509

p The logical error of all Utopians was pointed out by Marx already in the spring of 1845. In his theses on Feuerbach he wrote: "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society."  [509•*** ^^150^^ It is not 510 difficult to understand which part is "superior to society" in all the Utopians: the part that sees the bad aspects of the existing order and strives to create a new social system, under the beneficial influence of which people would finally get rid of the vices which are now characteristic of them; in brief, it is the reformers themselves. Every Utopian reformer regarded his own appearance as a happy historical coincidence; but since this coincidence had happened, since the reformers had discovered the great truths of the new social science, all that mankind had to do was master these great truths and put them into practice. "It seemed to them (i.e., the Utopians.—G.P.)" says the Manifesto of the Communist Party, "that once people understand their systems they will not fail to see in them the best possible plans of the best possible state of society.” This conviction also determined the practical programme of their activity. As the Manifesto rightly remarks, "future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans".^^151^^

p In order to rectify the Utopians’ radical mistake it was not enough to acknowledge the existence of objective scientific truths. It was essential, apart from this, to put an end to the logical error, noted by Marx, which divides society into two parts, one of which—that which negates a given reality—is superior to society and, consequently, to reality as well. But this error, fatal for theory, could be eliminated in one way only: by an analysis that would reveal that the very reformers who negate a given reality are a product of the development of that reality. This would eliminate from social science the dualism of the object, i.e., of a given reality, and the subject, i.e., the reformer who negates this reality and strives to change it in accordance w^rith his reformatory plans. The strivings of the subject would then be seen as nothing but a consequence and indication of the course of development of the object. And this was achieved by Marx in collaboration with Engels. The difference between the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels and the utopian socialism of their predecessors lies precisely in the fact that scientific socialism eliminated this dualism that is characteristic of all Utopian systems without exception and runs through the whole history of "Russian socialism”. According to Marx, the “educator”—the progressive section of the class which is the bearer of progressive social aspirations at a given time—"is educated" by the very reality which he wants to change. And if he wishes to change it in one particular way and not in another, this fact also is explained by the objective course of development of the same reality. Consciousness is determined by being. This is why Marx and Engels had the right to state that their theoretical conclusions "are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered by this or that would-be universal reformer”, but merely express, in general 511 terms, "actual relations springing from ... a historical movement going under our very eyes".^^152^^ But when we say today thai Marx and Engels succeeded in putting an end to utopianism and placing socialism on a scientific basis, we should not forget that they solved the very task which confronted Belinsky as soon as h& adopted the viewpoint of Hegelian philosophy and which, after leading him to a strong negation of utopianism, forced him to become reconciled for a time with reality, because he was unable "to develop the idea of negation”, i.e., to discover the objective contradictions characteristic of this reality.

p The greatest of the Russian Hegelians understood instinctively the colossal importance of the theoretical task which was tackled and solved at about the same time by the two great Germans who had been through the same philosophical school. But the terrible undeveloped state of Russian social relations, which were the only ones that Belinsky could know and observe, prevented him from finding a solution to this extremely important task. And not being in a position to find a solution to it, Belinsky was faced with the dilemma of either remaining at peace with reality for the sake of negating utopianism or becoming reconciled to a Utopia for the sake of negating reality. Russian reality was too sombre for Belinsky to hesitate long in his choice. He revolted against reality and became reconciled with a Utopia. This is the very step which the Russian reader usually associates with memories of certain disrespectful expressions addressed by the "furious Vissarion" to a certain "philosophical cap"!^^153^^

p Under the circumstances at that time this step of Belinsky’s in its turn did him great honour. But, in discussing this step, we must on no account forget that the reconciliation with a utopia—however inevitable it was for Belinsky then—nevertheless meant a lowering of his theoretical standards and that this lowering of theoretical standards was not Belinsky’s service, but his great misfortune, caused by the selfsame wretched “Roossian” reality. In Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik’s exposition this misfortune acquires the form, which ill befits it, of a service.

p Belinsky’s reconciliation with a Utopia meant his revolt against reality not for the sake of the real interests of the labouring section of society, brought to life by the growth of the contradictions concealed in that very reality, but for the sake of an abstract principle. This principle was for him the principle of the human individual. "There was developing within me,” he said in one of his letters at that time, "a fanatical love of the freedom and independence of the human individual.” Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik thinks that here Belinsky had in mind "a real human individual”. But the whole point is that the “individual”, in whose defence Belinsky so ardently took up arms then, was itself only an abstract principle. Consequently Belinsky’s rising in its defence also assumes an 512 entirely abstract nature. He demands the freedom and independence of the individual "from the base fetters of irrational reality, the opinion of the rabble and the tradition of barbaric times”. The interests of the individual should be protected, in his opinion at that time, by rebuilding society on the principles of "truth and valour”. There is, of course, very little that is “real” in all this. And it could not be otherwise because Belinsky did not succeed in "developing the idea of negation”, basing himself on the contradictions concealed in reality itself, and because as a result of this he had to make an armistice with utopianism.

p Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik does not deny the Utopian sympathies of the "furious Vissarion”. But, firstly, he does not suspect that these sympathies were very closely related to what he calls Belinsky’s “individualism”; and, secondly, his remarks concerning these sympathies testify to his extremely poor knowledge of the history of socialism.

p He writes: "In Utopian socialism Belinsky did not take any interest in its communist ideals, which were sometimes of a most anti-individualistic complexion" (I, 280).

p This is simply ridiculous. Nineteenth-century Utopian socialism—and it was in this socialism that Belinsky took a great interest—in the person of the vast majority of its most eminent representatives was not only not interested in communist ideals, but was positively hostile to them. Therefore it was perfectly natural that a person interested in nineteenth-century Utopian socialism could be quite uninterested in "communist ideals".

p Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik continues: "Most typical Communists based their theories on the need for the absolute subjection of the individual to society; the Saint-Simonists, with whom in the person of Enfantin and others Belinsky was most closely acquainted, regulated not only labour, but all the manifestations of individual life, from freedom of conscience to dress and hairstyle" (I, 280).

p Let us assume that Enfantin really did show a great fondness for regulations. But he was never a "typical Communist”, whereas the passage quoted by me suggests that our learned historian of Russian social thought takes him for one.  [512•* 

p Today it is rather hard to have a clear idea of what exactly Belinsky’s socialist views were. But if one is to judge about them 513 from Dostoyevsky’s story quoted by Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik on pp. 280-81 of Volume One, it emerges that he was not as far from the "typical Communists" as our author thinks. Dostoyevsky says that Belinsky radically rejected property. True, the selfsame Dostoyevsky says that Belinsky believed with all his heart that socialism not only does not destroy the freedom of the individual, but. on the contrary, restores it in unprecedented greatness. But this too proves nothing, because this conviction of Belinsky’s was shared by all nineteenth-century Utopian socialists and all "typical Communists".  [513•*  In general, not a single Utopian of the modern period would object in the slightest to, for example. Belinsky’s statement that "one of the highest and most sacred principles of morality is religious respect for human dignity in any man. without respect of person, first and foremost, because he is a human being".  [513•**  Any Utopian socialist and any "typical Communist" could agree unconditionally with Belinsky here, and if our author says that Belinsky could accept only that part of Utopian socialism that did not go against his "ethical individualism”, this testifies merely to his extreme lack of knowledge on the subject of Utopian socialism. It seems to me that Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik’s view of this socialism was considerably influenced by Dostoyevsky’s Devils.

That Belinsky did not get on with utopianism for long is quite right. But the point here was not his "ethical individualism”, but again the fact that lie had been through the school of Hegelian philosophy. He retained a dread of "arbitrary conclusions of subjective significance only".  [513•***  And the Utopian cannot do without such conclusions. This is why towards the end of his life he began to regard “socialists” (i.e., Utopian socialists) with great contempt. And this is also the reason why at the same time he reached the conclusion that "Russia’s inner process of civil development will begin only when the Russian nobility turns into a bourgeoisie”. It is characteristic that it was then that he condemned Louis Blanc for his inability to regard Voltaire from the historical viewpoint. This new mood of Belinsky’s is extremely interesting and important for the history of Russian social thought. But 514 Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik has confused the facts relating to this period of Belinsky’s life in a most unfortunate fashion. And he was hound to do so! He looks at the facts through spectacles that conceal their true meaning from him, but enable him to find in them things that were never there. Even in the article on the Borodino anniversary our author managed to discover an anticipation of Mikhailoivsky’s theory of "the struggle for individuality”. That is the limit: it is the Pillars of Hercules, because in fact the article n question was—quite the reverse—an attempt to leave once and for all the path along which, incidentally, Russian social thought had arrived at Mikhailovsky’s sociological constructions also. If Belinsky had succeeded in solving the task with which he was wrestling at the time, constructions such as Mikhailovsky’s, i.e., essentially Utopian constructions, would have been possible only somewhere in the backw^roods of our social thought. This task was solved not by Belinsky, however, but by Marx, and before Marx’s ideas penetrated the consciousness of the progressive ideologists of the Russian proletariat we were to wander for decades in the wildernesses of Utopian abstraction.