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p Lenin discovered that the export of capital constitutes a new economic category in the highest and final stage of capitalism. He showed that this phenomenon attains " enormous dimensions" in the age of imperialism, acquires crucial importance and becomes one of the "most essential economic bases of imperialism".^^1^^

p From the historical standpoint, the export of capital is indissolubly linked with the economic and political division of the world. At the present time it has taken on several additional qualities that are particularly dangerous to the developing countries. By investing capital in these countries’ main industries the foreign monopolies seize almost total control over them. Sometimes they run the whole economy, since it is usually so undiversified that it relies on just one or two products. As Lenin summed up the process, this is economic annexation without political annexation.^^2^^

p Another reason why the policy of the foreign investors hinders the developing countries from achieving economic independence is that foreign capital is antagonistic towards the state sector of these countries’ economies: it tries to limit their foreign economic contacts and to corner the internal market. The export of capital also accelerates the development of capitalism in the newly independent countries, but 78 the local capitalism is subordinate and "second class”. It is clear that the export ol capital provides the material basis lor nco-colonialism.

p Thus, in modern conditions the export ol capital has come to perform new functions, in addition to the old ones, which will largely determine the phenomenon’s future evolution. The export of capital today is intended to: (1) keep the developing countries within the world capitalist economy, (2) serve as a means of fighting the national liberation movement and world socialism and (3) help intensify the financial exploitation of the young states. The sum total of its old and new functions places the export of capital firmly among the weapons used in the inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries.

p As is the case with other areas of expansion, the export of capital brings into conflict the general and specific interests of individual powers, producing rivalry and competition. These conflicts are further intensified by the fact that there has been a change in the structure of the export of capital. State-sponsored investments now make up a sizeable proportion of such capital investments. On the one hand, this fact demonstrates the strengthening of state-monopoly tendencies in the export of capital, and, on the other, it points to its ever-growing political nature: a process is developing that is linked with a modification of inter-imperialist contradictions. Before the Second World War profits were the main spur in the monopolies’ struggle in the world market, and the forms adopted by the struggle included the seizure of capital investment spheres. Now, however, direct capital investment, just like the provision of loans, credits and grants, is not undertaken for the sake of profits alone. An important stimulus for stepping up the export of capital to the developing countries is now the urge to outdo one’s rival and secure additional levers of political influence.

p The continent of Africa illustrates clearly how the export of capital acts as a means of inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries. It reveals the origins and results ol the conflict between capital from different foreign countries. It is of great interest and highly topical to study these questions for a number of reasons. Firstly, the export of capital 79 (and the very concept of "foreign capital”) is depicted in bourgeois writings as a technico-economic category—the transfer of funds from a highly developed to an underdeveloped country, which has the sole aim of “helping” the latter. Thus, the analysis makes no mention of the exploiter essence of foreign investments, the problem of the clash of interests between the “donor” countries, and the fact that the export of capital serves above all else as an instrument for the expansion of the particular imperialist power. Secondly, there is a clear tendency to belittle the significance of the export of capital, especially to developing African countries, on the grounds that there has been a reduction in the proportion of finance exported to the former colonial and dependent territories as measured against the total export of capital. Thus, the question of inter-imperialist rivalry is also pushed into the background, since in fact the point is simply that it has become less attractive for the Western powers to invest in the developing countries. Thirdly, foreign investment is linked solely with the liberated countries’ need for development capital, and Western investments are viewed as being an answer to this need. Here too the attempt is being made to disguise exploitation as philanthropy, which naturally excludes the possibility of competition.

p The tendency to depict the export of capital as charity requires no further comment. It is an imperialist fiction widely used in relation to the developing countries and based on speculation with their vital needs. The influx of external finance really does occupy an important place in the structure of the newly independent countries’ economies. It is, for example, the means whereby 12-16 per cent of the developing states’ imports "are paid for. Foreign capital also finances a considerable part of their investments. As for the reduced share of these countries in the general amount of foreign investment, the situation merits closer examination. Statistics show that approximately two-thirds of direct private investment from the USA, Britain, the EEC countries and Japan goes to other developed capitalist states and only one-third to the developing countries. The main reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the changes that have occurred in the structure of the economies of the industrially developed countries. The scientific and technological 80 revolution has given them greater opportunities for massive capital investment with quick returns, whereas capital investment spheres in the developing areas of the world remain limited. Another factor of no small importance is that the holders of capital assets see in the growth of the national liberation movement a real threat of expropriation.

p Should one conclude that the role of the export of capital (to African countries, for example) is diminishing? Are the Western powers losing interest in sinking their capital into Africa, and is the heat of battle between them for investment spheres cooling off? Careful analysis shows that such conclusions, which are encountered in print, are fundamentally unsound.

p The contradictions between the imperialist powers over private investment in Africa form part of their general world-wide rivalry in the export of capital. Although the world is currently witnessing the growing international unity of capital, the tendency is accompanied by interimperialist struggle. This is inevitable, since the economic foreign policy of any bourgeois state is directed primarily at strengthening and extending that country’s own position abroad.

p Even the export of capital from one developed country to another, i.e., reciprocal investment, reflecting the objective process of the international integration of capital and the intermingling of interests, is by no means free of interimperialist contradictions. The balance of power as far as the mutual exchange of private capital between the USA and the European states and Japan is concerned shows that the USA’s dominant position here" is almost unshaken, unlike the spheres of industrial production and foreign trade. This gives the American monopolies substantial advantages over their competitors. American imperialism obtains considerable political dividends in Western Europe and Japan. It is financial penetration that largely ensures the retention of its political influence against the background of the USA’s declining position in world trade and gold reserves.

p The export of capital to the young states of Africa plays an even greater role in this respect, since it takes place on 81 a basis that is completely different from that which prevails among the developed states. The imperialist powers’ capital investment in Africa cannot be viewed as a part of the exchange of “surplus” capital, an everyday occurence in the economic relations of the capitalist world. Here, in fact, no exchange takes place. The capital exported from Africa by the foreign monopolies is merely surplus value created by the labour of African workers. Thus, the export of capital from the imperialist powers to African countries widens the scope for the exploiter relations between them, while the “national” imperialisms have always wrestled with one another for dominance in this sphere.

p Foreign investments in the developing countries are to an incomparably greater degree bound up with the question of political influence than investments in the developed countries. While the intrusion of American private capital into Western Europe already evokes resentment and alarm among a considerable section of the bourgeoisie in the former metropolises in this connection, the prospect of losing political influence in the traditional areas of domination in Africa through the transfer of the controlling interest to a competitor is a cause of particular anxiety, especially to the monopolies of Britain and France.

p One of the sources of inter-imperialist contradictions is the fact that the national monopolies all try to invest in the key (and, consequently, the same) sectors of the young countries’ economies. There is no question of any "division of labour" here. As the magazine United States News and World Report aptly commented, the main thing is not the number of American enterprises operating in a country, but their strategic location in the key industries.^^3^^ Consequently, the monopolies compete not for investment opportunities as such (there are more than enough capital investment spheres in the newly independent countries of Africa), but for investment in those industries whose seizure will ensure, in addition to good profits, the attainment of political ends.

p In the complex of contradictions between the imperialist powers the rivalry that stands out most sharply is that between the USA, Britain and France—the principal investors 82 in Africa. The FRG and Japan are currently being more actively drawn into the competitive struggle.

The overall volume of capital exported from the main imperialist powers to African countries is progressively increasing, although the growth pattern varies from power to power, as does the proportion of African investments in the" total amount of their capital invested abroad.

Table 2 Diiect Private Investment (Minus Depreciation Kxpeni-es) in Africa by the USA, Britain and France (in millions of dollars) Year South Africa Other African countries Total ’,’„ of total foreign investments Country 1HG1 1908 % of total foreign investments in IOCS USA 586 2 1 477 0 3 9 Britai n 959 2 1 408 0 8 8 France ............. 614.1 1. ’295.0 32.0 So»ire.-: Calculated from SKITCJ/ ol Cinienl iiusine.ss, Sept. 1965; Bomdol Trade Journal, 26 Jan., 1968; Alricn Uepnii, No 1, 1069; Le Mnnileur nlrictiin, ;t July, ll)t>9.

The table shows that British monopolies increased their direct private capital investments in Africa 1.5 times, French monopolies doubled theirs and American investment nearly trebled. The USA, which in 1960 trailed behind Britain and France in terms of the volume of its investments, led the field in 1968. This fact demonstrates vividly the futility of the efforts of some American economists to prove that US investment in Africa is not substantial. True, the American monopolies’ direct capital investments in Africa are currenly running at only about 4 per cent of their total overseas investments. The reason for this, however, is not so much "lack of interest" as the barriers that were erected, and still to a certain extent remain, against transatlantic capital. American sources confirm this thesis. Professor Emerson writes: "Since the colonial authorities were generally unreceptive to largescale American economic penetration and sought to 83 preserve their dependent domains for themselves, the Union of South Africa and Liberia were the two major areas for American investment”^^4^^. The elimination of the official colonial barriers altered the position, as is shown in the following table.

Table 3 The Cirowlli of Direct US Capital Investment in Africa (in millions of dollars) 1950 140 155 287 2.4 1957 301 363 664 2.1 1961 311 753 1,064 2.8 1962 357 914 1 ,271 3.1 1963 411 1,014 1,426 3.5 1964 467 1 ,219 1 ,685 3.8 1965 529 1,380 1 ,918 3.9 1960 600 1 ,474 2,074 3.8 1967 667 1,611 2,278 3.8 1968 692 1,986 2,678 4.1 1972 960 3,179 4,139 5.2 s: Compiled and calculated from Balance of Payments, 1963; Surcey ol Current Business, Sept. 1965, Sept. 1967. Oct. 1968, Oct. 1969; Africa Re-port, No. 1, 1969; Christian Science Monitor, 22 April 1970; Orerxra-i Business Report, July 1972, p. 19.

p It can be seen from the table that in 1957 the amounts of American capital investment in South Africa and the remainder of Africa were roughly equal, whereas in 1972 South Africa accounted for less than 25 per cent of total US investment in the continent. Over the eight-year period from 1964 to 1972 US private direct investment in the newly independent African countries almost trebled, climbing to 3,179 million dollars by the end of 1972. The average annual increase amounted to 14 per cent. The proportion of US overseas investment going to Africa also rose, from 2.1 per cent in 1957 to 5.2 in 1972.

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p It is often asserted that the US monopolies "make hardly any profits" on their African investments, but the actual figures do not support this claim. In fact, Africa yields the highest rate of return anywhere in the world (a not unimportant factor in the competitive struggle!). Thus, during the period 1957-68 every 100 dollars invested abroad by American corporations produced a profit of 6-8 dollars in Canada, 6-14 dollars in Western Europe, 10-16 dollars in Latin America, but 26-31 dollars in Africa. The total profits raked in by US monopolies in Africa in 1967 were 65 per cent higher than the total amount of new capital invested in that year. The structure and geographical distribution of American investment in Africa testify to its competitive nature. 54 per cent of direct capital investment is placed in the oil industry, 17 per cent in mining, 16 per cent in manufacturing and 7 per cent in trading. Thus, American capital is pouring into precisely the areas that are already dominated by the former metropolises.

p American private capital comes into conflict with British capital mainly in those countries that once made up British Africa where there are rich mineral deposits. For example, after Nigeria had gained independence, capital from more than 100 different American companies and a number of banks flowed into the country, not to mention money from the US oil monopolies (see below). British firms were forced by massive investment from the American Kennecott Copper Corporation and the American Smelting and Refining Company to slacken their grip on the lead, zinc, tin, niobium and silver mining industries. Nigeria’s textile industry was penetrated by US bank capital in the form of Arcturus Investment and Development, a subsidiary of Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan Bank. Even the United Africa Company lost its monopoly on a number of products: it was eased out of the profitable soft drinks trade by Pepsi-Cola.

p American capital is attacking British positions on a broad front in East Africa too, especially in Kenya. In 1960 Britain was the undisputed master of the country’s economy. But by 1969 the USA accounted for about one-third of all foreign investment in Kenya, a situation that was brought about largely by the agreement on investment guarantees concluded between the USA and Kenya. The US Embassy in 85 Nairobi officially stated that "The image of Kenyan development potential, financial self-reliance and good investment climate is well-known in the US. US companies look upon the Kenyan market as one of the most promising in Africa".^^5^^

p Banking occupies a special place in Anglo-American competition to export private capital to Africa. During the colonial period British banks held the monopoly in British Africa. Lloyds Bank, the Westminster Bank and the National Provincial combined with the Standard Bank to set up the Bank of West Africa, which dominated the whole region. Barclays Bank DCO (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), the Standard Bank of South Africa and National & Grindlays had a wide network of branches throughout the southern and eastern parts of the continent. From the early sixties American banks tried to make inroads into Englishspeaking Africa. Branches of the Chase Manhattan ’Bank were opened in Nigeria, and in Southern Africa Chase Manhattan was joined by branches of the First National City Bank and the Bank of America. They also penetrated into East Africa. The passive resistance offered by the City of London to the intrusion of American bank capital into its sphere of operations produced no results of any substance. London then adopted a series of firmer measures designed to both consolidate the position of British banking houses and limit the activities of their American competitors.

p The principal measure was the setting up in Britain of a powerful banking coalition to operate in the developing countries and, especially, those in Africa. The autumn of 1969 saw the merger of two of the large British banks that operate outside Europe, the Standard Bank and the Chartered Bank. The new bank that has resulted from the merger controls assets of $6,000 million. It has a wide network of branches at its disposal in the developing countries with dozens of thousands on staff. Over half these branches are in African countries.

p Since the Midland Bank and the National Westminster Bank are represented on the board of the Standard Bank and 13 per cent of the Chartered Bank’s capital belongs to Barclays, once Britain’s largest colonial bank, the new 86 banking group represents in effect the "Big Five" of the British banking world. This substantially boosts the competitiveness of the new group. The French press was clearly apprehensive at the news of the merger: "British banking know-how is superior to that of nearly all other financial establishments in Europe. What is more, the British bank has ten times as much foreign capital as the continental banks.” A further feature of the amalgamation was also pointed out—the invitation to American banks to participate: "This transatlantic tie-up makes possible the procedure which the City thinks will best help it to resist the overseas expansion of the American banks, especially First National City, Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America".^^6^^

p France’s anxiety was well-founded. Examination shows that the bitterest rivalry between foreign capitals is taking place in French-speaking Africa. US, West German, Japanese and, more recently, British monopolies are fighting determinedly to get their hands on the valuable raw materials located in these countries. While competing with one another, however, they are at the same time encountering growing resistance from French capital. The Vice-President of one of the US financial giants, the Chase Manhattan Bank, Herve de Carmoy, commented: "French industrialists are coming to realise more clearly the great advantages secured by direct investment. . . . Above all it is the certainty of being able to capture markets that would otherwise remain closed through protectionism or access difficulties."^^7^^ But as to the prospects for French capital investment in the USA, Carmoy referred directly to the necessary conditions for this: "It is necessary to identify American firms which would be interested in an agreement with French firms. . . in exchange for access for their own products to the markets of Europe and French-speaking Africa.”^^8^^ The remarks of this authoritative American financier do more than reveal the significance that the USA attaches to its overseas investments; they underline the increasing attention that US imperialism is devoting to capital investment spheres in Africa and give an indication of the direct rivalry in this connection with France. French private capital is in effect presented not with a deal but with an 87 ultimatum—to grant American companies unimpeded access to French-speaking Africa. Only if this demand is met will the doors to the USA be opened to French firms.

p The reasons for this situation become clear when it is recalled that French monopolies wished to restore their international position, weakened as a result of the Second World War, and renewed the export of capital to Africa on a massive scale, while putting obstacles in the way of other would-be investors. This export has undergone a radical transformation. Capital is now being mainly exported not as loans but in productive form, with the bulk of investment going to the franc zone.

p France is currently the most active exporter of capital to Africa, and the greater part of French private investments is concentrated in the countries which once formed the African part of the French colonial empire. According to 1969 figures, the total volume of direct private investment by French firms in Africa comprised some 32 per cent of all French capital investments of this type abroad. Although France takes third place after the USA and Britain in the volume of direct private investment in Africa, as can be seen from Table 2, it should be borne in mind that American and British direct private investment in Africa amounts to only 4 per cent and 9 per cent respectively of their total foreign investments, as opposed to the French figure of 32 per cent. This is a clear indication of the importance to France of the export of capital to Africa.

p In analysing the present state and prospects of the competitive struggle, one must also take account of differences in the distribution of US, British and French investments among the sectors of the African countries’ economies. For example, the general volume of all direct private investment in the African oil industry is running at about 2,041 million dollars, or 41 per cent of all foreign capital investment. But the proportion of French investment in this supremely “competitive” African industry amounts to only 35 per cent of France’s total investments in Africa. Even smaller is the amount of French direct private investment in mining—10 per cent, or 130 million dollars, whereas the investments of other powers in this sphere of production (excluding South Africa) reach 792 million dollars.

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p Given that the oil and mining industries are the most profitable investment spheres and that France is crying out for minerals, it is clear that the French monopolies are at a disadvantage, which can only spur on the competitive struggle.

p In Gabon, for example, American private capital, as represented by the monopolies Bethlehem Steel and United States Steel, has largely excluded French firms from iron and manganese mining operations, having seized half the share capital of the mixed companies active in this field. Despite French resistance, West German capital is making determined inroads into Mauritania. By 1969 investment by West German firms in Mauritania had exceeded 15 million marks.

p 54 per cent of all French private direct investment is channelled into the manufacturing industry of African countries (about 275 million dollars) and the service industries—transport, trade and services (425 million dollars). The private capital of other imperialist powers is now penetrating these spheres too.

p In North Africa, for example, French capital held, until recently, a completely dominating position in the profitable service area of building and running hotels, motels and the like. American and West German companies are now mounting fierce competition against the French firms. The list of similar instances could be easily continued.

p Private capital investment by the FRG and Japan is still considerably smaller than that of the USA, Britain and France. However, the rate of investment growth of the monopolies of these countries and the geography of their penetration are already turning them into competitors, and not only of the former metropolises.

p The figures given below show that the volume of capital investment grew almost 6 times in the eight years from 1963 to 1970 and the average annual rate of increase amounted to 4.7 per cent. Africa received some 16 per cent of the FRG’s private investments abroad, i.e., less than France’s quota but greater than that of the USA and Britain.

Despite the fact that the West German monopolies are advancing into Africa on a broad front (by 1968 private capital from the FRG had been invested in 31 African
•
89 Private Capital Investment by the PRO in Africa (in millions of DM) 1960 .......... 179.9 1966 ....... 1962.......... 228.4 1967....... 1963 . ........ 295.8 1969 ....... 1964.......... 316.4 1970....... 484.6 564.1 676.2 1,003.0 1965......... 449.3 Sources: Bundetanzeiger, 30 June 1965; 18 November 1967; 19 April 1968; Stnliatishes Jahrbuch fur BRD l’J69, If/71.
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countries), the directions of the "main assaults" determining the principal areas of inter-imperialist rivalry are becoming more obvious too. By 1969 the most important of the West German monopolies’ investments in the newly independent countries of Africa were distributed as follows (in millions of DM):

Liberia........ 134.1 Libya......... 56.1 Algeria........ 50.6 Ethiopia........ 47.6 Guinea........ 30.0 Nigeria........ 25.7 Source: Ubersee Rundschau, No. 18, 1969. Ivory Coast.......20.0 Egypt .........18.8 Mauritania........15.4 Morocco.........12.2 Congo (Kinshasa) 8.0 Togo...........4.0

p This information points clearly to the interests of the West German monopolies in Africa: iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania, oil in Libya and Algeria, bauxites in Guinea, timber from the tropical forests of the Ivory Coast, phosphates in Morocco and so on. But these same investment spheres also attract the monopolies of other powers. Consequently, in Liberia the FRG is competing against the USA, in the Ivory Coast and Morocco against France, while in Guinea, Libya and Algeria the FRG is an active protagonist in an imperialist free-for-all.

p The Japanese monopolies are comparative newcomers to Africa, but are gradually making their presence felt. As the Japan Press commented: "Though still distant for the 90 average Japanese, Africa has a lure for Japanese monopoly capital which seeks a virgin land for capital investment.”^^0^^ In the face of stiff resistance, primarily from Britain and the USA, Japanese private capital has over the last few years been intensively penetrating the continent, particularly the English-speaking countries. By 1970 Japanese private investment in Africa was already in excess of 200 million dollars. The Japanese oil companies Mitsui Petroleum Development, Teikoku Oil and Teijin are sinking capital into the Nigerian oil drilling operations, thus competing with British Petroleum and American monopolies. Japanese textile firms are also making headway in Nigeria. Tn order to block the resistance of British capital, they are co-operating with French investors. A similar Japanese-French alliance, this time aimed at US monopolies, can be observed in Niger, where a consortium of Japanese companies is proceeding to mine uranium in conjunction with French companies. Their American rivals have been squeezed out.

p The involvement of partners is the norm in Japanese investment operations in Africa. The Japanese monopolies see this procedure as a ploy against British and American competition, of which they are constantly aware, and not only in Africa. For similar reasons, French, Italian and even West German capitalists willingly accept the Japanese offers. This is a clear ex imple of the collective forms of inter-imperialist struggle, so typical of the current situation.

p There is no doubt that the penetration of Japanese private capital into Africa will gain in intensity. This is openly admitted in Japan itself. Fumihiko Kono, the President of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, who headed a Japanese Government mission which visited nine countries in Tropical Africa in February 1970, stressed in his report to the Government that "Africa is a promising virgin land for Japanese capital investment”. Kono pointed to three factors which might facilitate the expansion of Japanese capital: the "unusual African interest in Japan’s high economic growth”; the "relative absence of antagonism against Japan, as could be expected from Japan’s minimal presence in the past in Africa”; and, most important of all, 91 the "unanimous desire of African nations to get rid of the continuing rule of their former suzerains.”^^10^^ The observation that the peoples of Africa long for complete economic independence is nothing new. What is interesting is the attempt being made by Japanese monopoly capital to use the desire for independence and the anti-colonial sentiments of African public opinion for its own ends in the competition for capital investment spheres in Africa. At the same time it must be admitted that Japan’s economic successes and high-level production technology may cause it to be viewed by many African countries as a more promising partner than Britain, for instance, which is now floundering in a morass of financial and economic troubles. All these circumstances give Japanese monopolies the edge over their competitors in the assault on Africa, but at the same time they contribute towards intensifying the inter-imperialist struggle, Tokyo’s competition with London and Washington. Japanese monopolist circles are aware of the prospects and are planning ahead. The Japan Press reports: "It may be too early to see how Africa and the Middle East will react to the planned massive capital investment drive by the Japanese. It may be noted, however, that in anticipation of local opposition and competition with American and British capital, the Japanese plan to make common cause with France, Italy and West Germany."" Thus, the magazine not only revealed Japanese private capital’s expansionist schemes for Africa, but also spelled out its opponents and possible allies, indicating simultaneously the deep contradictions between the Common Market countries, on the one hand, and Britain and the USA, on the other. Declarations of this sort are not very often found in bourgeois publications. The Japanese magazine provides further confirmation of the well-known fact that forces in the capitalist world are constantly regrouping: former enemies become allies and vice versa. Agreements between monopolies are temporary in nature, while competition is constant.

p The Japanese monopolies will undoubtedly make their contribution to the sharpening of the inter-imperialist struggle to export private capital to Africa. However, the main factor in the struggle will apparently be the growing 92 intrusion into Africa of American "private business’, which is receiving steadily increasing state backing. An analysis of the modifications that the Nixon Administration has been making to its African policy shows that, although the existing methods of state economic, political and social expansion of the USA into Africa still fully retain their role as the most important instruments in the inter- imperialist struggle, another tendency is becoming more apparent—the wish to transfer the main burden on to the monopolies. Similar development can be detected in Britain, France and the FRG. In the circumstances the export of private capital has come to be one of the principal weapons in the struggle.

p The appearance and development of this tendency is brought about by several factors. Firstly, the deep and continuous crises of the balance of payments of the main imperialist powers compel them to reduce government expenditure. Secondly, the sectoral structure of these powers’ foreign investments is changing. Direct investment in manufacturing is on the increase. This significantly extends the circle of private exporters of capital to the developing countries. Thirdly, the purpose of exporting finance is altering. The funding of the military and other non-productive spheres is declining, while money for economic development is being supplied in increasing quantities. Subsidies are steadily giving way to loans. In this way, private capital is offered an ever-increasing scope. Fourthly, state- monopoly capitalism in many developing countries has already perfected the infrastructure and taken other ancillary measures, thus creating definite economic prerequisites for ensuring the safety and profitability of private capital investment.

p A fairly complete picture of American plans is conveyed in a report made to President Nixon by Secretary of State William Rogers. Entitled The United States and Africa in the Seventies, it was published in Washington on the 29 March 1970, six weeks after the visit made by the head of the State Department to ten African countries.

p The theme of the Rogers report is the need to further increase the volume of private US capital investment in Africa, which, as he put it, "can and must play an ever- 93 growing role" in the development of the African countries. Moreover, he advances certain ultimatum-like conditions, whose aim is to place American investors in a privileged position vis-d-vis their European and other competitors. Thus, in order to create an investment climate favourable to private American investors, Rogers proposes that African governments should devise "special programmes”, pass investment laws, guarantee the integrity of investments, introduce "reasonable rules on entry, work and taxes" and so on. If this declaration of unconditional surrender is adopted by African governments, Rogers promises to make an attempt to "arouse the interest of average American investors in studying the possibilities" of making investments in order to develop the manufacturing industry, including flour-grinding, plywood production and even .’.. shrimpfishing.

p Two features stand out in the declaration. Firstly, the US Secretary of State is speaking directly to the governments of African countries, completely ignoring their links with the former metropolises, their existing treaties and agreements, their association with the EEC, etc. Appealing to the sovereignty of young states is also one of the techniques used by the imperialists in their competitive struggle. Secondly, only "average investors" are mentioned, i.e., people who are firmly denied access to the most profitable investment spheres (the mining industry) by the big monopolies. It is worth recalling that of all American direct private investment in Africa, which amounted to 2,678 million dollars in 1968, 75 per cent went into mineral and oil extraction. This sum includes 692 million dollars invested in South Africa and 678 million in oil drilling in Libya before the revolutionary-democratic forces came to power.

p Thus, Rogers raises the question of further expanding American capital in Africa and involving the "average investor" in this. His arguments about the “interests” of the African countries are simply a camouflage for his true intentions. Clearing the way for private capital and squeezing out competitors is one of the main aims of US Government bodies, since the export of capital has always been the principal means of imperialist expansion. As is pointed out in 94 the documents of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, held in Moscow, "The US monopolies have penetrated the economies of do/ens ol countries, where they are increasing their capital investments and are seeking to gain control of key positions in the economy".^^12^^

p In stepping up the export of capital to Africa, the USA goes farther than simply making appeals and declarations: it also takes practical measures. Thus, in 1969 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation was set up in the USA (Rogers refers to it in a way that suggests that it arose merely from Washington’s concern for the peoples of the developing countries). The Corporation is a typical product of state-monopoly capital. It officially belongs to the state, but private businessmen are appointed to run it. The way in which the Corporation is financed underlines the merger of state and private interests. Its funds consist of a reserve of 100 million dollars from the Agency for International Development (AID), supplementary state allocations amounting to 75 million dollars and a further 100 million dollars which AID will pay in instalments over live years from the interest received on earlier loans. However, the state will incur no losses, since the Corporation’s profits over the next five years will total not less than 150 million dollars.

p The Corporation is an important means of strengthening the competitiveness of American capital investments. It provides not only guarantees but also loans in the local currency; it offers advice on schemes requiring capital investment and even becomes involved in investment itself. In Rogers’s words, the Corporation will serve as a base "for a more effective, flexible and energetic approach to American capital investment" and for "attracting fresh American private investment in Africa”.

p Other steps are also being taken in the USA to bolster capital investment in the developing countries and seek out new investment spheres. Apart from AID and the new Corporation, banks and numerous private organisations are involved. Moreover, opportunities for capital investment are not just sought; they are also created. The state finances special expert groups set up for this purpose. AID collates information on the investment situation and sells it to US 95 business circles in the form of the Catalogue of Investment Information and Opportunities. In 1969 20 African countries were covered by AID’s “investigations”. In addition, 27 “investigations” were actually carried out by American companies. The large American monopolies make regular use of AID’s services.

p American private capital is helped by the state to set up permanent missions in African countries (the expenses are borne by AID). Such observation points have already been established in Addis Ababa, Kampala, Nairobi, Accra, Abidjan, Casablanca and Rabat. It is noteworthy that the list features four countries of former British Africa, which have remained within the sphere of interest of British monopolies, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco, which come in for special US attention.

p All these facts indicate that American monopoly capital intends to extend the scale of its economic assault on Africa, in accordance, moreover, with a carefully thought out strategic plan. Two circumstances point to an inevitable intensification in the USA’s clashes with the former metropolises, as well as with Japan and the FRG. The first is that the centre of gravity in the export of American capital to Africa is shifting to long-term direct investment, which ensures the US monopolies of control over branches and subsidiaries in African countries where British or French monopolies currently have the upper hand. The second circumstance is that the American plans involve seizing positions in the developing manufacturing industry in Africa, as well as in trade and services. This will lead to increasing rivalry between the USA and France in the first instance, as well as with Japan and the FRG.

p The effect of inter-imperialist contradictions can also be detected in the process whereby international monopolist amalgamations are being formed in Africa. Bourgeois economists try to depict the emergence of these amalgamations as resulting only from the weakening competition between national monopolies and from their switch-over to “ collective” efforts at “aid” for the development of newly independent states. There can be no doubt that this process reflects a trend towards unity in the imperialist camp. But it most certainly does not herald any respite in the 96 competitive battle. Quite the reverse. It is precisely the intensifying competition in the present-day capitalist world that produces the formation of international monopolies.

p The competition between private capital from different countries is also responsible for the setting up of mixed companies. In principle, this development reflects the changes that have taken place in the developing countries. It has become more and more difficult for the monopolies to expand through their traditional methods—by organising branches and subsidiary companies. In many African countries there are increasing demands to curtail the domination of the economy by foreign capital and to nationalise its property. These demands are being met by a number of African governments. In the new conditions the monopolies are obliged to play a more subtle game and to change their tactics. As a result, mixed companies (with the participation of foreign and national, private and state capital) are gradually replacing the branches that are owned outright by the monopolies.

p The setting up of such companies undoubtedly means that foreign capital has had to retreat somewhat and that the young states are growing stronger. Nevertheless, it is evident that the process in its present form benefits the monopolies. They are actually widening the sphere of their penetration of the economies of the developing countries. They are taking control of national capital and using it in their own interests. But the main point is that the expansion is being concealed by a national camouflage. The monopolies are endeavouring to find allies in the developing countries, prevent nationalisation and forestall protectionist measures that might be taken by local governments. Were this not the state of affairs, it would be hard to explain the bitter competition between the largest corporations and firms in the USA, Britain, France, the FRG and Japan to become “ partners” in the mixed companies formed to exploit Nigerian oil, Guinean bauxites, Zambian copper, uranium from Gabon and Niger, etc.

p There is no need to prove the harm that the influx of foreign private capital does to the developing countries and the consequences it leads to. However, it would be wrong to shut one’s eyes to the fact that the overwhelming majority of liberated countries are unable to accumulate capital and 97 undertake large-scale production, and are in need of outside assistance. What must, therefore, be considered is a radical change in the conditions under which foreign capital is invested in the developing countries. It is clearly impossible to formulate any single, universally valid solution to the problem. A deep analysis of the particular circumstances in each developing country is called for, together with differentiated approach to different types of private capital and its national affiliation. Only then can it be decided how much foreign capital to attract, what measures to take in order to restrict and control it and when to start eliminating it from the national economy.

p As for the inter-imperialist contradictions over the export of capital, the African countries must take advantage of them. Under the effect of the world system of socialism on international economic relations, the Western powers are already making some concessions to the liberated countries in the provision of credit. The deepening of the inter-imperialist contradictions also offers many kinds of opportunities for improving the situation. Some African states, especially those which have opted for non-capitalist development, are already benefiting from the strife between the foreign monopolies.

p The export of capital remains one of the basic elements in the system of international economic relations of modern capitalism, and the expanded export of capital whips up the struggle to partition the world economically, while at the same time acting as one of the weapons in the fight. This conclusion is fully supported by an analysis of the state and tendencies of the international movement of capital. Despite the fall in the developing countries’ share of total funds invested, they will continue to be a highly important investment sphere for foreign capital. It may even be assumed that, as their economies develop, their mining operations expand and manufacturing becomes established, some levelling off will take place in the distribution of the finance invested between the developed and the developing countries.

p At the same time the process of founding an independent national economy in the newly independent states is inseparably linked with limiting the imperialist powers’ 98 opportunities to dominate and will further stimulate the rivalry and competition to export capital.

When assessing the role and place of private investment as one of the means of inter-imperialist struggle in the developing countries, it is necessary to take account of one further factor, which determines the amount and destination of capital investment—profitability. The figures show that new investments are already assured of profits from the investments that were made earlier. The financial exploitation of the developing countries is increasing. It is estimated that by the mid-seventies their total debts will amount to not less than 100,000 million dollars and that their annual payments will total 10,000 million dollars. In other words, their loan repayments will exceed the influx of new capital from abroad. This process is responsible for two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the prospect of the growth of profits stimulates the expansion of private capital and the competition thus engendered, but, on the other, the danger of the recipient’s “bankruptcy” restrains investment activity. Whether the first or the second tendency predominates depends on the actual conditions in each developing country and on the nature of the guarantees offered the investor both by his own state and by the government of the particular liberated country.