CONCERNING THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN COGNITION AND MORALITY
p The scheme for the action, outlined above, may be isolated from morality: it describes any purposeful activity. The given scheme, therefore, depicts the elementary process of cognition 34 and of verification through practice, in a word, the most simple of experiments. Further, the goal of the experiment is knowledge: for this reason it is important to follow the results of the experiment and to draw from it the corresponding conclusions. In the instance of the moral act, this aspect is of a secondary nature. In any case the results and consequences are apprehended if not by he who initiated the act, at least by other people. Thus the moment of cognition is unavoidable.
p The original unity of the moral and cognitive aspects of practice is reflected in words such as “truth” which expresses the notions of objective verity and moral rectitude. The same may be said of the meanings of the words “law” and “obligation”. In this original unity we may also locate the source and foundation of the connection between science and morality, they are both the outgrowth of the development of two interrelated aspects of human practice
p The same original interconnection is located in the goal—the initial point for activity. The goal represents the unity of two aspects: the subjective and the objective. On a subjective level there is that which is desirable, that, in other words, which appears to the individual as good and that which he wishes to achieve. On the objective level there is that which is possible; that which may be implemented, or which at least appears feasible to the individual. An assessment of possibility is determined by knowledge. When an individual determines a goal for himself he regards achievement of this goal as possible. He would not set as a goal that which he firmly knew to be unattainable.
p Our idea of what is good is also conditioned by knowledge. The satisfaction of hunger is undoubtedly “good” but it may turn out to be harmful for the hungry person if he eats too much too fast. It is important to know this. The examples could be multiplied.
p Therefore, links are contained in the striving for good on the one hand, and knowledge on the other; contained in the very purposeful nature of practical activity and in its role for cognition. Activity is directed towards the good, but the very notion of good or evil, the assessment of the feasibility of a goal and of harmfulness or usefulness depend upon the knowledge which one has acquired. Cognition, that is science, is prompted by the same striving for the good which stimulates morality; both are directed to identical notions of social usefulness. Thus the intrinsic connection between science and morality lies at their very roots. The core of this connection resides in the 35 unity of subjective-objective and desired-possible which is inherent in the notion of a goal.
p Morality presupposes consciousness. It evolves as people become aware or the effects of their actions and develop sanctions against that which brings about harm as well as work out measures to encourage that which is useful. The origin of ethics lies, therefore, in the perception of consequence—in the last link in our scheme of the action, the link including cognition (it goes without saying, cognition not only by the individual performing the act, but also by other people). The first link in the scheme—the goal ana the phenomenon of goaldetermination in itself—developed from instinctive and reflex strivings, from guiding elements which focus the activity on the achievement of an external object. The awareness of these strivings also provides the most elementary conscious goal. .
p But indeed “awareness” is simply the transition from perception or emotional experience to knowledge. "The way in which consciousness is, and in which something is for it, is knowing.” [35•1 Therefore in a trivial fashion moral consciousness begins with knowledge. Morality is developed in accordance with the degree of the individual’s consciousness of activities and the ensuing results, in accordance with human mutual interrelations and individual needs. Morality reflects their being. That which distinguishes morality from science therefore does not consist in the assertion that science reflects reality whereas morality does not.
p The difference resides in the nature of this reflection. Knowledge—the statement of objective being—is the product of science. In turn, morality, through knowledge, develops imperatives. For science, being is presented only in the form of an object. Morality, on the other hand, gives expression to the subject itself; it reflects his drives, interests, etc. Consequently it addresses its imperatives to the subject, to his consciousness, through which it guides his behaviour.
p The reflection of reality in ethics is often distorted by false and fantastic notions. In the same vein knowledge is distorted and continues to be distorted by spurious theories and opinions. The movement of cognition from mythological explanations of events to quasi-scientific and later, to fully scientific explanations is continuous; the principles of science are in a state of development. The same process marks the 36 liberation of morality from religioi s and mythological thought patterns.
p However the scientific self-knowledge gained by man trails behind his knowledge of the world about. When the laws of mechanics were discovered no science of man and society in the true sense of the word existed. But in the last hundred years man’s self-knowledge has been firmly grounded in the soil of science. Consequently, morality is to an ever greater degree derived from this scientific self-knowledge (of both the individual and society). This connection is not a simple one; the process referred to does not proceed smoothly. But this does not serve as a basis for a denial of the fact that the progress of science and the related development of a scientific view of the world inevitably engenders a scientific approach to the problems of morality, the more so when science exerts an ever more active influence upon public life.
p We must further take into account that one of the conditions giving definition to the notion of morality is the opportunity for choice (both the awareness of the opportunity for choice and the actual opportunity). To bring about this choice a correlation between consciousness and real possibilities is essential. Otherwise the choice may be aborted or may lead to undesired effects. To put it in other words, actual freedom of choice is ensured by knowledge. The role of knowledge as the condition for real freedom has been long known: freedom is indeed the capacity and opportunity to act intelligently. Extensive knowledge is afforded by science—the knowledge of conformities and regularities. Therefore an advanced morality providing a pre-established approach to activity in any given complex situation would be inconceivable without science.
p Knowledge, by establishing the possible and the impossible, thereby defines when a conceivable good is realistic or unrealistic. Thus although knowledge does not define good and evil as such and does not strictly determine the choice made by the individual, it nevertheless does define the boundaries of the possible within which choice is confined. The expansion of knowledge widens the frontiers describing that to which an individual may approach consciously and, consequently, the range of conscious choice. In other words, knowledge expands the perimeter of morality. At the same time that cognition expands the real opportunities it dismisses imaginary possibilities. This in turn exerts its influence on the realm and the content of morality. Thus religious and Utopian 37 aspirations give way to more realistic and science-based perspectives. The direct influence of knowledge on the moral sphere is supplemented by that exerted through the embodiment of scientific results in practice, by alterations in human life with the consequent reflection of these changes in new moral problems ana notions.
p In real life the individual often takes into account only superficial opportunities, thereby risking overlooking real possibilities. Avoidance of these extremes is possible only given the guidance of that which directs the scholar; namely the bringing to bear of existing knowledge, the attempt to expand this knowledge and to avoid the creation of absolutes.
p Science, by uncovering the laws of reality thereby describes that which is in principle possible as that which is in agreement with these laws. Conversely, it describes that which is in principle impossible as that which stands in contradiction to these laws. To hope to achieve any given result in defiance of the laws of nature and of social development is in effect to hope for a miracle. To advance goals of this type, when the corresponding laws are already known, is absurd, and from our point of view, immoral.
p Before a science of society had been developed, the laws of human relations and behaviour were expressed in moral precepts such as "sow the wind and reap the whirlwind”. The science of man and of society provides—and in the future will provide—more precise and profound imperatives, but the substance of the ties between knowledge and ethics remains the same as that expressed in the folk wisdom of old.
To conclude, knowledge exerts a very considerable influence on the sphere of morality for it widens the boundaries of that to which an individual may consciously address himself, it gives focus- to real, and dismisses imaginary possibilities, demonstrates possible consequences and provides new means for the achievement of goals; unreal goals are dismissed but new goals appear and are shown to be realistic. As an offshot the depth and content underlying the notion of good is changed as is the system of values pertaining to the definition of morality. It is sufficient to juxtapose the value systems of the Christian believer anci the Marxist to understand the scale of the changes introduced in this sphere by scientific knowledge.
Notes
[35•1] K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 159.