49

p The talks which began late in 1933, on the Soviet government’s initiative, for concluding a regional pact to safeguard the security of the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, occupy a special place in the history of the Soviet efforts for peace and against aggression. "The Soviet Union is interested in strengthening peace everywhere”, Izvestia wrote on January 29, 1934, "for, with international relations strained as they are, an armed clash between the Great Powers, wherever it may break out, would tend to escalate into a world war. More particularly the USSR is interested in the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe."

p The Soviet government did a lot towards strengthening peace on the Soviet borders. It had concluded non- aggression treaties with many nations. That meant that all of them recognised peaceful coexistence as basic to their relations with the USSR. The signing of agreements about the definition of aggression and a number of other measures went far towards promoting the cause of peace.

p However, at a time when certain powers were already heading for aggression, measures of that kind were not enough to keep the peace. The aggressors were in no mood to reckon with any treaties or any standards of international relations. They were intent on using force to carry out their plans and were preparing for war. It was senseless to try and admonish them by any peace offers or appeals for peaceful coexistence.

p There had to be a different kind of action, the action that could ensure peace and security in spite of the aggressors’ plans. Aggressors based their policies on the use of force,^^108^^ and they did not reckon with the interests of other nations unless these had a requisite force behind them. Nazi Germany, using her economic potential, was quickly building up the strength of her war machine as well, developing into the mightiest state of capitalist Europe. With her predatory foreign policy, she became a formidable threat to many 50 nations of Europe. What made matters still worse was the emergence of a bloc of aggressor powers, comprising Germany, Japan, Italy and some oilier countries.

p The only way to keep the peace in Europe was for all the nations facing the danger of aggression to rally together in order to counter the aggressors with a still greater, overwhelming force. That could be achieved by the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral treaties of mutual assistance by the states under a threat of attack, and by setting up an effective system of collective security in Europe.

p That was the course to take if war was to be prevented. The Soviet proposal for concluding a regional pact met in equal measure the interests of peoples of the USSR and of the other countries of Europe. That is exactly why it had fetched widespred response at the time, being for long in the limelight of European diplomacy and public opinion.

p The Soviet government found that with German imperialism on course for aggression once again, it was a matter of particular importance for the USSR and France to establish close co-operation in action to keep the peace.

p During his visit to Paris, Litvinov pointed out in a statement to the French press on July 7, 1933: "Neither our political, nor our economic interests clash with the interests of France in any point of the globe, and, therefore, there are no obstacles, in our view, to our closer co-operation, both political and economic.” The People’s Commissar stated with satisfaction that the Soviet Union’s peace policy was winning more and more understanding in France.^^109^^

p In a conversation with the prominent French politician Edouard Herriot, who was in the Soviet Union in August and September 1933, Litvinov spoke about the firm determination and desire of the USSR to "seek closer contact with France".^^110^^ The Soviet government proposed a gentleman’s agreement about an exchange of information as a step towards it.

p The French people felt deeply concerned over their destiny. The grave danger hanging over France was clearly sensed by her most far-sighted politicians as well.

p Besides, the French system of alliances with Poland and some other states of Central and Eastern Europe was gradually losing its earlier import because as the alignment of forces in Europe changed, so did their foreign policy orientation. The French government’s attempts to come 51 to terms with Nazi Germany, notably at the expense of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, also greatly undermined relations of those countries with France and their confidence in her.

p At the same time, the rapid economic growth of the USSR and the enhancement of its defence capability led to it being considered in France as a possible partner in opposing the danger of Nazi aggression. In the context of a deep economic crisis, the interests of the French business community in increased trading links with the USSR was likewise a matter of no mean importance.

p However, there were quite a few personalities in France’s ruling circles who were in favour of co-operation with Nazi Germany. Foreign Minister J. Paul-Boncour admitted in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador V. S. Dovgalevsky on November 22, 1933, that "there are influential political, commercial and industrial circles in France seeking an accommodation with Germany”. He remarked that but for his opposition, "Daladier would already be conducting direct negotiations with Germany.” ^^111^^

p The French government, having overcome the waverings due to the fierce resistance of reactionary elements which wanted no trucks with the Soviet Union, finally arrived at the conclusion that there had to be co-operation with the USSR in action against Nazi aggression. With Germany having left the League of Nations and walked out of the Disarmament Conference, Paul-Boncour, talking to the Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky, pointed out, referring to appropriate statements by certain Soviet diplomats, that the question of supplementing the 1932 Soviet-French non- aggression pact with a pact of mutual assistance might come up, indeed, in due course. In a conversation with Litvinov in Paris on October 31, J. Paul-Boncour "mentioned several times mutual assistance as complementing the non- aggression pact”. It was he, too, who raised the question of the USSR joining the League of Nations.^^112^^

p On November 29, 1933, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the French government that the USSR was willing to consider concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with France and joining the League of Nations. The instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in France was: "You may open your conversations with Boncour on these grounds. Communicate the results.” On the following 52 day Dovgalevsky informed Paul-Boncour about it. Litvinov said in those days: "We have set firm course towards a closer relationship with France." ^^113^^ Shortly afterwards Dovgalevsky was summoned to Moscow to be given circumstantial instructions regarding subsequent negotiations with the French government.

p While welcoming the French proposals in principle, the Soviet government still considered it more reasonable for safeguarding peace in Europe to conclude not a bilateral Soviet-French treaty but a multilateral agreement on collective security with other nations concerned taking part.

p On December 19-20, 1933, the Soviet government drafted the following proposals to be communicated to the French government:

p “1) The USSR is willing to join the League of Nations on certain conditions.

p 2) The USSR does not object to a regional agreement being concluded within the framework of the League of Nations about mutual defence against aggression from Germany.

p 3) The USSR is willing to see this agreement joined by Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland or by some of these countries, with France and Poland in without fail.

p 4) Negotiations to specify the commitments under a future convention on mutual defence can begin upon the submission of a draft agreement by ... France.

p 5) Regardless of the obligations under the agreement on mutual defence, the parties to the agreement must undertake to render each other diplomatic, moral and, as far as possible, material aid also in the event of an armed attack not envisaged by the agreement itself..." ^^114^^

p The document just quoted contained a brief and concise account of the overriding positions of principle which informed of the struggle the Soviet state had launched against the growing danger of another world war. For this reason it is necessary to take a closer look at some of them.

p First, in distinction from the French proposal for a bilateral Soviet-French pact, the Soviet Union was pressing for a wider agreement. The Soviet government considered some action to prevent war and to check the aggressors to be the major task in hand. The Soviet-French treaty about mutual aid in resisting aggression could play a tremendous 53 part in tliis respect. But to conclude a multilateral agreement on collective security would have been a matter of far greater importance for ensuring a safe peace in Europe. Should Germany have nevertheless launched the war, she would have had to wage it against all the parties to the pact at once, that is, under extremely unfavourable circumstances.

p Second, it is worth looking through the list of nations which were projected as parties to the regional agreement which has gone down in history as the draft Eastern Pact.^^115^^ One condition of particular importance in the Soviet proposal was that France and Poland were to have been indispensable parties to this pact.

p A word of comment on French participation. The USSR could have assumed contractual obligations regarding aid to the nations listed in its proposal only if France had assumed the same obligations. Otherwise, should France have stayed out in the event of the USSR entering the war against Germany because of her attack upon the Baltic countries, the Soviet Union would virtually have found itself alone in a state of war against the Nazi Reich, while the overriding concern of Soviet foreign policy at the time was to avoid such a war.

p The reactionary circles of the Western powers, above all, those of Britain, strained every nerve in those years to provoke war between the USSR and Germany as well as the USSR and Japan. But the Soviet Union was cautious enough not to fall for that kind of provocation. Naturally, the Soviet Union could have come to the aid of a victim of aggression even without having a treaty of mutual assistance with it. It did actually lend such assistance on more than one occasion, as will yet be shown. This assistance has been always provided with due regard for the particular situation and by such means and methods as to keep the USSR from being involved in a war against aggressors in what would have been extremely dangerous and unfavourable circumstances for the USSR, without allies.

p It would have been a different matter if France had joined the USSR in helping the victim of aggression, as envisaged in the Soviet proposal. In such a case, there would have boon enough ground for expecting lliat, faced by the prospect of a war against the USSR and France at once, Nazi Germany would not have ventured into acts of 54 aggression against other parties to the pact. Besides, Germany would have had to reckon with the likelihood that Britain, as France’s ally under the Locarno Pact, might also have entered the war, following France. If such an attack had still taken place, the aggressor could have been curbed by the joint efforts of the USSR, France and other parties to the Eastern Pact.

p The participation of Poland in the Pact was also a matter of tremendous importance, in point of principle, for the USSR. To begin with, that would have meant that Poland, once actively involved in all anti-Soviet actions of the imperialist camp, would become an ally of the USSR. Besides, it was precisely Poland’s participation in the pact that could have made Soviet participation in it really effective, because the Soviet Union had no common border with the Nazi Reich and could seriously consider joining a war against Germany only in close co-operation with Poland, which would have allowed the transit of Soviet troops through some of her territory towards the German borders. The main thing, however, was that a coalition involving the USSR, France and Poland would have virtually deterred the Nazi Reich from venturing into such a war. Also, the guarantee of Poland’s continued independence was a matter of great importance, in principle, for the security of the USSR, because as long as there was an independent Poland, Germany could have no convenient access to the Soviet border. Therefore, the USSR was prepared to make its utmost contribution towards safeguarding Poland’s independence and inviolability.

p With such allies as France and Poland, the Soviet Union would have undertaken to provide assistance to the Baltic countries and other small nations as well. For example, once an ally of France, the USSR would not have objected to having these allied commitments extended to France’s allies—Czechoslovakia and Belgium (Poland was likewise in alliance with France). At the same time, the Soviet Union was most interested in having the reciprocal obligations of the parties to the Eastern Pact extended to the Baltic states as well. That was because, having captured the Baltic states, Nazi Germany would have obtained a vantagogronncl for a subsequent attack against the USSH.

p Third, a word of comment about the League of Nations. The institution of the League of Nations was part and 55 parcel of the Versailles system of peace treaties created by the Entente Powers and the U.S. as a result of their victory in World War I. It was one of the instruments in the hands of those nations by which to ensure the immutable territorial and political outcome of the victory they had won, and the dominant position of the Anglo-Franco-American imperialist alignment in the world. Along with that, ever since it was founded, the League of Nations had been one of the centres for organising foreign intervention against the Soviet state and other anti-Soviet acts. However, by 1933 the role of the League of Nations within the system of international relations had radically changed. The positions of France and Britain in the world grew weaker, and the League of Nations stopped being an instrument of their domination of other nations. Yet it could still play a certain positive role as one of the means to ensure collective security and to make its contribution towards the struggle against aggression and for the consolidation of peace and international security. For example, Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that in the event of aggression by one of its members against any other, all the remaining members were under obligation to apply economic and military sanctions against the aggressor.^^116^^

p On joining the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was anxious for it to become effective in strengthening peace and security. In the event of an attack against the USSR by any state whatsoever, all other members of the League of Nations were obliged to come to its aid. True, there was no particular reason to hope that the other members of the League would actually render assistance to the USSR. Simultaneously, the USSR came under obligation to render assistance to other members of the League of Nations should they have fallen victim to an act of aggression. The Soviet state was willing, on its part, to join the League of Nations’ collective action in providing assistance to a victim of aggression.

p That was what made the Soviet Union’s accession to the League of Nations worthwhile and possible. The inability of that organisation to take any effective steps against the Japanese aggressors who had invaded Northeast China (Manchuria) in 1931, damaged its prestige. But the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, prepared to make a tangible contribution towards action against aggression, 56 could have given it a new lease of life. Therefore, many members of the League of Nations had a stake in Soviet participation.

p The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations assumed added relevance because all the allied treaties of France, including the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, were based on the Covenant of the League of Nations. Under those treaties, France could not have lent assistance to the Soviet Union without violating, for instance, the Treaty of Locarno and without a decision by the Council of the League of Nations about the USSR being a victim of aggression. Therefore, for the USSR to join the League of Nations proved to be an indispensable precondition for the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance between the USSR and France, as well as of the collective security pact for Europe proposed by the Soviet Union.

p Those were the circumstances behind the invitation to the Soviet Union from most of the members of the League of Nations in the autumn of the subsequent year to join that organisation. Once in the League of Nations the Soviet Union became its most consistent champion against aggression and for the maintenance of peace.

p Fourth, there is yet another important point to note about the Soviet proposal. It stated that the parties to the agreement should back up one another also in the event of an attack by a state outside the agreement. This point clearly intimated the danger that was facing the Soviet Union at the time from Japan. When France proposed concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR, the Soviet government asked at once whether France meant mutual assistance in the Far East as well. However, all that the French government was prepared to do in announcing its readiness to conclude a treaty with the USSR was to act against German aggression alone. ^^117^^ The Soviet government was interested in having certain support, if not outright military assistance, provided in the event of a conflict in the Far East as well. It should be noted at the same time that the very fact of such a pact being concluded even without the abovementioned provision, would have been of no mean importance for the Soviet Union in the event of a conflict with Japan. For the pact would have been an extra guarantee of peace on the Soviet Western borders which would have enabled the Soviet government to reserve more strength and 57 give more attention to action against the Far Eastern aggressor.

p Speaking at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on December 29, 1933, Litvinov emphasised that "the maintenance of peace cannot depend on our efforts alone and demands co-operation and assistance from other nations”. Seeking, therefore, to establish and maintain friendly relations with all nations, the USSR was giving particular attention to strengthening the relations and socuring a maximum rapprochement with those of them which, like the Soviet Union, were interested in the preservation of peace and willing to oppose peace breakers. "The Soviet Union, on its part, is ready to accomplish this task because work in this direction is dictated by the interests of the working people of the whole world and by the security of all peoples, including, of course, the peoples of the Soviet Union. The peoples, like ours, who have provided the fullest possible evidence of their commitment to peace and their respect for the security of other nations, have also the fullest possible right to their own security." ^^118^^

p By its proposal for concluding a regional agreement on mutual defence against Nazi aggression, the Soviet government started a new stage of active struggle for peace and security in Europe. Soviet action against aggression, determined and guided by its positions of principle, won widespread recognition and support by the mass of the people in all European countries.

p The proposals of the Soviet government were handed by the Soviet Ambassador in Paris Dovgalevsky to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs J. Paul-Boncour on December 28, 1933. Having looked them through, the French Minister could not help admitting that they had outstanding importance for the maintenance of peace. "We are undertaking a job of great importance with you, today we have begun making history with you," ^^119^^ he told the Soviet Ambassador.

p It was not, however, without some hesitation that the French government accepted the proposal submitted by the Soviet government. In spite of the danger hanging over France, that country’s reactionary elements still bestially hated the Soviet state and would not hear of any co- operation with it. They hoped to come to terms with the Nazis.

p It was not until April 20, 1934, that Louis Barthou (who 58 succeded J. Paul-Boncour as Minister for Foreign Affairs in February) informed the Soviet government that he had been authorised to continue the negotiations. Barthou worked hard, as he usually did, to make the negotiations a success. He understood perfectly well what danger was facing France from Nazi Germany and saw the Soviet Union as the major ally in action to ward it off. At the same time he believed that, should France decline the Soviet proposal, the USSR could find itself forced to take steps to resume such relations with Germany as had existed between the two countries under the terms of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. And then Germany would reap the benefit France had rejected.

p Late in April 1934 the Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, A. Leger informed the Soviet Embassy in Paris about the outline (sketch) for the pact proposed by the Soviet Union to be formalised as a treaty. The idea behind that outline was to conclude a multilateral regional pact of mutual assistance (Eastern Pact) with the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic states in it and France out. The parties to the pact were to have pledged non-aggression and mutual assistance in the event of aggression. However, only the neighbouring states were to have afforded mutual assistance under the French scheme.

p Another idea was for the USSR and France to conclude a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance associated with the Eastern Pact as well as with the 1925 Pact of Locarno. Under that treaty, France would have afforded assistance to the Soviet Union, had it been attacked by any of the parties to the Eastern Pact; the Soviet Union would have come to France’s aid, had she been attacked by one of the Locarno nations. ^^12^^° (Besides France, the parties to the Pact of Locarno were Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium.)

p The outline worked out by the French Foreign Ministry narrowed down the obligations France was to have assumed in accordance with the Soviet proposal; she was committing herself to giving assistance to the USSR only rather than to all the parties to the Eastern Pact. True, France was hound by allied obligations also with Poland and Czechoslovakia under the treaties she had earlier concluded. But in the event of a German attack on Baltic states, France could have stayed out. The Soviet Charge d’Affaires in 59 France M. I. Rosenberg immediately drew A. Leger’s attention to that flaw in the scheme he had proposed. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry replied that the French government could not assume any obligation regarding aid to the Baltic countries.

p The draft treaty worked out by the French Foreign Ministry differed from the Soviet proposal also in that it provided for Germany to join the Pact as well. Naturally, such a modification could complicate the negotiations about the Pact right away, but, considering the importance which the French government attached (partly under the influence of Britain and Poland) to Germany being offered to join the Pact, the Soviet government did not object to its proposal being so amended.

p In his conversations with Louis Barthou on June 4, 1934, Litvinov reverted to the issue of aid to the Baltic countries. The French Minister found the Soviet arguments convincing, but gave no final answer to them. The draft Eastern Pact was examined on June 5, 1934, at a French Cabinet meeting which approved it in principle. ^^121^^ But on the question of guarantees for the Baltic countries, it took up a negative stand. Barthou communicated this decision to the Soviet Foreign Minister on the following day.

p The Soviet government continued, however, to insist on French guarantees being extended to the Baltic states and objected to the division of the parties to the Pact into neighbours and non-neighbours since no aid for the latter was envisaged. In the end, the French government recanted such a division but it still refused to commit itself to aiding the Baltic states. With the major issues regarding the conclusion of the Eastern Pact settled between the French and Soviet representatives, it was decided to start negotiations with the governments of other nations which were to join the Pact.

p The outline-text of the Pact consisted of a treaty of regional mutual assistance, a treaty between the USSR and France as well as a General Act. It was envisaged that Poland, the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be parties to the treaty of regional mutual assistance. Tlie treaty, apart from committing the parlies concerned to aid each other in the event of aggression, provided i’or their consultations with a view to preventing war or restoring peace. Under the Soviet-French 60 Treaty, the USSR was to become a guarantor of the 192,> Pact of Locarno, on a par with Britain and Italy. France committed herself to assisting the USSR in the event of an attack against it by any of the parties to the Eastern Pact. Under the General Act, the Eastern Pact was to have come into effect once the USSR joined the League of Nations.

p While informing the Soviet ambassadors in the countries concerned about the outline-text of the Pact, the Soviet Foreign People’s Commissar emphasised that it was not a draft but a mere outline handed to him by the French in Geneva. In his letter he noted, in particular, that it was worthwhile including a definition of aggression in the regional pact. The People’s Commissar took the view that Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic countries, havhig signed the convention about the definition of aggression, "can hardly object to this amendment. Nor is France likely to oppose it, but Germany must be expected to resist it." ^^122^^

p First of all, France informed Czechoslovakia and Poland about the draft Eastern Pact. On June 6, 1934, the Soviet ambassadors brought the negotiations to the knowledge of the governments of the Baltic countries. On the following day, the proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact was passed on to the German government by the French Ambassador.

p Active Soviet efforts for peace and security in Europe had led to a general improvement of Soviet-Czechoslovak as well as Soviet-Romanian relations by that time. In earlier years, the governments of Czechoslovakia and Romania, with such influential leaders as Benes and Titulescu, invariably held extremely anti-Soviet positions. With the independence of both countries threatened by the Nazi Reich, they had to revise their policies regarding the USSR which was the principal fighter against Hitler aggression. By an exchange of notes on June 9, 1934, the USSR established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Romania.

On being proposed to conclude the Eastern Pact, the Czechoslovak government immediately announced that it accepted this proposal and was ready to join the Pact, even in the event of Germany opposing it.