p “Surveying in a single glance the whole life and activity of Belinsky" from his viewpoint, Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik sees the following picture.

p “The thirties began for Belinsky ... with a typical philosophical anti-individualism, on the basis of which there developed the distinctive aesthetic individualism of the Schelling period and the ethical individualism of the Fichtean period, which soon went to extremes and led ... to a fleeting period of ethical philistinism (1836-37). Together with Hegelianism came a reaction which expressed itself mainly in sociological anti-individualism and continued until the beginning of the forties.... The forties begin for him (i.e., for Belinsky.—G.P.) with a break with all’substantial principles’ and a transition to philosophical individualism whose terms also formulate Belinsky’s transition from romanticism to realism; during this tima Bolinsky’s aesthetic individualism, which in his Hegelian period almost turned into an ultraindividualism, again cama back to its formsr course. His protest against Hegelianism shows itself here as vivid and strong sociological individualism, which is most characteristic of the final period of Belinsky’s activity; the ethical individualism, in spite of random vacillations, remains in this period also the basic principle of the greatest representative of the Russian intelligentsia. This in a most 508 general outline is a schematic picture of the gradual development of Belinsky’s world outlook" (I, 288).

p Is the development of Belinsky’s world outlook clear to you now, reader? For my part, I must confess: the “scheme” outlined by Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik explains to me only that words turn up most opportunely when ideas are lacking. But I knew that perfectly well already.

p To say that in the history of Belinsky’s intellectual development Hegelianism signifies “mainly” the triumph of "sociological anti-individualism" is to reveal an astonishing ability to view phenomena “mainly”, or, to be more precise, exclusively, on the surface. Behind Belinsky’s "sociological anti-individualism" typical of him during the period of his passion for Hegel lies’an attempt to solve the most profound question of the philosophy of history in general and the philosophy of Russian history in particular. He who wishes to help us understand the history of Belinsky’s intellectual development must first and foremost explain to us what this question was and what means of solving it our brilliant critic did and could possess at that time. But Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik prefers, on the contrary, 1o conceal this question in the wings of “schematic” constructions, leaving on the stage only abstract ideas (all his various “individualisms” and “anti-individualisms”), in the mutual combat of which he tees the development of Belinsky’s world outlook.

Describing the famous article "Essays on the Battle of Borodino”, Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik says that, following in Hegel’s footsteps, Belinsky arrived in this article at a moderate "antiindividualism" (I, 265) and that although he eventually recognised "the inevitability of the suppression of the individual, we’, will not find in him a strongly anti-individualistic motii" (I, 2CO). 1 his is again words, words, words, that strip the brilliant man’s ideas of all content. One must show what it was that led Belinsky to "the suppression of the individual" and what he meant[ by this “suppression”. In fact, in the article "Essays on the Battle of Borodino" Belinsky arrived at the inevitability of the suppression of only those “individuals” who rebel against the reality around them. Why did he adopt such a severe attitude to such individuals? Because and only because he had ceased to be satisfied by the meaningless radicalism that negates concrete reality in the name of this or that abstract principle. Belinsky subsequently! said of himself that he had been unable at that time "io develop the idea of negation". And here lay the whole secret of his "reconciliation with reality”. But what did "developing the idea of negation" mean for him? For him—as an Hegelian—it meant showing [hew reality itself arrives at its cwn negation through its own development. Negation of reality which is not produced by the course of development of the reality itself does not contain anything real, i.e., ra- 509 tional.  It is nothing but the revolt of subjective opinion against the objective reason of history and as such it merits condemnation, censure and ridicule. This was Belinsky’s view at that time; this was the meaning of what our “historian” of Russian social thought calls his moderate anti-individualism. The practical conclusions at which Belinsky arrived in the articles belonging to this period of his intellectual development are truly awful. Belinsky himself soon realised this, and we all know how he suffered at the recollection of them, how deeply ashamod of them he was. But the theoretical interest revealed in these articles testifies to the enormous intellectual power of their author and does him great honour. It is the same interest that directed the theoretical investigations of the most serious socialists and sociologists of the nineteenth century.  [509•*  In his Memoire sur la science de Vhomme Saint-Simon said that before him the science of man had been based only on conjecture, whereas he wanted to base it on observation.  Essentially this is the same theoretical interest that made B3linsky "become reconciled with reality".  [509•**  But in Belinsky this interest, under the influence of Hegel’s philosophy, acquired far greater depth. The point is that aversion for “conjecture” and the desire to substantiate the science of man with the help of “observation” did not prevent Saint-Simon, as it did not prevent Fourier, R. Owen and other reformers like them, from being utopians.  It is very useful to remember this for understanding the history of Russian social thought in general and Mr. Ivanov-Razumnik’s History of Russian Social Thought in particular.