98

p “Aid" to the developing countries is one of the new and most contradictory developments in the world capitalist economy and at the same time it is the main instrument in the policy of neo-colonialism. The very appearance of the “aid” concept is linked with the collapse of the colonial system. The West German journal Internationales AfrikaForum comments: "Before the Second World War it would not have occurred to any state to invest its own resources in the development of another country or its colonies.”^^1^^ This is true. The idea of “aid” was born in the minds of the ruling circles of the former metropolises and their imperialist 99 partners and competitors when the need arose to preserve the capitalist system in vast regions of the world.

p The contradictory nature of “aid” results from the fact that it is not only a collective stratagem of imperialism. The national imperialisms are only united by a single aim: to keep the liberated countries within the orbit of the capitalist mode of production, to take control of their economic development and to limit the further growth of the national liberation movement. At the same time every imperialist power is pursuing its own aims, which reflect the interests of its own monopolist groups. Therefore, the policy of granting “aid” throws into sharp relief the inter-imperialist contradictions as a whole and the contradictions of neocolonialism in particular. In view of the role of “aid” in the development of young states, this aspect of the problem is of particular theoretical and practical interest.

p The main struggle as regards “aid” to the countries of Africa is between the former metropolises, which are trying to use it in order to retain their positions and influence in their "traditional preserves”, and the USA, which employs “aid” as the principal instrument with which to bring about a re-allocation of spheres of influence in its favour.

p The definitions and assessments of “aid” given by writers of various nationalities reveal the sources of the contradictions and rivalry. For example, the American John Montgomery writes that "foreign aid is ... a complex instrument of national policy and domestic politics”, which "has many different roles to play in American diplomacy”,^^2^^ while his fellow-American David Baldwin considers “aid” as "an instrument for the achievement of US foreign policy objectives".^^3^^ Brian Crozier, one of the most energetic apologists for British neo-colonialism, notes that "with few exceptions the former colonies that have emerged into sovereignty are poor" and in need of “aid”, and poses the rhetorical question: "Where is that help to come from?" He then goes on to state bluntly that "help of real value will come ... from the former metropolitan powers, which understand the needs of the territories concerned and speak a language that is understood by the politicians and officials of the receiving countries"^^4^^ Bernard de Calloc’h, a prominent member of France’s ruling party, the UNR-UDT, insists that "aid" 100 Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1974/NSA319/20071126/199.tx" should have "an economic aspect: orders lor .trench equipment and the employment of French technicians, lor example, and a cultural aspect: the preference accorded the French language".^^5^^ The West German economist Karl Erdmann, commenting on the fact that the FRG is " incomparably more dependent on exports than the USA, France and Great Britain”, sees “aid” as a weapon in Bonn’s trade and economic policy. In his own words, "development aid" assures the FRG of "solid overseas markets" and helps the country to "make investments there and win trust”. This particularly "applies to Africa, which is situated near Europe and is historically and culturally linked with Europe”. Consequently, “aid” to the African countries has recently become "a matter of priority" for the FRG.^^6^^

p All these views have one thing in common. Each writer (and they include professors, politicians and statesmen) looks at the “aid” question only from the viewpoint of his own country’s interests. This feature is further proof of the important fact that, while retaining its general imperialist, class nature, “aid” in practice acts in most cases as a means of expansion for the particular imperialist state.

p If one looks at the content and the main aims and functions of Western “aid”, it will become apparent that it is they which are the root cause of the competitive struggle and the rivalry between the imperialist “donors”. A feature of the state loans, grants and gifts made to the developing countries is that their nature is determined not so much by economic aims as by political and social motives. Hence, the struggle for political influence is added to the general complex of inter-imperialist contradictions in the field of the export of capital (described above). This conclusion is supported by a typical feature of foreign investments in African countries during recent years—the predominance of state investment over private investment. The strengthening of state-monopoly tendencies in the export of capital is in the interests of the monopolist bourgeoisie, since it raises the competitiveness of the bourgeoisie’s own measures. One other circumstance is also of importance. The inter- imperialist contradictions of the past were ultimately resolved by war; in present-day conditions, as was pointed out above, such an outcome is improbable. But antagonisms accumulate 101 and become protracted. This gives rise to the need for longterm strategy, which by its very nature private capital "is unable to follow. It will not go where economic benefits are not immediately forthcoming, no matter what the political aims being pursued. Consequently, the brunt of the longterm inter-imperialist struggle for positions in the liberated countries is borne by state-monopoly capital, which takes the form of various kinds of “aid”.

p Despite the obvious political nature of imperialist “aid”, its function as a source of financial profit should not be underestimated. This factor further strengthens the role of “aid” as a weapon of inter-imperialist rivalry. “Aid” brings in substantial profits to the “donor” states. The outflow of money from a number of developing countries (especially in Africa) in the form of interest, profits and dividends already exceeds the influx of new capital. According to a clearly conservative estimate, the total debt of the developing countries amounted in 1970 to 60,000 million dollars, and it continues to grow. But also on the increase is the sum needed to repay the loans, credits and the interest on them. Thus, the “donors” are losing nothing; on the contrary, they are doing very well for themselves. As was stated, for example, at the Commonwealth Conference in January 1969 by Reginald Prentice, the former British Minister of Overseas Development, nearly all the money that Britain supplied to Zambia as “aid” returned to Britain in one way or another.

p Capitalism seeks to increase the role of the developing countries as a major source of profits. But this^^1^^ is only possible through the introduction of modern production methods, which presupposes, in addition to capital investment, the massive export of technical know-how to these countries. Hence the considerable activation in recent years of "technical aid"—the sending of experts, consultants, specialists, teachers, etc., to the developing, countries of Africa. This form of “aid” is also closely connected with the rivalry between the imperialist forces, since it opens up enormous opportunities for the competing states to penetrate practically every sphere of social, economic and political life in the continent’s newly independent countries. For the former metropolises "technical aid" acts to some extent as the equivalent of the colonial superstructure, and for their 102 imperialist competitors it serves as a means of squeezing out their rival and setting up their own levers of influence and control in the young states. It is significant in this connection that in the structure of French “aid”, for example, the proportion of money earmarked for "cultural and technical collaboration" rose between 1963 and 1969 from 36.2 to 51.7 per cent, and in British “aid” from 14 to 22.7 per cent, with Africa taking 89 per cent of the total allocation for technical “aid”. The main competitors are not going to be outdistanced. The FRG is currently spending to this end 23 per cent of her total “aid” provided under bilateral agreements and the USA—15 per cent.

p A most important function of imperialist “aid” is to help implant and develop capitalist relations in the liberated countries. But even this prime and general imperialist task is accomplished against a background of struggle and clashes between the capitalist powers. Through “aid”, each of them seeks to intensify its economic and trade links with a particular developing country or group of such countries. The former metropolises have an interest in fortifying their traditional relations with countries that once formed part of the colonial empires. They are seeking to prevent any changes in these countries’ market orientation and to bind their economies more closely to their own monopoly capital. For their part, the competing imperialist powers try to use “aid” as a means of reorienting the development of productive forces in the young states that are developing along capitalist lines to suit themselves. They wish to tie them to their own suppliers of equipment and consumers of raw material. “Aid” is often used for this purpose as an instrument for pressurising individual national governments and even as a means of bribing influential members of the ruling circles. W. Clark, the well-known British expert on “aid”, makes the point that “aid” may be given because of the need to update the former colonial relationships.^^7^^ According to his American colleagues, “aid” is the "practice of giving bribes" for political ends and is often a straightforward monetary transaction.^^8^^

p One of the main functions of “aid”—to usher in private capital—is inseparably linked with aspects of the inter- imperialist struggle. Since foreign capital from different countries comes into fierce conflict in the most profitable and 103 promising investment spheres, it is natural that the means of furthering expansion (and “aid” in particular) are also in competition. There is no shortage of examples to show that “aid” agreements compel the receiving country to provide a "favourable climate" and various guarantees only for capital from the creditor country. There are frequent instances of “aid” being a kind of bonus for services rendered to the private capital of a particular imperialist state. Clashes between the “donors” also arise in the choice of recipients of “aid” and its distribution among various spheres and sectors.

p The strengthening of the role of state “aid” as a means of supporting private capital does not just mean that “aid” and private capital are used jointly to finance promising ventures and enterprises in the newly independent countries; “aid” also acts as an equal “partner” of the monopolies, which involves it even more deeply in the vicissitudes of the inter-imperialist struggle. “Aid”, and especially American “aid”, is increasingly merging with private capital investments to form a single torrent of exported capital. This provides further grounds for regarding it as a weapon in the inter-imperialist struggle and rivalry.

p Thus, one can safely conclude that, irrespective of its form and distribution, imperialist “aid” serves the interests of the “donor”, i .e., the particular imperialist power: it secures privileges for that country’s monopolies, strengthens the position of its capital in the developing country’s economy, furthers the expansion of its exports and consolidates its political influence. Confirmation of this conclusion can also be found in the views of foreign specialists, especially those from countries which are feeling the pinch of competition or which as yet remain “outsiders” in the scramble for positions in the Third World. Two examples will suffice. In his book The Last Chance for the Third World Maurice Guernier, a former adviser to the General Commissioner for Planning, and director of the working group on development plans for France’s overseas territories, states frankly that, when offering “aid”, the great powers are guided by political considerations and try to establish their control over an area, easing out their political or commercial opponent.^^9^^ The West German economist Karl Erdmann puts it more definitely: 104 “Aid from the great powers to the developing countries is connected with claims to domination and power. In fact, they are not offering aid for development, but are pursuing a policy with this instrument. Consequently, they are quite happy to call their development aid a development policy."^^10^^

Statistical data give a clear indication of the balance of forces between the protagonists in the inter-imperialist struggle to furnish “aid” to Africa.

Table 4 “Aid" to African Countries (Excluding South Africa and Egypt) (in millions of dollars) Years Former metropolises (France, Britain, Italy, Belgium) International organisations Other West European countries (mainly the FRG) USA Total 1959 791 80 40 185 1,096 1960 862 198 26 211 1,297 1961 1,003 64 169 460 1,697 1962 1,016 94 163 488 1,761 1963 890 95 155 490 1,630 1964 791 179 138 359 1,467 1965 818 258 218 330 1,624 1966 895 274 216 384 1,769 1967 729 271 223 388 1,611 Sources: W. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa, N.Y.. 1969, p. 1-iS; "Agency for International Development”, Washington, 1968.

p The table reveals a number of noteworthy processes that are taking place in the “aid” offered by the capitalist states to the African countries. Firstly, in 1961 US “aid” sharply increased—almost three times in comparison with the 1959 level, while that of the European non-metropolitan countries increased more than fourfold. Secondly, in 1961 the former metropolises accounted for approximately 60 per cent of all “aid”, whereas in 1967 they accounted for only 47 per cent. Thirdly, in 1960 US “aid” made up a quarter of all “aid” from the colonial powers, while in 1967 the USA supplied more than half of it. These figures 105 demonstrate the aggressive nature of American “aid” to the newly independent countries of Africa, despite the fact that the continent of Africa was not officially recognised to be an area of primary interest to the USA.

p “Aid" from Britain is mainly offered to her former colonies, which are today sovereign states within the Commonwealth. British ruling circles are closely guarding this means of exerting influence, despite the financial difficulties that Britain is currently experiencing. It is thus not surprising that the cut-back in expenditure on many items in the budget has not affected “aid” in general, and “aid” to Africa in particular. Thus, from 1966 to 1972 British “aid” to the developing countries was running at £207.2 million every year, and Africa’s share in it amounted to £73.1 million, or 38.1 per cent of the total. Moreover, Africa’s share is on the increase. In 1966 the main recipients of “aid” were the countries of Asia, but in 1970 the African countries surged ahead with a 4 per cent lead. This is a clear indication of the significance which the British Government attributes to the use of “aid” in order to preserve its influence over the African part of the Commonwealth. It also shows that “aid” is viewed by London as an important weapon in the competitive struggle. A publication of the main British theoretical centre dealing with questions of foreign “aid”, the Overseas Development Institute, contains an eloquent admission to the effect that “aid” is a weapon in the competition between the “donor” and another power to gain political and commercial advantages in the country in question.^^11^^ In this connection, the list of the Black Africa Commonwealth countries, to which Britain offered the bulk of her “aid” in 1970 is of considerable interest. Zambia received £3.2 million, Kenya £10.2 million, Uganda £4.8 million, Tanzania £4 million, Malawi £7.8 million, Nigeria £8 million and Botswana £5.9 million. As can be seen, the list is headed by Kenya and Nigeria, the two key countries for British imperialism on the east and west coasts of Africa. London is putting up a particularly hard struggle in these countries in order to preserve its political position there.

p The structure of British “aid” also underlines its competitive nature. Over the period 1963-69 some 33 per cent of the British “aid” was allocated to supporting the monetary 106 systems of the recipient countries, 19 per cent went on financing imports, 17 per cent was spent on technical co- operation, 15 per cent on the development of infrastructure, 9.3 per cent helped to develop industry and 6.7 per cent was spent on social measures. The proportion of money spent on supporting the financial systems shows the great interest that British ruling circles have in maintaining regimes that are most favourably disposed towards them. Bearing in mind the state of the British balance of payments, it can be seen that imports were also financed in the interests of Britain herself. The development of an infrastructure is, on the one hand, necessary to the young states, but, on the other hand— and this is the main point—it clears away all obstacles to the activities of the monopolies, which have no interest in investing in a nonproductive sphere. Authoritative British newspapers have often stressed that “aid” is an instrument in the long-term strategy of the former metropolis, which is primarily defending its own interests. The New Statesman defined British "aid strategy" to the African countries in the following terms: "Our aid should be planned... to produce long-term economic effects. If, in the process, regimes fall and new social groups rise, we should carry on with our programmes, even if we are occasionally accused of political interference.”

p The magazine even went so far as to urge its readers to pay no attention to the fact that "some African governments will object”, since Britain was not answerable to them for her actions.^^12^^

p France relies to an even greater extent than Britain on “aid” in her struggle to preserve her position in Africa. 40 per cent of all kinds of Western “aid” to Africa comes from France, and 87.5% of all French “aid” to the developing countries is supplied to her former African colonies. Professor Rene Gendarme, an expert on French policy towards Africa, points out in this connection that development aid has become a most effective component of foreign policy and that it is a convenient way of carrying out decolonisation without detriment to traditional economic ties and without modifying the balance of forces.^^13^^ It is not difficult to see what the French professor has in mind when he refers to "the balance of forces”.

107

p Unlike Britain, France concentrates her “aid” on a small part of the African continent, which includes principally the countries of the Afro-Malagasy group. One of the explanations for this is supplied by Paris’s fear that this part of former French Africa may cease to be influenced by France as a result of the growing competition from foreign capital (American, Japanese and West German), which tries to tempt local governments with “profitable” offers. The disintegration of the Afro-Malagasy group which started in 1973 shows that France’s apprehensions were justified.

p Proportionally speaking, “aid” to the countries of the Afro-Malagasy group is running at a fairly constant level. The reduction in Algeria’s share results directly from the social and economic transformations that have taken place there, its choice of a non-capitalist path of development and the curbing of the activities of French private capital in the country. Fluctuations in the proportion of “aid” received by Morocco and Tunisia reflect the level of relations between these countries and France, and also the intensity of the inter-imperialist struggle for influence in them. Reductions in French “aid” coincide with periods when "American and West German imperialism come upon the scene".^^1^^’* Thus, for a number of reasons and, in particular, as a result of the Moroccan Government’s refusal to accede to Paris’s demand that the Minister of the Interior, General Oufkir, who had been found guilty of kidnapping Ben Barka, should be retired, France drastically reduced her financial “aid” to Morocco (from 300 million francs in 1964 to 53 million in 1968). The USA and the FRG were not slow to benefit from the situation. In 1967 they had supplied 55.5 per cent of the total amount of foreign “aid” to Morocco, and in 1968 this figure had risen to 67.7 per cent. The proportion contributed by France shrank from 37 per cent to 16.2 per cent. It was only in 1969, as part of a general review of its Mediterranean policy, that the French Government made concentrated efforts to restore its relations with Morocco and Tunisia and provided them with “aid” amounting to some 200 million francs.

p It should be noted that the ruling circles of France obtained a certain measure of success through their juggling with the “aid” funds. Although the gaining of political 108 independence by countries which had formerly been French colonies caused the inter-imperialist contradictions there to intensify, the balance of forces has not been working automatically for the benefit of American or West German imperialism. Whenever the question of “aid” or technical co-operation arises, the overwhelming majority of the French-speaking countries of Africa still turns to the former metropolis. That is why France, just like Britain,^ does not make any substantial cuts in her expenditure on “aid” and “co-operation”, despite all her financial difficulties. As Yvon Bourges, France’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stressed, no circumstances whatever "would change anything in the privileged relations that France has with the states of Black Africa and Madagascar. Nor would any changes be made to the Aid and Co-operation Fund".^^15^^

p While lagging considerably behind the USA, France and Britain in offering “aid” to the African countries, the FRG is nevertheless actively involved in the competitive struggle. When examining the role of the FRG, one must bear in mind that her "professional experience" is as yet rather limited: state allocations for "development aid" were first included in the Bonn budget in 1956, for political reasons as well as economic ones. Addressing the Bundestag on one occasion, the present Minister of Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Josef Ertl, stressed: "The Third World does certainly not play the deciding role in all issues. But anyone who follows UN debates knows that it has a sizeable contribution to make. ... So that it is there that we should seek friends.”^^10^^ Thus, “aid” is regarded in West German ruling circles as an instrument of political influence, through which it is possible to restore German imperialism’s former position.

p By 1969 the FRG had already concluded agreements for the provision of financial and technical “aid” to 94 developing countries, of which 36 were in Africa. In its 1968 state budget Bonn allocated for “aid” purposes 2,188^ million marks (50 million in 1956). In fact, by relying on “aid”, West Germany managed to put some pressure on Britain, France and even the USA in a number of African countries. Thus, in 1968, for example, the offer of credit to Morocco to the tune of DM 100 million was conditional 109 upon the Moroccans’ pledge to give preference to purchases of West German goods. This aroused bitter resentment in a number of American and French firms. By granting considerable financial and technical “aid” to Tunisia, the FRG was by the beginning of 1970 second only to France in the list of Tunisia’s trading partners, having squeezed out the USA. The main African recipients of West German “aid” include countries in which the interests of West Germany inevitably clash with those of the former metropolises or the USA, or both.

p The volume of American “aid” to Africa grew progressively from the early sixties. As Rupert Emerson points out, before this time, during the colonial period "the metropolitan powers did not welcome foreign intrusion into their colonial domains”, even when it was a question of “aid” for developing dependent territories. The declaration of the colonies’ independence radically changed the situation. "The frowns of the former colonial authorities could no longer be decisive even though the United States strove to avoid any impression that it was elbowing its allies aside in their former domains.”^^17^^ The American professor’s eloquent admission testifies convincingly to the fact that from the very beginning “aid” was a field for competition between the imperialist powers and a weapon in their struggle for influence in the developing countries.

p The development of commodity exports and promotion of the expansion of private capital were from the outset the economic basis of the American policy of granting “aid” to African countries. It is not by mere chance that more than 90 per cent of all the money offered as “aid” is intended for purchases of goods by the developing countries from the USA itself. Whether a country receives “aid” or not depends on its willingness to sign agreements providing guarantees to private capital. The political aspect of American “aid” is largely determined by the USA’s wish to squeeze out the former metropolises and to become the supreme arbiter of the destinies of African countries. Thus, both the economic and political aims of the USA have come into conflict with the interests of the European powers.

p Typically enough, despite the conclusion contained in the report to President Kennedy made by General Clay’s 110 committee on “aid” policy towards the developing countries, which said that "since immediate security interests were less evident in Africa ... the committee regarded Africa ’as an area where the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden’ ”,^^18^^ an exception was made in the case of Ghana, the Congo (Kinshasa) Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Libya, i.e, those countries where the USA either wished to reverse the course of social and economic development, or was struggling for influence against the former metropolises, or was trying to deal with both issues at the same time. Moreover, as Rupert Emerson further informs us, Washington had decided to act independently towards the former British colonies, while in the former French possessions it intended to co-ordinate its actions with Paris. This differentiated approach did not arise arbitrarily and can be explained by the fact that France was considerably less enthusiastic than Britain in her response to US penetration of her spheres of influence. While the French Government saw US “aid” as directly encroaching on its preserves in Africa, London considered that, in view of the "threat of communist penetration" of its former African possessions, the intrusion of US “aid” was the lesser evil. London maintained this position until approximately 1966 and, needless to say, during this period it^did^much to abate Anglo-American rivalry in providing “aid” to the African countries and gave Washington a largely free hand.

p Commentators who analyse American “aid” to Africa usually draw their readers’ attention to the fact that from the late sixties onwards the so-called selective approach came to the fore. In other words, “aid” was offered mainly to a small group of specially chosen countries. In fact, however, the USA had been using this method all along, but the fact was only officially acknowledged in the second half of the sixties, and from then on the differentiation was further accentuated.

p Ever since the early postwar years the African countries selected to receive the bulk of American “aid” were those which were most important to the economic and political interests of the USA. These were Tunisia and Morocco, where Washington vied with Paris for influence; Nigeria, the Congo (Kinshasa) and Libya, which possessed reserves 111 of strategic raw materials to which the American monopolies were struggling to gain access; Liberia, the US “haven” in Africa; and Ethiopia and Ghana, the important bastions on the eastern and western coasts.

p In the authoritative view of Rupert Emerson, the question of granting “aid” to other African countries which had previously been British or French colonies was complicated by the unwillingness of the former metropolises to release these countries from their economic orbit.^^19^^ Is this not, in fact, one of the reasons for the development of the tendency towards a “selective” approach in the USA?

p It is true that from 1966 to 1968 official circles in Washington, Congress, the press and even serious studies began to make the point in ever stronger terms that the USA was not receiving a "sufficient recompense" for its “aid” to the African countries. For this reason, Professor Charles Wolf of Boston University urged the government not to undertake any aid programmes which would cost more than the total profits received from the country.^^20^^ Michael O’Leary of Syracuse University pointed out that "antipathy toward aid to non-allies was clearly shown" in American public opinion.^^21^^ Furthermore, Rupert Emerson has observed that African “aid” programmes cause considerable political problems for the United States, since both increases and cuts in the programmes give rise to unfavourable criticism. In the first case "the former colonial powers accuse the USA of trying to oust its European allies from their traditional spheres of influence, while Left-wing circles raise charges of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, if the programmes are cut back, then everyone asserts that America has no wish to help the developing countries”. The former White House adviser on African affairs makes no comment on the views of the "Left-wing circles”. As for the USA’s European allies, he almost goes as far as to issue them with an ultimatum: "To meet those needs the fullest possible collaboration of all potential donor countries is obviously to be sought, but the price of winning their collaboration is too high if the United States must be prepared to play a role secondary to that of the ex-colonial powers. As American relations with Africa evolve, it is essential that America both have, and make it apparent that it has, an independent policy towards 112 African countries and not one contingent upon its relations with the former colonial metropolises.”^^22^^

p The further course of US “aid” policy towards African countries shows that such recommendations were taken into consideration. One can identify three basic directions in which this policy developed. In all cases it led to a further intensification of the inter-imperialist struggle.

p Firstly, the number of countries which were the main recipients of American “aid” became even smaller. In 1969, for example, 90 per cent of “aid” granted through AID went to 15 countries, 80 per cent of the "development loans" went to 8 countries and 95 per cent of the "support aid" went to 4 countries. Among these countries were Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana and several others, where the USA is trying to create a neo-colonialist shop window for its policy now that its European partners have been either pushed aside or had their activities put under American control.

p Secondly, American “aid” is being put increasingly on to a regional footing. In 1969 40 per cent of the money sent to Africa in accordance with AID programmes was invested in regional projects. At the same time the number of bilateral AID programmes for Africa was cut from 35 in 1968 to 21 in 1969 and 12 in 1970. These tactics have several objectives: to force the young states to form groupings that will benefit the USA; to economically link progressive regimes with reactionary ones; to create the conditions that would facilitate the expansion of private capital; and to weaken the influence of the former metropolises, which are trying to obstruct the establishment of American hegemony in Africa.

p Thirdly, there is a growing tendency in American “aid” strategy to make use of international financial and economic foundations such as the World Bank, AID and IDA, i.e., to replace bilateral “aid” by multilateral “aid”. Since interimperialist contradictions stand out with the greatest clarity over this issue, it merits closer consideration.

p Throughout the postwar period the greater part of imperialist “aid” to the developing countries has been offered on a bilateral basis. This, of course, gives the “donor” maximal opportunities for using “aid” in his own interests. 113 Such tactics were employed above all by the former metropolises. In the case of France, for example, multilateral “aid” accounts for less than 5 per cent of her total “aid”. Britain, which used to devote up to 10 per cent of the total to multilateral “aid”, has made a 15 per cent reduction in her participation in multilateral “aid” in recent years. Even the FRG is tirelessly championing the idea of bilateral “aid”, since it appears to offer the most real opportunity for penetrating the African continent.

p The European neo-colonialists’ attachment to bilateral “aid” cannot be explained by economic factors alone. Through this form of “aid” Britain, France and Belgium are attempting to make use of bilateral ties with the African countries in order to preserve their own political position there, while the FRG is similarly trying to acquire the means to exert economic and political influence. The expansion of multilateral “aid” facilities is depriving these countries of substantial benefits. As the West German journal Internationales Afrika-Forum for August 1967 pointed out, the money which the “aid”-giving countries channel through international agencies is "wasted for political use in bilateral relations”.

p In turn, by insisting on the priority of multilateral “aid”, the United States is trying to limit her opponents’ use of the bilateral version as a weapon in the struggle against America. By virtue of her dominating position within the international agencies the USA plans to take control of the contributions made by the other imperialist powers, to subordinate them to her own interests and at the same time (a matter of no small importance) oblige her partners to increase their “aid” allocations while reducing the American share.

p Washington’s European allies do not openly reject the US proposals, but do their best to sabotage them. The endless discussions add a further twist to the inter-imperialist contradictions over providing the developing countries with “aid”. A report of the Development Assistance Committee (DAG) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pointed out that the whole difficulty of co-ordinationg “aid” lay in determining forms of co- operration which would be economically and politically 114 acceptable to the countries which sat on the Committee.^^23^^ However, despite the observation that "uncoordinated aid can be not only useless but even harmful to the economy of the receiving country" and that it is necessary to eliminate " confusion and competition" from the “aid” programmes, all attempts to hammer out agreed decisions invariably fail. Inter-imperialist rivalry makes it impossible to find "politically acceptable" ways of co-ordinating “aid”.

p While continuing the discussion with her competitors, the USA is relentlessly implementing her own “aid” policy, thus making further tension in this sphere of inter-imperialist contradictions inevitable. Whereas, for example, the British Government maintained the general “aid” fund for 1970 at the level of 1968-69 and slashed its allocations for multilateral financial “aid”, the USA did the exact opposite. In a message to Congress dealing with “aid” to foreign states for the 1969-70 financial year President Nixon declared forcefully that the use of international agencies for giving “aid” had to increase, and would increase when other states stepped up their participation.

p The outlook for inter-imperialist clashes over “aid” to the African countries can be judged from another document— the above-mentioned report made by Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon entitled The United States and Africa in the Seventies. The true class essence of the thesis that "the American programme for economic aid to Africa is geared to the national interests of the United States" is exhaustively revealed in the report, although there is no shortage of attempts to make it sound “ humanitarian”.

p Rogers does not promise to increase the volume of American financial “aid” to the African countries in the seventies. He looks to the former metropolises to provide the lion’s share of the “aid” in view of "their strong historical connections with Africa”. On the other hand, he insists that the conditions and principles laid down by the United States should be adopted. In his book Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy the American “aid” specialist David Baldwin wrote: "Foreign aid is ... a means by which one nation tries to get other nations to act in desired ways.”^^24^^ The programme of American aid to Africa outlined in the report is the 115 practical embodiment of this view. Rogers’ plans for the seventies were: to continue with the selective approach to African countries; to increase the use of multilateral channels for supplying “aid”; to mainly support regional projects; to use loans almost exclusively for purchasing American goods and services; and to widen the involvement of American private business in the "development process”.

p The aggressive nature of the programme reflects the growing competition between America and the EEC countries and Japan and the US drive to consolidate its weakened position in the world economy, to increase the pressure on the national liberation movement in Africa and, in general, to safeguard the interests of American imperialism by coordinating all forms of expansion: “aid”, the export of capital, trade and political and social measures.

p The reason for giving added weight to the selective approach policy is clear. The USA “helps” those on whom, for one reason or another, it relies most heavily. But there are other points in the Rogers programme which should not be overlooked, especially the plans for making wide use of international organisations and particularly for activating the International Development Association (IDA).

p As is generally appreciated, the IDA, which the USA plans to activate during the seventies, operates under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The fact that the World Bank serves as an instrument of imperialist policies, through which the tactical tasks of monopoly capital are accomplished and attempts are made to achieve its strategic class aims, does nothing to exclude the differences of interest which exist between the members of its governing board. The decisive voice in the World Bank and the IDA belongs to the United States. The USA provides most of the capital used by these organisations. Consequently, when allocating loans for various regions and activities, both organisations generally abide by American recommendations. Washington’s priorities become those of the IDA; the main recipients of the money, provided on the most easy terms, are those countries in Africa which have been selected by the United States. Naturally, the plans for further expanding this channel, while welcomed in America, are evoking resistance from the 116 European imperialists. Rogers points out that the USA has from 1969 onwards been involved in lengthy discussions with the other members of the IDA in an attempt to bring them round to the American point of view. However, London, Paris and Bonn are perfectly aware that the system of arrangements for the movement of capital that is being foisted upon them is, in the first instance, of economic and political benefit to the United States of America.

p By collectively introducing the norms of capitalist economy into the newly independent countries, this system sunders the traditional links between the young states and the former metropolises. It is highly improbable, therefore, that the West European powers will accept the American proposals, and it seems that a further intensification of the contradictions over this issue is inevitable.

p There are also other reasons for America’s attachment to collective activity via the international organisations. The point is that American business circles bitterly resent the increasingly frequent cases where "soft loans" from US funds are used to pay off the developing countries’ debts to other imperialist states. They are also fiercely indignant at the fact that the expansion of multilateral operations through the IDA was accomplished until recently by purchases of American goods worth only some 20 per cent of. the US contributions. Some financial groupings in America are also annoyed by the “competition” from the World Bank and the IDA which, as they see it, benefits the Bank’s European members.

p Naturally, Washington hastened to make appropriate modifications to the activities of the World Bank and the IDA. When deciding whether to issue a loan, the Bank has since 1969 taken note of the amendments to the American law on “aid”, and the IDA has extended the range of countries receiving “aid”. Thus, American plans for activating international “aid” channels are largely determined by inter-imperialist competition. Hence the resistance that they are encountering from the USA’s European rivals.

p In an attempt to find ways out of the situation that has developed, Washington has devised new plans. A special working group on “aid” problems, set up on President Nixon’s instructions and headed by Rudolph Peterson, the 117 former chairman of the Bank of America, proposed that the system of bilateral “aid” should be completely abolished, that the US Agency for International Development (AID), which implemented the USA’s bilateral programmes, should be abandoned and that all “aid” funds should be transferred to an "international pool”. This “pool” was to be inaugurated by the USA, the West European states and Japan. These and other ideas produced by the Peterson group were outlined in a report handed to President Nixon in March 1970. The report naturally assumed that the other capitalist powers would also reject bilateral “aid” to the developing countries. Typically enough, Peterson’s proposal applies only to economic and technical “aid”. Military “aid” remains the individual prerogative of the USA. The group is of the opinion that a sharing of effort along these lines would put an end to the long-lasting disarray over the issue. At the same time the Peterson group suggested the creation of an American international bank for development with funds amounting to 4,000 million dollars and an institute for "technical aid" with a capital of 1,000 million dollars. If this were to happen, then the international “pool” and the World Bank would be financed through bodies outside the control of the US Congress.

p It is easy to see that all these proposals are a further development of the tendency in the USA to establish an American monopoly over the granting of “aid” to the developing countries. Washington’s European allies and Japan are unlikely to reject bilateral “aid” of their own free will, since it is essentially the same export of capital, just like private investment, but it pays not only financial, but also political, dividends.

p For the developing countries in general and the African countries in particular imperialist “aid” fully retains its neocolonialist character, no matter what organisational or technical modifications may be made to the procedures for granting it. But it would be a simplification to ignore a further aspect of the problem: irrespective of the imperialists’ ultimate plans, the financial means and technical resources that they offer the liberated countries are capable of stimulating some development in the latter’s productive forces. When stating that they have an interest in receiving aid, African 118 governments are planning to use precisely this aspect of it in their own interests. Consequently, only a firm and clearsighted position on the part of the national governments which would reject any imperialist diktat connected with all forms of aid and its distribution offers an alternative to their subordination to the neo-colonialism of the “donor” states, regardless of whether they are acting collectively or in isolation.

p The inter-imperialist contradictions over “aid” show no signs of dying down. Quite the reverse. A bitter struggle is now centred on the problem of bilateral versus multilateral “aid”. It seems that the rivalry in the African countries that the imperialist powers consider to be the “key” countries will become even fiercer. The growing trend towards the stabilisation and, in the case of some Western powers, even the reduction of the amount of “aid” offered will help to build up the contradictions. This trend is caused, on the one hand, by the capitalist world’s financial and currency crisis and, on the other hand, by a certain disillusionment on the part of the “donors” with the results achieved through “aid”. The political dividends did not match up to expectations. Consequently, in addition to their attempts to strengthen the role of the “traditional” external sources of finance for the Third World (private investment), the imperialist powers are taking steps to heighten the effectiveness of “aid”. However, since each power is pursuing its own objectives, the contradictions must inevitably grow worse. This fact, in conjunction with correct tactics, can be used by the developing countries in order to secure further changes to their advantage in the procedure for receiving aid from the imperialist powers. It will also help them to resist the neocolonialist features of aid.

Clearly, there cannot be a single plan of action on this issue for all the developing countries, since their present levels of development and their internal conditions, like the tasks they face, are extremely diverse. But all the young states need to alter the nature of their relationships ( including the aid relationship) with the industrially developed capitalist powers. It appears that a promising opportunity for this is offered by the deepening contradiction between the imperialist powers over the problem of bilateral versus 119 multilateral aid. When trying to prove the advantages of the version they are championing, the imperialist powers will be forced to make further concessions to the liberated countries. This applies primarily to the former metropolises.