p In the preceding discussion we have already dwelt on the evolution of Morris’ views on the place and role of the icon in art: these range from a characterization of the work of art as a whole as an icon designating value to an aesthetic discourse with an evaluative usage of diverse signs, predominantly iconic, as the most characteristic for this discourse, and back to iconicity as a general, important aspect of art as a whole.
218p In this section we shall view in greater detail Morris’ characterization of the actual icon and its special features in art. In his work Signs, Language and Behavior he gives the following definition of the icon: “A sign is iconic to the extent to which it itself has the properties of its denotata" (5, 349). In semiotics the name “denotatum” is given to whatever the sign points to, while a phenomenon (or object) which functions as a sign is called a “sign vehicle”. Morris argues that, in accordance with this terminology, a sign is iconic insofar as the sign vehicle possesses the properties of the sign’s denotatum.
p In a sense the denotatum is perceived simultaneously with the icon, i.e., information about certain properties of the object is received both directly and indirectly. The sign vehicle functions in this as one of the denotata of the icon. Morris holds that it is theoretically possible to imagine a totally iconic sign, in which case its sign vehicle will also be its only denotatum. We do not agree with this view of the American philosopher’s, and subscribe instead to the view that a sign has a signification, i.e. is a sign insofar as it designates something distinct from what it is. In the theoretically possible case adduced by Morris the sign ceases to be a sign and simply becomes a thing. And a thing which represents itself is not a sign. In practice, continues Morris, every iconic sign is relative, since, first, it is never capable of embodying with absolute identity all the properties of its denotatum, and secondly, it almost always has properties which its denotatum lacks. To prevent the interpreter taking the sign vehicle for the denotatum, i.e. for the designated object, artists frequently intentionally emphasise in the sign those of its properties which are lacked by the object (the frame of a painting, the stage in the theatre, the pedestal in sculpture etc.)
p The iconic sign, Morris notes correctly, is no more nor less expressive than any non-iconic sign. It can designate in any way: by designating (portrait), by evaluating (caricature), by prescribing (visual command), etc. Correspondingly, icons may in principle be scientific, poetic, mythological, religious etc. Such forms of icons as, for example, the iconic performance of actions (ritual, theatre, film) can serve the 219 most diverse individual and social purposes (aesthetic, informative etc.). The icon’s strong side is its ability to present for the viewer’s contemplation that which it designates, and its weakness is that it is restricted to the designation of objects which it resembles.
p Morris is right to see the special significance of icon for art in the fact that it enables values to be embodied in art in such a way that they can be observed directly, e.g. the beauty of spatial forms, colour pattern in painting etc. In the perception of icons the direct cognition of value properties is rendered possible by the presence in the icon of that value which it designates. We shall return to the question of the connection between icon and value when we consider the question of values.
p Morris’ conception of the iconic sign and its place in art provoked lively discussion both amongst the adherents of semantic aesthetics and amongst its opponents (20; 22; 23). In the article “Aesthetics, Signs and Icons”, co-authored with D. Hamilton, as well as in Signification and Significance Morris discusses criticism levelled at him and draws certain conclusions from it. Let us briefly consider these critical remarks and the conclusion drawn by Morris.
p Morris regards as just the remarks made by Benbow Ritchie, Louise Roberts and Clifford Amyx to the effect that it is essential to make a clear distinction between the question of the iconic character of the work of art as a whole and that of the iconic character of the signs used within the work of art. But he does not agree, quite rightly, with assertions (by Amyx and Ritchie) that iconicity is a syntactic and not semantic problem. It is quite a different matter that within an iconic sign, such as for example a picture, we can analyse syntactic relationships.
p The critics also point out that a clearer distinction has to be made between the iconic and non-iconic sign. The difficulty here is ascertaining which properties they have in common and how many there need to be before a sign can be called iconic.
p Morris and Hamilton suggest a way of evading this difficulty by doing away with the iconicity-non-iconicity 220 dichotomy and replacing it with a scale of iconicity. Since iconicity is not subordinate to strict rules the essence of things is in the degree to which it is present. In the authors’ opinion this approach disposes of the question of which set of properties should be taken to fit the definition of iconicity. This does not of course dispose of the question of which properties are essential for an icon. These vary in different sign situations (9, 361).
p The definition which the authors here propose for iconicity does not seem successful. We consider it more productive to isolate the concept of icon by delimiting the most widely shared concept of similarity, such as the concept of isomorphism, elaborated in mathematics.
p In Signification and Significance Morris introduces more refinements. The presence of mere similarity, he states, is as yet insufficient to regard one phenomenon as the icon of another. Reproductions are not iconic signs with respect to one another, they only become such in one special case-with respect to the original. The sign vehicle can itself have different significations in different semiotic processes. Thus, to an art historian a drawing may be the sign of styles, of an author etc.
p Morris dwells in particular on the criticism of his theory that the sign vehicle of an icon belongs amongst those objects which it can designate. The attraction of such a position for the explanation of aesthetic perception is, in Morris’ opinion, obvious, since everything that is designated is in actual fact embodied in the work of art and the observer has no need when perceiving an icon to move away from what the work itself gives him. But, Morris admits, such an explanation contains a serious degree of simplification, for the qualities which are designated are not present in the sign vehicle with their full force. Iconicity can be “weak” in degree, and in this case there will be a strong divergence between the sign vehicle of the icon and the designated objects.
We have already stated above that what matters here is not “attraction” or “over-simplification” but the absolute necessity for the sign to designate a “certain something" which is distinct from itself.
Notes