p The normalisation of Soviet-American relations was one of the major problems of Soviet foreign policy. Describing U.S. policy, Litvinov said at a session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR that America had for many years "carried on the war declared by the capitalist world after the October Revolution against the new Soviet system of state aiming to create a socialist society. That was a war against the peaceful coexistence of the two systems".^^76^^ The growing intensity of American-Japanese contradictions in Asia and in the Pacific and the increased danger of an armed conflict between Japan and the U.S. compelled the American ruling circles, however, to change their attitude to the USSR. Some convincing arguments in favour of diplomatic relations with the USSR were produced by the American Nation magazine: "The Russian issue is very real 36 today, and must be faced immediately . .. recognition already means more to the United States than to the Soviet Union.... Mr. Hoover’s attitude on Russia has jeopardized the position of the United Stales in the Paciiic area, where the fate of nations may he decided during the next decade. If his policy is not quickly reversed, the loss may be irretrievable. ... Now America needs Russia’s aid in the Pa- cific." ^^77^^

p The absence of any contact with the USSR in international affairs could not but weaken the U.S. position in front of Japan. This issue gave rise to a good deal of controversy in the U.S. ruling circles. It was summed up most clearly by the Washington Post on December 30, 1933: the basic argument in favour of recognition is that a strong Russia would be an effective counterweight to Japan in East Asia and would, therefore, lessen the danger of war between Japan and the U.S. The strongest argument against recognition is that it would strengthen Russia and in that way help her preach Communism of which she is the birthplace.

p Large sections of American opinion, including influential industrial and commercial quarters interested in expanding economic links with the Soviet Union were pressing hard for diplomatic relations to be opened with the USSR.

p At the same time, there were still quite influential forces at work in the U.S. against the recognition of the USSR. When Secretary of State Henry Stimson was advised in 1932 to meet the Soviet delegate at the Disarmament Conference, he, raising his hands, exclaimed: "Never, never! It will be centuries before America recognises the Soviet Union”. As Henry Morgenthau, who was then in the U.S. government, pointed out in his reminiscences: "The State Department in 1933, frankly, was unsympathetic, if not hostile to the whole idea of opening relations with the Soviet Union" ^^78^^

p Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became U.S. President early in 1933, found it right and proper to take the initiative in normalising relations with the Soviet Union. The basic factor that made it imperative for the United Slates and, especially at that particular moment, to change its mind about opening relations with the USSR, was the threat to U.S. interests from Japanese aggressors in the Far East.   [36•* 

p The consistently peace-seeking character of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet Union’s increasingly active involvement in the resolution of pressing international problems, including its readiness to make a sizable contribution towards combating aggressors, and the rapid growth of the Soviet Union’s strength and international prestige played an important part in compelling the ruling circles of the United States to decide that they had to co-operate with the USSR. Information about the importance the U.S. was attaching to relations with the USSR appeared in the American press over and over again. The New York Times stated in January 1933 that relations between the U.S. and Japan were extremely strained. The policy of nonrecognition of the USSR drastically weakened the U.S. position in the Far East. The League of Nations and the U.S. would not be in a position to establish a proper relationship with Japan if they maintained a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union which was the third side to the Pacific triangle.

p On May 16, 1933, two months after it came into office, the new American government established its first direct contact with the USSR. On that day, Franklin Roosevelt sent his messages to the 53 heads of state participating in the World Economic Conference in London, and the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, including the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin. Urging specific moves to strengthen peace, the U.S. President called for all nations to conclude a non-aggression pact between them. Kalinin’s message in reply to Roosevelt, which was sent three days later, contained a brief account of the Soviet Union’s consistent action for peace and disarmament. "The Soviet Government”, the message said, "has concluded non-aggression pacts with most of the nations it has official relations with and it cannot but welcome your 38 proposal for concluding a non-aggression pact by all na- tions." ^^79^^

p Considering that certain powers, above all Japan and Germany, were harbouring land-grabbing plans, there was no prospect, however, for Roosevelt’s offer coming to fruition.

p Roosevelt’s message had no tangible effect either for concluding a general non-aggression treaty, with the USSR and the U.S. among the parties to it, or for direct contact being established between the two countries in international affairs.

p On October 10, Roosevelt sent a second message to Kalinin to say that he thought it desirable to put an end to the "abnormal situation" between the U.S. and the USSR. He expressed his readiness to discuss the matter with a representative of the Soviet government. Replying, Kalinin pointed out that the abnormal state of relations between the two countries had an ill effect on the overall international situation, impeding the consolidation of peace and encouraging the aggressors. The message said that Litvinov had been appointed to represent the Soviet government in the talks with Roosevelt.^^80^^

p The exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Kalinin fetched a widespread response. The Soviet press noted with satisfaction that this meant putting an end to the 16- yearold period of non-recognition of the USSR by the United States of America. On October 21, Pravda said in a leading article that the Soviet Union occupied too prominent a position in the world for it to be any longer ignored by other countries "without doing damage to themselves”. The American press highlighted the positive effect which the normalisation of Soviet-American relations might have on the situation in the Far East. For example, the New York American newspaper wrote on September 27 that if Japan ever intended to establish her domination of the Pacific, violate American rights or threaten American territory on the islands or in the continent, America would have an ally, or at least, a friend in the person of Russia. The San Francisco Chronicle pointed out on October 21 that it was, above all, the situation in the Far East that had prompted Roosevelt to take that step.

p Isolated voices of American opponents of establishing relations with the USSR were drowned in a loud chorus of those who favoured a change of the United States’ earlier 39 manifestly bankrupt policy towards the Soviet Union.

p As a result of Litvinov’s talks with Roosevelt, there was an exchange of notes in Washington on November 16, 1933, formalising the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the U.S. The notes recorded the hope that relations between the two nations would forever remain normal arid friendly and that the two nations "henceforth may co-operate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world". ^^81^^

p For the United Stales to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR meant admitting the failure of its policy of ignoring the world’s first socialist state. So farsighted a politician as Roosevelt could not have failed to take steps towards ending the abnormal situation that existed at the time, and revise U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union. "It is necessary to do justice to President Roosevelt’s farsighted approach”, Litvinov said, "because soon after taking office or, perhaps, even before that, he saw the futility of any further action against us for the sake of capitalism, and the benefit of relations with us for the sake of American national interests and those of international peace."^^82^^

The Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Seventeenth Party Congress described the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. as an essential achievement of the Soviet policy of peace. "There can be no doubt”, J. V. Stalin said in the Report, "that this act is one of most serious importance in the entire system of international relations. The point is that it does not only serve to increase the chances of peace-keeping, improve relations between the two countries, strengthen trading links between them and create a base for mutual co-operation. It is a landmark between the old times when the U.S. was seen in different countries as a base of support for all kinds of anti-Soviet trends, and the new times when this base has been removed by its own good will from the way to the mutual advantage of both nations." ^^83^^