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p The events of today have been prepared by long and farreaching historical processes. Consequently, a description of the general evolution of inter-imperialist contradictions in Africa is a necessary preliminary to a study of certain aspects of them. The Second World War gave fresh impetus to the inter-imperialist struggle to redistribute markets and spheres of influence. Despite the war situation, colonial problems had a substantial effect on the relationship of the Western allies, giving rise to constant clashes. The basis for many of the contradictions between them and their presentday rivalry dates from precisely this period.

p In September 1940 after the fall of France the fascist countries (Germany and Italy) concluded an agreement whereby the northern and eastern parts of Africa would go to Italy, and the remainder of the continent south of the Sahara to Germany. At the same time the slogan "Get England out of Africa" gained currency among the axis powers.

p It was obviously a belligerent stance perfectly natural in wartime, and it only served to further irritate the European opponents of the axis powers. It also made the latter’s aggressive intentions perfectly clear. However, the allies were far from united, and the colonial issue sparked off sharp disagreement and mutual distrust. Britain had no intention 24 of withdrawing from Africa: instead, she tried to enlarge her colonial possessions at the expense of the defeated French.

p This objective lay behind the suggestions made by the British Government in the summer of 1940, when France’s days seemed already numbered, to the effect that a single Anglo-French state should be set up. London’s plans were then put into more practical effect in a unilateral action about which France had not been consulted. On the 17 June 1940 the Foreign Office instructed all British consuls in the French colonies to offer “protection” to the French, should France be defeated.

p Naturally, the French Government categorically rejected London’s “integrationist” ideas, and protested strongly against the Foreign Office action.^^1^^ However, British imperialism made repeated attempts throughout the war to effect the legal seizure of French colonies. This caused sharp differences between the British Government and the leadership of the "Fighting French" forces. The repercussions have not died down even to this day.

p In supporting de Gaulle as leader of the "Free French" movement, the British were thinking of more than just consolidating the forces of the Western allies. A secondary aim was to use de Gaulle in order to take over the French colonies. But it had already become clear in 1942 that de Gaulle was stubbornly resisting London’s plans, in spite of the military situation. The conflict took on such proportions that the British Government even began to look round for a “substitute” for de Gaulle, who was said by Churchill not to be making a "proper contribution" to victory over the axis powers. Only the absence of a suitable candidate foiled this attempt. Nevertheless, the British continued to do everything possible to prevent de Gaulle from establishing control over France’s colonial possessions. In the spring of 1942, London and Washington turned down his suggestion that the "Free French" National Committee be recognised as the provisional government. In May 1942, without informing de Gaulle, the British landed troops on Madagascar. Worse still, from April to July 1942 the British Government did not allow de Gaulle out of London and prevented him from visiting the Lebanon and Syria, both territories mandated to France. 25 Nevertheless, the "Free French" leader managed to make his way to the Middle East, where he saw with his own eyes that British undertakings "not to pursue any political aims in the states of the Levant and not to encroach on France’s position in the area" were not being honoured.

p Upon de Gaulle’s return to London, a complete breakdown in relations between him and Churchill was barely staved off. But since de Gaulle needed British support and he was necessary to Churchill in view of the forthcoming inevitable Anglo-American confrontation after the North Africa landings, the conflict was smoothed over. However, the most serious contradictions over the colonial issue during the war arose between the USA and Great Britain.

p First of all, meeting with no resistance from its allies, who were recoiling under the blows of Hitler’s war machine, the USA embarked on an intensive penetration of their overseas markets. But Washington also wished to remove the official hurdles blocking its entry to the colonial world. In the course of Churchill’s first meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941 he was asked about "equal access to markets”. Roosevelt also demanded that this point be included in a declaration of war aims. What was really at stake here was the system of imperial preferences introduced in 1932. Seeing the danger, Churchill became very annoyed and replied: "Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire. Every idea you entertain about the structure of the postwar world demonstrates it.”^^2^^ In the circumstances of the time, however, Churchill had to agree in principle t6 the American demand. The joint declaration incorporated the phrase "equal access to markets”.

p It is perfectly natural that British colonies should have been coveted. Given the situation as it then was, Washington simply wrote off the other European colonial powers, which had been defeated in war: France, Belgium and Holland. Only Great Britain stood in its way, and the American bourgeoisie had longed for the opportunity to get their hands on the British Empire. It should be remembered that in 1942, at the instigation of the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, the State Department drew up a plan for handing all colonies over to an international trusteeship body, which the USA intended to dominate. Needless to say, 26 Britain categorically opposed the plan. Anthony Eden conveyed British views direct to Roosevelt during his visit to Washington in March 1943.^^3^^

p From the very outset of the war the view began to form in Washington that, even if the war were won, the British would be too exhausted to hold on to the whole of the Empire, and their natural “successors” were the Americans. This view continued to spread. In 1944 the influential American journal Fortune wrote that the collapse of colonial empires demonstrated their inability to exist independently. The governments of the metropolises should invite the USA to help them devise a new colonial policy, and it was of primary importance that London should consult Washington on the question of Africa.

p The problem of the colonial possessions, and particularly Britain’s African colonies, proved to be a stumbling-block in Anglo-American relations throughout the war years. It was the cause of frequent disagreement at meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill.

p The conflict began before the USA entered the war at the consultations held between the two leaders in August 1941 in Argentia Bay, near the Newfoundland coast. This was the meeting that resulted in the declaration of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter. The eight points of the Charter proclaimed the main objective of the war to be the destruction of nazi tyranny, and mentioned a few general democratic principles. In particular, it was stated that the USA and Britain respected the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, and also that both powers sought the restoration of the sovereign rights and independence of those peoples which had been deprived of them by force.

p In both Africa and Asia most of the politically conscious opinion believed not without reason that these Charter provisions applied to the colonies as well. American propaganda supported this view. However, immediately he returned to England, Churchill gave his version of what the Charter meant. In his report to Parliament on the 9 September 1941 he declared: "At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now 27 under the Nazi yoke, and the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.”^^4^^ In other words, Churchill unequivocally excluded from the jurisdiction of the Atlantic Charter Britain’s colonial empire. Shortly after, Roosevelt rejected Churchill’s interpretation, stating on the 22 February 1942 that the Charter applied to the whole world and so to the British Empire as well. A similar assertion was made in May 1942 by the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles: "The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole—in all oceans and in all continents".^^5^^

p These "variant readings" of the Atlantic Charter should not be regarded as a chance occurrence or misunderstanding. American diplomacy had set itself the task of taking advantage of a good opportunity to put pressure on Britain and provide American monopolies with access to British colonies. Elliott Roosevelt, the President’s son, recalls some of the views his father expressed to him while awaiting Churchill’s arrival for the Argentia meeting. Talking about the aims of the war, the President said that the USA had no intention of just being a kind uncle whom the British Empire could make use of in order to extract itself from a difficult position and then forget about. Roosevelt then produced a finesounding phrase to explain his position: as President of the USA, he was obliged to make clear to the British. . . that "America won’t help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples”. In the subsequent discussion with Churchill the position sounded a little different. It was a question of removing “ barriers”, the economic agreements that gave some states advantages over others. Roosevelt was not insisting that Britain stop "suppressing colonial peoples”; he was simply out to abolish the Empire trade agreements that had been obstructing the US monopolies.^^6^^

p To some extent, this marked a return to the Open Door Policy announced by the USA way back in 1899. The policy was supposed to ease the "peaceful economic" penetration of American capital into underdeveloped countries, so that vast 28 profits could be made out of the backward peoples without incurring the stigma of colonialism. "America ... is robbing all and sundry and doing so in a unique fashion. She has no colonies"^^7^^—this was Lenin’s view of the tactics of American imperialism.

p Some American historians describe Roosevelt as "a most complicated human being—a man of a bewildering variety of moods and motives”, and claim that this fact, in conjunction with his reticence and reserve and the absence of notes and diaries makes it impossible to obtain "reliable and detailed information on the motivation of his foreign policy".^^8^^ In fact, however, Roosevelt the man may have displayed a variety of moods and motives, but not Roosevelt the politician. The facts show that in clearing the path for the United States into the colonial empires of the European metropolises he was quite consistent and single-minded. His ideas on colonial policy come very close to what was later called neo-colonialism. He told Churchill, for example, that 20 thcentury colonial methods "involve bringing industry to these colonies" and "increasing the wealth of a people by increasing their standard of living, by educating them, by bringing them sanitation—by making sure that they get a return for the raw wealth of their community".^^9^^ In other words, "you need to develop before you can exploit"—with the help of the United States, of course.

p An example of such tactics is provided by Roosevelt’s position on the question of France’s African colonies. This gave rise to sharp differences between the British, the French and the Americans at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, after the landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa. By that time it is quite certain that Roosevelt regarded Britain and France not only as allies, but also as rivals. He said at the time that "the English mean to maintain their hold on their colonies. They mean to help the French maintain their hold on their colonies".^^10^^

p Consequently, while preparations for the landing operation were being made, the Americans attempted to relegate the British to second place, suggesting that during the initial stage their role should be limited to transporting troops and supplying sea and air cover. However, London was perfectly aware that if the first landing party consisted entirely of 29 American units, the USA would be in a very strong position to assert its authority over the occupied territories. Churchill objected, and the provision of British vessels for troop transportation was halted. As a result, the operation began six weeks behind schedule.

p But even after agreement had been reached and the landings had been successful, the USA took steps to deprive Britain of an equal share in administering the occupied areas. Cordell Hull dispatched special instructions to American representatives in North Africa, stating that the USA "bore the main responsibility" for managing North Africa’s economic resources, strategic raw materials, finance, transport, industry, food supplies and even public health. Even American sources note that these and similar measures were motivated by the aim of "acquiring colonies in North Africa" or at least bases.^^11^^

p Churchill’s message saying that de Gaulle refused to leave London for Casablanca, since "he’s furious over the methods used to get control in Morocco and Algeria and French West Africa”,^^12^^ was regarded by Roosevelt as an attempt to blackmail the Americans to drop their support for Giraud. True American businessman that he was, Roosevelt was shocked not by European colonial rule in Africa as such, but by its inefficiency. "Wealth!" he said to his sons in Casablanca. "They (i.e., the European metropolises—author) have robbed this continent of billions, and all because they were too short-sighted to understand that their billions were pennies, compared to the possibilities!. . ,"^^13^^

p At a meeting between himself, Churchill and the Sultan of Morocco on the 22 January 1943 Roosevelt discarded theoretical discussion in favour of practical measures. He stated at the outset that the postwar position of colonies would be very different from their prewar status. Then he recalled the ties between French and British financiers, who had formed joint syndicates to exploit the colonies. Finally, he pointed out that, in order to tap Morocco’s natural resources, (1) the United States could arrange to train Moroccan specialists in the best American universities, and (2) the Sultan would have no difficulty in negotiating contracts with American firms, which would both work the country’s natural resources and provide revenue. The Sultan was delighted, and the 30 British Prime Minister, biting his cigar in fury (as eye- witnesses recall), left the room.

p The episode is revealing in more ways than one. It shows the origins of the USA’s postwar expansion into Africa, lays bare the inter-imperialist contradictions over the colonial question and illustrates the methods of American neo- colonialism, which have been further developed since that time.

p Roosevelt was in no doubt as to the future status of the French colonial possessions. He not only supposed that after the liberation of France the United States (with some assistance from the British) would be able to retain its military control for many years over the French colonies in North Africa; but he was not at all sure whether it would be right to return the colonies to France "at any time”.

p The USA maintained this position for many years, and it coloured Franco-American relations. In his memoirs General de Gaulle recalls how even during the war the United States had made attempts to take over North Africa and prevent France from reasserting herself as a sovereign state.^^14^^

p According to the American historian William Langer, the issue of the French colonies in North Africa even influenced the US Government’s decision to preserve diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime, despite its obviously pro-fascist bias. The American ruling circles hoped in this way to facilitate their penetration of North Africa, an area that was "of crucial importance" to the USA.^^15^^

p US aspirations to the French colonial succession boded ill for Britain. In the first place, London had already concluded in 1943 that Britain would be unable to grab the French possessions, and, in the second place, feared that the question of partitioning the British colonies might arise. In the circumstances, the British Government preferred to oppose "the dissolution of empires" on principle. In response to Roosevelt’s idea that Dakar and Bizerta should be handed over to the USA and Britain for use as bases, Eden declared in his memorandum of the 13 July 1943 that the suggestion ran counter to British interests. Britain had no need of any French territory, and disapproved on principle of any policy that might lead to the downfall of the colonial empires. Eden noted in passing that the USA had no wish to see a 31 strong French government in office, nor did it wish the French colonial empire to remain intact.

p With the evident approval of the US Government, American monopolies made great strides in Africa during the war. A special trade mission, which included some prominent businessmen, visited British, French and Belgian colonies in Africa in 1942. Shortly afterwards, in October 1942, the magazine Life condemned British colonial policy and advised Britain to give up the Empire. But the British gave as good as they got. The April 1943 issue of the National Review contained a sharply worded account of the plight of the American Negroes, who were said to be worse off than colonial slaves, and on the 16 September 1944 The Economist called on the government to tell the Americans frankly and clearly that neither Britain nor the other European colonial powers had the slightest intention of giving up their colonies.

p Statesmen too, especially those of the USA and Britain, did some straight talking over the colonial issue. During the war the leader of the American Republican Party, Wendell Willkie, made repeated demands for the abolition of the colonial system, promising the peoples of Asia and Africa “guarantees” of their independence.^^16^^ The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, responded by saying that he was more interested in what Britons thought of the British Empire than in American views.^^17^^

p But the most persistent opposition to American pretensions came from the Prime Minister himself, Winston Churchill.

p His position was most pointedly summed up in his famous speech made at the Lord Mayor’s luncheon on the 10 November 1942, when he declared: "I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire".^^18^^

p Even at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when the US State Secretary, Edward Stettinius, raised the question of the future role of the United Nations vis-d-vis the dependent territories, Churchill flared up immediately and said that in no circumstances would he consent to anyone’s "thrusting interfering fingers into the very life of the British Empire”.

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p Despite the military situation and Britain’s increasing financial dependence on the USA, the Churchill Government used more than just words to resist American aspirations. A good example is the two countries’ relations with regard to the Lend-Lease arrangement.

p During negotiations over the quantity of Lend-Lease supplies and the procedure for their delivery and payment the US Government insisted that in exchange for American aid Britain should open the markets of the British Empire to American goods and abolish preferential customs tariffs. The discussion begun in Argentia Bay continued. The USA was not satisfied with the compromise article included in the Atlantic Charter. Despite Churchill’s fierce resistance, the hopelessness of the situation forced the British to back down. Article 7 of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease agreement signed on the 23 February 1942 stipulated that after the war Great Britain would remove all impediments to international trade and reduce tariffs. However, Churchill’s compliance with the American demand was only a trick. Cordell Hull recalls in his memoirs: "Thereafter, however, it frequently became apparent to me that Prime Minister Churchill, despite this pledge, was determined to hold on to imperial preference”.^^19^^

p Grave concern was aroused in London by the fact that the USA had taken the initiative in devising a preliminary plan for a general international trusteeship system. To this end a special committee, headed by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, was set up in the State Department in the second half of 1942. Accordingly, in February 1943 Whitehall suggested to the White House that a joint declaration on colonial policy should be published. The British draft of the document stated that responsibility for governing colonies and seeing to their defence needs should remain with the appropriate colonial powers. Bearing in mind the differences in the stage of development attained by the various colonies, these powers would gradually lead them to selfgovernment. No specific timetable was laid down. The sole concession made by Britain lay in the proposal to establish regional commissions to promote international cooperation over the improvement of living standards in the colonies.^^20^^

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p It goes without saying that a document of this kind was unacceptable to a United States government that was trying to unlock the gates of the British colonial empire. The British Cabinet, in turn, rejected a draft prepared by the State Department, since the term “independence” occurred in a description of the future status of the colonial peoples. Although the document was referring not to the granting of independence but simply to the establishment of a timetable for granting it, Washington was informed that "the memorandum and draft resolution would not be acceptable to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in their present form".^^21^^

p In the meantime the USA’s interest in the colonies of the European metropolises, especially the African ones, continued to grow. The well-known American specialist in African affairs, Rupert Emerson, comments: "It was only as World War II developed that the United States came into direct and extensive contact with Africa.”^^22^^ What was meant by “contact” was clarified in the summer of 1943 in a public statement made by Henry Villard, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the US State Department: "Never before has the word ‘Africa’ meant so much to the people of the United States ... the war has turned a powerful searchlight on Africa, focusing attention on its strategic position.”^^23^^

p This is accurate. Strategic factors, as well as economic and political considerations, prompted US interest in Africa.

p The following figures convey a clear picture of the practical results of the strengthening of the USA’s grip on Africa during the war years. Before the war American monopolies controlled 43 per cent of all African mining operations for manganese ore; by 1946 the proportion had risen to 76.8 per cent. Their control over copper mining rose from 7.1 per cent to 29.2 per cent, and over vanadium extraction from 35.9 per cent to 43.1 per cent. A similar situation developed in relation to chromium, cobalt, rubber, columbite and other valuable minerals. During the period 1941-45 there was a fourfold increase in US trade with Africa: from 250 to 1,058 million dollars’ worth. Private capital investment by the monopolies grew by 50 per cent over these years.

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p The enterprise of the monopolies was backed up by official action. A special delegation led by Robert Murphy of the State Department and William Donovan, one of the leaders of US intelligence, was sent to North Africa in December 1940. On the 26 February 1941 Murphy signed an agreement on US economic aid to North Africa with General Weygand, head of the Vichy administration in North Africa. General Catroux, a supporter of de Gaulle, described these political manoeuvres and the subsequent US decision to land troops in North Africa as an attempt to take over the French colonies there.^^24^^ De Gaulle himself was in no two minds as to the real plans of the USA and Britain. He called the "political conduct" of his allies "blatant selfishness" and was "less inclined than ever to place any trust in the ideological formulas that they employed to conceal it”.^^25^^

The contradictions between Britain, the USA and France over colonial issues grew stronger during the early postwar period preceding the liberation of the enslaved countries from colonial rule.