Britain in the battle for peace.” He pointed out that "only an urgent consolidation of collective security, ready to meet any further aggression by Germany with resolute action, could bring it home to Hitler that peace is more profitable, after all, than war".^^75^^

p The Soviet government’s initiative was not supported by Britain’s ruling establishment. They sought agreement with the Nazi Reich rather than with the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office believed that they should by no means discuss Anglo-Franco-Soviet co-operation with Maisky, so as not to compromise the negotiations with Germany.^^76^^ Even the West German historian A. Kuhn pointed out that "the British ambition to come to terms with anti-communist states hindered all intensification of Anglo-Soviet relations." ^^77^^

p The considerations which the British top leadership proceeded from in opposing the idea of co-operation with the Soviet Union could be summed up as follows.

p Should insurmountable obstacles have been raised in the way of the German aggressors, that would have meant assuring peace not only for Britain but for the Soviet Union as well. But while the British Conservatives wanted peace for Britain, they, guided by their class considerations, by no means wanted to have the Soviet Union live in peace, going ahead with the construction of its new, socialist type of society.

p If, with Britain, France, and the USSR in alliance, things would still have come to the point of war, Nazi Germany would have inevitably been defeated. But for the same class considerations, such a victory did not suit the British Conservatives either, since the Soviet Union would have been among the victor powers, that is to say, not only would it have continued to exist but it could even have strengthened its position in the world. Besides, it was taken into account in London that the war could have led to socialist revolutions breaking out in a number of capitalist countries.

p This can well be seen from a statement made by British Premier Baldwin in 1936. He said that in the event of an armed conflict, Britain "might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik".^^78^^

p The rulers of the British Empire had worked out their own general strategic plan providing for an imperialist collusion between Great Britain and the Nazi Reich. In return for the Nazi pledge not to encroach on the British Empire London was ready to grant Nazi Germany the “right” to aggression eastwards in the hope of eventually pushing her into a war against the Soviet Union. It was expected in London that the security of the British Empire would thus be ensured, and the Soviet Union would be destroyed or, at any rate, weakened, and that Nazi Germany, Britain’s major imperialist rival, would be extenuated, too.

p British Premier Baldwin said in 1936, setting out his views on the subject: "We all know the German desire, and he (Hitler) has come out with it in his book, to move East and if he should move East it should not break my heart... 106 If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, T should like lo see the Bolsheviks and the Nazis doing it." ^^79^^

p That course of the British Conservatives ran counter to the national interests of Britain and the British people. It was Fraught with the most serious consequences for Britain (it proved to he one of the essential causes hehind the outbreak of the Second World War).

p The British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Chilston found it necessary to warn the Foreign Office that, in spite of all good will of the USSR and its desire for co-operation with Britain, this policy of London could eventually have unfavourable consequences for it. He wrote that the Soviet government’s policy was to secure collective action to deter Germany: but should it find that all of its attempts at safeguarding its own security in that way were to no avail, it could reverse its policy towards Germany and opt for the normalisation of relations with her.^^80^^

p Although there were serious difficulties to surmount— because of that policy of Britain’s ruling circles—in strengthening the security of Europe, the Soviet Union continued to do everything possible, on its part, to rally all the nations objectively interested in the maintenance of peace.

p The Soviet government still considered the United States’ participation in the promotion of peace most important. The U.S. Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, L. Henderson, commenting on Molotov’s report to the Central Executive Committee in a dispatch to the Department of State on January 11, 1930, laid accent on the passage which referred to the need for closer relations between the Soviet Union and the United States which, as Molotov pointed out, "has enormous significance from the point of view of the preservation of general peace”. This statement and the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, A. A. Troyanovsky, who had arrived in Moscow, had given enough reason to Henderson to tell the Department of State that the Soviet government was counting on U.S. aid in creating a system of collective security. On April 17, W. Bullitt reported to Washington about his conversation with Litvinov who had emphasised the importance of joint efforts by the U.S. and the USSR "in the interest of peace”. According to Bullitt, Litvinov was inclined to think that should a war break out in the West, that would be a war of Germany against France, and Japan would not attack the USSR 107 alone, without Germany. Therefore, showing concern not only for its own country, but for general peace, the Soviet government offered the United States to share in a collective effort to strengthen the security of the peoples. Yet Washington showed no interest in these proposals. ^^81^^

p Speaking on July 1 and September 28, 1936, about action lo promote peace in the Assembly of the League of Nations, Litvinov, under instructions from the Soviet government, declared that the only way to safeguard peace was by setting up a system of collective security. He called for the League of Nations to be transformed into a bloc of states concerned with preserving peace and united for mutual defence and assistance. We demand, he said, "that this bloc should really organise mutual assistance, that it should draw up its action plan in good time so as not to be caught napping, and that war-making activity going on outside this bloc should be effectively countered by the organisation of collective resistance".^^82^^

p Because not all the members of the League of Nations agreed to share in applying military sanctions against the aggressor, the Soviet government spoke up for the members of the League to conclude regional or bilateral pacts of mutual assistance. In case of the need for military sanctions to be applied, this could be done by the parties to the appropriate regional agreements and also—subject to their own desire—by other members of the League. These proposals of the Soviet government to strengthen the League of Nations were passed on to the League’s Secretary- General on August 30, 1936. The Soviet government strongly opposed the proposals of certain countries for the abrogation of the Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which envisaged sanctions against an aggressor.

p The steadfast effort of the USSR for peace and collective security contributed towards raising the Soviet Union’s international prestige. Some remarks by the former British Premier Lloyd George, in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on July 1, 1936, are most indicative in this respect. The international role of the USSR, Lloyd George said, is rising. The policies of Britain and France are becoming increasingly unclear, wavering and indefinite. That, naturally, is undermining the confidence, particularly, of the medium-sized and small nations, in London and Paris. "Meanwhile, the USSR has all along been pursuing a 108 clearcut and definite policy of peace.” So is there anything surprising, indeed, he said, "if medium-sized and small nations are more and more taking the USSR as their guidepost and if they increasingly regard it as their own lead- er?" ^^83^^

p One of the top officials in the Secretariat of the League of Nations, F. Walters pointed out in his two-volume A History of the League of Nations that ever since it joined the League, the USSR had been its "convinced supporter”. The conduct of the USSR towards the aggressive powers was "more consistent with the Covenant than that of any other great power”, and that Soviet Union played the leading part in the League as it concerned security.^^84^^

p The controversy which developed in the League at the time over the prospect of amending its Covenant, showed, however, that the League was sliding down to utter impotence and collapse. This was due, in part, to the Western powers’ connivance at aggression. With reference to the matter, Maisky reported to Moscow that the major trend to be observed among the majority of Conservatives and the one shared by the British government was towards Britain’s “semi-isolation” in international affairs. It boiled down to a reform of the League of Nations “(pulling the League’s teeth out”), that is, to the formal or actual abrogation of Article 16 of the League Covenant.^^85^^ Because of Britain’s and France’s short-sighted policies, the League of Nations found itself hamstrung and incapable of safeguarding peace.

p The aggressor states were out to subvert the League of Nations. Italy followed Japan’s and Germany’s example by leaving the League in December 1937.

p Nazi Germany was pressing the small nations of Europe to boycott the League’s action against the aggressors. The Nazis realised perfectly well that the consolidation of the League and the conclusion of regional pacts of mutual assistance would hamper their land-grabbing plans. Therefore, the German government wanted as many European countries as possible to declare neutrality in case of any armed conflict in Europe and refuse to participate in the application of sanctions provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Nazi Reich thus hoped to obtain an opportunity l,o swallow up the small nations of Europe one after the other, encountering no organised collective resistance from other states.

p The Polish diplomatic service, with J. Beck at its head, lent active assistance to the Nazis in undermining the League of Nations and disuniting the countries of Eastern Europe in the face of aggression. In 1936 he put forward his idea of creating a belt of “neutral” states from the Baltic down to the Black Sea (incorporating the Baltic countries, Poland arid Romania). That proposal played into Berlin’s hands as it retarded the creation of a genuine system of collective security.

p The British government, too, put forward some peace- endangering plans. For example, Chamberlain, addressing the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on Marcli 10, 1937, wondered whether Germany would agree to conclude non-aggression treaties with all of her Eastern neighbours. The USSR could also have concluded such treaties with them.   [109•*  Essentially, however, his suggestion was that this scheme would take the place of the Franco-Soviet pact.^^86^^ Lord Privy Seal Lord Halifax noted there and then that he had proposed a scheme of that kind to the German Ambassador in London, Ribbentrop, back on February 11, 1937. ^^87^^

p In subverting the League of Nations, the British government still attached special importance to how to do away with the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance that was so unpalatable to it. Naturally, that had nothing in common with the consolidation of peace and security in Europe. Britain’s ruling circles did achieve their aim in substance, if not in form. That was confirmed by a report from the U.S. Ambassador in Paris Bullitt to Washington about his conversation with the French head of government Camille Chautemps on December 4, 1937. Chautemps said during the meeting that he "would be quite ready to give the Germans all the assurances possible that France would never make a military alliance with the Soviet Union directed against Germany or indulge in military conversations with the Soviet Union." ^^88^^

p The Soviet government considered that one of the possible useful measures towards creating a broadly-based front of struggle against aggression was the publication of a joint declaration by a number of European countries 110 anxious for peace to be preserved.^^89^^ So, in a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Davis, on March 2(5, 1937, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed that it was not too late to stop the aggressors through resolute action by the peace-loving nations. The publication of a firm declaration by the non-aggressor nations of Europe that they were standing together for peace could have played an important part in keeping the peace, the People’s Commissar pointed out. If the U.S. were to join in such a declaration, that would contribute towards preserving peace not only in Europe but in the Ear East as well.^^90^^ The People’s Commissar more than once urged the publication of such a declaration in his negotiations with representatives of other countries.

The U.S. did not support the Soviet proposal. At the same time it is worth noting that the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Davis, highly appreciated the contribution which the Soviet Union could make and did make towards strengthening peace. Reporting to Washington about the role of the Soviet military potential in the course of events in Europe, he wrote on June 28, 1937: "Russia’s might and strength . .. are of indisputable value in deterring Hitler. . . The Russian Red Army is one of the strongest factors for peace in Europe." ^^91^^