p The position of the USSR was entirely different. On September 19, 1938, the Czechoslovak government asked the Soviet government to reply as soon as possible to these questions: a) will the USSR, in conformity with the Treaty, afford prompt and effective assistance if France remained loyal and afforded assistance as well?; b) will the USSR help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations?^^151^^

p The following instructions were given to the Soviet Ambassador in Prague on September 20:

p “1. You may give an affirmative answer on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union to the question from Benes as to whether the USSR will render prompt and effective assistance if France remains loyal to her and affords assistance as well.

p 2. You may give a similar affirmative answer to the other question, too. ..." ^^152^^

p The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, immediately passed this reply to the Czechoslovak government. France was informed about it as well. So in those difficult and dangerous conditions for Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government once more officially reaffirmed that the USSR would fulfil its obligations under the pact providing for assistance to her in the event of an attack by Germany. In accordance with this decision, Litvinov, speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 21, 1938, restated the Soviet government’s position on resistance to aggression. He stressed that measures outlined by the Covenant of the League of Nations had to be taken against the aggressor resolutely, consistently and without hesitation, and in that case the aggressor would not be tempted and "peace will be preserved by peaceful means”. Litvinov, in his speech, exposed the disgraceful policy of 180 abetting aggression, to the extent of getting "directives and ultimatums at the cost of the vital interests of any particular slate”. The head of Iho Soviet delegation read out the statements which the Soviet government had passed to the government of France on September 2 and to that of Czechoslovakia on September 20.

p However, London and Paris were still deaf to the Soviet proposals. How absurd that was has been most strikingly shown in the memoirs of Winston Churchill. "The Soviet offer was in effect ignored,” he wrote. ".. .They were treated with an indifference—not to say disdain. . . Events took their course as if Soviet Russia did not exist. For this we afterwards paid dearly." ^^153^^

p In fulfilment of the emergency instructions of their respective governments, the British and French Ministers in Czechoslovakia emphatically declared to the Czechoslovak government in the night of September 21 that should it fail to accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "will not honour its treaty" with Czechoslovakia. "If the Czechs join forces with the Russians,” they emphasised, "the war can become a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then, it will be very difficult for the governments of England and Franco to stay out." ^^154^^

p Submitting to Anglo-French pressure, the Czechoslovak government gave up by consenting to Hitler’s Berchtesgaden demands.

p Litvinov repeatedly confirmed the Soviet readiness to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia also in his conversations with foreign diplomats and politicians.

p For example, Litvinov conferred in Geneva with Lord Privy Seal de la Warr and Deputy Foreign Secretary Butler in the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva.

p Butler cabled to the Foreign Office quoting Litvinov as having said that "if French came to the assistance of the Czechs Russians would take action”. He said that "he had for long been hoping for conversations between Great Britain, France and Russia, and he would like to suggest to us in this informal conversation that a meeting of the three Powers mentioned, together with Romania and any other small Power ... should take place preferably in Paris, and so show Germans that we mean business." ^^155^^

p Chamberlain was almost horrified by the comments of the People’s Commissar in his conversation with de la Warr 181 and Butler. He saw them as a "great danger" (!?) since to follow them through would have meant, in his opinion, "to strengthen Bolshevism in the whole world".^^156^^

p For the next few days the British government was almost continuously in session to consider the increasingly involved situation, but Chamberlain and Halifax did not even mention Litvinov’s proposal, thus withholding it from the Cabinet members. De la Warr, who attended all these sittings, also kept silent.

p Although the Soviet government was not in a position to know about Chamberlain’s reaction to the People’s Commissar’s offer, it gave a perfectly correct assessment of the situation as it had shaped up and of the possible prospect ahead. On September 23, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the report from the People’s Commissar about his conversation with de la Warr and Butler, wrote it was doubtful that France and Britain could agree to a conference with Soviet involvement because they had so far been ignoring the Soviet Union.^^157^^

p Even many Western politicians and historians had to admit that the Soviet stand on assistance to Czechoslovakia was impeccable. For instance, a prominent British Conservative Party leader L. S. Amery pointed out that "Russia’s attitude throiighout the crisis was perfectly clear”. The Soviet Union, he wrote, "consistently backed the conception of collective security." ^^158^^ American historian Arthur H. Furnia also admitted in his study The Diplomacy of Appeasement that unlike Britain and France, "the Soviet Union actually showed a ... willingness to render military assistance to Czechoslovakia." ^^159^^

p The Soviet government held an adamant and determined position also because Polish aggressors were acting hand in glove witli those of Hitler Germany against Czechoslovakia.

p Back on April 17, 1938, Stomonyakov stated that " Poland is coming into the open as an actual party to the aggressor bloc. In a hurry not to be too late she presented her ultimatum to Lithuania right after the AnschluB and enforced the establishment of diplomatic and all other relations with Lithuania which she ... regards as nothing but (lie beginning of her gradual colonisation of Lithuania. Poland is playing an active role in the German plans to resolve the Czechoslovak question. She is openly stirring up the Teszin question... Poland, as is now obvious to 182 everybody, is closely bound up with Germany and will go on following in her footsteps." ^^160^^

p On May 25, 1938, Daladier informed the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Surits, that his sounding of Poland’s position in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia had produced the most negative result possible. Not only was there no reason to count on support from Poland, Daladier said, but "there is none to feel sure that Poland will not strike in the back.”^^161^^

p J. Beck informed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, on September 19, 1938, that within two days Poland would have considerable forces brought up to the Czechoslovak border, and that he was prepared to contact Hitler or Goring personally about co-ordinating the action by Germany and Poland against Czechoslovakia.^^162^^ On the following day Lipski said as much to Hitler, stressing that Poland "would not shrink from resorting to force" to have her demand met. Hitler assured Lipski that in that case the Third Reich would take Poland’s side.^^163^^

p On September 21, the Polish rulers presented an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government demanding that some areas of Czechoslovakia should be turned over to Poland, and also denounced the 1925 Polish-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty.^^164^^ In the meantime, Polish forces continued to be massed close to the Czechoslovak border. The Polish military attache in Paris informed the French General Staff that if German troops should attack Czechoslovakia, Polish troops at once would seize the whole of Slovakia which would then be split between Poland and Hungary.^^165^^

p On September 22, the Czechoslovak government, reporting the immediate danger of an attack from Poland, turned to the USSR for support. In response, the Soviet government passed a statement to the Polish government on the very next day to the effect that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider that to be an act of aggression arid would denounce her treaty of non- aggression with Poland.^^166^^ The Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, Fierlinger, was immediately informed of that statement.^^167^^ That is to say, the Soviet Union once more confirmed its resolute stand in defence of Czechoslovakia.

p Referring to the policy of the Soviet Union, British historian John Wheeler-Bennett wrote: "She look every opportunity to prove her willingness to fulfil her obligations to 183 France and to Czechoslovakia: again and again this was emphasised in London, in Paris, in Prague, in Geneva and also in Berlin, to the acute embarrassment of the British and French governments. According to all available evidence, the conduct of Russia was exemplary throughout the Czech crisis. She even went beyond the letter of her bond, threatening to denounce her non-aggression treaty with Poland, if that state joined in an attack on Czechoslovakia." ^^168^^

p All that was taking place at a time when the situation was most dangerous for the Soviet Union itself since the Polish government was harbouring the idea of a joint crusade by German and Polish forces against the USSR. The Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, told Bullitt on September 25 that "a war of religion between fascism and Bolshevism was about to begin" and that in the event of the Soviet Union lending assistance to Czechoslovakia, Poland was prepared to go to war against the USSR shoulder to shoulder with Germany. The Polish government was confident, Lukasiewicz declared, that "within three months the Russian Armies would be in complete rout and Russia would no longer preserve even the semblance of a state".^^169^^

p Romania, too, took up a stand to favour the aggressors. Informing the Italian government about Romania’s position, the Romanian Minister in Rome, Zamfirescu, told the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Ciano, that Romania had objected, continued to object and would be objecting to Soviet troops passing through her territory to render assistance to Czechoslovakia. As regards the deterioration of relations between Poland and the USSR over Czechoslovakia, the Romanian Minister said that "Romania would side with Warsaw and in any event the alliance with Poland would take precedence over any pledge to Prague." ^^17^^° That meant that in case of an armed conflict breaking out because of the German and Polish aggression against Czechoslovakia, with the Soviet Union involved, Romania could, in spite of her alliance with Czechoslovakia, side with the aggressors.^^171^^

p Japan also kept up a threatening posture with respect to the USSR. On September 26 Goring informed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, that in the event of a German-Soviet conflict, Japan had pledged herself to attack the USSR.^^172^^ The Soviet embassy in Japan also communicated to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 184 September 21 that Japanese newspapers went altogether along with the Nazis over the Czechoslovak question. Some were calling for the Anti-Comintern Pact to bo transformed into a military agreement of Germany, Italy and Japan. ^^173^^

p Yet all that notwithstanding, the Soviet Union was still prepared to fulfil its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. The necessary military measures in preparation for such a contingency had been taken well in advance.

p On September 21, some Soviet military units were put on the alert in the face of a sharply exacerbated crisis. At the same time, other measures were taken to reinforce the units stationed in the western borderland military districts and enhance their combat preparedness. Altogether, the units on the alert comprised 1 armoured corps, 30 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, 7 armoured brigades, 1 motorised infantry brigade and 12 air brigades, etc. 548 combat aircraft were on hand to bo flown to Czechoslovakia. ^^174^^

p On September 25, 1938, the People’s Commissariat of Defence instructed the Soviet Air Attache in France, Vasilchenko, to communicate the following to the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin:

p “Our Command has so far taken the following preliminary measures:

p 1. 30 infantry divisions have been moved into areas in the direct proximity of the western border. So have cavalry divisions.

p 2. The units concerned have been adequately reinforced with reservists.

p 3. Our technical forces—Air Force and armoured units are in full fighting trim.” ^^175^^

p This information was passed to the French General Staff on the following day. It was also communicated to the British government in the course of the Anglo-French negotiations then in progress.

p A further 17 infantry divisions, 22 armoured and 3 motorised infantry brigades were put on the alert in the closing days of September. A total of up to 330,000 men had been called up for service in the Soviet Armed Forces ad- ditionally. ^^176^^

The facts just cited indicate that the position of all the major parties involved in the events under review became quite clear. The Nazi aggressors were acting with 185 increasing impudence day by day. The Polish ruling circles acted in alliance with them. The position of Britain and France, on the other hand, was increasingly defeatist. Not only did they refuse all support for Czechoslovakia, but, on the contrary, they were helping the Nazi Reich annex the Sudetenland and did it so as not to provoke a general war in Europe involving the Western powers as well. It was the Soviet Union alone which stuck to its firm and consistent position and emphatically declared its readiness to fulfil its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia and lend her effective assistance.