p We continue to outline our conclusions drawn from an analysis of the notion of morality itself. Making no claim to make a precise definition of morality, we will focus only upon 32 those features of the individual’s morality which to us would appear to be essential.
p First, morality presupposes not only the conscious act (including a judgement), but also its evaluation or at least the possibility of evaluating it, that is to say, the apprehension of a relationship between the completed or intended action and a corresponding system of values (the notions of good, necessary, norms, and goals). Otherwise, even given the consciousness of one’s action, the individual does not know what he does, just as a child may not understand that he is behaving poorly. A she-animal heroically defends her offspring; heroism was also displayed by primitive savages. But a complete moral evaluation of an act requires an apprehension of the goal to which it was directed.
p Second, morality presupposes a correlation of values, judgements and actions with the consciousness borne by others; it is a social phenomenon. The notion of a moral code held by an isolated individual is lacking in content.
p Third, morality presupposes at least a minimal fulfilment in corresponding activities. Limited strictly to the sphere of moral consciousness, it would remain a "thing in itself”, devoid of reality. Even expressed only through speech it already acquires reality which can be assessed as either moral judgement or hypocrisy.
p The fourth feature of morality consists in the possibility, of choice (If only a conceivable one). If this possibility be lacking, it is impossible to speak of morality.
p Finally, a particular feature of morality resides in what we may call the axiomatic or unconditional imperative. As long as discussion is underway and arguments as well as opportunities are being weighed, moral consciousness does not emerge in a pure form. But there comes a moment of decision and action, when an individual may even act in defiance of reason, obeying moral dictates which have a more profound justification. This internal moral conviction rests upon feeling and is above all the result of having mastered the experiences proffered by one’s life in society.
p The “cellule” in which morality emerges in the unity of consciousness and action is the act—conscious and completed action or activity of the individual. The act is formed of the following: the goal or intentions; the plan of their implementation; the inducement or will which transform one’s intentions into actions; the comprehension of the latter by the individual. Goal, plan and will refer to the consciousness; activity completes the transition from consciousness to results and 33 consequences, and the latter return to react upon the consciousness. We have before us, in a formal sense, the usual feedback system.
p Besides the entire complex of external conditions, the subject of morality remains outside the confines of the given scheme, i.e., the individual himself performing the act (he is also a condition of his own activity), the considerations prompting him to advance the given goal, his value orientation, his subconscious strivings, his abilities, character, and sheer physical capacity. Behind all this, of course, stand the social conditions influencing the personality of the individual, but they “act” here through him. This is often ignored and frequently, complaining of circumstances, one overlooks the possibility that it is precisely oneself that is the “condition” interfering with the completion of one’s good intentions; through indolence, cowardice, incompetence or, as it happens, stupidity.
In the scheme of the act which we have presented morality is directly incorporated in the goal. The plan determines that which must be done to achieve the goal. Correspondingly, action emerges as an imperative defined by the goal. The imperative posited by morality is called the duty. In the moral sense action is duty-bound. In the realm of inducement to action appear those which we call moral and volitional qualities, by which we indicate the ability to transform intent into action (or conversely, into restraint). Action includes the subjective (determining consciousness) and the objective (the external action itself), through which the subjective intention “transforms” into its result. Therefore the moment of transfer to action (the moment of will) occupies a special place: it resembles a switch, releasing the current of moral intentions into external matter. The results and consequences themselves in their objectivity are located beyond the confines of morality. But they return through perception: the individual sees what he has done and reacts in one way or another to the results of his act.
Notes