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p At the basis of Morris’ semiotic analysis of art lies the theory of “ discourse”, first formulated in the article “Science, Art and Technology”. According to this theory, over the course of time the need for an improved performance of certain functions has led to the specialization of sign systems, of “languages”, or, in Morris’ term, types of “discourse”. In accordance with the three types of activity which he isolates-scientific, artistic and technological-he distinguishes three basic, “primary” types of discourse, which serve these types of activity: scientific, aesthetic and technological. Since types of discourse are the components and products of activity, their analysis, the writer correctly argues, can serve as one of the means of studying the activity itself.

p In his attempt to define the specifics of the aesthetic discourse, of the aesthetic sign Morris looks, in his articles “Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs" and “Science, Art and Technology”, to the iconic character of the aesthetic sign. But as the iconic sign, or icon, is not only used in art, the iconic character of a sign cannot be a sufficient condition for the definition of the specifics of the aesthetic sign. Therefore Morris names the designation of value as the second characteristic of this type of sign: the aesthetic sign designates the value properties of real and possible situations. Moreover, its specific nature is seen to consist precisely in its designation of value via an icon. The work of art is a specific aesthetic sign, i.e. an icon which designates value (3, 415). Thus, in Morris’ early articles the aesthetic discourse is characterized as language which serves to communicate values through icons.

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p We can see a slightly different position in the work Signs, Language and Behavior. When he later evaluated this new position in his work Signification and Significance Morris maintained that this resolution does not represent an alternative to his previous viewpoint, that it is simply its development as a result of the introduction of the category of the “use” of the sign and the particular stress placed on the evaluative dimension of meaning (8, 72). Let us see in what exactly this new position consists and whether it is really only a development of his previous viewpoint. Morris now refuses to regard the icon which designates value as a specific aesthetic sign, distinguishing the aesthetic discourse. “No sign is as such esthetic,” he now writes, “and the attempt to isolate the fine arts by isolating a special class of esthetic signs seems now an error" (5, 195).

p He now bases his classification of discourse on two parameters : (1) the mode of signifying, (2) the way they use (the goal-oriented use) signs. Morris identifies the traditional modes. The primary modes are: the designative (in Richards’ terminology-referential, or symbolic), the appraisive and the prescriptive (these two modes correspond to Richards’ emotive mode). To which mode of signifying any particular discourse is ascribed depends on the proportional use of these or other modes of signifying in the set of signs (ascriptor). This means that art will be that discourse in which the appraisive mode is dominant in the sets of signs. This basis for the classification justifies a quantitative study of the different types of discourse. In order to take account of the qualitative factor the second parameter of the classification is introduced-the mode-use. Morris identifies the following four modes of using signs: informative, incitive, systemic and valuative. All discourse can be divided into 24 different types on the basis of these two parameters taken together.

p Art figures in two types in this classification. The fine arts (painting, music) and poetry Morris considers the appraisive discourse and fiction, the designative-appraisive. The valuative mode-use is, in Morris’ opinion, and we cannot but agree with him on this point, one of the most characteristic features of the signs used in art. This mode is best realized 212 when the properties of the designated objects are embodied vividly and concretely for direct observation, i.e. by the means of representation. But Morris now holds that art in its further use of signs, first, is not limited either to representation, or to the evaluative mode of signification.

p Signs in art, holds Morris, can be both iconic and noniconic, with both an evaluative and any other mode of signification. In painting, music and poetry the evaluative mode of signification is dominant, and the designative in fiction. In all cases the evaluative use of signs is essential for art, with moreover, as Morris correctly notes, an extra requirement. This requirement consists in the fact that the signs themselves, like the objects they designate, should evoke a positive evaluation of themselves, i.e. this evaluation should be at the least a part of, and in some cases even equal to their evaluative use.

p In Signs, Language and Behavior Morris also discusses the position of certain semanticists, in particular Susanne Langer, who recognise the sign (symbolic) nature of art and at the same time deny that art is language, since it has no “ dictionary”, i.e. total set of signs with definite meanings. Morris advances what we regard as true counter-arguments: If you take a musical note or a line in painting you cannot indeed say that they have a definite meaning, and you cannot compile from them a “dictionary”, but neither can you compile a dictionary of the separate phonemes, which constitute wordsigns. If however we take the representation of certain objects and people, which is the business of realist painting and programme music as the “word” of art, these can be seen to constitute a dictionary of signs which combine “ grammatically" in various ways depending on the style, school or personality of the artist. In this case a piece of music or work of art can be regarded as a language, composed of icons. We have every ground, therefore, concludes Morris, to consider the arts languages. These languages partly depend on phonic language, and are less adequate than this latter for certain purposes of communication, but then they are more effective for other purposes.

p Morris’ view of the different use of signs with any mode 213 of signification within a work of art, the interpretation of art as a sui generis “language”, the attempt at a quantitative analysis of discourse, including art, the isolation of the evaluative use of signs as the most characteristic for art with the additional requirement for a positive evaluation of the actual signs themselves, as well as a whole series of more specific theories (for example, the negation of the formalist requirement that only the actual signs should be evaluated in poetry etc.)-these are all fruitful and interesting from the semiotic point of view.

p At the same time the classification of discourse offered by Morris suffers from schematism and oversimplifies, in certain cases even distorts, the true state of affairs.  [213•1  Morris’ classification rests on two basic points. One of these is the “mode of signifying”. Let us take a closer look at this point. As we have already stated, Morris’ differentiation of meanings is traditional for semanticists. He sees the shortcoming of previous (including Richards’) differentiations of meanings in the absence of behaviourist criteria for their differentiation. He attempts to give just such a criterion, basing it on the difference between response-dispositions. We will not here attempt another analysis of Morris’ behaviourist approach to this question. Suffice it to refer to the fact that many commentators (V. Aldrich, M. Black et al.) have remarked on his inconsistency in the question of the differentiation of the modes of signifying. It has been pointed out in particular that Morris in effect failed to distinguish the designative mode from the valuative.

p As if in reply to such criticism, Morris adduced additional explanations in his Signification and Significance. In this work we no longer encounter the ambitious efforts to establish a behaviourist criterion of modes of signifying. Now modes, or dimensions as they are termed in this work, are distinguished depending on their reference to different aspects of the context and behaviour. The designative dimension points to the 214 observable properties of objects which function as stimulants. The evaluative dimension points to consummatory, affirmative properties of objects. The prescriptive dimension points to the instrumental nature of the act and behaviour. In contrast to the emotivists and together with the pragmatists (Dewey et al.) Morris holds that all signs have a meaning, i.e. a reference to the context and behaviour. At the same time he joins the emotivists in isolating the normative terms (evaluating and prescriptive), which cannot be characterized merely in terms of “signification”. They have other forms of interpretant, namely, what the emotivists designate as “attitudes” and “emotions”.

p Such is Morris’ point of view, and it provokes a number of questions and objections. If it is insufficient to characterize normative terms, such as, for example, evaluating terms, merely in terms of “signification”, then the differentiation of the dimensions of “signification” into designative and evaluative, which he makes without involving the “interpretant” is in effect non-existent. This also holds true for the prescriptive dimension. Those differences which Morris points to are the differences within a single designative dimension. It remains unclear whether every designative dimension becomes evaluative in the presence of a specific interpretant (e.g. emotion) or only those which Morris isolates as evaluating dimensions. The second would appear to be closer to the truth: the special nature of the properties (perfect etc.) with which the given designative dimension is connected generates a specific interpretant (“attitude”, “emotion”). Below we will examine how Morris connects the evaluating dimension with its reference to value properties, or simply to values.

p We can now briefly summarize the point of view expounded in Signs, Language and Behavior as follows. The work of art is regarded as a discourse which uses different signs, amongst which icons play an important role, but these are not the only signs. The signs have different modes (or dimensions) of signification, but the evaluative mode is the most characteristic. This means that in this case signs designate values. Signs in art are used to evoke a particular attitude in the perceiver to the values designated.

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p Morris insists as before that representation has an enormous role in art, and in this respect his previous articles retain their significance. However, he now no longer views the work of art as a whole as an icon. By regarding the iconic sign as a component (amongst others) of the work of art he is not merely “supplementing” his prior point of view, according to which the work of art as a whole is an iconic sign, but formulating a new, alternative view, although Morris is loth to admit this. In Signification and Significance he returns to the point of view of his early articles (although he does not directly admit this anywhere) claiming that on the whole the aesthetic discourse is in certain important aspects iconic (8,73). This reversal to his old position, taking account of the new classification of discourse by “dimensions” and the “usage” of signs within works of art constitutes a step forward.

p In connection with the modes of signification and the varieties of the use of signs Morris considers the question of “ expressiveness”, which, in his opinion, is of great importance for studies in art, religion, science, morals, and politics. He gives his fullest interpretation of “expressiveness” in Signs, Language and Behavior (in § 4, chapter 3). Morris points out here that a close connection can often be observed between the reproduction of certain signs and the state of those who produce this sign. Thus, a person in an excited state may speak more intensely, in short sentences, faster than someone who is not excited. Thus, the means of reproducing signs and the forms of signs produced by someone (e.g. designative, evaluative, prescriptive) may by themselves function for others, or for those producing the signs,  [215•1  as signals of the state of those producing the signs. Such signs, in Morris’ view, can be called “expressive”. In explanation he writes: “A sign on this usage is expressive if the fact of its production is itself a sign to its interpreter of something about the producer of the sign" (5,68). The author regards as expressive signs only those signs of states which are connected with the fact of the 216 production of the signs, e.g. such features of speech as tempo, sentence type, etc. Signs of states (such as blushing) which are not connected with this fact he does not regard as expressive signs.

p The essence of Morris’ conception consists in the isolation of “expressiveness” from the modes of signification. Signs, irrespective of whether they are designative, evaluative, or prescriptive, may express in addition the state of those who produce these signs. “The expressiveness is not part of the signification of the sign in question but rather the signification of another sign, namely of a sign which consists in the fact that a certain sign is produced" (5, 68).

p Thus expressiveness is an additional property of signs, over and above their signification, which does not serve as a basis for the differentiation of the modes of signification. In Morris’ view, the distinction he introduces is extremely important in the study of art, religion, science, morals, politics etc.

p There are a number of undoubtedly important factors in Morris’ conception of expressiveness. The main one of these is that the signification of signs does not embrace the state of the person using those signs. This argument can be taken as the epistemological basis for a rejection of erroneous aesthetic theories which view art as the “self-expression” of the artist, of his emotions, instincts, subconsciousness, subjective intentions, etc. However, the rejection of subjectivism, of the theory of “self-expression”, is in contradiction to the initial subjectivist principle of the interpretation of the “ signification" of signs. Such a rejection is found, incidentally, in the writings of Dewey, Morris’ teacher in the field of aesthetics. In actual fact, to the state of a person using (or creating) signs as an individual state we can only oppose “signification” interpreted not as a behavioural reaction but as the social and objectively significant reflection of natural and social reality in the minds of people.

p As one of the shortcomings of this conception we can also take Morris’ restriction of the term “expression” to the expression of the state of a person in the actual production of signs, which resulted in his withdrawal from the 217 consideration of those phenomena which constitute an important aspect of the problem of “expressive” signs. There is only a suggestion of this when in the notes Morris quotes Leibnitz’s interpretation of “expressiveness”: one thing expresses another. . . when there is a constant and regulated relationship between what can be said about each of them. The semiotic analysis of the correlation between expressiveness and iconicity in art, and in particular, in the representative arts is of great theoretical significance. But this aspect of the problem also slipped out of the American semioticist’s field of vision.

In Signification and Significance Morris endeavours to widen somewhat the scope of the signs which he regards as expressive. He notes Parsons’ observation that it is not only man who acts on objects with the help of signs, but that the objects themselves act on the “agent”. Morris admits that this “passive” aspect of behaviour has its own form of sign function and that such signs are for the large part “ expressive”. This area requires further study and “may throw considerable light on mythic, aesthetic, and religious symbolism" (8, II).  [217•1  Thus, in this question too we can see corrections and refinements in the direction of a fuller semiotic theory of art.