7

p The pertinence and vital import of the classic problem of science and morality are obvious not only to scholars but also to people whose occupations are far removed from science. Both scientists and laymen are concerned today with the interrelationship between science and morality. The situation determining the scope of interaction within the conditions set by the scientific and technological revolution is a unique and to a substantial degree “unprecedented” one. This provides us with the opportunity of looking at this traditional philosophical problem from a somewhat new perspective.

p In our century’ science has ceased to be the "private business" of the scientists. It is now entered into the “budget” of “debits” and “credits” of society as a whole. Science is silently and imperceptibly entering directly into production. It is modifying trie daily life and habits of human beings and winning an important position in the hierarchy of social consciousness. The further from the point of origin—- thefaster the motion. This proposition of Frederick Engels’ is applicable not only to the development of production but to contemporary science as well. Much depends upon progress in science and technology: to no small extent trie progress of human civilization as a whole and the implementation of the vast plans for the communist transformation of society are predicated upon this progress.

p However, other facts are just as indisputable. The growing interference of science in all spheres of human existence and, second, the scientific and technological revolution, having embraced within the last decades the basic production 8 spheres—have had the effect of making many moral problems yet more acute.

p Modern science is developing under the influence of both internal and external factors and at times touching upon into the political world and the fundamental interests or millions of people. Under bourgeois society the increasingly “ technological” profile of knowledge and the industrialization of science itself carries with it the danger of de-humanizing science; its achievements are perceived by many as bearing simultaneously both extraordinary good and evil. There is nothing surprising in the fact that more and more people are beginning to give serious thought to questions which at an earlier point in time were the privileged domain of a narrow circle of professional philosophers: what is the humanistic mission of science, what relationship does it have to the well-being and happiness of the human individual, is society capable of coping with the material and spiritual forces brougnt to the surface by science, is science “controllable”, can we properly manage the utilization of scientific achievements?

p These questions are being persistently posed, often in a dramatic form, by people of the most varied persuasions. Here for example, is now they are phrased in trie writings of an outstanding scientist, one of the leaders of the International Union for the Preservation of the Environment (L’Union Internationale pour la protection de la nature) Jean Dorst:

p “We are quite justified in asking ourselves what is the value of a technological civilization. Each of us has at one time or another had the sensation that we are riding on a fast train that is out of control and from which it is impossible to disengage. We don’t know where it is taking us, perhaps to a land of milk and honey, but perhaps to a dead end, to catastrophe in other words.... Man has played the role of sorcerer’s apprentice and evoked life processes which he cannot control.”

p Further on he writes:

p “The degree of civilization is measured not only by the number of kilowatts of energy produced by energy sources. It is measured above all by a large number of criteria of a moral and spiritual nature, and by the wisdom of the individuals participating in a civilization ... in full harmony with the laws of nature from which man will never escape.”   [8•1 

p Max Born, the eminent physicist, has stated the problem in a no less dramatic manner by touching directly upon the moral 9 and ethical aspects of the problem. In his words, in our technological century science has acquired social, economic and political functions. Modern science and technology is developing at a constantly accelerating pace and has changed beyond recognition the profile of human civilization. Without denying the social, human usefulness of scientific and technological achievements, Born at the same time draws our attention to the process, accompanying the scientific and technological revolution, of the collapse of all ethical principles which had been created over the centuries and which ’had permitted man to preserve a dignified way of life even during the height of savage warfare and universal destruction. Born regards as most dangerous, threatening, and perhaps “irrepairable” the effects of the active intrusion of science and technology into the sphere of human life.

p Born and Dorst may be criticized for underestimating the social and class aspect of this problem which caused widespread concern—problem the resolution of which depends in the final result not upon science, or more precisely, not upon science alone. But the sense of unease conveyed by these scientists is indisputably widespread. The contradiction existing between a technological civilization and the spiritual culture of society, as well as between the level of “knowledge” and of moral “consciousness”, is by no means a pessimist’s stroke of imagination. It goes without saying that the conclusions drawn by Dorst and Born may seem insufficiently optimistic, particularly to those who see in the attainment of material wealth a panacea for social ills as a whole and an end in itself, who are inclined to turn the “knowledge” factor into a fetish, and who measure progress in terms of the level of comfort achieved and number of civilized “toys” accumulated. But if optimism is based upon the analysis of real factors, if faith in progress is to be freed from the fashionable illusion that science and technology are capable of resolving all of the fundamental contradictions of social existence, then these apprehensions must be recognized as well-founded and reasonable. Given the background of “apocalyptic” attitudes and views, which have been widely disseminated in the bourgeois world, the endeavour to defend the moral and spiritual criteria of progress, accumulated through the sufferings and triumphs of thousands of years of human history, takes on special value. This is true above all when the authors of the appeal to accountability before man are themselves scientists.

10

p Many scientists in the twentieth century, including Timiryazev, Joliot-Curie, Einstein and Wiener, insisted on the importance of providing a moral justification for further progress in science and technology. Helping lay the groundwork for modern science, they were also disturbed over the fate of human civilization. Far from considering the evolving situation in science as natural and normal, they emphasized, each in his own way, the dependence of scientific knowledge and activity upon social conditions and upon the moral state of society. With a feeling of trepidation and malaise Frederic Joliot-Curie wrote:

p “Scientists are aware of the beneficial impact science has had upon society; they also know what could be achieved if only peace reigned supreme on earth. They wish that the phrase could never be pronounced that ’science is leading us to destruction by the atomic and hydrogen bombs’. Scientists know that science cannot be guilty. The finger of guilt should be pointed at those who employ the achievements of science to malicious ends.”   [10•1 

p Scientific cognition—the accumulation of more and more profound knowledge—is a process carried out, as is well known, to subordinate reality to the power and interests of mankind. The authentic scientist, then, cannot avoid being disturbed by the human—and humanitarian—meaning of that which takes place behind the facade of the "drama of ideas”. The divergence between the true and the good is perceived by him as a social problem impossible to dismiss by references to “professional” impartiality. This was well understood by Norbert Wiener, who was disturbed by certain tendencies emerging in the evolution of cybernetics, the science he created, and by Albert Einstein, who more than once insisted upon the priority of moral criteria in the evaluation of the work and profile of the scholar.

p Addressing their attention to the social-ethical side of scientific activity, outstanding scholars have in mind not only the feasibility of the inhuman application of the achievements of science and technology.

p To be sure, science is a powerful weapon for the liberation of mankind, demanding from society responsible and competent application. But is it really possible to limit the humanitarian meaning of the problem to the sphere of application of scientific achievements alone, without touching upon the 11 modes of thought and methodology employed by the scientist? The striving toward a cognition of the essence of any given factor, subject, or phenomenon forces the scientist to remove himself from his individual human experience and to “talk” in the language of the object under examination. In other words the individual with his concrete interests and needs “ disappears” from the field of vision of the natural scientist to be replaced by machines, algorithms, formulae, etc. When the epistemology of a given scientific approach to the world is turned into an absolute the result is an impoverishment and emasculation of the humanitarian content of the creative activity of the scientist, in turn engendering in the latter spurious conceptions concerning his social “impartiality”.

p The history of science, including modern science, is rich in examples of selfless efforts made by scientists to defend the humanitarian import of their labours. Therefore we must separate ourselves from attempts to heap the blame for one or another social woe on science and scientists for it has become fashionable to represent them as the most probable cause of all conceivable human woes and misfortunes. The idea is not a new one—suffice it to recall Rousseau’s reply to L’Academic de Dijon, casting blame for the decline of morals upon science and art. Much time as well as theoretical and practical experience were required before the guilt for social misfortune could be accurately located in the inhuman bourgeois system. Does it make any sense to repeat the errors of the past?

p Without calling into doubt the noble intentions of Rousseau we wonder, however, whether it is necessary to argue that it is precisely the true opponents of human progress who are today above all interested in the advancements of similar exaggerated claims concerning the “guilt” of science.

p It must be underscored that the pure subordination of morality to science (or the reverse) has little explanatory value concerning their interrelation in the contemporary world. The Marxist formulation of the question proposes the examination of this interaction as it applies to the fate of human activity as such. In this light we will clearly see the unbalanced nature of the extremely widespread train of thought, according to which scientific and technological progress exerts an influence on morality by engendering in moral consciousness and behaviour a given set of consequences, whereas morality serves merely as an object of encroachments on the part of science and technology. But isn’t it possible that ethics has something 12 to say in answer, since it also makes a significant contribution to societal progress?

p The myth of a scientific threat is one of the forms of a "substitution manoeuvre" which we encounter even today. In the capitalist countries the propagation of this myth, as a rule, provokes no serious objections on the part of the powers that be. The contemporary bourgeoisie eagerly supports the establishment of “scientism”, that is to say, an abstract approach to scientific problems placed at a remove from real needs and interests of the real, concrete historical individual. It must be confessed, certain results have been achieved. The ideas stemming from ethical relativism have sunk deep roots in the consciousness of many bourgeois scholars, philosophers, and natural scientists today. Bearing an interest in the results of the scientist’s labour, the contemporary bourgeoisie takes every opportunity to propagate its version of the “immorality” of scientific knowledge. In a time of unceasing assaults upon “traditional” morality which allegedly has not held up to the ordeals of our “unstable” "illogical century (at this point allusions are often made to Auschwitz and Hiroshima), bourgeois theoreticians by means of a not very skillful argumentation try to bring us to the conclusion that science and scientists can consider themselves free of moral concerns and obligations before society. Thus the dispute over science and morality acquires a clearly articulated ideological character.

p Among scientists living and working in bourgeois society there are many who find themselves in agreement with Joliot-Curie, Einstein or Wiener in the effort to maintain rigorous humanitarian standards in scientific activity. However we must not forget that other types exist—those natural and particularly social scientists who have quite consciously and candidly placed themselves at the service of the ruling class. We refer to people like Edward Teller, the physicist, or William Vogt, the neo-Malthusian philosopher, who make no effort to conceal their reactionary and anti-humanitarian views. We refer to those whom Lenin pitilessly defined as the scholarly bailiffs of the capitalist class. For them naturally, the question of the moral responsibility of science does not even arise. Karl Marx; evaluating the principal difference between the classic writer of English political economy, David Ricardo, and the reactionary ideologue, Thomas Malthus, spoke of the "utter baseness" of the latter’s thought, about the fully justified loathing felt by the English working class towards Malthus; "the people’s instinct was correct here, in that they felt that he 13 was no man of science, but a bought advocate of their opponents, a shameless sycophant of the ruling classes.”  [13•1  Baseness of thought is an inevitable result of “scientific” activity directed against the interests of the individual and mankind as a wnole. A decisive pre-condition for the disappearance of such people from the sphere of science, wrote the founders of Marxism-Leninism, is the fundamental transformation of society on communist principles.

p Underscoring the transformative force imbedded in science in contemporary society, Marxism-Leninism, nevertheless, avoids the extreme of overestimating this force. To be sure, science enjoys a certain autonomy and is free to “dictate” its conditions. But, incorporated in the system of concrete historical and social relations, science itself is subject to the “dictates” of reality. Its sphere of competence is by no means unlimited, and its own development is in obvious dependence upon the social and class structure of society and the dominant ideology. The tragic situation in which the modern scientisthumanist can—and often does—find himself is inexplicable from the point of view of the laws of the development of knowledge as such. The explanation must be class-based, and the resolution—socio-political.

p With the victory of socialism the social conditions underlying the development of science are fundamentally altered. The well-being of man, the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people, the expansion of the creative capabilities of the individual—these are its basic goals and social import. In this sense socialism is the turning-point in science, the beginning of the re-orientation of its social functions, from the "production of things" to the "production of the human as such”.

p The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress states that "under socialism the fullest possible satisfaction of the people’s material and cultural requirements is the supreme aim of social production".  [13•2  This fully pertains to science as well since it is becoming to an ever greater extent a direct productive force in society. Its place in social life and role in the resolution of the most pressing tasks in the building of communism is expressed not only in enhanced efficiency and in progress achieved in socialist production, but also in the creation of the necessary conditions for the harmonious 14 development of the creative activity and capabilities of the Soviet people. Science—this was emphasized at the 24th Congress of the Party—is emerging as a powerful social and cultural force in the implementation of one of the major tasks in the building of communism, namely, the transformation of social relations, the moulding of a new man. This communist orientation given to science and determining the social and humanitarian meaning of scientific creativity under socialism, decisively alters the character of its interrelations with other forms or human activity—including, morality.

p Might it be argued then, as far as socialist society as a whole is concerned, that the question under discussion loses its relevance, that the proolem of the moral responsibility of scientist for the social effect of his own creative activity is in general erased from the agenda?

p As matters stand the belief in the indifference of science to moral questions has its advocates among certain Soviet scientists as well. The motives of a technocratic ideology, the turning of scientific knowledge into a fetish, and the underestimation of moral factors find support among scientific and technological intelligentsia. “Knowledge” is sometimes identified with “consciousness”, and’contrasted with “faith” and “convictions”. Attempts are made to interpret the domain of the moral in the individual and society from the position of an abstract and one-sided rationalism. Even in those instances when the connection between science and morality is recognized, as indisputable, we may encounter many dubious and simplistic judgements which in fact require a more critical evaluation.

p Thus, for example, the question of the relationship between science and morality touches upon essential aspects of the process of educating and bringing up the younger generation. Experience has demonstrated that the individual’s level of education by itself does not guarantee a high level of moral consciousness, that an identification of the cognitive and the moral-educative aspects in personality formation is just as erroneous as is the juxtaposition of these two aspects. Consequently, no matter how important the notion “ knowledge”, it must not be turned into an absolute. The direction and object of this knowledge, in other words the ideological and moral orientation, are the most important considerations.

p In this connection the proposition advanced by Lenin in the well-known speech "The Tasks of Youth Leagues" is extremely pertinent. In his words: "The entire purpose of training, educating and teaching the youth of today should be to imbue 15 them with communist ethics.”  [15•1  Does it follow that Lenin underestimated the significance of professional training for future specialists? It goes without saying, no. The question at hand is of another nature, the necessity of organically linking general education and instructions per se, on the one hand, and the tasks and goals of communist transformation of society on the other. This teaching and training should be free from one-sidedness and narrowness and contribute to the development of the truly creative individual clearly aware of his place and social role in society. Lenin posed the question of the moral underpinnings for education in the broadest sense: as not only the most important condition for the correct—full and harmonious—formation and development of the personality, but also as an essential condition for the implementation of the final goal—the building of communism. A developed moral culture and high ethical consciousness are not merely supplements to or embellishments on the “basic” profession of the individual but rather the expression of the authentic humane meaning of creative activity in a collectivist society. In reference to the system of “instruction” as such, Lenin proposes the organic unity of education, essential in both a professional and social sense.

p Another aspect of the same question is connected with the state and character of the development’of scientific knowledge itself. Max Born refers to the serious gap in "style of thought" between representatives of the humanities and natural sciences. As a result civilized society is, in his words, fractured into two groups: the one guided by traditional humanist principles and the other by ideas derived from the natural sciences. Born is sceptical about hopes for overcoming this gap by a "rationally balanced education”. He is without a doubt correct, since the latter is not capable of altering the "style of thought" as such, a style which reflects the objective state of science in a society dominated by alienation. The outstanding physicist is very close in his thoughts to those precisely formulated by Karl Marx. Describing science in the future communist society, Marx wrote: "Natural science will in time subsume under itself the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume under itself natural science: there will be one science.”  [15•2  We observe that this implies not the mechanical joining of the natural and social sciences (“humanities”), or the absorption of 16 one by the other, but rather the appearance of a science of a new quality, in which an orientation towards humanist values finds clear expression in the very subject matter of scientific cognition and activity In the theme under discussion, the formative process of this “umbrella” science, already under way in socialist society, must be conceived as a process reflecting ongoing changes in the object-activity of the personality and as a process of intensification of the active creative attitude of the human, both to the outside world and to himself.

p The points we have outlined above suggest the motivations which led the authors of the present work—natural scientists, philosophers, historians—to gather together to express their views on one of the most urgent problems facing the modern world. The book gives an impression of the nature and level of discourse centred upon this problem and conducted by Soviet scholars. Further, the authors made an effort to overcome certain shortcomings and misperceptions, connected, in particular, with our understanding of the notions “science” and “morality” as such. We often include in our conception of “science” only the natural, so-called “exact” sciences, and leave out of consideration the social (“humanist”) disciplines. Such a notion of the range of science, excluding from its boundaries those disciplines which study directly man and social relations, is in no way justified. It undermines in advance the substantiation of points of view derived therein. The same may be said of the various understandings of the notions “morality” and “ethics” which have left themselves to a wide range of interpretations. The authors of the present work take into consideration the complexity and imprecision of the theme under discussion and endeavour to the extent of their abilities to make a contribution to its further clarification.

p This collection of essays contains an analysis of the nodal points in the problem of science and morality. What correlation may be established between the truth and the good? What is the moral significance of science, its role in forming and perfecting social ethics? Where may we locate the moral factor in scientific knowledge and creativity and what are the boundaries describing the influence of morality upon the development of science?

p How do we define the moral responsibility of the scientist for the social effects of the application of the discoveries and achievements of science? The connection between science and morality is not limited to simple coordination, it bears an internally coordinated stamp—such is the central idea of the 17 book, the unifying thread of the articles. Differences in points of view are often quite substantial and extend to the very interpretation of the complex dialectic of the relationship between the two spheres of human activity within our concern. The book is written in such a fashion that the reader may, pursuing the development of the central idea shared by all of the authors, in so doing discern differences in attitude.

p This book is intended to stimulate discussion, it is polemical. The authors do not make any pretensions to possess the "ultimate truth”. On the contrary they believe that the problem in question stands in need of further discussion and theoretical elaboration. They hope that the proffered level of discussion will serve as a stimulus for further reflection and inquiry.

The choice of a polemical form of presentation was necessitated not only by the (not unimportant) circumstance that the scientific yet lively approach avoids the danger of “academicism”. The writers were concerned not only with widening the circle of potential readers. In truth it is impossible, to paraphrase Lenin, to present a new view in other than a polemical form. This means of presentation is employed by the authors in disputing individual points and propositions of their colleagues as well.

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