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p The limiting of imperialist rule in Africa has applied to more than just territorial and economic factors. Simultaneously a process is taking place that reduces the practical possibilities of imperialist policies in relations with the newly independent countries. In this situation, despite the fact that the imperialist powers’ foreign policies are concentrated on the struggle with the main enemy—world socialism—their rivalry in the narrowing sphere of political influence on the continent is also becoming fiercer.

p Before the disintegration of the colonial system the destinies of African countries were determined by the policies of the metropolises. At the present the peoples of Africa are increasingly becoming the masters of their own fate. The governments of many young states are trying to limit the activities of foreign capital and to fit them into a definite framework. The liberated countries are also exerting a perceptible influence on international relations.

p However, with a few exceptions, the measures being taken by African countries both in the economic and political spheres in order to attain genuine sovereignty are still proving inadequate. It is impossible to give a simple explanation for this fact. But among the host of reasons, which include both the legacy of the colonial past and the effect of neo-colonialist policies, one basic reason must be singled out. It was discussed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workrrc’ Parties held in Moscow in 1969. Many 198 of the young states have still not chosen a course of development, and in a number of countries power has been seized by reactionary elements which have close connections with imperialism. It is precisely this factor that offers the governments and monopolies of capitalist powers a certain "freedom of action" and encourages them to struggle for political positions in Africa.

p The political aspect of the inter-imperialist struggle in Africa is the most contradictory. All the Western powers have an interest in keeping the young states within the orbit of imperialist policies. At the same time, each power is attempting to occupy the dominant position in the social and political life of a newly independent country.

p Ever since the beginning of the gradual collapse of the colonial regimes the USA has used her advantages over the European colonial powers in an attempt to obtain a leading political role in Africa. By the end of the fifties the US position in the political life of Western Europe and Asia appeared to Washington to be sufficiently solid; only in Africa, where the old colonialists still held sway, was there a check to American opportunities for independent action. The disintegration of colonialism removed the formal limitations on American political expansion and caused US ruling circles to lay claim to a leading role in the new Africa.

p There are many aspects to the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in free Africa. We shall confine ourselves to those which highlight the most important sides of the struggle, its forms, methods and prospects.

p The African Commonwealth countries as the object of political rivalry between the imperialist powers. In 1960 there were three clearly delineated zones of British influence in the Third World: South-East Asia, the Middle East and a large part of Africa south of the Sahara. Today only this last area remains. Britain has largely managed to retain her economic, political, cultural and, to a certain extent, military ties in the vast region stretching from Cape Town to Lusaka and from Nairobi to Accra. In addition, Britain has been able to include almost all her former African colonies (with the exception of South Africa and Rhodesia) in the Commonwealth and to keep them within the system of imperial 199 preferences and the sterling area. Of the 33 members of the Commonwealth (including Great Britain) 13 are African countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius.

p These countries have widely differing relations with Britain, but they all take part in the numerous organisations that foster co-operation within the Commonwealth. The former metropolis provides the bulk of their financial and technical “aid”, organises the training of national personnel, and so on.

p The question of what the Commonwealth as a whole and its African part mean to Britain has been given detailed examination in a number of studies by Soviet and foreign specialists. These works analyse the contradictions within this political structure, its development trends and prospects.^^1^^ So we shall look at just one problem—the political rivalry between the imperialist powers, especially the USA and Britain, in some of the main countries of former British Africa.

p Rupert Emerson points out that "As far as the United States is concerned, access to the English-speaking countries has generally been easier than to those linked to France".^^2^^ The common language, the "special relationship" that has made London dependent on Washington and the deep penetration of American capital into the economy of Britain herself really have made US political expansion into the African parts of the former British Empire very much easier. Nevertheless, this expansion is meeting with increasing resistance. A scarcely veiled Anglo-American contest can be seen everywhere both over general issues and over those affecting each individual country. In 1959 the USA turned down a British proposal, dictated by tactical considerations, that Britain and America should work out a joint policy towards Africa south of the Sahara. Britain in turn rejected an American idea for co-ordinating “aid” to the African countries, seeing this as a US move to establish control over the British programmes and to secure more profitable markets for her manufactured goods.

p During the first few years after Britain’s African colonies had attained independence the United States pursued a very 200 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1974/NSA319/20071126/299.tx" restrained policy towards the English-speaking countries of Africa, despite the loudly proclaimed policy of "filling the vacuum”. Although carrying out an economic penetration, the USA acknowledged the supremacy of her European allyin the sphere of political influence.

p William Attwood recalls how amazed he was, when preparing to take up his post as American ambassador to Kenya, to learn from State Department officials working in the Bureau of African Affairs that it was US policy "to tailor our actions in Africa to the wishes of our often shortsighted NATO partners. . . .”^^3^^ But at the same time Attwood also learnt something else. He was given a copy of the report presented by the task force assigned by President Kennedy to review US policy in Africa. Attwood writes: ”. . . It rejected the Eurafrica idea . . . that Africa was still a semidependency of Europe and that America should put intrude. . . . But it stressed that our ‘intrusion’ should be low-key, practical. . . .”^^4^^

p This thesis formed the basis for all subsequent US actions aimed at seizing the channels of political influence in the English-speaking countries of Africa from the USA’s “ shortsighted” NATO partner.

p When drawing up and carrying out this policy, Washington proceeded from several premises and circumstances. Firstly, the USA always secretly shared the false colonial idea that the African peoples were incapable of running their own affairs independently, without the help of foreign guardians and mentors. Secondly, owing to the general weakening of Britain, American ruling circles increasingly took the view that London was no longer capable of being such a “guardian”. Thirdly, having taken upon herself the mission of “protecting” the young states from "communist infiltration”, the USA considered that only her political influence, in conjunction with economic and military means, was able to accomplish the task. Although it does not rule out measures taken jointly with its allies, Washington nevertheless does not fully trust them and, more important, has no confidence in their strength and ability to actively oppose communism in the Third World. Military and political disagreements have long been rife between France and the USA. Although Britain is regarded as the USA’s main 201 partner thanks to the "special relationship”, she is coming to be seen less and less in the United States as a "reliable barrier" to the further development of the national liberation revolution in Africa.

p Also of no small importance was the fact that in the second half of the sixties Britain’s political ties with the African members of the Commonwealth became substantially weaker—a result of London’s policy towards South Africa and Rhodesia. Only their economic dependence on the former metropolis prevented them from carrying out their oft repeated threats to "leave the Commonwealth" and "break off relations" with Britain. Naturally, this process did not pass unnoticed in the USA.

p Finally, in recent years Anglo-American relations have been losing more and more of their “special” nature. Thus, the main obstacle to political rivalry between the two powers is falling away.

p It should be remembered that, when establishing the "special relationship" with the USA, which was initiated by Churchill’s unfortunate speech in Fulton on the 5 March 1946, Britain’s ruling circles were pursuing very definite aims. With American help they hoped to overcome the postwar economic difficulties, slow down the national liberation movement of the colonial peoples and restore Britain’s international position. But the main point is that London viewed the "special relationship" with the USA as a means of limiting American claims to the "British legacy" and of possibly preventing the Americans from getting, as Churchill put it, "the guardianship of the British Empire, minus Great Britain".^^5^^ In order to achieve this, it was necessary to encourage US expansion into those spheres and areas where there were only minor British interests or none at all. The plans of Britain’s ruling circles even included the mobilisation of the USA for a “crusade” against communism. This point was made clear by Roosevelt shortly before his death, when he stated that "the British were perfectly willing for the United States to have a war with Russia at any time. . . .”^^6^^ It was only when Britain’s military doctrine was supplemented by a section on the “indefensibility” of the British Isles that her ruling circles began to realise the possible consequences of these provocative tactics.

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p In fact, Britain did not achieve a single one of the aims which she had set herself when entering into the "special relationship" with the USA.

p Eventually, by the end of the sixties, this relationship had become an obstacle to the two countries’ developing their own policies, as became abundantly clear over Britain’s intention to join the Common Market. In October 1967 Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, even went so far as to say that the "special relationship" with the USA no longer existed.

p If one compares different writers’ views on the state of the Anglo-American "special relationship”, a number of typical features emerge. The main point is how this relationship affects the policies of both powers towards the developing countries and, particularly, those in Africa. The gist of American declarations is that this is precisely the sphere that gave rise to the contradictions which caused the crisis. The prominent American publicist Stewart Alsop observes that ”. . . the ’special relationship’ has been for some time in a process of rank decay... . The process of decay started with the ill-advised Suez adventure by the British in 1956, and the angry and ungenerous American reaction to that adventure".^^7^^

p British views are less categorical and boil down to saying that the United States will still “need” Britain. Moreover, this view is held by academics as well as political commentators. In his study The Future of British Foreign Policy, published in 1969, Professor Max Beloff of the University of Oxford writes that the USA is "the natural and inevitable successor to Britain”. However, the professor considers that "It has suited the United States—at least until very recently—to encourage the view that Britain could still play a Great Power role in the old sense. In part this has been due to the clear American dislike of being left with no proper interlocutor on her own side of the great ideological divide; in part it has been due to a hope that Britain could still sustain some of the burden of common defence, and thus take some of the load off American shoulders".^^8^^ So it is no longer a matter of a "spiritual alliance”, full of "mutual understanding" and so on. Emotion has given way to unconcealed expediency, or, as The Observer pointed 203 out, Britain’s sentimental credit has long been exhausted in her relations with America.^^9^^

p In this situation the USA’s political expansion into the African Commonwealth countries, as into the other traditional areas of British interests, began to take on a more and more determined character.

p Four main tactical devices can be singled out in the actions of the imperialist competitors: (1) the adoption of a broad complex of different measures in the sphere of information, ideology, culture, education, etc., with the aim of generally consolidating political influence in the particular country; (2) the setting up of strong points within the ruling party (or grouping) in order to split it and isolate the forces that are looking to the competing power, and subsequently to secure the decisive political positions; (3) the organisation of a new party (or the resurrection of an old one) led by their “allies”, which is later brought to power by “democratic” methods or through a coup d’etat; and (4) the use of crisis situations in the country for attempts to fill key posts with pro-American or pro-British individuals.

p The choice of one stratagem or another (a combination is usually selected) is determined by the specifics of each country, by the strength of the imperialist rival’s position and by the level of strategic interests in the area. An important feature of American policy as a whole, which must be particularly borne in mind when undertaking an analysis, is the fact that attempts are made to use the political and social peculiarities of the young states and their development problems. Let us consider a few of the most typical examples of Anglo-American political rivalry in the countries of East and West Africa.

p The struggle for political influence in East Africa is well illustrated by Kenya, the country which is viewed by both the USA and Britain as the main stronghold in trie region.

p By expanding into East Africa, Britain was pursuing political aims as well as economic aims. For British imperialism it was a region of great military and strategic significance. Kenya was the crossroads of the sea and air routes linking the metropolis with its Asian possessions, Kenya protected 204 the ilank in the "east of Suez" strategy and Kenya was the “gateway” to Central Africa. In addition, a considerable number of immigrants from Britain had seized the best land and had become firmly established in Kenya. Many of these factors are still relevant today, but others have been added. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania formed the nucleus of the African part of the Commonwealth of Nations; geographically they are adjacent to the racist and colonial south of Africa, in which considerable British interests are concentrated.

p The USA, in turn, has also long shown an interest in East Africa. Typically enough, the first diplomatic representation in the area was the American Consulate, opened on Zanzibar as early as 1833. But right up to the Second World War and during the early postwar years Britain kept her "East African reserve”, as William Attwood, the former US ambassador to Kenya, called the region, under lock and key.

p The situation changed completely when the countries of East Africa attained national sovereignty, and open political rivalry between the USA and Britain was initiated by the visit to Kenya paid in 1961 by the Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, and by his scarcely veiled anti-British speeches there. "... Washington evidently saw a favourable opportunity for gaining political credit in this area by contrasting itself with London,"^^10^^ said the well-known historian Maclean.

p Kenya soon came to occupy a privileged place in the US programme for Africa. Kenya received Most Favoured Nation treatment when applying for “aid”, loans, etc. US expansion was furthered both by the firm policy of capitalist development pursued by the Kenyan Government and by the laws that were passed guaranteeing capital investment and the free export of profits. However, the USA was obliged to reckon with the strength of the British economic position in the country and so applied pressure in those areas where her rival was most vulnerable—in the sphere of politics, ideology and social measures.

p One of the largest centres of the USIA (United States Information Agency) was opened in Nairobi, and in a short time it extended its activities to cover the whole country. 205 The centre inundated local libraries, schools and other educational establishments with American propaganda. Americans work as sub-editors in all sections of the Kenyan Government’s radio station, the Voice of Kenya, and Kenyan employees are regularly sent to the USA on courses. The position is much the same in the local television service. American companies have bought up 60 per cent of the broadcasting time. Needless to say, their programmes are loud in their support of US policies and advertise the American way of life.

p The “Americanisation” of government officials is carried out in the Government Training Institute, built with US funds. About 500 people receive additional training there every year. Work among young people is carried out through the National Youth Service and the National Union of Kenyan Students, which are also American-financed. American missionary groups, with a combined staff of about 1,000, carry the political and ideological influence of the USA into the hinterland. They run 40 secondary schools, 12 colleges, 48 clinics and 12 hospitals, and have their own "flying doctor" service.

p The reciprocal visits of government, social, trade union and other workers are an important means of strengthening US political influence in Kenya. During the last few years nearly all Kenyan ministers and many high-ranking military officers and the managers of banks and other establishments have visited the USA by special invitation. Kenya, in turn, has been visited since 1968 by the former American VicePresident, Hubert Humphrey; Judges Marshall, Douglas and Stewart of the US Supreme Court; Heard, a director of the Ford Foundation; the Negro Senator Edward Brooke; and, lastly, none other than US Secretary of State William Rogers. All these visits were used to advertise US policy in Africa. Apart from this, the Americans mounted a large-scale ideological campaign in Nairobi in 1968: the International Press Institute conference and "The First African-American Dialogue”, in which African and American statesmen, members of parliament, academics, journalists and others took part.

p All in all, the USA has managed to significantly strengthen her political influence in Kenya at the expense of 206 Britain. An example of this is the situation in the country’s ruling party, KANU. Speaking at a meeting of the KANU executive committee in April 1968, the President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, was forced to admit that the ruling party had lost its unity and had split into two rival groups: the pro-American KANU-A and the pro-British KANU-B. It is significant here to remember the fate of the former Secretary-General of KANU and Kenyan Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Tom Mboya, who was considered to be the leader of the KANU-A grouping and who was killed on the 5 July 1969. Those responsible for this act of terrorism have never been unmasked. Tom Mboya was one of Kenya’s main politicians and statesmen, and was seen as a likely successor to Jomo Kenyatta, i.e., as the country’s future president. He made virtually no secret of his pro-American leanings and was known in the government as "the USA’s man”.

p In the late sixties Mboya began to create difficulties for the pro-British grouping, and London became seriously worried about the prospects for its Kenyan “allies” remaining in power. Thus, in January 1968 Mboya did all he could to prevent Charles Rubia, the former Mayor of Nairobi and a man who had close connections with the British Embassy, from being elected Chairman of the Nairobi branch of KANU. In the spring of that year he tried to retain the old procedure for the presidential elections (through the National Assembly), which drastically lowered the chances of the leaders of the pro-British grouping. He managed to establish KANU-A groups, later abolished with great difficulty by Jomo Kenyatta, in the major branches of the party—in Mombasa, Machakos and other towns. In addition, as Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Mboya began to extend the country’s economic relations with the Scandinavian countries, Italy and Japan, thus enlarging the number of Britain’s competitors.

p The fact that during the last months before Mboya’s death he outwardly weakened his ties with the USA and began to speak as a pure nationalist was seen by his enemies as a tactical move in the battle for the presidential chair.

p Mboya’s assassination evoked a broad response abroad, as well as in Kenya. The British press was perplexed over what 207 harm the "Kenyan Crown Prince" was doing to anyone. In July 1969 the New York Times reported that Mboya had not discounted the possibility of physical violence being used against him by his political enemies. He was alleged to have told his New York friends that "the danger is growing, since President Kenyatta plans to hold a general election”. The Italian weekly Rinascita revealed who Mboya’s New York friends actually were. They were political intriguers and shady dealers associated with the CIA, and they informed the American press that in a letter written a few hours before his death Mboya had admitted that he might well become a victim of the struggle between the groupings in KANU. After analysing the political situation in Kenya, Rinascita reached a very definite conclusion: "Mboya was a dangerous candidate for the succession to Kenyatta, and he was all the more to be feared since he enjoyed the full support of the USA".^^11^^

p The Kenyan armed forces are also an object of AngloAmerican rivalry, with London trying to preserve its influence in them and Washington making stubborn efforts to dislodge the British. The following example is typical. In July 1967 an exchange of letters took place between Edward Peake, the British High Commissioner in Nairobi, and the Kenyan Minister of Defence, Njoroge Mungai, confirming the agreement to establish a British military training team in Kenya "to assist in the training and development of the Armed Forces of Kenya”. The agreement preserved Britain’s complete supremacy in matters of assisting "the Commanders of the land, air and sea forces of Kenya in the discharge of their responsibility for the training and development of those forces".^^12^^ Thus, the Kenyan forces were assured of "highly competent guidance" and felt no need of “aid” from anyone else.

p But Washington took a different view. Shortly after the exchange of letters just referred to, Njoroge Mungai was invited to the United States, where it was agreed that some Kenyan servicemen, including air force personnel, should be sent to America for training. Then in March 1968 a group of 42 American officers headed by General Goodpaster, the Commandant of the National War College in Washington, arrived in Kenya. In talks with Mungai the 208 general again raised the question of strengthening co- operation between Kenya and America over the creation of a national Kenyan air force.

p The growth of American influence in Kenya is demonstrated by the fact that in recent years there have been no serious disputes in Kenyan-American relations. The USA has come in for no direct criticism either in the press or in statements made by Kenyan leaders, unlike Britain, which has been frequently attacked. London, however, was in no mood to acquiesce to the political expansion of its rival into an area where its influence was once supreme, and the British reaction can be described as passive resistance, accompanied by persistent anti-American propaganda: "The first proponents of anti-Americanism in East Africa were probably the white settlers, who so often accused the United States of stabbing Britain’s imperial back”, as Ali Mazrui puts it.^^13^^ The British counter-measures were successful. A less hostile attitude towards the former metropolis prevails in East Africa nowadays than previously.

p Anglo-American political rivalry is taking other forms in Ghana. As is shown by the way events have developed in recent years, the methods of staging a coup and compromising undesirable candidates for power, creating new parties and abolishing old ones, and the use of elections and economic pressure have all been used in Ghana in various combinations. Temporary truces were concluded between the rivals and their actions were co-ordinated depending on the situation, and then the competitive battle flared up again with renewed force.

p Before February 1966 American influence in Ghana was insignificant compared with Britain’s. There were no open displays of the two powers’ political rivalry. Only in the economic sphere did the interests of the British and American monopolies conflict. Britain and the USA were equally unhappy with Kwame Nkrumah, which forced them to coordinate their actions. The coup d’etat of the 24 February 1966 was one of the results of their joint tactics.

p It would, of course, be simplistic to view the change of regime in Ghana as being only the result of the subversive activities of the imperialist powers. The causes of the coup are far more varied and run deeper. To some extent, they 209 reflect the complex processes that accompany nation-building in young countries recently delivered from colonial bondage. But, in analysing this event, it would be equally wrong to ignore the tactics of imperialism, its subversive activities and its use and aggravation of a situation through the methods of political, economic and ideological sabotage. As the British sociologist David Horowitz admits, imperialist subversion in developing countries is not "an isolated aberration of policy".^^14^^

p In order to understand the course of events, it must be realised that Britain engaged in subversive activities against progressive forces in the Gold Coast colony long before “granting” it independence. Even at the end of the forties the British had recognised the grave danger to imperial interests represented by the movement headed by Nkrumah. They also realised that the imposition of sanctions and restrictions alone would not remove the danger. So from 1949, when the Convention People’s Party (GPP), the main political force in the country’s national liberation movement, was founded, the British authorities did all they could to undermine its position and influence. Acting through agents and following the theory of “intercepting” a social revolution, the British began to organise new parties on a massive scale to counterbalance the CPP. There were soon more than ten of them, but none could compete seriously with the CPP. Then the so-called United Party headed by Kofi Busia was set up. But its efforts to occupy a dominant position in the country were equally unsuccessful. The party was dissolved, and Busia emigrated from Ghana.

p Britain probably possessed sufficient means to organise and carry out the coup of the 24 February without the help of the USA. All Ghana’s senior officers had been trained and educated in Britain and, by and large, kept up their close connections with British military establishments. Before 1961 the commanding positions in the Ghanaian army were held by British officers—the leaders of coups in the past were their immediate subordinates. Apart from that, as the London newspaper Tribune commented on the 27 February 1966, "in comparison with any other British colony in Africa, Ghana had the most clearly defined class of the middle 210 bourgeoisie, brought up in the British tradition. Ghanaian establishments were very closely linked with the British system of government and were really copies of their British counterparts.”

p The need for Britain to co-ordinate her actions with the USA arose from two factors—the Agreement on Joint AntiCommunist Actions and the influence that the USA had already acquired in Ghana’s police force, the second participant in the putsch. American news agencies stated forthrightly that the coup had been organised by British Intelligence in collusion with the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA.

p The result of the Ghanaian coup was not just the complete reorientation of the new regime towards the West, described as "balanced neutrality”. The new political climate also created a favourable environment for an inter-imperialist struggle for influence, primarily between Britain and the USA. Le Monde’s African specialist, Philippe Decraene, wrote: "Very discreet at the time when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah still presided over the destiny of the Republic of Ghana, the American presence today is clearly perceptible in Accra.. . .”^^15^^

p It is certainly true that within a short time the number of staff at the US Embassy in Ghana rose steeply. Accra was invaded by hundreds of various American specialists acting as advisers and consultants to the National Liberation Council and to the country’s government agencies. The number of representatives of the "Peace Corps" trebled between 1966 and 1969. The visits of American officials to Ghana became more frequent. Explaining the heightened interest being shown in the country, Washington said that it was acting in the “interests” of Ghana’s peoples. On his return from an African tour during which he also visited Ghana in January 1968, US Vice-President Hubert Humphrey stated bluntly that Africans did not wish to be perpetually dependent on the former metropolises. Africans longed for friendship with the USA, her support and assistance.^^16^^ Backing up this thesis, the USA provided the new Ghanaian regime during its first two years with about 50 million dollars in the form of loans, technical “aid” and goods. US Ambassador Williams, who left Accra in March 1968, 211 declared with great satisfaction that relations between Ghana and the USA were at their zenith.^^17^^

p Britain, however, reckoned unequivocally that the overthrow of Nkrumah would secure the return of this “ recalcitrant” member of the Commonwealth to the patronage of the former metropolis, and the increasing activity of her competitor alarmed British ruling circles and put them on their guard. Counter-measures were soon taken. In the first place, the British proceeded to strengthen their old links, and establish new ones, with Ghanaian military and business circles. An agreement was reached with the leaders of the National Liberation Council to renew the training of Ghanaian servicemen in Britain. Next a group of British army officers went to Accra, where they concluded an agreement providing for the exchange of military units "for training purposes”. The London journal Africa and the World pointed out in August 1968 that "British troops are to take over stand-by security duties in Ghana. ... Police Chief Harlley, the real boss of the NLC (National Liberation Council), ordered his police security organisation to keep a tight watch on the army.” It will be shown below that the rivalry between the army and the police in Ghana was also a result of the bitter struggle between the imperialist powers for influence in the country.

p At the same time, London launched a cautious but persistent anti-American campaign in the British-controlled press. Articles appeared describing racial discrimination in Ghanaian hotels owned by US firms; the newspaper Daily Graphic revealed that the Americans had bought up a pharmaceutical factory built by Hungary; and a number of publications, of clearly British origin, dealt with Negro riots in the USA, and so on. But the main struggle centred upon key figures in the highest spheres of Ghana’s national, political and social life.

p As soon as it had been set up, Ghana’s National Liberation Council became the object of rivalry between Britain and the USA and also, although to a very much lesser extent, the contest was later joined by France and the FRG. The first results of this rivalry were the persistent crises within the NLC and the worsening of relations between the army and the police. The imperialist struggle for influence 212 in Ghana developed further with the NLC’s declaration of its plans for a transition to civilian rule, and the conflict came to a head at the same time as general parliamentary elections were held in Ghana.

p On the Ghanaian side, the main role in preparing and carrying out the coup of the 24 February 1906 was played by Colonels E. K. Kotoka and A. A. Afrifa and the InspectorGeneral of the police force, J.W.K. Harlley. The first two were well-known for their pro-British sympathies, while Harlley was in permanent contact with US representatives. Having created the NLC, the leaders of the coup set up a compromise figure to head it—General Joseph Ankrah, who was at that time supported by the British, not without good reason, Ankrah had been brought up in a British mission school, he had served in the King’s African Rifles, had repeatedly visited Britain and was in constant touch with various official bodies. However, while Ankrah’s position was growing stronger and he began to be viewed as a potential candidate for the post of President once civilian rule had been restored, the general’s sympathies swung perceptibly towards the USA. This was marked outwardly by his frequent meetings with American representatives and by the freedom of action that he gave them in the country. The French Le Monde observed that immediately after Ankrah had visited the USA Washington stepped up its activities in Ghana noticeably.^^18^^

p Ankrah was removed from the political scene in the best British tradition. The firm Geafan Ltd., an imitation of the American Gallup Institute, knew that the head of the military-police regime aspired to the position of "Father of the Nation”, a man who stood "above tribal and party differences”, and offered him its services in 1968. Accordingly, the firm not only regularly published in the local press the results of its public opinion polls, which revealed that the whole country “welcomed” Ankrah as a future President, but also blackmailed foreign firms in Ghana into providing sums of money which it then transferred, in Ankrah’s name, to potential members of the presidential electoral college.

p Rumours that Ankrah was secretly conducting a personal electoral campaign, especially when political activity in the 213 country was forbidden, appeared in April 1969 and led to an enquiry. In the end, Ankrah admitted the "error of his ways" before a special commission which included members of the NLC and the Supreme Court, and resigned. A. A. Afrifa became Chairman of the NLC. The way was now clear for further British manoeuvring. It should be added that the firm of Geafan Ltd., registered in Britain, was formally headed by a Nigerian who had a Swiss wife, and was not involved in any other, similar operations.

p In Accra two versions of Ankrah’s exposure were in circulation. According to the first, emanating from the British Embassy, at the end of 1968 British Intelligence received “information” from a number of British firms in Ghana about the financial contributions that were being demanded of them in order to prepare for Ankrah’s election as President. British Intelligence recommended these firms to continue payment for a few months, and then informed the other members of the NLC of the matter. Ankrah was removed from his post at the insistence of Harlley, i.e., with the knowledge and consent of his American friends. The second version differs from the first in one small, but substantial, detail: British Intelligence revealed Ankrah’s machinations not to the other members of the NLC, but to Afrifa personally, who, despite Hartley’s attempts to play the incident down, appointed a commission of enquiry. One other fact is typical. In its edition of the 3 April 1969, prepared before the NLC’s announcement of Ankrah’s retirement, the London-controlled Ghanaian weekly Guardian carried an article setting out the charges against Ankrah in great detail and in very harsh terms.

p But the Ankrah affair was only a stage in the inter- imperialist rivalry in Ghana. As the British African specialist Colin Legum commented, "The power struggle centres on two leaders—Professor K. A. Busia, former leader of the opposition United Party, and Mr. Komlo Gbedemah, Nkrumah’s former Minister of Finance".^^19^^ Both returned to the country after the coup. According to Legum, Busia was supported by Afrifa, and behind Gbedemah stood Harlley, who was, moreover, a relative of his. It is true that Gbedemah’s position was extremely weak, since he had been Minister of Finance under Nkrumah and, according to a NLC 214 decree, was “disqualified”, i.e., stripped of the right to be in government service for 15 years. However, Gbedemah was fully rehabilitated through Harlley’s efforts which aroused the indignation of Afrifa, who suggested, as a result, that the Disqualification Commission should be dissolved.

p On the 1 May 1969 the ban on political parties in Ghana was lifted and preparations for parliamentary elections got under way. About twenty parties appeared in the country immediately. However, only the leader of the Progress Party, Busia, and the leader of the National Alliance of Liberals, Gbedemah, possessed the means for setting up party organisations, renting premises, procuring transport and, most important of all, for conducting an electoral campaign. After the parties had been registered, Busia visited London and Gbedemah went to Geneva. As a result of these trips, the funds of both parties were substantially replenished. As was pointed out in Accra’s diplomatic circles, the American and West German representatives were convinced that Gbedemah’s party would triumph in the elections, while their British and French colleagues were in no doubt that Busia would carry the day.

p In the parliamentary elections that took place in Ghana on the 29 August 1969 a majority of the electorate voted for Busia’s Progress Party, which won a total of 105 out of 140 seats in parliament. Busia headed the first civilian government in Ghana since 1966.

p The end of this “round” in the conflict of imperialist interests in Ghana is noteworthy. After the parliamentary elections the US Embassy in Accra was restaffed almost completely, while the British Times of the 25 October 1969 reported with great satisfaction that a democratic Ghana under the realistic leadership of Busia was clearly in Britain’s interest. It went on to say that Ghana was clearly adopting a pro-Western position and favoured co-operation between the Commonwealth countries. Nevertheless, the USA has not set aside the plans for strengthening her political influence in Ghana at the expense of Britain. Accra, which usually figures in the African routes followed by Washington’s representatives, was included in the African tour made by Secretary of State William Rogers in February 215 1970. Ghana remains on the United States’ list of “select” African countries. The activities of the American "Peace Corps" have been stepped up considerably in the country, and the penetration of US private capital into the Ghanaian economy intensified. However, the Ghanaians themselves have caused the imperialist plans to be modified. Military leaders assumed power in Ghana in January 1972. Busia’s regime came to an end, and its leader sought refuge in Britain.

p It was pointed out earlier that the imperialist powers try to make use of crisis situations in individual African countries in order to strengthen their political influence. A clear example of this is provided by the events in Nigeria, once British imperialism’s main springboard in West Africa. In Chapter IX the Nigerian crisis was analysed from the viewpoint of the monopolies’ struggle for the sources of strategic raw materials. That is undoubtedly the main point in the events. Yet they also involve the substantial political interests of the Western powers.

p After the first coup in Nigeria (15 January 1966) differences could already be seen in the views on the country’s future political system between Britain, the USA and France. Washington preferred a unitary system, the speedy abolition of the emirates in the north of the country and feudal relations, and the rapid capitalist development of all the regions, since it considered that in these circumstances the political influence of Britain would inevitably dwindle. Besides, the Americans had by that time managed to establish close ties in the circles of the local bourgeoisie, and British advisers and consultants began to feel the mounting pressure from their American colleagues.

p For its part, London was categorically opposed to the idea of a unitary government. In British plans Nigeria was dissected into a number of territories ruled by a "native administration”, i.e., the system of indirect rule was to be restored in slightly changed forms. The Financial Times, for example, even suggested that any form of federation should be rejected and that the regions of Nigeria should become completely autonomous entities.

p France was not directly seeking any real political position in Nigeria, but for a number of reasons might have had an 216 interest in seeing the country dismembered. Firstly, this would have eliminated a dangerous economic and political competitor to West African countries that looked to France. Secondly, there was a prospect of extending French influence to individual regions of Nigeria, especially since many of the leaders and emirs in the Northern Region protested against "Ibo rule" after the coup of January 1966, and threatened to leave the federation. In this connection the British journal Foreign Report stated on the 16 June 1966 that Northern leaders had approached the government of the neighbouring Republic of Niger, which once belonged to France, about some form of political union. The journal went on to say that another plan which was being discussed concerned the establishment of ties between Northern Nigeria and Cameroun. And, thirdly, the division of Nigeria would have been a serious blow to the British position in Africa and to the Commonwealth, and would have given France some important cards to play in her political rivalry with Britain: it would have been a clear demonstration of the superiority of French policies in Africa.

p The declaration of Biafran “independence” and the civil war that flared up in Nigeria gave some French circles real reasons to believe that their plans would succeed. Thus, supporting the separatists was a step towards achieving their political, as well as economic, aims.

p London was perfectly well aware of this. "The Times declared on the 22 October 1968 that "General de Gaulle is apprehensive that Nigeria’s French-speaking neighbours will be drawn into the orbit of Lagos should Nigeria remain one country. . ..” Rumours circulated in London to the effect that Niger had already unofficially informed Nigeria that she would be willing to enter into close co-operation, were it not for her complete dependence on French subsidies. Dahomey was in a similar position. The view was attributed to Paris that such events clearly indicated a "British plot”.

p The actions of Britain and France during the events in Nigeria threw into sharp relief their contradictions and the struggle for political influence in West Africa. France’s support for Biafra and her partially successful attempts to 217 ensure official recognition of the separatist regime by countries in French-speaking Africa (Ivory Coast and Gabon) were regarded in Britain as parts of a "policy of trying to penetrate former British African territories".^^20^^

p An examination of the present state and prospects of the Western powers’ policies towards the countries of former British Africa that now form part of the Commonwealth of independent states shows that, apart from those rejecting a capitalist orientation, these countries will remain an object of neo-colonialist political rivalry, primarily between the USA and Britain. The former metropolis will not give up its position voluntarily and will make no move to dismantle a structure which assures British imperialism of substantial advantages. Washington, in whose plans Africa is beginning to occupy a more prominent place, will undoubtedly step up its political expansion into the English-speaking countries of Africa. Additionally, Britain is beginning to face political competition in Africa from the FRG, Japan and South Africa (in countries like Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) and also, to some extent, from France.

p As for US plans, a number of conclusions can even be drawn from the route followed by Secretary of State William Rogers during his African tour in February 1970. He visited ten countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria, Cameroun and Liberia. Morocco and Tunisia feature in the US policy towards both Africa and the Arab East. Washington has long had a "special relationship" with Ethiopia, Liberia and Zaire. Of the remaining five countries four are English-speaking, and in them the USA is struggling either for political influence (Kenya and Ghana) or for raw material sources (Nigeria and Zambia). Thus, to some extent, the route followed by Rogers indicates the USA’s priority interests. A part of the American press tried to explain the omission from Rogers’ tour of the French-speaking countries of Tropical Africa (with the exception of Cameroun) by claiming that the USA was showing a certain restraint towards the zones of French influence.

p Obviously, the language barrier presents some difficulty, but, as will be shown below, plans for acquiring a decisive 218 political influence in French-speaking Africa also form part of Washington’s programme.

p The imperialist political contest in French-speaking Africa. The main protagonists in the political contest between the imperialist powers in French-speaking Africa are France and the USA. The other competitors to French imperialism in the area—Britain, the FRG, Italy and Japan—are restricted to secondary roles for the present.

p French foreign policy during de Gaulle’s presidency caused a considerable deterioration in Franco-American relations as a whole. One of the results of this process was the further deepening of the contradictions between the two powers in the African countries which were formerly French possessions.

p Not so long ago, while pursuing the policy of expansion in Africa, the USA did at least pretend to “respect” France’s position, especially when the steps taken affected the former French territories. But in 1966-67 the Americans rejected these tactics and began to act decisively and openly against French interests. Nor was any concern shown for trying to hide the deepening contradictions. On the contrary, American propaganda launched a vigorous anti-French campaign in the African countries.

p Thus, the hidden contradictions between the two Atlantic allies came out into the open in Africa and emerged as out-and-out rivalry.

p In recent years the United States has considerably boosted her political and diplomatic activities in the countries of former French Africa. In 1967 North Africa was visited by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer. In January 1968 Vice-President Humphrey was in Tunisia and the Ivory Coast. In June and July of the same year Palmer again toured ten countries of former French Africa (Senegal, Cameroun, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and the CAR). In 1970 Secretary of State William Rogers visited Morocco, Tunisia and Cameroun.

p In addition, special invitations were issued during 1968- 69 and official visits were paid to Washington by the Presidents of Niger, Cameroun, the Ivory Coast and 219 Tunisia, King Hassan of Morocco and a number of other statesmen from African countries linked by agreements with France.

p US diplomatic activity went hand in hand with measures designed to undermine French influence. Thus, for example, the USA is aware that the Common Afro-Malagasy Organisation (OGAM) is one of France’s mainstays in Africa, and has frequently tried to split the organisation and weaken French influence in it. Pointing to the close ties between Washington and President Mobutu, American political commentators also stressed the fact that the USA was a party to the creation at the beginning of 1968 of the Union of Central African States (UEAC), comprising the Congo (Kinshasa), the Republic of Chad and the CAR. The appearance of this union almost torpedoed the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), carefully nurtured by France, and so nearly damaged France’s political interests as well as her economic ones. In this connection a UPI correspondent reported from Fort Lamy that the new amalgamation was expected to have close relations with Washington.^^21^^ As soon as UEAC had been set up, the Congolese applied, of course, to the USA for help in carrying out the new union’s regional projects.

p The USA was instrumental in organising the Monrovia Conference of April 1968, attended by 14 West African countries. America hoped that a new amalgamation would emerge, comprising both French and English-speaking countries. According to the US plan, such an amalgamation might lead to the dissolution of OGAM and, with the help of pro-American representatives of countries like Liberia and Ghana, French influence in the western part of the continent could be openly challenged.

p The US propaganda attack on France’s position in Africa also involved "special means”. African Betrayal,^^2^^’^^1^^ a book written by Charles Darlington, the first American ambassador resident in Gabon, appeared in New York in 1968. It sharply criticised France’s “anti-American” policy not only in Gabon but also in other French-speaking countries in Africa. Two chapters were devoted to this theme (“The Seamy Side of Grandeur" and "A Long Way from Lafayette”).

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p At the same time the United States increased the pressure on those African governments which "are not heeding the voice of Washington”. This is borne out by the American press campaign of 1968 against President Albert Bongo of Gabon. He was openly accused of "complete dependence" on the former metropolis, and the “evidence” produced included not only the expulsion of the "Peace Corps" from Gabon but also the fact that the Gabonese delegation to the UN had voted against Israel in the debate on the Middle East crisis and the invitation to visit Libreville given to the Minister of Education of the Canadian province of Quebec.

p American propaganda is showing a clear tendency to explain the political instability and economic difficulties of certain African countries by their continued dependence on France. Thus, even the student unrest in Dakar in June 1968 was interpreted in the USA as a direct result of Senegal’s serious economic position, brought about purely by the orientation of the Senegalese economy towards France.

p US representatives and the American press are constantly impressing upon countries such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic and Gabon that they need to carry out a thorough “Africanisation” of government officials, in the economic, political and ideological spheres and in all other areas where Frenchmen are still "running the show”; they, of course, are “obstacles” on the road to "genuine progress" and are impeding the "friendly assistance" that could be given to these countries by the "disinterested American representatives”.

p Also relevant in this connection is the series of articles on the Malagasy Republic published in the Washington Post at the end of 1967. They were sharply critical of the country’s relations with France, and aroused open indignation in the Malagasy Republic itself. The Washington Post was obliged to publish a special letter signed by the Malagasy Republic’s ambassador to the USA. The letter condemned the "tone and content" of the articles and also declared that "the sarcastic remarks aimed at French aid to Madagascar are ill-founded".^^23^^

p Paradoxical it may seem, but the greatest indignation in the United States is aroused by France’s military presence 221 in Africa, brought about by the agreements on "mutual defence”. Not a single French military measure in Africa manages to avoid bitter criticism in the American press and official “regret”. There are constant disapproving references to the support given by French paratroops to President M’Ba of Gabon in 1964, when a pro-American putsch had been fomented in the country; the sending of French troops to the CAR in November 1967; and the French military exercises in the Ivory Coast, in which a newly created division of the "invasion forces" took part, and so on. It is quite revealing to see that the creation of this military unit, which is kept on permanent stand-by alert, was interpreted by the American press as evidence of France’s determination to maintain pro-French regimes in a number of African countries at all costs and to prevent US penetration.

p The propaganda campaign and the practical steps taken by the USA to seize from France the means of wielding political influence in French-speaking Africa have not gone unnoticed in Paris and have given rise to determined opposition. French imperialism still has a sufficiently firm base in its former African possessions from which to take countermeasures. In accordance with the Franco-African agreements that accompanied the granting of independence and which are still maintained, the two sides are obliged to constantly exchange information on international issues with the aim of co-ordinating their foreign policies. In practice, of course, this condition is rather one-sided and had the effect of placing the foreign policies of the young African states under French control. What is more, a special paragraph in the agreement on collaboration in international politics states that the African countries’ UN representatives will keep in constant touch with the representative of France, i.e., will vote according to his recommendations.

p However, with the strengthening of the liberated countries’ national statehood and the growth of national awareness and also under the pressure of their imperialist competitors, the ruling circles in France have begun to sense the inadequacy of their existing forms of control over the young states. This gave rise to the idea of “Francophonia”: ever since the beginning of 1967 various French politicians, public 222 figures and statesmen have been calling persistently for the amalgamation of the French-speaking countries of Africa into a single organisation headed by France. This plan is connected with the need to establish new principles for Franco-African co-operation. The idea is supported by Senegal’s President Senghor, Niger’s President Diori and a number of other African leaders. In an open or concealed form “Francophonia” is propagated by the Paris-controlled African press. Supporters of the idea contend that it is only based on France’s wish to make maximum use of co- operation with the developing countries in their interests; it is also a constructive alternative to the setting up of regional economic groupings. At the same time, great emphasis is laid on France’s “altruism” and “disinterestedness”.

p In an article entitled "The International Legacy of General de Gaulle" Michel Debre, France’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs (subsequently Minister of Defence), wrote: "Thus, in the space of a few years the African states and Madagascar attained independence, in most cases in an atmosphere of friendship and joy. This decolonisation, effected without difficulty, with one exception, gave rise to the new reality of a relationship of trust between the former metropolis and the young states. . . .” In the same article Debre stressed that it was an important responsibility of France’s to "uphold . .. her natural, traditional role in Africa".^^24^^ But if this “role” is to be maintained, then imperialist competitors have to be kept out of the former colonies and French imperialism’s shaky position there has to be shored up. In the eyes of its creators, this new version of a community of French-speaking countries went a long way towards achieving these aims.

p News of de Gaulle’s resignation brought sighs of relief in the capitals of France’s imperialist competitors, since the former President was held to be primarily responsible for France’s resistance to pressure from her rivals. But at the same time the changes in France were also used to undermine the African countries’ trust in the policies of the new regime. Articles appeared in the American, British, West German and even Swiss press claiming that substantial modifications would be made in France’s African policies, that the policies would become "purely pragmatic" and that 223 French-speaking Africa should not pin its former hopes on Paris, but should urgently seek new "allies and partners”. The British Foreign Report commented: "The governments of Africa’s French-speaking states enjoyed a special relationship with General de Gaulle and are very apprehensive at his departure___" Providing its own interpretation of the reasons for this apprehension, the journal went on to say that now "France will almost certainly maintain the agreements with countries which are of strategic or economic importance. . . .” This is clarified later: ”. . . even a Gaullist like M. Pompidou might think twice before helping President Tombalbaye of Chad. . .” and "There seems little chance that a new French president will provide President Senghor of Senegal with enough support to get him over his troubles".^^25^^ It was thus impressed upon the governments of Africa’s French-speaking countries that they needed to renounce their orientation towards France.

p Another device used by France’s imperialist competitors consisted of attempts to compromise the African policy pursued by France under de Gaulle and to explain it only in terms of the selfish interests of French ruling circles. Thus, the West German journal Afrika heute rams home several basic propositions. The journal thinks that there is "something predatory" in France’s African policy and that it fails to reckon "with the ideological or racial boundaries in Equatorial or Southern Africa”. The orientation towards overseas territories "can be explained mainly by France’s desire to survive in world politics" and to attain "with the help of overseas influence her ultimate aim—hegemony in Europe”. The final thesis is that the "spiritual foundation" of France’s African policy is "devotion to national interests”. The journal has not discovered anything new, since the foreign policy of any bourgeois state is primarily determined by its national interests. The aim, however, is to prove to the Africans that Paris’s arguments about "the community of French-language culture" and the "historical traditions" in Franco-African relations and so on are just a facade.^^20^^

p The events of recent years show that de Gaulle’s departure has done nothing to lower the intensity of France’s rivalry with her Atlantic partners over political influence in 224 the French-speaking countries of Africa. In fact, the imperialist contradictions in the northern part of the continent have even deepened. The causes of this are the Middle East crisis and the seizure of power in Libya by revolutionary democrats, which has had a considerable effect on the imperialist balance of forces in Arab Africa.

p Unlike the USA and Britain, France took up, on the whole, a special position from the very start ot the 1967 crisis in the Middle East, although during the first days of the fighting she placed an embargo on deliveries of arms to both of the belligerents. In the final analysis, the position was neither pro-Arab nor anti-Israeli. It was determined by the interests of the French monopolist bourgeoisie, which was in search of new markets. France’s political manoeuvres over the Middle East crisis are a direct legacy of the general policy that she has been pursuing recently, aimed at ending her economic, military and political dependence on the USA, relegating Britain into the "second division" and refurbishing the French role in Europe. The events in the Middle East in 1967, which directly affected the interests of the USA and Britain and put them into an extremely difficult position vis-d-vis the Arab world, provided France with an additional trump in the struggle for influence in North Africa and, consequently, with substantial political gains. At the same time, the contradictions between France and her allies had taken a turn for the worse. In Washington, London and Bonn Paris’s actions were seen as betraying the concept of the Atlantic Community and sacrificing Atlantic solidarity to selfish interests.

p Particular dissension was caused by the Franco-Libyan negotiations over Libya’s purchase of Mirage fighters. These negotiations coincided with the new Libyan Government’s decision to rid the country of American and British military bases.

p “The story of the French arms sale to Libya . . . has shaken the credibility of the French Government. ... It is threatening open deterioration in French-American relations. . . .” That was how the New York ’Times of the 24 January 1970 saw the situation. The basis for this declaration was the growing conviction in US governing circles that the French were positively trying to deceive the Americans.

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p News of the negotiations in Paris with the Libyan armspurchasing mission first appeared in the New York Times on the 19 December 1969, but France’s Ambassador to the USA, Charles Lucet, immediately denied the report. Later, however, officials in Paris admitted that the question of selling Libya 10 or 15 Mirage fighters had been discussed, but said that the figure of 50 that had been mentioned was vastly inflated. US Ambassador Shriver pressed the French Foreign Ministry, and was told that the reported sale of 50 Mirage fighters to Libya was an exaggeration. The situation was clarified by the Minister of Defence, Michel Debre, at a meeting of the French National Assembly’s Defence Committee on the 21 January 1970. He was obliged to declare that all the original reports really had been inaccurate. Libya was to be sold not 50, but 100 planes!

p Washington and London considered this declaration to be a very grave matter indeed. The US Congress and the British Parliament immediately resounded with near-demands for sanctions action to be taken against France. But the French Government was in no mood to give way. At a meeting of the French Council of Ministers on the 30 January 1970 the Centrist leader, Jacques Duhamel, asked: "Is it really necessary to provide military equipment, even over a period of time, in order to replace the British and the Americans in Libya?" President Georges Pompidou replied that "France must have a Mediterranean policy and as powerful a presence as possible”. This was demanded by the country’s "historical role, its policy of entente with the Arab countries" and by its centuries-old tradition".^^27^^ Typically enough, both question and answer were couched in terms that leave no doubt as to France’s strong determination to strengthen her position in North Africa regardless of the objections of her imperialist competitors.

p The Franco-American-British dialogue on the question of political influence in Africa was taken a stage further by a French Government foreign policy statement made in the National Assembly on the 25 April 1970 by the Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann.

p The Minister emphasised that the aim of France’s Mediterranean policy was to prevent the Mediterranean basin 226 from again becoming an arena for rivalry between the Western powers, and the prime means for achieving this aim was to strengthen co-operation between France and the countries of North Africa, in other words, to re-establish the supremacy of French influence in the area. The statement says that, apart from the French-speaking countries of Africa, with which France "is linked by ties of a special nature”, there are other states—Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia—to which 95 per cent of French teachers and 64 per cent of technical specialists are sent. The success they have attained in economic development, Schumann says, results from the relations which, though fully independent, these countries wish to maintain, above all, with France. A reply to France’s competitors is thus already given in the name of the African countries themselves. Relying on this argument, Schumann declares that France is willing to maintain and develop that presence, that French influence, one of whose virtues is the fact that they are wanted. They form the basis of French Mediterranean policy.

p Nor was the question of Franco-Libyan relations avoided in the statement. Schumann presented them in a rather special light. He pointed to the fact that it was Libya herself which had taken the initiative in suggesting to France that they improve their co-operation, which "is already spreading to the economic and cultural sphere and will do so more and more”, and said that in such circumstances "no French Government would have refused”.

p The visit paid by the French President, Georges Pompidou, to the United States in February and March 1970 showed again that the contradictions between the two powers had hardly lessened at all. Only their geographical setting had changed slightly—they had largely shifted from Europe to Africa, although Georges Pompidou attempted to join the two continents when he declared that "The Mediterranean is the belly of Europe".^^28^^

p The problem of Franco-American relations, as projected on to Africa, occupied a prominent place in the statements and speeches made by Georges Pompidou during his American visit. Speaking at a reception in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on the 2 March 1970, he said: "Of course France has retained a privileged position in the states that have emerged 227 from her former empire, but competition is progressively making its appearance and is now operating there".^^29^^ On the following day, when replying at a press conference to a question about France’s policy towards Libya, the French President resorted to a completely unexpected device—he stated that France had not wished to sell Libya planes but had only sought to "establish a presence in Libya, since a vacuum had formed there and we preferred that it should be Billed by us"!^^30^^ An instructive transformation! France is now turning America’s weapon against America. The French weekly France Nouvelle comments that the "vacuum theory" was invented by American imperialism in order that "each time that French or British colonialism was beaten somewhere in the world it would be replaced by an American presence on the pretext of ’filling a vacuum’. Seen from this point of view, Pompidou’s Libyan policy is no departure from neo-colonialist practices.”^^31^^

p The measures taken by France to ward off an American penetration into North Africa included a reconciliation with Tunisia and Morocco, assisting the settlement of frontier and other disputes between Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, the conclusion of an agreement with Libya and the offering of credits to Morocco and Algeria. In conjunction with a number of other actions, these tactics brought France definite political gains.

In a television interview on his return from the USA on the 12 March 1970 President Pompidou summed up his visit as follows: ".. .we noticed that of course French policy and United States policy are not the same thing, but basically our long-term and general objectives come very close to one another, and, if the way of approaching them, the way of looking at questions, is not always the same, all that we have to do in the end is to talk in order to understand one another and consequently in order to either support one another or at least, as it were, to put up with one another".^^32^^ If one reads between the lines, this statement indicates that there are profound disagreements between the two powers, and mere talking will hardly be enough to ensure that the imperialist rivals will permanently "put up with one another" in Africa.

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p This analysis of some aspects of the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in the liberated countries of Africa allows one to draw the following conclusions.

p Firstly, the struggle shows that the tendencies towards political integration and disintegration within modern imperialism not only co-exist, but are competing with one another, with the second tendency often gaining the upper hand in Africa. Although their policies are a mixture of Atlanticist and Eurocentric elements, the West European former metropolises have no wish, however, to extend this combination to the “overseas” zones of their traditional influence. Secondly, the incidence of political conflict between the imperialist powers in the developing countries indicates that each power is trying in its own way and in accordance with its own interests to handle the common class task of setting up in these countries a state political structure that meets the interests of imperialism as a whole.

p Thirdly, the nature and level of the political rivalry between the imperialist powers in different part of Africa underline the fact that this rivalry is taking on its most noticeable forms in countries which are obediently treading the capitalist path. The imperialist forces present a considerably more united front towards the young states that have chosen a socialist orientation.

p The political contest between the imperialist powers inflicts undoubted harm on the young states and impedes their internal consolidation. In their rivalry the imperialists rely on forces which, although competing among themselves, are nevertheless pro-imperialist and are opposed to progressive transformations in their countries.

The outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle for political influence in the developing countries depends on the extent to which the tendency towards integrating policies and carrying out a common anti-socialist strategy will prove capable of surmounting the limitations created by the internal processes of imperialism and the general correlation of forces in the modern world.