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p The continent of Africa is one of the important fronts in the global trade war that is being waged between the imperialist powers. This front has acquired particular significance since the late fifties and early sixties, when the barriers that had protected the metropolises’ colonial markets in Africa finally collapsed. The disappearance of the colonial regimes coincided in time with several developments: the relative oversaturation of the home markets and the increasing similarity of the production range of the main capitalist countries, leading to the feverish employment of all competitive advantages; the deterioration of the USA’s position in the capitalist world; the appearance in Western Europe of closed economic groupings; and, finally, the active emergence of Japan into the world market. It also turned out that, when “departing” from Africa, the colonial powers did not leave it to fate to guide the foreign trade of their former possessions. On the contrary, they tied these countries with a chain of individual and collective treaties and agreements. The British system of imperial preference and the sterling area remained intact, the franc zone was strengthened and the Eurafrica Association appeared, with the result that almost a half of the continent was fenced off by customs barriers.

p From the mid-sixties onwards the lessening of home demand and the crisis situation in the British and US balances of payments led to the stepping up of their export assault on Africa and to bitter conflicts in the Englishspeaking countries of Africa. In the very same countries Japan came to be a dangerous rival for Britain. In the trade sphere the contradictions between the EEC and the USA 120 become more intense every year. The relations between the EEC and the associate countries in Africa are constantly criticised by Washington. The contradictions within the Common Market are also growing deeper, despite the rapid growth of internal trade and the common tariff structure.

p Inter-imperialist rivalry in the matter of trade with the African countries cannot be viewed merely as "healthy competition”, as bourgeois economists choose to call it. When exposing Karl Kautsky’s reformist notions, Lenin made the point that, if one imperialist power outstripped another in trade with regions that were traditionally under the latter’s influence, then this "by no means proves the ‘superiority’ of free trade, for it is not a fight between free trade and protection. . ., but between two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital".^^1^^ The examples provided by the clashes between the former metropolises and their competitors in Africa fully confirm Lenin’s view.

p One of the main complexes of inter-imperialist contradictions in trade with Africa lies in the relations between the USA and the EEC, with France being the most active spokesman for the Community. It is well-known that the American-French dialogue on this issue even reached “summit” level.

p In January 1970, a US Department of Agriculture representative officially warned the EEC countries that any protectionist tendencies in their foreign trade policy and any use they might make of trade barriers that would impede the development of exports would have the effect of obliging the USA to impose import restrictions on agricultural and industrial products. At more or less the same time the Ambassador Robert Schaetzel, the US representative to the Community, and Davis, a Department of Commerce official, issued similar statements. They made three charges against the Common Market countries: the common external tariff was too high, the agricultural policy was hindering the development of American exports to the European market and to the markets of third countries and, lastly, the preferential status which the EEC had arranged for African countries infringed the rules of international trade.

p The American position was spelled out even more specifically in the above-mentioned report made by US Secretary 121 of State William Rogers to President Nixon, ’The United States and Africa in the Seventies. The report states: "We are also urging the elimination of discriminatory tariffs— sometimes called ’reverse preferences’—which put our goods at a competitive disadvantage in many African markets. We hope that European nations see no linkage between eliminating the preferences they currently receive in some twenty African nations and their levels of aid to those countries.”^^2^^

p The American claims were twice rejected by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Schumann. While making a government foreign policy statement in the National Assembly on the 25 April 1970, he pointed out that, despite US “aid” to Africa, it was the duty of Europe and France to assist African states on privileged terms. Schumann returned to this theme in the course of an interview given to the French weekly Entreprise on the 18 July 1970. When asked if he considered that US dissatisfaction over the Common Market’s successes might grow into anger, Schumann replied: "The Americans claim that the system of preferences offered by the African countries to EEC members in the form of compensation for their efforts contradicts the system of general preferences which is being set up, runs counter to the rules of GATT, and that it is necessary to put an end to this state of affairs. To this we reply categorically that we should not be ashamed of this policy, for it is, in my view, one of the Community’s greatest achievements.”

p The aggravation of the contradictions between the USA and the EEC (and France in particular) as regards trade with Africa is a direct result of processes that have been taking place throughout the past decade.

p During the early postwar years US foreign trade, including trade with Africa, developed in the context of fierce Anglo-American rivalry, since the key positions in foreign markets had been captured by the British monopolies. From the end of the fifties France, the FRG and Japan also entered the competitive struggle, and this drastically reduced the USA’s share of the capitalist world’s foreign trade.

p During the early postwar years the USA made use of the temporary disappearance of Germany and Japan from the world capitalist market, as well as the weakened position 122 of Britain and France, and managed to oust her rivals to a considerable degree. However, the picture then began to change. Ever since 1960 the US share in the foreign trade of many countries has been falling, especially under the growing pressure of West German and Japanese monopolies. Consequently, American exporters have been making more determined efforts to capture African markets. But the former metropolises are pursuing the same tactics, which produces a competitive battle over trade with Africa.

p As can be seen from the table given below, the figures reflecting the total volume and the share of American trade with Africa show higher growth rates than the corresponding figures for Britain and France.

p The table also reveals a number of other interesting facts. Firstly, the USA is gradually catching up with Britain and France as regards exports to Africa. Secondly, ever since 1963 Britain and France have had a deficit trade balance with the African countries, while, in the case of the USA, exports have exceeded imports throughout the period. This is a typical picture of trade between the USA and the developing countries. The latter are obliged to cover the deficit trade balance through loans and credits, whereas the USA, by providing these, extends the opportunities for her own trade expansion and acquires a means of exerting political influence.

p The growth in US trade with the African countries, accompanied by bitter struggle with US competitors, is one of the results of the general modernisation of America’s foreign trade system.

p In addition to a number of general steps, special measures were taken to activate trade with Africa. The year 1964 saw the creation in New York of an Afro-American Chamber of Commerce, the members of which included representatives from the largest banks and the mining and manufacturing industries (the First National City Bank, the OlinMathieson Chemical Corporation, American Metal Climax, etc.). The Chamber of Commerce collects and distributes commercial information on Africa, organises seminars for the employees of exporting firms, establishes contacts with the commercial attaches in African embassies, sends its own missions to Africa and even receives the heads of African 123 Table 5 US, British and French Trade with Africa (in millions of dollars) Year Africa’s Total Imports Exports to Africa Africa’s Total Exports Imports from Africa USA Britain France USA Britain France 1960 7,860 750 1,360 2,024 6,350 565 1,260 1,418 1961 7,790 810 1,360 1,856 6,540 620 1,320 1,504 1962 7,510 970 1,280 1,498 6,730 680 1,310 1,621 1963 8,370 980 1,412 1,606 7,480 710 1,435 1,671 1964 9,656 1,200 1,510 1,644 8,658 810 1,561 1,808 1965 10,359 1,224 1,690 1,660 9,185 875 2,001 1,769 1966 10,504 1,320 1,593 1,680 98,888 820 1,750 1,909 1967 10,860 1,155 1,600 1,627 10,320 770 1,740 1,849 1968 11,460 1,245 1,540 — 11,900 855 2,010 — 1969 13,110 1,370 1,720 — 13,100 900 2,170 — 1970 14,556 1,626 1,830 — 14,751 1,114 2,390 — 1971 18,685 1,634 1,810 — 15,396 1,317 2,570 — Sources: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. June 19P2, 1965. 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972; W. A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa, New York, 1969, pp .TO, 100, 101. Overseas Business Report, July 1972, p, 21, 28, 29. 124 states. The Chamber ot Commerce was not slow to produce results. During the first year of its existence American exports to Africa rose by 21 per cent and US imports from Africa by 19 per cent.

p The USA’s growing interest in trade with Africa is illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of 1969 three special export associations were created in order to stimulate the export of American commodities to African countries. 28 exporting companies joined these associations. The state provided them with a "support fund" amounting to 437,500 dollars.

p Although on average African countries account for only 2.5 per cent of American exports and imports, and the USA still lags behind Britain and France in terms of the volume of trade with Africa, trade between the USA and Africa has almost trebled since 1950, and by 1969 the USA’s share in the total foreign trade turnover of the African countries was already 10 per cent.

p Trade with Africa is important to the USA not simply because the continent is a rapidly expanding market for American goods and a source of scarce raw materials. Trade is also one of the main instruments of American neo- colonialism, a means of establishing political influence. In his report to President Nixon, referred to earlier, Secretary of State William Rogers also pointed to the direct link that trade had with the political relations between the United States and the countries of Africa. Thus, the stepping up of American trade with Africa is dictated not only by economic, but also political, needs. This, in turn, whips up the inter-imperialist struggle still more.

p Despite the relative diminution in the share of African countries (including the members of the franc zone) in French foreign trade (a direct result of France’s participation in the Common Market), French trade with Africa is on the increase, and the former colonies are serving once again as important markets for the sale of many French commodities and as major suppliers of food and industrial raw materials.

p In 1968, for instance, African countries received 54 per cent of all French pharmaceutical products that were exported, 47 per cent of instruments, 43 per cent of detergents, 40 per cent of metal products and the output of the 125 cotton industry, 30 per cent of sugar and railway equipment, 20-30 per cent of clothing, paper and cardboard and knitwear, and about 20 per cent of electrical equipment, footwear and cars. During this same year France imported from Africa 80 per cent of all the sugar that she imported, 65 per cent of wine and cocoa, 50 per cent of coffee, tea, fruit, edible oils, oil-producing crops and vegetables, 41 per cent of her lead, 30 per cent of metallic ores and so on. These figures show that the African market is not only retaining its importance to France, but that, in keeping with the general tendency to increase exports, its role is even increasing. It is precisely for the African market that France is above all arranging direct and indirect export subsidies, and is using the export of capital to boost the process.

p Despite some growth in French trade with English- speaking Tropical Africa and the Republic of South Africa, France’s main trading contractor continues to be the Frenchspeaking countries of Tropical and North Africa. In 1967 over 90 per cent of France’s total African trade was with these two regions. It is precisely for this reason that Paris musters all available means to defend its trade position in French-speaking Africa, which accounts for some 15 per cent of all French foreign trade. As part of this process, France offers, on the whole, passive resistance to her EEC partners and raises specific barriers against Japan and particularly the USA.

p If one examines the geographical distribution of US exports to Africa, it is easy to see that America’s principal trading partners, excluding South Africa and Liberia, are the continent’s English-speaking countries. Of the former French possessions only Morocco, Tunisia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast can be singled out (in the last two countries US exporters are having to surmount high tariff walls). The American press declares in this connection that the markets of the French-speaking African countries have been converted into "French reservations”, and officials in Washington threaten Paris with retaliatory action. Thus, at the Second UN Conference on Trade and Development (Delhi, February 1968) the American representative, Eugene Rostow, condemned the trade privileges which France enjoyed in Afrika and pointed out that the USA might, in turn, impose 126 market restrictions against countries which obstructed the free How of American goods.

p The US Government is backing up its threats with practical measures. A trade bill forwarded to Congress by President Nixon in November 1969 contained special points that would extend presidential powers to take counter-measures against competitor-countries which limited the import of American goods or subsidised their own exports to third countries, consequently ousting the USA from their markets. The President also expressed the wish that Congress should pass a special declaration on government measures designed to encourage other countries to abolish or reduce non-tariff barriers. This action, of course, is not directed against France alone. It also applies to some extent to the other members of the European Economic Community and also to Japan. Nevertheless, French-speaking Africa is to feel the main effects of the measure.

p It should be pointed out that in some cases pressure from Washington produces results. In 1970 despite opposition from Paris, the countries of the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) took steps to halve their general tariffs on most imported goods. Secretary of State William Rogers made a special point of saying that the USA had "been most encouraged to learn" of this and that "this measure offers the prospect of greater American trade with these countries".^^3^^

p Britain is putting up no less a fight than France for strong trading positions in Africa. Moreover, the British monopolies are not only trying to buttress their interests in the former British possessions, but are extending the area covered by their expansion.

p Britain lost guaranteed markets for her commodities as a result of the collapse of the colonial system. In addition, her chronic balance of payments deficit worsened markedly during the sixties. Accordingly, London’s main aim in foreign trade was to boost exports by all possible means. The reason is clear enough. From 1960 to 1970 Britain’s share in world capitalist trade fell by almost 3 per cent in exports and 2.5 per cent in imports. Apart from the general weakening of Britain’s economic potential in accordance with the law of the uneven development of capitalist countries, the 127 main reason for the country’s diminishing role in world trade is the intensive penetration of the markets of the former British Empire by the monopolies of the USA, the FRG Japan, Italy and a number of other countries.

p Faced with this situation, Britain is increasing her trade with the developed capitalist countries (their share of British exports rose from 64 per cent to 75 per cent between 1955 and 1969, and of imports from 63 per cent to 70 per cent) and is taking steps at the same time to defend her traditional markets. Since the mid-sixties London has managed to halt the decline in the system of imperial preferences that had been taking place during the postwar period as part of the general process of trade liberalisation. This was an important factor in Britain’s successful competitive battle in Commonwealth markets against other countries, since it coincided with an expansion in the trade of manufactured goods, on which the preferences were higher than for other items. All African Commonwealth countries (except Rhodesia) are included in the sterling area, which London still continues to nurture. The existence of the sterling area gives Britain substantial privileges both as regards the purchase of goods and food and in securing markets in the member countries. It was for this reason that, despite the devaluation of the pound in November 1967 and the worsening of its monetary situation, London made sure of keeping the sterling area intact by providing a dollar clause with regard to the foreign exchange reserves held by the central banks of the member countries. In spite of frequent recommendations from the USA, Britain has also refused to abandon her system of bilateral agreements on the general principles of conducting trade and providing reciprocal tariff concessions with the African Commonwealth countries.

p A typical example of the clash between the trading interests of Britain and her imperialist competitors can be seen in Nigeria, once the bastion of British colonialism in West Africa.

p In 1964 Britain had an absolute monopoly on Nigerian imports. Even in 1963 British exports exceeded the total quantity of goods imported by Nigeria from the USA, the FRG and Japan. By 1968, however, Britain had begun to lag behind her competitors in terms of export growth and their 128 total exports were already higher than Britain’s. The situation caused concern in Britain. On the 24 July 1909, the London Chamber of Commerce published the report of a special trade delegation that had visited Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone in March of that year in order to study the possibilities for increasing British exports to those countries. The report mentioned that Nigeria could be a particularly profitable trading partner for Britain, since the economic development programme compiled by the Federal Government offered British exporters broad opportunities for participation. The report also contained a serious warning about the growing competition in the Nigerian market from Japan and other states, which, it was said, ought to stimulate the British Government and British firms into taking appropriate steps.

p The activation of trade with French-speaking Africa was one such step. British trade with Algeria rose significantly from 1968 onwards. In 1968 the deliveries of Algerian goods to Britain increased by 38 per cent over the 1967 level, and British exports to Algeria shot up by 50 per cent. In its issue dated the 16 April 1969 the French weekly Information Industrielle et Commcrciale commented that Algeria "had become a hotbed of international competition”. During this period British trade with other countries in French-speaking Africa also increased. British exports to Zaire grew by 14 per cent, to Morocco by 37 per cent and to the Ivory Coast by 48 per cent. The Malagasy Republic, Tunisia, Cameroun, Burundi, Togo, Chad, Ruanda and Dahomey were similarly affected.

p It is symptomatic that in North Africa Britain is meeting opposition to her expansion not only from France but also from the FRG. In a report delivered at the annual meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce’s Near and Middle Eastern Section in March 1969 its chairman, W. Rose, declared, for example, that the increase in British exports to North African countries that had been achieved in 1968 was not enough if Britain was to compete successfully against the FRG, in the first instance, which was trying to dislodge Britain from her position as the second largest exporter to North Africa. Rose pointed out that, although British deliveries to the area had grown by 25 per cent, France, the 129 FRG, Italy and Japan had achieved even more impressive results. He concluded that British firms needed to struggle in order to improve their position in North African markets.

p In the case of the FRG, trade with the African countries is of particular importance, since the country does not itself possess sufficient reserves of raw materials. Apart from this, the development of West German industry has considerably outstripped the growth of the home market. This is causing the FRG to boost her exports, mainly of manufactured goods. At the same time, foreign trade statistics make it clear that the FRG’s major trading partners are themselves highly developed industrial countries. Consequently, West German exporters are striving to consolidate their grip on the promising markets of Africa. Although over the past decade West German trade with the developed capitalist countries, and especially with those belonging to the EEC, has risen sharply, the developing countries account for some 20 per cent of it, and in absolute terms their share is showing a strong tendency to increase.

Not only the former metropolises of Britain and France, but also the USA and Japan are facing competition from West German firms in Africa.

Table 6 West Gorman Trade with Africa (excluding South Africa) (in millions of DM) 11)65 1U66 1967 1968 1969 1971 Imports 4 561 4 940 4 724 5,900 7 717 7,982 Exports ......... 2,227 2,283 2,397 2,645 4,721 6,073 Sources: SJafisHsc/ies Jahrbuch fur BRD, W6’J, S. 295; Obcrsee Rundschau, 1972, N. ’t, S. 6.

p The table shows that imports are running at a considerably higher level than exports. On the one hand, this benefits the African countries, since it gives them a positive trade balance with the FRG. On the other hand, it is a reflection 130 of the West German tendency to view Africa as merely a supplier of raw materials, an appendage of the world capitalist economy.

p The main African targets for the FRG’s trade expansion are the countries which possess reserves of raw materials that are necessary to keep West German industry running. In the case of West Africa, this means the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia; in Central and East Africa— Zaire and Zambia. These are precisely the countries in which the former metropolises, as well as the USA and Japan, are struggling for influence.

p In North Africa the FRG is developing trade with Algeria, Morocco and Libya (in 1969 imports from Algeria increased by DM 67.5 million and from Libya by DM 185.2 million). At the opposite end of the continent there are flourishing trade links between the FRG and South Africa, which receives about 35 per cent of all West German exports to Africa.

p As a whole, Africa accounts for 5.8 per cent (1971) of the FRG’s total exports, and 8.5 per cent of her imports. The economic expansion of West German monopolies in Africa is taking place in the midst of a fierce competitive battle with monopolies from the other imperialist powers, with the main rival differing from country to country. In 1969 a group of West German firms concluded an agreement with Algeria to supply her with 200 million DMs’ worth of equipment for an engine assembly plant. This deal was pulled off in the face of American, British and French competition. West German exporters are holding their own against American and Japanese firms in the markets of Morocco and Tunisia, since an agreement with these countries provides for the duty-free import of a number of commodities from the FRG. In the African states that are associated with the EEC the FRG relies on the preference agreements with the Common Market for support in the trade battle against the USA. In order to boost exports to the English-speaking Commonwealth countries in Africa, Bonn offers large amounts of credit for the purchase of goods from West Germany. About 35 per cent of all the credit offered in 1969 was provided on these terms; among the recipients were Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria.

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p The competition between the FRG and the other imperialist powers, particularly the USA and Britain, in the markets of Africa will become fiercer during the seventies, since there are no grounds for supposing that the general economic contradictions between the capitalist countries will resolve themselves even slightly. What is more, the West German authorities are making no secret of their intention to intensify their economic expansion into Africa. Dr. Erhard Eppler, the Federal Minister for Economic Co-operation, stated clearly on the 26 June 1969 that a broad economic “assault” on the African countries was planned by the FRG to take place during the seventies/’ But the US and Japanese Governments have similar plans, and the former metropolises have not the slightest intention of yielding. It should, however, be borne in mind that, if the FRG manages to maintain both her high rate of economic growth, particularly in the industries geared to exports, and her monetary advantages, then the West German monopolies, as well as their Japanese counterparts, will become increasingly dangerous rivals in Africa for the monopolies of other states in both the Old and the New World.

Another former metropolis, Italy, which was all but ousted from Africa during the early postwar years, is launching a commercial invasion of Africa on an ever increasing scale. According to the July 1970 issue of the Italian journal Successo, trade between Italy and Africa increased at a faster rate between 1961 and 1969 than Italy’s foreign trade as a whole. Thus, Italian exports to African countries increased from 266.9 million dollars in 1961 to 719 million dollars in 1969. The average annual increase amounted to 14.5 per cent, while that of all Italian exports was 13.5 per cent. The import figures are even more revealing. During the same period Italy’s imports from Africa rose from 330 million dollars to 1,114.5 million dollars, the average annual increase being 15.4 per cent, while that of all imports stood at 10.2 per cent. Italy’s trade with Africa accounts for over 7 per cent of her total foreign trade (imports 9 per cent and exports 6.1 per cent). Italy’s main trading partners in Africa are the countries with which the other imperialist powers also have an interest in establishing trade links, i.e., South Africa, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco.

132 Table Japanese Trade with Africa (in millions of dollars) I960 196! 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Exports All Africa . 350 380 330 470 600 810 720 835 920 1 140 1 400 North Africa ...... 55 65 36 52 56 43 45 67 76 Tropical Africa .... 245 270 ^15 325 449 530 534 637 705 793 944 Southern Africa .......... Imports All Africa . 120 155 60 175 80 215 115 285 140 ’65 130 350 155 170 640 280 730 330 875 North Africa ..... 25 36 21 25 21 27 37 39 60 Tropical Africa .... 50 56 50 80 144 140 >09 °73 328 481 560 Southern Africa .......... 100 99 120 100 120 245 290 210 255 Sources: Compiled from Monthly Bulletin of Statistic* June 196?,, 1965, 1967. 1969, 1970, 1971. 133

p Japan’s struggle for overseas markets has gathered momentum rapidly in recent years as a result of the significant strides that have been made in her industrial production. The highly competitive nature of Japanese products enables her to substantially increase exports to the developed capitalist countries, although here she is encountering serious obstacles—discrimination, various customs barriers and, lastly, a blunt refusal in some cases to import Japanese goods. Even the USA, Japan’s main trading partner, has recently begun to resort to these measures. Accordingly, the Japanese monopolies are devoting more and more energy to channelling their export-led expansion into the developing countries, including those in Africa. Thus, in 1969 alone Japanese exports to Africa rose by 16.4 per cent above the 1968 level, and imports from Africa increased by 17.1 per cent. While enlarging the volume of her overseas trade, Japan has not (unlike the USA, Britain and France) reduced the African section of it. Between 1960 and 1968 the proportion of exports going to Africa diminished by a mere 1.4 per cent, and the proportion of imports even rose by 3.28 per cent.

p It should be noted that between 1960 and 1969 Japan’s foreign trade turnover as a whole increased by roughly 4 times, the growth in both exports and imports being more or less identical. Thus, the fact that the African proportion of Japanese trade remained largely unchanged gives a vivid indication of the scale of her commercial expansion into the "Dark Continent”. This view is also supported by the absolute trade figures.

p Between 1960 and 1970 Japan’s exports to Africa rose by more than 3.5 times and imports from Africa by 6 times. During the same period the USA and Britain increased their African exports and imports by only 1.5 times on average, and France even reduced her exports, though imports rose slightly. Japan is, thus, outstripping her principal competitors in terms of the rate at which she is developing trade with Africa, and is also gradually overtaking them in absolute terms. Given the currently limited capacity of the African market, this fact must be seen as constituting a serious threat to other states’ commercial interests in Africa.

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p It should be made clear that the main increase in Japanese trade is occurring in Tropical Africa, i.e., in that part of the continent where the inter-imperialist struggle is at its peak and the former metropolises are putting up the stiffest resistance. Japanese companies are concentrating on countries which are rich in mineral resources. For instance, between 1968 and 1969 Japanese trade with Zaire rose by 98.5 per cent and with Nigeria by 68.7 per cent. A Japanese Government delegation visited Africa in February 1970. Upon his return to Tokyo the head of the delegation, Fumihiko Kono, the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was one of the initiators of the idea of creating a special committee on African affairs under the auspices of the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations. At the same time he "advised the Government to establish an ’African policy’ of its own and vigorously carry it on".^^5^^ Since the Mitsubishi Company accounts for 10 per cent of the country’s exports and 13 per cent of its imports, Kono’s recommendation would appear to carry some weight.

p Japanese monopoly capital is as yet only making its debut in Africa, but it is already becoming a dangerous competitor there, especially for Britain and the USA. Japan is coming into conflict with these countries, since the structure of her trade with Africa is similar to theirs and the "geography of intrusion" is roughly the same. A further intensification is to be expected in the rivalry within this group of imperialist powers in the African markets, and especially in the continent’s English-speaking countries.

p In recent years Africa has become a vast and promising market for the car industry. In this connection a fierce battle is taking place in Africa between the car manufactureres of the USA, Britain, the FRG, France, Italy and Japan. In former British Africa the struggle is mainly between British and American companies.

p British firms, which were the first to capture the car market of the former British colonies, are naturally trying not only to hold on to their position but also to extend it. For their part, the US automobile concerns are doing their utmost to push back their competitor. The "car war" is being fought on two fronts—the export of finished cars and the construction of local car assembly plants, which are in effect 135 subsidiary companies. Since the springboard for the attack on the continent’s liberated countries is South Africa, where the largest number of overseas branches of the major British and American firms is concentrated, the situation in that country must be briefly reviewed.

p As for the British car industry, the British Motor Corporation (BMC), the Leyland Motor Corporation (LMC) and the Rover Company all have branches in South Africa. In 1964 BMC built an assembly plant at Blackheath, near Cape Town. In the spring of 1967 LMC secured profitable terms from the South African Government and built a foundry for casting engine blocks and a diesel engine plant near Johannesburg. Until recently LMC was the largest producer and supplier of heavy lorries in South Africa. The Rover Company is represented by its subsidiary, Rover South African Manufacturing.

p The British firms’ main competitors are the three American giants—General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. In 1966 they were joined by American Motors International. Chrysler is successfully eliminating the British firms in the sale of both cars and heavy vehicles. Chrysler’s investments in South Africa have now reached a total of 35 million rands. In 1967 the concern proceeded to erect a new lorry assembly plant in Pretoria, much to the irritation of LMC. The General Motors and Ford branches in Port Elizabeth have recently expanded production so much that they are facing an overproduction crisis. The consequent “overheating” of the car market forced the British monopolies to use their influence on the South African Government and, as a result, measures were taken to reduce the production of the American factories. The US firms then partially switched over to organising the production of spares and components, a field in which British companies also held a dominating position.

p Relying on their production capacity in South Africa, the car monopolies began their struggle for the markets of the newly independent African countries in the mid-sixties. In Zambia, where the Rhodesian crisis had led to an urgent need for road haulage vehicles, the British Rover Company immediately set up an assembly plant at Ndola. Following suit, the American firm Willis Jeeps, which belonged to the 136 Kayzer group, built an assembly plant of their own in Lusaka. Fierce competition arose between the American and British firms to supply Zambia with oil transporters. The contest was won by LMC, whose South African branch managed in four months to deliver 150 vehicles of this type to Zambia for a total of 3 million rands.

p A curious situation has arisen in Rhodesia. Car assembly plants had been built in the country by Ford and BMC subsidiaries prior to the unilateral declaration of “ independence”. When “sanctions” were introduced against Rhodesia, the American Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia curtailed production at the beginning of 1967, assuming that its competitors would follow its example. However, the BMC works at Umtali carried on as usual. The local factories owned by Rover and Leyland employed similar tactics. This “ incident” evoked bitter disagreement between the British and American subsidiaries. In the end the American factories started production once again.

p At the beginning of 1968 Leyland concluded a profitable deal with the Government of Zaire for the sale of 75 buses and 900 Land Rover vehicles. The Americans were not slow to react. After the visit to Kinshasa of Joseph Palmer, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in July 1968, the US Government offered Zaire a loan of 15 million dollars (to be repaid over 30 years with an annual interest rate of 3.5 per cent) with which to purchase road haulage vehicles and spares from the USA.

p The West German Volkswagenwerke concern is very active in former French African territories and is gradually excluding French firms. Between 1968 and 1969 French exports to Madagascar fell by 11 per cent, while West German exports rose by 9.4 per cent, with the greatest increase taking place in car industry exports. "Independence has entailed increasing competition and the exclusion of France”, the French journal Temps Modernes (No. 28, 1969) reported.

p In the foreseeable future the "car war" in Africa will, clearly, become more intense, since markets in the developed capitalist countries are diminishing and the car monopolies are jockeying for positions in the Third World. Moreover, the profits accruing from the Third World are twice as high as in Europe or the USA.

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p Finally, we must examine one further aspect of the trade competition between the imperialist powers in Africa—the export of armaments.

p According to Western statistics, in 1959 alone the developing countries spent 19,000 million dollars on arms purchases, although foreign aid to them in the form of loans, gifts and subsidies totalled only 4,000 million dollars. Purchases of weapons and military equipment by these countries have continued at an ever increasing rate throughout the past decade. Africa is no exception, since not a single African state is capable of manufacturing weapons independently. The Western powers which supply arms—the USA, Britain, France and the FRG—recognised that the demand for armaments provided additional opportunities for extracting economic and political benefits. The arms business is not just a matter of commerce. Once the deliveries are made, instructors appear on the scene, and there arises the need to train local personnel and to regularly supply spare parts and ammunition. The imperialist powers make use of all these factors in order to subordinate the client country to the supplier and to strengthen their political influence on the local ruling circles. The sale of arms is also a profitable business, and the armaments manufacturers have a clear interest in its continuation.

p Consequently, the supply of military hardware to African countries has become an object of fierce competition and rivalry between the Western powers.

p The USA was first off the mark in the massive sale of weaponry to Third World countries, including those in Africa. In 1963 Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defence, created the post of Special Adviser to the Secretary on these matters and appointed the experienced businessman Henry Cass. As a result of his exertions, the export of American arms to the developing countries trebled over the following three years: receipts shot up from 700 million dollars to 2,000 million dollars.

p Britain followed the US lead in 1964. The new Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, appointed Roy Mason to take charge of the armaments export programme. Two years later, in 1966, the French armaments commission also set up a special section—a department for foreign relations regarding 138 arms sales. It was at this time that a new job appeared in French embassies in African countries, that of attache for armaments. There were quick results. In 1968 French sales of military equipment netted a total of 4,000 million francs, compared with 3,000 million francs in 1966.

p The European arms suppliers—France, Britain and also Sweden and Switzerland—began to display particular interest in capturing the African armaments market from about 1966 onwards. Among other reasons for this was their fear that, if US aggression in Vietnam were halted, vast reserves of American military equipment would be released on to the market at give-away prices.

p All the French-speaking countries of Africa buy their weapons from France, with the exception of Zaire, where the USA has an armaments monopoly. It should also be mentioned that from the summer of 1967 until the end of 1969 considerable quantities of French arms were dispatched to Biafra, which had seceded from Nigeria.

p Britain occupies the dominant position in the sale of armaments to the English-speaking countries of Africa, since the African members of the Commonwealth are bound by agreements to this effect. Despite this, however, Washington is beginning to compete with London here too. Senator Eugene McCarthy refers to "the British, often in competition with the United States in the arms sales business. . . .”^^6^^

The scale of inter-imperialist rivalry over the export of arms to Africa should not, of course, be exaggerated, but it should not be overlooked that the total volume of military equipment delivered to Africa is constantly growing. According to calculations made by the West German journal Volkswirt, in 1968 the countries of North Africa purchased armaments to the value of DM 112.5 million, Central African countries bought the same amount and the Republic of South Africa spent DM 262.5 million on arms.^^7^^ The increasing armaments build-up in Africa, which the imperialist powers are making every effort to encourage, does more than simply activate the inter-imperialist rivalry in the African armaments market. It also creates additional difficulties for the development of the African countries, which could have dangerous consequences for the peoples of the continent.

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p The African trade war between the imperialist powers will, clearly, intensify in the near future in both its concealed and overt forms.

p This conclusion is supported by a number of factors. Despite the developing countries’ diminishing share of the world export market, they are increasingly participating in world trade in absolute terms, and are becoming more integrated into the world capitalist market system. Moreover, their participation is now direct and is no longer channelled through the metropolises, as was the case during the colonial period. Thus, the young states are feeling the increasing effect of the contradictory laws of this market and the full weight of its principal feature: it is the scene of a bitter struggle between groups of monopoly capital from different states. Owing to their currently low level of economic development, the liberated countries can, in the main, act only as the object of this struggle. At the same time, at a new stage in the national-democratic revolution, which presupposes the young states’ attainment of economic independence, the imperialist powers’ struggle for diminishing spheres of influence in Third World markets will inevitably assume more embittered forms.

p Clearly, the main disagreements will arise between the EEC countries and Japan, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, since the trade contradictions between them are intensifying on a global scale.

Despite the increasing internationalisation of the capitalist system’s world economic ties, imperialist protectionism is not shedding its aggressive nature. While protecting their home markets, either individually (e.g., USA) or collectively (EEC countries), the monopolies are simultaneously furthering their expansion into the developing countries. Their competition and the bitterness of their economic contradictions in these countries are on the increase. To an ever greater degree the state is being involved in the rivalry between the monopolies, and the continent of Africa, as a vast and promising export market, is not being left out of the struggle.