59

p As more and more European, African and Asian countries were drawn into the war, the conviction grew among American workers that the United States, too, would not remain on the sidelines. Instrumental in the collapse of neutralist illusions were, first, the end of the “phony war" and, as a result, the defeat of France, Belgium and Holland, the occupation of Norway and Denmark, and the entrance of Italy into the war; second, Nazi Germany’s attack on the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people; and third, the collapse of Japanese-American negotiations and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. A direct threat was posed to Great Britain, which stood face to face with Nazi Germany, powerful, drunk with its military successes and now in control of almost all of Western Europe.

p American workers became more and more sharply aware of the inevitability of US entry into the war: the White House was sending message after message to the Capitol with proposals for new defense appropriations and additional taxes.

p Although the unions continued their campaign of protest against involvement in the war, more and more labor organizations pledged their support of the administration and the Democratic Party. In 1941, when Roosevelt entered his third term as president, a number of unions openly and unequivocally expressed themselves in favor of national defense measures. Voices could be heard urging US intervention on the side of Britain. More and more often appeals were 60 made to the government to arm American merchant ships and to give them naval escorts.

p At conventions of AFL and CIO unions, the attitude to the war was now formulated as a matter of strengthening national defense. The delegates to the third convention of the United Office and Professional Workers of America (CIO), for example, declared in September 1940: “We support wholeheartedly the vigorous and forthright declaration on peace and national defense made by the CIO and its President, John L. Lewis. We are determined to keep out of this war.”   [60•1 

p The third convention of the CIO was held November 18 to 22, 1940 in Atlantic City. This was an important event in the life of the democratic wing of the labor movement. Taking part in the proceedings were 438 delegates, representing almost four million members. John L. Lewis, who was still the CIO president, delivered the report of the executive committee, in which he said that the CIO, its officers and the mass of union members were fully prepared to meet their responsibilities at that crucial moment in the life of the nation, that the CIO stood in the forefront of defense, and that the workers in the organization would increase their output in the mines and plants.

p At the same time, the convention still supported US neutrality. A resolution on preserving peace and safeguarding democratic institutions said that more than ever before the people were determined to keep the country from being involved in foreign wars, and that America should not participate in any international adventures that might draw it into the war. It said that the eternal vigilance of organized labor should become the main guarantee that 1917 would not be repeated and that peace and national security would be ensured.  [60•2 

p The convention raised the question of profiteering in the defense industry. It devoted particular attention to abuses connected with the granting of government contracts. A resolution on war and profiteering said: “...this Convention 61 condemns profiteering in the national defense as contrary to the public interest and authorizes and directs the executive officers of the CIO to formulate measures looking toward the control of profits by the Federal Government through such measures as profit limitations in government contracts."  [61•1 

p One convention resolution condemned fascism but at the same time put an equal sign between Nazism and communism, This approach indicated sharply conflicting tendencies within the CIO, an omen of future complications. There were elements in the CIO leadership who were interested in seeing the entire activity of the organization assume an anti-Soviet orientation. Despite the prevalence of democratic sentiments in the CIO during the war, these rightist leaders from time to time succeeded in pushing through resolutions which, albeit not directly, rejected the idea of joint actions with the Soviet Union.

p A change in leadership took place at this convention. John L. Lewis, who along with the Republican Party had suffered defeat in the 1940 elections, had to resign as CIO president. He recommended as successor one of his closest associates, vice-president of the United Mine Workers Philip Murray. In naming Murray, Lewis hoped to have a reliable man through whom he could continue to influence the CIO, particularly since the mine workers’ union headed by Lewis held strong positions. He was counting on Murray in the matter of supporting the Republicans.

p Publicist John Steuben later wrote in the labor magazine March of Labor, that “Philip Murray belongs to the old school of conservative labor leaders who believe that the interests of labor and capital are alike, and that it is possible, even desirable, to establish a partnership between employers and labor unions".  [61•2 

p Murray was to head the CIO for twelve years until his death in 1952. Unlike Green, Harrison, Hutcheson and other leaders of the old school, he was more circumspect and flexible, capable of making temporary compromises with the left wing of the labor movement. A convinced opponent of communism, 62 he did not, however, totally shun joint actions with the Communist Party on certain important issues, particularly during the war.

p Due to his position he felt free to criticize the monopolies on questions of profits, wage policies, working conditions, cost of living and labor legislation. In other words, he criticized them within the framework of a liberal bourgeois policy. Murray looked for agreements with the monopolies that would be favorable to labor and avoided sharp confrontations.

p Murray also gained repute in the CIO unions for his tendency to stress his democratic spirit; he frequently made promising statements about defending the freedom of political views and party affiliation. To complete this thumbnail sketch, we should mention his close ties with Catholic circles.

p Such was the new leader of the CIO, chosen by the third convention. He did not live up to Lewis’ expectations, for Murray supported the Democrats and Roosevelt’s policies, and called on the workers to increase their vigilance and strengthen the nation’s defenses to be prepared for the possible entry of the United States into the war against Nazi Germany.

p The defeat of France and the British retreat at Dunkirk brought the military situation in Western Europe to a critical low. Hitler was preparing an attack on the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign and domestic policy at that time was geared to one main goal—to delay this attack and accelerate the country’s defense preparations. Fearing that time was against him, Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941.

p The aggression against the Soviet Union thoroughly exposed the rapacious nature of fascist Germany and its political war aims.

63

p “We grappled with fascism,” said Marshal Georgi Zhukov, “when almost all of Europe was overwhelmed by it. We were the last hope for many people and nations. The world held its breath in 1941: would we survive or would the fascists take the upper hand here too? For us, this battle was the great test. It was a test of the viability of our social system, our communist morality, the strength of our economy, the unity of nations, in a word, everything that had been built after the year 1917.”  [63•1 

p The giant battle in the East assumed the character of a sharp struggle between two social systems—capitalism and socialism. Two different ideologies confronted each other in this battle: the reactionary ideology of fascism, and the progressive communist ideology. The people of the USSR were defending Soviet power and fighting for the social progress, freedom and independence of all peoples. Their courageous struggle roused the hopes of the people in the Nazi-occupied countries for victory over the enemy and inspired an upsurge in the Resistance movement that had begun in Europe. The USSR stepped into the front ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition and became its leading force. The center of World War II had shifted to the Soviet-German Front, to which Hitler moved 80 per cent of his land forces, 90 per cent of his air force, and thousands of tanks and guns.

p However, it would be wrong to assume that after Germany attacked the Soviet Union the neutralist sentiments of the American people underwent a sudden change in favor of US entry into the war against the Axis powers. Many Americans still continued to think above all of peace for America. Many statements, resolutions, letters, telegrams and speeches bore witness to this.

p A clash of opinions about the Soviet Union’s entry into the war took place within the power structure. Different groups and trends within the bourgeois parties, in Congress and in business and government circles assessed this event and its possible consequences in different ways. Roosevelt and his associates took a wait-and-see attitude as they studied the balance of forces and the Soviet ability to resist the enemy. As part of this, the President sent his closest advisor, Harry 64 Hopkins, on a mission to Moscow. At the same time, Roosevelt and his supporters saw in the USSR a potential war ally.

p In reply to a telegram of congratulations from M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the Fourth of July (Independence Day), Roosevelt said that the American people were abhorred by the armed aggression, that they had strong bonds of friendship with the Russian people, and that therefore they were following with compassion and admiration the courageous struggle the Russian people were waging in self-defense.

p But many other leaders, not concealing their hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, predicted its early destruction. Some, like Senator and future US President Truman, cynically expressed the hope nurtured by American reaction that Germany and the USSR would bleed each other white.  [64•1 

p Truman spoke openly to the effect that it was in the interests of the United States for German and Soviet soldiers to kill as many of each other as possible. The bourgeois press gave wide coverage to such opinions. It is no wonder that many American workers, taking the false assertions of bourgeois propaganda on faith, felt that the Soviet Union would be unable to survive the struggle with Nazi Germany.

p The top leaders of the AFL headed by Green took like positions. They distorted the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and implanted the notion in the minds of workers that the USSR was not disposed toward an alliance with Great Britain for a joint struggle against fascism. Progressive, democratically-minded Americans, however, ultimately succeeded in launching a movement for solidarity with the Soviet people.

p It was precisely this circumstance that forced Green, despite his hostile anti-Soviet position, to assert in October 1941 in a report to the 61st AFL convention that America should aid the Soviet Union. He hastened to make it clear that this should be done “as a matter of expediency without any pretense that the two countries could become friends".  [64•2 

p The developing movement to aid England, the USSR and China was supported by CIO unions, some AFL locals, the 65 Communist Party, the Labor Party of New York, and left and liberal figures in the arts and sciences.

p Organized workers became the most dynamic and influential part of this movement. The Communist Party of the USA, whose prestige in the labor movement was rising noticeably, played an outstanding role. It pointed out that “this is a people’s war”, and that the workers were “the indestructible backbone" of the national war effort. “It is upon the broad shoulders of the working class that the main burden of the fight against Hitler falls.”   [65•1  It said that “Hitler, in declaring war against the Soviet Union, has signed his own death warrant".  [65•2  The day that Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the National Committee of the US Communist Party called on the American people to launch a mass movement of solidarity with all the forces fighting fascism, and to render immediate and effective aid to the Soviet Union. Its statement declared: “Down with the criminal war of German fascism against the Soviet Union."  [65•3 

p On June 28, 1941, at an extraordinary plenary session of the National Committee, Foster in his report pointed out that Hitler’s attack upon the Soviet Union had changed the character of the world war, and thereby had made changes in the Party’s attitude toward that war necessary. The Party renounced the slogan, “Keep America Out of War”, and called on all working people to support the federal government’s measures to strengthen the nation’s defenses. It came out in favor of armed neutrality, rendering lend-lease aid to countries fighting against the Axis powers, and further increasing defense production.

p A movement of solidarity with the countries fighting against fascism was mounting in the labor unions. Throughout the entire second half of 1941 the unions campaigned for increasing the rate of defense production and rendering military and other aid to Britain, the USSR and China.

p Many labor organizations adopted resolutions and issued press releases expressing support of the peoples fighting 66 against fascism. A resolution of the CIO Unions Council of Chicago contained an appeal for immediate, full and unconditional assistance to all countries fighting against fascism. At a convention of the United Office and Professional Workers, such leaders as R.J.Thomas of the auto workers and Michael Quill of the Transport Workers Union called on working people to render aid to Russia and England, since for America there was nothing more important than the defeat of Hitler. The convention gave its full support to Roosevelt’s foreign policy.

p The third national convention of the National Maritime Union of America (CIO) held in Cleveland in July 1941 declared that the union recognized “the present struggle of Great Britain and the Soviet Union against the forces of fascism to be sincere and requiring the full support of all liberty loving people throughout the world. The present war (if genuinely prosecuted), can be the burying ground of fascism forever."  [66•1  The International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America at its September 1941 convention in St. Louis resolved that all possible aid should be lent and furnished to Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union, and that nothing should be done which would in any way tend to hamper or delay production.

p When in the autumn of 1941 heavy fighting broke out along the approaches to Moscow, a conference of delegates representing 90,000 Ford workers discussed a plan for maximally increasing the production of munitions and other war materials for Britain and the Soviet Union. At mass meetings in New York, members of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union hailed the Soviet Army and its resistance to the Nazi invasion. On October 27, a mass meeting was held in New York. Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph E. Davies told the 60,000 people assembled there that Russia needed tanks, airplanes, strategic raw materials, and help, friendship and understanding. He urged generous aid without delay. Expressing the mood prevailing at the meeting, Davies said that it was the duty and good fortune of the United States 67 to pay honor to the valiant, bold and courageous defense put up by the Soviet Government and the Russian people.

p Progressive American workers held precisely these feelings. Even before the United States entered the war some labor unions began fund-raising for the USSR, and contributions began coming in as early as November. Among the first to set the example were the fur and leather workers, who sent two checks for $50,000 each.  [67•1  At the same time, there were increasing demands to repeal the remaining sections of the Neutrality Act. Almost all labor unions and workers’ meetings urged the government to take decisive measures to render expeditious aid to Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

p Roosevelt on November 7 assured the Soviet people that it was the desire of the government and people of the United States to do everything possible to assist the Soviet Union in that critical hour. The American government extended lend-lease to the Soviet Union. In a letter to lend-lease administrator Stettinius, the President suggested that he take immediate steps to provide war materials to the Soviet Union.

p However, due to the resistance of reactionary circles, US and British aid to the Soviet Union lacked in speed and effectiveness. Suffice it to say that by the end of 1941 US military deliveries to the USSR amounted to only half a million dollars, and only seven convoys of freighters with war cargoes came from Britain to Archangelsk. To be sure, lend-lease aid increased in the following years, but it amounted to a very small share of the overall volume of war production put out in the USSR. Marshal Zhukov subsequently noted: “This aid should not be discounted. It unquestionably played its role. From England and America we received gunpowder, highoctane gasoline, several brands of steel, locomotives, airplanes, vehicles and food. But this was only a very small part of all that the war required."  [67•2 

p On November 17, 1941, Congress and the President approved a new amendment to the Neutrality Act of 1939. American merchant ships were now permitted to arm 68 themselves, sail into zones of military operations, and call on ports of belligerents. The Neutrality Act thereby in fact ceased to operate. The administration and Congress increased defense appropriations, and developed the construction of more defense plants. Industry was gathering momentum, and unemployment dropping.

p Already in early 1941 the labor unions had begun a movement for raising productivity and achieving the maximal use of production capacities in industry. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, this drive assumed broad scope. A big role was played by the CIO, since two-thirds of its membership worked in the defense industry. A resolution adopted by the fourth convention of the CIO in November 1941 said that the essence of the national defense program consisted in producing the necessary volume of war materials—airplanes, tanks, ships, cannon—in order to give speedy aid to the countries fighting the fascist aggressors. To achieve this, it said, industry had to work at full capacity.

p The call was timely. The steel industry alone was producing six million tons of steel less than it could have at full capacity.  [68•1  The Steelworkers’ Organizing Committee offered a plan to avert a 20 per cent cut in production, and sponsored a drive to collect scrap iron and steel throughout the country.  [68•2  In the aircraft industry, the unions issued a call to bring production up to 500 airplanes a day. There were many such examples, all testifying to the concern of the unions about the production of munitions needed for lend-lease to Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

p The fourth convention of the CIO in November 1941 considered the question of setting up industrial councils. A resolution said that the CIO proposed adoption of Murray’s industry-council plan as a measure necessary at the present stage of the country’s political development. Subsequent CIO conventions during the war also upheld the proposal for harmonious cooperation between capitalists and workers in the organization and management of production. The industrial monopolies always rejected this plan.

69

p In contrast to the CIO’s industry-council plan, the AFL concentrated upon gaining representation for labor in already existing government defense agencies.  [69•1 

p As 1941 drew to a close it took with it the last hopes for peace for Americans. Danger loomed from the West, from across the Pacific Ocean. In November, the long Japanese-American negotiations came to an impasse. Militarist Japan was preparing to attack American possessions in the Pacific. The attack on Pearl Harbor was destined to erase the last line between neutrality and war. The American people faced the fact of entering World War II.

p December 1941 was an important milestone in World War II. On the eve of December 7, 1941, the Red Army mounted a counteroffensive in the snow-covered fields near Moscow, breached the enemy front, and beat Hitler’s forces back far from Moscow. It was an historic victory for the Soviet Union.

p On the same day that the Soviet Army dealt this heavy blow to the fascists, elsewhere a drama was enacted that put the United States into the ranks of the belligerents. It took place at Pearl Harbor. Japanese aircraft carriers under naval escort had approached the Hawaiian Islands unnoticed, and early on the morning of December 7, executed a devastating surprise attack on the US naval base there. The United States suffered heavy losses in lives, ships and planes. Simultaneously, the first raids were made against cities and bases on the Philippines, Guam, Wake and Midway islands.

p On December 8, Congress declared war against Japan. On December 9 in an Address to the Nation, the President called on all Americans to come to the defense of their country. “We have learned,” he said, “that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack—that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map."  [69•2  On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States.

p The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor dealt the final blow to the isolationists; it meant the complete collapse of neutralist illusions and was the final factor forcing the United States to 70 enter the war. Americans now had not only to produce arms, but to take them up themselves. General mobilization was declared.

p Throughout the country long lines of citizens wishing to volunteer for the army formed at recruiting stations. In New York alone, over 115,000 men signed up on the first day of mobilization.

p At the same time, the call-up under the Universal Military Conscription Law began. Letters came in from all parts of the country to the President, congressmen and the leaders of the AFL and CIO, in which workers voiced their support of the government, pledging to help it and take part in the struggle against fascism.

p Shortly before Pearl Harbor, on November 24, 1941, the White House received a memorandum from the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and vicepresident of the CIO, Sidney Hillman. As the head of the labor division, Office of Production Management, he proposed that an agreement be made with industry regarding uninterrupted production during wartime. He said in the memorandum: “We are all agreed that ’strikes as usual’ can no more be tolerated than ’business as usual’ or ’profits as usual’.... Both the A.F. of L. and the CIO, at their recent conventions have pledged unstinted support to the defense program."  [70•1  The memorandum further stressed that the unions were prepared to turn that commitment into a no-strike pledge if the United States entered the war, but on the condition that industry refrain from lockouts, breaks in production, and any actions that would adversely affect working conditions and wages. To reach such an agreement, it was proposed that a national conference of representatives of labor, industry and the government be called.

p These proposals came not only from the unions; both industry and the government were no less interested in holding such a conference. On December 11, 1941, Roosevelt wrote to AFL and CIO leaders Green and Murray, and also to 71 William Batt, Chairman of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. In his letter to Batt, he said that he was calling a conference on wartime labor relations to be held between representatives of labor and industry in consultation with public representatives. The conference would commence on December 17 in Washington. The President felt it was essential to guarantee that mutual commitments would be met and that a mediation body be set up to avert and settle industrial labor disputes.

p The unions responded immediately. On December 15, the AFL executive council issued a declaration urging all AFL members to make new efforts to build up the nation’s military strength. It pledged that the workers in the defense industries would not resort to the strike until final victory over the enemy was won, and expressed the conviction that mutual grievances in all branches of the war industry would be removed with the help of mediation agencies. It also gave assurance that the AFL would cooperate with the government mediation service. Finally, the declaration pointed to the need to preserve the 40-hour workweek with time-and-a-half pay for overtime, as established by the 1938 wages and hours law.

p A conference of AFL unions, held in Washington on December 16, 1941, discussed the tasks of the Federation in connection with the war effort. It issued a statement that reiterated many of the points mentioned in the executive council’s declaration. Similar measures were taken by the CIO executive board. CIO union newspapers wrote about the anti-Japanese sentiments of the workers who, in face of the aggression, were ready to increase productivity or sign up for military service.

p However, it would be an oversimplification to say that all American workers were enthusiastic about making the sacrifices involved on the no-strike decision. There were those who did not agree with this decision and demanded that work be stopped if employers rejected union demands. Authors Howe and Widick wrote about this in a book on the UAW. Even in this militant union, where democratic traditions were always strong, the politically conscious workers and their leaders had to work hard to gain acceptance of the decision not to strike during wartime. Resolutions to that effect twice failed 72 to pass at UAW conventions.  [72•1  Similar situations occurred in AFL unions and the Railroad Brotherhoods.

p On December 17, representatives of labor, industry and the government gathered in Washington. From the AFL came William Green, Matthew Woll, Daniel Tobin, George Meany, John Frey and J. Coyne; from the CIO, Philip Murray, Joseph Curran, Emil Rieve, R.J.Thomas, Julius Emspak and John L. Lewis. Industry was represented by big corporations. The conference reached agreement on banning strikes and lockouts in industry for the duration of the war, and on the establishment of a National War Labor Board, whose functions would include settling all disputes and grievances. President Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins expressed satisfaction with the decisions of the conference. Concerned with the problem of national unity in this critical period, they undertook measures to create the Board immediately.

p Less than a month later, on January 12, 1942, the National War Labor Board was established. In contrast to the National Defense Mediation Board which it replaced, the new board was given broad powers for settling disputes in the war industry during the national emergency. William H.Davis became chairman, and the Board consisted of 12 members, four representing industry, and four representing the public. The AFL representatives were George Meany and Matthew Woll; the CIO representatives were Thomas Kennedy and R. J. Thomas. How often the monopolies and employers violated contract provisions can be judged by the fact that in the first half of 1942 alone, 272 cases involving the interests of almost two million wage earners were brought before the Board.  [72•2  On January 22, the President sent Green and Murray a letter which said: “In order that Labor’s part in the national effort may be most effective, I am asking the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations to form a Combined Labor War Board, to consult with me periodically on all matters concerning Labor’s participation in the war. It is my thought that this Board would meet with me 73 and therefore it should be sufficiently small to make this a real ‘round table’ talk."  [73•1  The AFL and CIO leadership supported Roosevelt, and three days later the Combined Labor War Board was formed. It was composed of Green, Meany and Tobin from the AFL, and Murray, Thomas and Emspak from the CIO. A meeting of the Board, under the chairmanship of Roosevelt, took place in the White House in February 1942.

p Such were the first practical steps taken by the labor unions after US entry into the war. The American working class, and especially organized labor, now had to assume a considerable part of the responsibility for creating the conditions necessary for the country to make a worthy contribution to the common cause of defeating fascism.

Entry into the war was a powerful stimulus for stepping up production and putting the economy on a war footing. The industrial boom which had begun in the years of neutrality now entered a more active stage. It reached its peak in 1943; and for some branches in 1944. The industrial production index, according to data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System gives an idea of the dynamics of production during World War II (1957-1959=100)  [73•2 :

1940 1942 1944 38.3 43.9 56.4 69.3 82.9 81.7 70.5

p The growth of war production was particularly intensive, with the average monthly index rising from 8 in 1940 to 102 in 1944, or an increase of 12.7 times.  [73•3  In late 1942, production for war was about 55 per cent of total output, as against 18 per cent in 1941.  [73•4  The war boom was distinguished also by a marked increase in government investment in the economy and in the government’s share in industry. Some representatives of big finance capital expressed serious concern about 74 this, seeing the growth of government ownership, especially in the war industries, as a threat to private enterprise.

p The government’s role in the capitalist economy during the war had indeed grown, as manifested in increased subsidies for industry. During the war, about $26 billion worth of new facilities were built, of which about $17 billion worth were financed directly with federal funds.  [74•1  A total of about 2,800 enterprises were built with federal funds, including 534 aircraft, 150 steel, 116 machine tool building, 84 aluminum, 65 shipbuilding and 60 synthetic rubber plants, plus a number of oil refineries, electrical plants and other enterprises.  [74•2  Congress approved increasingly large budget appropriations for war expenditures. Of the $329 billion in budget allocations between 1940 and 1945 inclusive, war expenditures amounted to $292 billion.  [74•3  While in the prewar year $1.2 billion were spent for these purposes, in 1945 the figure reached $90.5 billion.  [74•4  War expenditures in 1942 constituted 32 per cent of total production, as compared with 10 per cent in 1941 and 2 per cent in 1939.  [74•5 

p The government distributed war orders among the big corporations. Between June 1940 and September 1944, it awarded $175 billion in contracts to some 18,539 corporations.  [74•6  Of these, more than 30 of the most powerful monopolies were under the control of the Morgan, Mellon, Rockefeller and Du Pont Wall Street banks. On the whole, eight major banking groups controlled about one hundred of the strongest and most influential non-finance corporations. Over two-thirds, or $118 billion, of the above-mentioned $175 billion in government contract’s went to this group of companies. About 30 per cent of all the war contracts were awarded to big corporations like General Motors, Ford Motor Company and General Electric. A total of $70 billion in contracts went to 16 corporations, most of which operated in 75 the aircraft, ship-building, explosives, and light metals industries. Not surprizingly, production in these industries increased 20 to 35 times during the war.  [75•1 

p The administration continued its line of reorganizing government agencies to better meet wartime needs. Thus, in January 1942, the Office of Production Management was replaced with the War Production Board (WPB). Roosevelt appointed Donald Nelson, vice-president of Sears, Roebuck and Co., to head it. The WPB Production Division was headed by William H.Harrison, vice-president of American Telephone and Telegraph; Industrial Operations by James S. Knowlson, president and chairman of the board of StewartWarner Corp., and the Materials Division by William L. Batt, president of SKF Industries. Other key posts in WPB system went to William Knudsen, Edward Stettinius and Philip Reed, all top executives of big industrial corporations.  [75•2  On October 2, 1942, President Roosevelt signed an anti-inflation bill, and established the Office of Economic Stabilization, headed by Justice James F. Byrnes, to administer the new law.  [75•3  Also created were a Price Control Board, a War Shipping Administration, and other agencies.

p Seeking to stimulate industrial development, the President gave much attention to activating the role of the labor unions. He sent messages to conventions of the AFL, CIO, Railroad Brotherhoods and international unions, and wrote personal letters to Green, Murray, Lewis, Whitney and other leaders. In a letter to William Green and the AFL executive council dated December 13, 1941, he expressed his confidence in the wholehearted cooperation of organized labor in those serious days.  [75•4 

p Roosevelt established close contact with many labor leaders, consulted with them and appointed them to important posts in government agencies. Not only Hillman, Murray, Green, 76 Harrison and Carey, but many other leaders were actively involved in the work of committees and boards.

p An executive order of April 18, 1942 established the WarManpower Commission, which assumed certain functions of a number of government agencies that dealt with manpower problems. It was charged not only with keeping track of labor resources, but also with the retraining and distribution of skilled personnel for the war industry. The creation of this federal agency was dictated by the necessity of bringing the element of organization into the theretofore spontaneous process of manpower mobility, and the need to help supply the leading war industries with skilled workers. All these measures attested to the enhanced role and influence of the federal government in the capitalist economy and class relations.

p The war opened up prospects of high profits for American industrialists. The scramble for profits took place against a background of fierce competitive struggle. As mentioned earlier, during the years of neutrality the number of companies in the United States fell from 473,000 to 468,000. During the war, more and more companies, unable to withstand the blows of big capital, either failed or were absorbed by the monopolies, so that by 1944 the total number of operating American companies went down to 412,500.  [76•1  Also, the number of banks was reduced from 14,975 to 14,660 from 1941 through 1945,but total bank assets grew from $87.3 billion to $162.2 billion.  [76•2 

p This process led to a further increase in the concentration of industrial production and, similarly, of huge masses of workers in giant enterprises. According to a report of the Senate Small Business Committee, before the war there were 49 enterprises in the USA that employed over 10,000 workers each. By the end of the war, there were 344.

p During the war the rate and scope of industrial raw material and fuel production grew. There was tremendous growth in the extraction of oil, gas, ores, bauxites, non-ferrous metals, and the production of electricity, chemicals and explosives. 77 Ship building and machine building developed at a high rate. Workers in the war industry reached record indicators, creating a vast quantity of airplanes, tanks, artillery, ammunition and other war materials.

It was a period of industrial upsurge, and, as is usually the case in upswing phases, supply and demand on the labor market shifted in favor of the working class. A huge army of workers was needed to fulfil the war production program. Thus, unemployment was reduced to a minimum. The following figures show the employment picture between 1940 and 1945 (in thousands).  [77•1 

Table 1 Total Civilian work force Armed forces Civilian work force Em pi. Unempl. 1940 54,760 530 54,230 45,340 8,890 1941 55,730 1,640 54,090 49,090 5,000 1942 58,500 4,000 54,500 52,110 2,390 1943 62,830 8,950 53,880 52,410 1,470 1944 63,990 11,370 52,620 51,780 840 1945 64,360 11,610 52,750 51,600 1,150

p As can be seen, employment in the economy reached its peak in 1943. Serious difficulties arose in providing industry with labor power, especially in meeting the constantly growing demand for skilled workers. This demand was greatest in the war industry. According to War Production Board data, nearly 41 million persons were in nonagricultural employment at the beginning of 1942. Of these, about 20 million were employed in manufacturing, mining, construction, public utilities and transportation.  [77•2  Five million were employed in the war industries at that time. By the end of the year the number increased to 15 million, and by mid-1943, to nearly 18 million.  [77•3 

78

The overall employment picture for nonagricultural employees changed as follows (in thousands)  [78•1 :

Table 2 Total 36,220 39,779 42 ,106 41 ,534 Manufacturing 12,974 15,051 17 ,381 17 ,111 Mining 947 983 917 883 Contract construction 1,790 2,170 1 ,567 1 ,094 Transportation and public utilities 3,248 3,433 3 ,619 3 ,798 Wholesale and retail trade 7,416 7,333 7 ,189 7 ,260 Finance, insurance and real estate 1,480 1,469 1 ,435 1 ,409 Service and miscellaneous 3,705 3,857 3 ,919 3 ,934 Government 4,660 5,483 6 ,080 6 ,043

p It should be borne in mind that Table 2 gives the total employment figures for the entire able-bodied population except for those working in agriculture. Therefore these figures do not accurately reflect the actual number of working people, since they also include the nonproductive category of the population, who appropriate the greater part of the national income.

p In most branches of the economy, 1943 and 1944 were peak employment years. Employment began to drop in late 1943 in some industries and early 1944 in others. Statistics for the war years show almost full employment of the civilian population. A factor of no little importance was that 11.3 million Americans were in the armed forces in 1944. A large percentage of these were workers who were drafted or volunteered. A great many of them would not have been able to find work in a peacetime economy. Thus, the war created the illusion of full employment. Consequently, as some American economists and historians assert, however high the number of employed may have been during the war, it cannot be considered full employment.  [78•2 

79

The entry of the United States into the war was instrumental in changing not only labor’s economic position but also the prevailing political sentiments. This manifested itself mainly in the attitude to the country’s active participation in the war and its discharging its duty as an ally. The events on the fronts of the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War had a particularly great impact on the thinking and feelings of progressive American workers.