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p Summarizing the many discussions on the relation of semiotics to axiology, in Signification and Significance Morris points out that to unite semiotics and axiology it is necessary to decide on the corresponding type of behaviour. This, in his opinion, is preferential behaviour, and axiology, or the study of values, should be regarded as the study of preferential behaviour. Preferential behaviour at the positive level serves to preserve and construct an object, and at the negative to evade or destroy such situations. A value situation is one in which preferential behaviour takes place. The term value is employed in three senses designating different aspects of the value situation. In the situation where preferential behaviour is expressed in the choice of perceived objects (e.g. a preference for portraits over landscapes at an exhibition) we are dealing with operative values. When preferential behaviour, is in accord with the values designated by signs we have conceived values. Finally, the term value is employed with direct reference to objects, and such values can be called object values.

p The orientation of axiology to the study of value behaviour, or of behaviour with regard to values, cannot in principle be criticized, but the behaviourist elimination of the mind as a factor of this behaviour condemns Morris’ study to failure. When, for example, Morris introduces into his behaviourist axiology the concept of designated (or conceived) values, i.e. of such mentally represented values of which the sign significations are made up, he retains the full force of all the difficulties and contradictions of the behaviourist interpretation of meaning (which we have discussed above). As an illustration we can take the following example. In Varieties of Human Value, when he examines the factors which influence value or preferential behaviour, the author cannot avoid naming such conceived values as philosophical convictions, and a person’s attitude to life. But Morris fails then to explain how these factors of value behaviour are to be understood from a behaviourist point of view. Here too he is beset by his previous difficulties in explaining such behaviour with regard to values which are expressed, strictly speaking, not in behaviour but, for example, in emotions and intellectual reactions.

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p Let us now see what connection Morris finds between axiology and semiotics. Values can exist without signs just as signs without values. But there are such aspects of sign behaviour, namely preferential behaviour, where values come into play. It is here, Morris argues, that axiology and semiotics intersect. This is particularly characteristic of prescriptive, as well as evaluative, signs, which are extremely typical and important in art. Irrespective of whether, Morris continues, a work of art contains signs or not, discussion of art values on the aesthetic level presupposes axiology. Morris sees there being two questions, or aspects to the relation of values to art: 1) of the nature of aesthetic evaluation. This question can be studied from a semiotic point of view, i.e. it can be explained how different schools of criticism differ from one another depending on whether they are predominantly designative, prescriptive or evaluative; 2) of the relation of the actual work of art to values.

p As we have already noted, in his pre-war articles Morris held the view that aesthetic signs designate value as icons. Now he advances a new approach which uses in its analysis the distinctions between operative, conceived and object values. By bearing in mind this distinction, argues Morris, it is possible to assert that a work of art is capable of designating the object value of objects which it designates. In just the same way it designates operative and conceived values. In illustration to his claim Morris points out that in painting, for example, it is possible to “depict”, or embody a situation of people drinking a tasty drink (object value) or people whose character displays a markedly preferential behaviour (operative values) or Utopian scenes and ideal people ( conceived values).

p The explanations which Morris provides in his book Signification and Significance do not strike us as convincing, for Morris refers to painting. But the essence of our objection is that it is impossible to say, with application to the non-representational arts, e.g. to literature, that values are directly embodied or represented.  [222•1  If, in the case of the 223 representational arts, the designated values are to a greater or lesser extent inherent in the sign vehicle and in this sense accessible to the perception, to direct cognition, then what is to be the case with literature, and particularly prose, in which the designated values, whether operative, conceived or object, are not, with minor exceptions, inherent in the sign vehicle and belong to the mental sphere? These are not accessible to the perception and, therefore, to direct cognition. The cognition of these values is mediated by the system of language, which is to a considerable extent neutral with regard to those values which it designates and to which it refers. Morris does not clear up this question. Nor, for that matter, does he explain which type of value can be directly embodied in the material substratum of language and in its outer form (structure).

p In his philosophical interpretation of value Morris as a whole follows the value theories of R. Perry and J. Dewey. As Morris himself points out, the central concept of his behaviourist axiology-preferential behaviour-is analogous to Dewey’s concept of selective-rejective behaviour and Perry’s of interest. In Morris’ view, the concept of value is relatively objective, in other words value is a property of objects, but with respect to preferential behaviour, to the subject. Values, consequently, include both objects and subjects. The subjectobject relation is no less objective than object-object relations. Thus, on the main question in the theory of value, i.e. that of the subjective or objective character of value, Morris follows Perry (and Mead) in occupying an intermediate position between axiological subjectivism, which is characterized by a relativistic interpretation of value, and axiological realism, which regards value as independent of the subject. Morris himself calls his position objective relativism.

p However, despite his pronouncements against subjectivism, in his discussion of the aesthetic sphere Morris is effectively influenced to a large extent by Dewey’s relativistic theory of value. Thus the theory that he shares with Perry of the connection between value and interest Morris interprets in Deweyan spirit as interest in the performance of an action: only that which is relevant for the behaviour of the subject can be said to have value. Like Dewey Morris was unable to 224 overcome the primary shortcoming of utilitarianism, inherent in pragmatic axiology as well, namely, their inability to show the specific features of aesthetic value as distinct, say, from moral values or simply from utility. Just like Dewey Morris effectively does not distinguish aesthetic value. In his description of the aesthetic sign he does not even ask which type of value-aesthetic, moral etc.-is designated by this sign. The beautiful is not distinguished as a special and important factor of the content of art, nor does he analyse the aesthetic character of the actual means of designation. As a result the correct view that in art the actual signs should stimulate a positive evaluation of themselves remains unsubstantiated, since positive evaluation is not elucidated in the concept of aesthetic evaluation.

p We should note Morris’ anxiety to overcome the limitations of the naturalist approach to the explanation of values, an approach which links the content of values exclusively with the bio-psychological nature of man, his biological needs. In addition to bio-psychological he notes the social determinants of value behaviour: cultural tradition, religion, economics, the performance of social roles etc., and in the process stresses that “the main determinant of the ratings is a social one" (7, 69). It would of course be pointless to look for a dialectical-materialist interpretation of social life as socio-historical practice in the thought of a bourgeois philosopher. Morris’ interpretation of social life goes no further than the theory of factors typical of modern bourgeois sociology.

p Morris also tried to investigate through experiment the relation of signs and value in art, and primarily in painting. “Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead and Lewis,” writes Morris, “were major influences on my thinking, and they had all believed that... a scientific study of values and evaluations not only was possible but would be of service to man in his characteristic activity as valuer. It seemed desirable to put this philosophic position to a serious empirical test" (7, vii). Morris also tried to perform this task in his Varieties of Human Value and in a number of articles. Generalizing from the results he obtained through experimentation Morris concluded that values can be studied scientifically and that 225 evaluation can be controlled in the terms of scientific method. The increase of information on this subject would influence the very evaluation of ethical, artistic, philosophical and religious activity. This does not mean, argues Morris, that science can replace these and other forms of reality or perform their functions and purposes (7, 186-204).

p E. Schulz, a reviewer of Varieties of Human Value, wrote that the value of this book consisted not in its concrete conclusions, but in the general tendency of the scientific approach to value study and the development of a technique for the realization of this goal, and that in this respect Morris’ book is one of the most significant in the last few decades.

p There is no doubt that the general desire to apply the technique of scientific-empirical analysis to the study of values is of serious interest. Incidentally, Morris bases his method on familiar methods of measuring values, the scale of value, methods of measuring meaning (including those proposed by Osgood) and factorial analysis. It is also important to stress that the scientific approach to the study of values can only succeed if the objectives of science itself are correctly understood. Dewey lacks such understanding, and so does Morris, both of them interpreting science as a phenomenon of an instrumental-pragmatic order without reference to its objective content.

In Soviet aesthetic literature the question of the application of quantitative methods in the analysis of artistic value is posed, the stress being laid on that the accumulation of empirical material and obtention of quantitative data should proceed from scientific theoretical principles-the idea of determinism, the inevitability that the aesthetic consciousness should be conditioned by social existence, social practice. Only on these conditions will the quantitative approach be effective. But in the work of many western sociologists, including Morris, these essential conditions are lacking.

p There are two marked tendencies in Morris’ work: one is connected with his activities as a scholar in the field of 226 semiotics, the other sets him out as a representative of contemporary bourgeois philosophy. As noted above, in this second capacity his views are not outstanding for their originality. In his philosophical views Morris is a pragmatist who is strongly influenced by behaviourist psychology and the ideas of logical positivism. “Thus,” writes one Soviet critic, “in its philosophical basis Morris’ semiotics is an idealist conception" (21, 104). It is not therefore surprising that as a philosopher, and also as a representative of the semantic philosophy of art, Morris does not have the weight and influence of, say, Croce, Cassirer or Whitehead.

p In contrast to Morris the philosopher Morris the semiotician (where he is unencumbered by the burden of behaviourism) is a highly respected authority.  [226•1 

p Morris’ importance and popularity in aesthetics is also largely due to his semiotic (in the concrete scientific sense of the word) methods of studying art. If Peirce stood at the origins of the semiotic methods of the study of art, and Richards was the pioneer in the field, Morris can justly be called the founder and systematizer of these methods. It was Morris’ writings that served as a stimulus for many discussions at symposiums and congresses on aesthetics and which influenced all the leading representatives of semantic aesthetics (I. Richards, S. Langer, A. Kaplan, B. Heyl et al.) as well as the entire school.

p When we assess the value of Morris’ aesthetic studies from a Marxist point of view we should bear in mind that his semiotic theory of art can serve as a characteristic example of how such an abstract science as semiotics can be used for the theoretical “substantiation” of formalist “abstract art".

With specific reference to Morris’ attempt to give semiotic 227 substantiation to abstractionism in his article “Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs”, the inconsistency of this endeavour has already been indicated in a number of articles (see 10; 11). It is important .here to emphasize the actual desire to find theoretical justification for one of the most formalist directions of contemporary modernist art.