p With the establishment of Soviet-American diplomatic relations, the USSR sought to invite the U.S. to play its part in stabilising the situation in the Far East. The Soviet government considered it necessary to conclude a 40 Pacific pact to this end. It took into account the fact that the consolidation of peace in the Far East would create optimal conditions for the maintenance of peace in Europe, and, conversely, a war in the Far East would rouse other aggressor powers to action as well.

p The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed in a conversation with French statesmen on July 6, 1933 that "if one wants peace in Europe, one cannot stand by looking indiflerently at the events in Asia" since any conflict in the Far East can be used by Germany and some other countries "in order to create difficulties in Europe." ^^84^^

p The Soviet Union, on its part, held a firm position with regard to the aggressive plans and ambitions of the Japanese militarists.

p The Soviet government took into account the fact that the Japanese war party was guiding itself with increasing evidence towards a "prospect for a preventive war against the Soviet Union”. "In the face of such a situation, our policy,” the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in Japan, K. K. Yurenev on September 17, 1933, "while keeping up our basic commitment to peace, cannot be one of concessions and favours to Japanese militarists or one of ignoring the acts of provocation and outrage which the Japanese government is indulging in. We are projecting and pursuing a firm line of resisting Japanese importunities.. ..” Such a line follows from the assumption, the letter pointed out, that "we can offer quite effective resistance if the worst comes to the worst, that is, if Japanese militarists really tried to attack the Soviet Union. Because of the measures we have taken in the last two years or so, we do not find ourselves by any means defenceless in case of the enemy’s attempt to put us on our mettle." ^^85^^

p In the Far East Japan, as stated earlier on, threatened not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. interest as well. Roosevelt did not conceal in his conversations with Litvinov in Washington, during the talks about the establishment of diplomatic relations, that America was seriously concerned over the aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists. In that connection, the Soviet representative suggested that it would be expedient to have a Pacific non-aggression pact concluded by the USSR, the U.S., China and Japan, but Roosevelt limited himself to instructing Bullitt to deal with the matter and report to him.

p The People’s Commissar suggested during the conversations with the U.S. President that the USSR and the U.S. could likewise conclude an agreement on joint action to meet a threat to peace. However, President Roosevelt declared that he preferred to make unilateral declarations whenever necessary. So, the U.S. gave no support either to that far-reaching Soviet proposal which, if accepted by the U.S., could have changed the worsening international situation for the better.

p So these facts indicate that the Soviet government was ready and willing to establish active co-operation with the U.S. in opposing Japanese aggression, but the U.S. government did not intend to take really effective steps against the aggressors at the time, and hoped that Japan would begin by going to war against the USSR, and that would make the U.S. position easier. The American journalist Knickerboker who had close contact with Bullitt and other influential American officials, told a Soviet diplomat in Berlin in November 1933 that the U.S. did not contemplate effective co-operation with the USSR in opposing Japanese aggression. That was due, in part, to a fear of an eventual full victory of the USSR over Japan and a revolutionary outburst in Japan and China. ^^86^^

p In the very first conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Bullitt on December 11, 1933, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Soviet government, reiterated the Soviet proposals for concluding a Pacific Pact and for possible co-operation between the USSR and the U.S. to meet a threat of war. However, Bullitt passed it over. Two days later the same issues were discussed between Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. M. Karakhan and Bullitt. Recording the U.S. Ambassador’s remarks in bis transcript, Karakhan pointed out that one could guess from Bullitt’s words that a study of the question of a Pacific Pact in Washington had Jed to " negative conclusions”. A few days later Bullitt told the People’s Commissar that he foresaw "great difficulties" about the matter. The Soviet government still considered it necessary to press for the conclusion of the Pacific Pact. Troyanovsky, appointed as Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. in December 1933, was instructed to "uphold the desirability of the proposal for a non-aggression pact to be concluded between the USSR, the U.S., Japan and China."^^87^^

p On February 23, 1934, Troyanovsky was received by President Roosevelt. The Soviet Ambassador said that it was desirable for the USSR and the U.S. to co-operate in opposing Japanese aggression. He pointed out that "it will not be an easy thing to deter Japan and get her to reduce her appetites. Japan will not listen either to America or to the USSR separately, but she will listen to them both even at the eleventh hour, that is why we must be in contact."^^88^^ Roosevelt, however, dodged the subject. The issue of the Pacific Pact was once more raised by Litvinov with Bullitt in March 1934 after the U.S. Ambassador returned from a trip to the U.S. However, Bullitt "has not given a reasonable answer". ^^89^^

p By the spring of 1934 it had become obvious that Japan did not yet consider herself sufficiently prepared for war against the Soviet Union. That was indicated, for example, by the fact that the Japanese government had chosen China as the main target of her further aggression. On April 17, 1934, it published a statement clearly indicative of her intention to establish her control over all of China to the extent of crowding out Britain, France and the U.S. In that connection, the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out in a letter of May 11, 1934, to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that, as British political circles believed, the general strengthening of the USSR, its achievement in international affairs, and the defence measures it was taking in the Far East, above all, its powerful Air Force capable of wiping out Japan’s major centres in a matter of hours, all those facts persuaded the Japanese ruling establishment that to attack the Soviet Union under those objective circumstances would be a rather risky enterprise.^^90^^ Although the immediate danger of Japan attacking the USSR was no longer there, the Soviet Union went on pressing for the Pacific Pact to be concluded. On May 13, 1934, Litvinov told W. Bullitt that so long as the U.S. and Britain stuck to their policies in the Far East, Japan could do whatever she pleased. "The only effective method of restricting the Japanese is to arrange at once joint action by all powers having interest in the Pacific." ^^91^^

p However, the U.S. government did not support the Soviet proposals for strengthening peace in the Far East, while keeping up its policy of abetting Japanese aggression.

The British government considered concluding a bilateral 43 treaty of non-aggression with Japan so as, by ensuring its self-seeking interests in the Far Fast, to push Japan into armed action against the USSR. It was Chamberlain acting for Premier Baldwin while he was on leave, who took the initiative on September 1, 1934. Even some of the Foreign Office staff had serious doubts about the expediency of such a move. The Chief of the Far Eastern Department, Orde, pointed out in his memorandum on the subject that such a pact "will surely bring nearer the day when she will attack Russia”. However, Japan’s aggressive ambitions were directed not only against Russia and so it was "after a successful settling of accounts with Russia and a pause for recovery that Japan may become a real danger to our own possessions in the Far East." ^^92^^ The British ambassador to Japan was instructed to find out the price Japan was ready to pay in return for Britain’s consent to conclude a pact that was of so much benefit to Japan. Chamberlain and Simon took up the cudgels for a pact with Japan.^^93^^ However, because of the impending talks with Japan on matters arising from her reluctance to prolong the existing agreements about the balance of the naval forces of the imperialist powers, the negotiations with her on that subject were adjourned.