38

p With the outbreak of war in Europe came a gradual revival of industrial production in the United States. The war and the repeal of the arms embargo gave American capital a chance to extricate itself from the long period of economic crises and depression of the 1930s.

p In November 1939, the Federal Reserve Board reported that US industrial activity continued to mount, and that industrial output had already surpassed the highest point during the 1929 boom.  [38•1  Industrial production growth continued in 1940 and 1941. The production index rose from 38.3 in 1939 to 56.4 in 1941.  [38•2  The defense industry increased particularly. The defeat of France and the precarious situation of Britain were more than sufficient stimulus to increase defense appropriations and expand arms production.

p The industrialists were constantly expanding production to meet the needs of the powers fighting against Nazi Germany. Civilian industries increasingly gave way to defense production, the latter accounting for 18 per cent of total output in 1941.  [38•3  The production upswing was due not only to greater private investment but also to the increase of government defense spending: from $1.2 billion of an $8.8 billion budget in 39 1939, to $6.7 billion of a $13.2 billion budget in 1941. In 1940 and 1941 there was a sharp increase in the rate of production in the coal, oil, gas, electrical, steel, shipbuilding, aircraft, automobile, aluminium and many other industries.

It would seem that with industry on the upgrade and unemployment dropping, conditions were being created for an abatement of the class struggle. But such was not the case. The working class continued its struggle against the encroachments of capital upon its living standard. Many hundreds of thousands were involved in work stoppages. The strike movement reached a high level in the years of neutrality, especially in 1941, as can be seen from the following figures  [39•1 :

1940 1941 Work stoppages Workers involved (in thousands) Man-days idle (in millions) 2,508 4,288 577 2,360 6.7 23.0

p It will be recalled that under the Black-Connery Wages and Hours Act of 1938 the minimum wage in 1940 and 1941 was set at 30 cents an hour. But this applied to only 13 million workers engaged in interstate commerce.  [39•2  On February 3,

p 1941, the US Supreme Court held the law constitutional. Under the provisions of the law, a 40-hour workweek was to go into effect starting October 23, 1940, as a result of which the minimum weekly wage would be only $12, or, calculated on the basis of 50 weeks, $600 a year.

p Of course, not all workers coming under the 1938 law were making 30 cents an hour. The law merely set the minimum beyond which wages could not drop. This minimum was used by the labor unions as a point of departure in the struggle for higher wages. Therefore, wage rates were in fact much higher than the official minimum in different industries and in different companies, and the differences depended on how well organized the workers were.

40

p The differences were exceedingly great both within each industry and among the various job categories. For example, in the manufacturing industries the average hourly wage rate in 1939 was 63.3 cents, while in 1941 it rose to 72.9 cents, which corresponded to a weekly wage of $23.86 and $29.58 respectively.  [40•1  With full employment during 50 weeks this amounted to $1,193 and $1,479 a year. In this group of industries there was a great disparity between the wages of workers producing durable and those producing non-durable goods.

p In contrast to wages in manufacturing, the average weekly wage in construction was $30.39 in 1939 and $35.14 in 1941,  [40•2  which amounted to $1,519 and $1,757 a year. However, in this industry the lowest hourly rates ranged between 50 and 62 cents, which even with a 40-hour week amounted to only $20 a week, or $1,000 a year. But the top rates here reached $1.50 an hour, or $60 a week and $3,000 a year.  [40•3  In the coal industry the weekly wages in 1939 averaged $23.88 and on first-class railroads, where the number of work hours was higher than in the mines, they amounted to $30.99  [40•4 . Wages in wholesale and retail trade and some public utilities had roughly the same range. However, there were other areas of work where average wages fell with amazing rapidity. Suffice it to say that in the services field (laundry work, for example), wages dropped in 1939 and 1941 to $17.64 and $18.69 a week, or to $872 and $934 per year.  [40•5 

p Differences in wages depended also on skill, sex, race and also on particular regions where the cost of living fluctuated sharply. The International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America reported in September 1941 that wages for these groups of workers were extremely low. Only as the result of stubborn struggle did it win a wage 41 increase to 40, and later to 50 cents an hour. At best, this amounted to from $16 to $20 a week, or from $800 to $1,000 a year.

p Differences were especially striking when average earnings were compared with the higher hourly rates and weekly and annual earnings of skilled workers in heavy industry, especially the organized workers.

p The Labor Research Association reported that in 1940 the average weekly wage was $26 ($1,300 a year), with wages ranging between $17 a week, or $680 a year in the textile industry, and $34 a week, or $1,700 a year in the transportation industry (trucking).  [41•1  The above average weekly and annual earnings in industry become meaningful only when considered in relation to the cost of living, that is, to the total annual expenses necessary for an average American family of four to get by. In 1939, this sum approximated $2,000.  [41•2  It was apparent, therefore, that incomes lagged well behind the cost of living. During the years of US neutrality the cost of living continued to rise.

p A book on the history of the United Auto Workers describes the hard life in Detroit, the center of the automobile industry. The Detroiters, it said, did heavy work, yet their wages were barely enough to maintain a modest standard of living for a family of four. The housing conditions were especially poor. In 1940, 34 per cent of the dwellings occupied by Negroes were substandard, and over 90,000 families in Detroit lived in such houses.  [41•3  But that city was not an exception.

p Owing to such factors as growing employment, a declining unemployment rate, higher wages, more family members working, and the payment of a time-and-a-half rate for overtime, the gap between family income and the subsistence minimum during the years of neutrality began to narrow noticeably.

p At first glance it may seem strange that the upturn in 42 industry and growth of employment intensified the struggle for higher wages. However, this is explained by the fact that the country had entered a period of war-production boom, under the impact of which the correlation between labor power supply and demand was shifting in favor of the workers. In such periods, the workers, especially in the low-paid bracket, were even more apt to take the offensive against the monopolies, demanding higher wages and better working conditions.

p As concerns the position taken on the strike struggle by the top officials of the AFL central bodies, many of them not only did nothing to help the workers win their demands from the monopolies, but often suppressed the initiative of individual unions and locals. Moreover, they came out against the initiative of the Communists and the CIO, who called on the workers to launch a broad strike movement. At the same time, they sought to inhibit the strikers’ hope for success.

p The shipbuilding industry acquired tremendous importance due to the war in Europe and big government contracts for building naval and merchant vessels during the years of neutrality. The companies and the government were extremely interested in seeing that the shipyards on both coasts worked without interruptions. The monopolies, it should be emphasized, sought to achieve uninterrupted production without observing the interests of the workers and in violation of collective agreements. As a result, labor disputes arose from place to place, many of which ended in strikes.

p One of these sharp confrontations took place in the shipyards of the Federal Ship Building and Drydock Company in Kearny, New Jersey. The strikers were led by the shipbuilding union (CIO). After the monopoly refused to conclude a new contract, the union called a strike on August 7, 1941, and 16,000 workers stopped work. On August 8, company president met with the head of the labor division of the Office of Production Management, Sidney Hillman, and representatives of the Department of the Navy to discuss the union demands. Among these was the demand that management accept the closed shop. The company’s refusal to hire only union members was the main cause of the strike. As early as May 23, 1941, Local 16 of the union had proposed a new 43 contract, which was to replace the one due to expire on June 24.

p The management agreed to a 12 per cent wage increase. The negotiations, with the participation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, ended with agreement on all points of the new contract except the demand for a closed shop, which the monopoly categorically rejected. It stuck to its position even after the MCS recommended that the demand be recognized as just. The management responded by saying that this proposal contravened the principle of free hiring and the right to work, which should not depend on a worker’s belonging to one or another organization.

p The company’s intractability led to a strike. The call was supported by 12,000 shipbuilders in Camden, New Jersey. Now that the strike threatened to assume large proportions, the government intervened, and the Department of the Navy took control of the shipyards and maintained it for 19 weeks. The dispute was continued at meetings of the National Labor Relations Board. By that time, the United States had already entered the war against the Axis countries.

p It was only on May 8, 1942, that the union called off the strike, after the corporation recognized all the workers’ demands and signed a collective contract in which, along with a wage increase and improved working conditions, the main point was the company’s acceptance of the principle of hiring only union members.

p In May 1941, a strike by members of the International Association of Machinists broke out in San Francisco. It was directed against the Bethlehem Ship Building Corporation, which for more than a quarter-century had put up stubborn resistance to the efforts of the union to draw unorganized workers into its ranks. The immediate cause of the strike was Bethlehem’s refusal to sign a contract proposed by the Association. Four other ship-repairing companies followed suit, refusing to sign a collective contract.

p How did William Green in Washington react to this strike? Speaking on May 11 before a meeting of the American Legion in Patterson, New Jersey, he declared that members of the International Association of Machinists in San Francisco had called an illegal strike that was not sanctioned by the union’s 44 central leadership. He demanded that the union call it off immediately, and that the workers return to work and in future try to gain satisfaction of their demands by peaceful means. Harvey W. Brown, president of the IAM, was indignant over the AFL president’s statements. He emphasized that the strike that Green had condemned was legal and sanctioned by the executive committee of the Association.

p In other industries, workers also continued to wage a struggle for higher wages and the recognition of newly created unions.

p The power structure was disturbed most of all by the coal miners’ strikes which embraced the entire industry. Back in 1933, the United Mine Workers (UMW) succeeded in getting the mineowners to sign the so-called Appalachian Wage Agreement, which set wages at $5.00 a day in the North and $4.60 in the South. It remained in force for many years even though the cost of living kept rising and labor intensity and productivity had increased. The contracts of 1937 failed to introduce anything new into the substance of that agreement.

p The 1937 contracts were due to expire in 1941. The miners demanded that the new contract establish a basic daily wage of $7.00, a standard workday, and no North-South differential. This differential meant lower wages for all workers in the South, Black and white alike. It is not surprising therefore that all the miners in the southern states were fighting to equalize their wages with those of miners in the northern mines.

p The employers rejected the miners’ demands, agreeing to only $5.00 a day. This led to a general strike of 400,000 miners in the coal industry in early 1941. The mineowners of the North, where almost 70 per cent of the nation’s coal was mined, were compelled to negotiate with the miners, but the southern mineowners continued to resist.

p Negotiations began on March 11 and continued, with a break, until July 5. The long strike put the miners into an extremely difficult position. Nonetheless they held on staunchly, refusing to go down into the mines until their demands were met. The stubbornness of the disputing parties led to a breakdown in negotiations. At that point, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened, but it could not move the mineowners to satisfy the miners’ demands either.

45

p The mineowners and coal companies, displeased with the pressure put on them by the MCS, filed a complaint with the NLRB. The conflict deepened and the mines remained idle. Finally, Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Perkins used their authority to compel the mineowners to resume negotiations.

p On April 29, the northern coal companies signed a temporary agreement. As for the southern mineowners, they remained unwilling to agree to the wage rates introduced in the North. The struggle continued. On June 19, a contract was signed with the mineowners of Northern Appalachia, and on July 5, with the companies in the South, under which the miners won a daily wage of $7.00, paid vacations, and a release from the obligation to use company stores. It was an important victory for the miners.

p “Either Henry Ford recognizes the union, or he’ll have no automobiles.” It was under this slogan that the workers in the Ford Motor Company plants embarked upon a decisive struggle in 1941. Their action opened a new phase in the fight to create one of the most powerful unions in the country. A big role in organizing this union was played by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and Local 600 at the Ford plants in Dearborn, Michigan. The workers faced an economically powerful and politically influential company with extensive experience in suppressing strikes.

p In a book about Henry Ford, historian Allan Nevins tries to convince his readers that Ford sincerely concerned himself about the well-being of the workers and strove to establish a “fair minimum" wage of $5.00 a day. In a word, as Nevins maintains, the Ford Company possessed “the most advanced labor policy in the world".  [45•1 

p The Time magazine wrote that in 1941, when the CIO surrounded the River Rouge plant with pickets and barricades, Henry Ford suddenly promised the workers that he would not only negotiate with the union, but would give it everything it wanted, including his agreement not to hire non-union workers.  [45•2 

46

p In reality, everything came out quite differently from the way bourgeois historians and press pictured it. There was nothing sudden about the fact that Ford was soon compelled to capitulate in the face of the onslaught of the union and its striking organized workers. The capitulation was preceded by a fierce struggle, and Ford was by no means as kindly a person as Kevins and the Time magazine made him out to be. Ford Facts, the periodical of Local 600, proved this quite conclusively when it exposed the methods the company used to exploit the workers, and compared the profits it made with the wages it paid. Addressing the workers, the paper asked: “How much do you contribute to Henry Ford? Take your pencil and figure out your yearly gift to Ford.”   [46•1 

p While General Motors and Chrysler workers were getting more than $8.00 a day, the average daily wage at the Ford plants was $7.25. This meant that with a five-day week, the Ford workers were getting $3.75 a week less than General Motors and Chrysler workers. “Over a year,” the labor paper pointed out, “you Ford workers who work 45 weeks a year receive $168.00 less than the UAW CIO workers in GM and Chrysler. Multiply that $168.00 dollars by the 90,000 Ford workers and you have the amount of your total annual gift to Henry Ford—$15,120,000."  [46•2 

p Of course, there was more to the matter than merely Ford’s edge over General Motors and Chrysler. The union paper did not go into the more complex and covert mechanics of worker exploitation by which the company reaped vast profits from their labor.

p The higher hourly wage rates and annual earnings of the workers at GM and Chrysler plants were a concession exacted by the workers through fierce struggle. In early 1941, the Ford workers decided to follow the same path. The fight was led by the United Auto Workers (CIO).

p At that time the UAW had 660 contracts covering 450,000 workers. In December 1940, the union had 356,644 members or twice as many as in December 1939, when its membership 47 stood at 167,500.  [47•1  The UAW demanded acceptance by the Ford Company of the closed shop principle, higher wages, and lower assembly line speed. It came out against the tyranny exercized by plant guards, who numbered over 3,000 in those years, and also against the company’s espionage activities in the plants.

p The union also devoted much attention to the struggle to gain equal status for Negro workers at the Ford plants and to eliminate the flagrant jimcrowism in hiring and firing, working conditions and wages. According to Ford Facts, ten per cent of the workers at the Ford plants were Negroes. The paper noted that of the 9,825 Negroes working at the Ford plants, 6,457 were doing the heaviest jobs, especially in the foundry and rolling shops and at open furnaces. They received bottom wages. This is confirmed by the wage scale for Negro workers in the Ford-owned Briggs Manufacturing Company. There, the lowest rates ranged between 25 and 60 cents an hour for the various jobs that had become the “privilege” of Negroes. Therefore, their earnings did not exceed $10 a week, or $500 a year. And this at a time when the average wage rate of white workers at all the Ford plants was 90 cents an hour, or $36 a week and $1,800 a year.  [47•2 

p Over a period of 50 years, Negroes had tried to join the AFL, but largely without success because the constitutions of 12 AFL international unions openly banned their acceptance.  [47•3  In contrast to this policy, the ClO-affiliated UAW vigorously defended the interests of Negroes. The constitution adopted at its convention in 1940 stated its intention to unite into one organization, regardless of religion, race, creed, color, political affiliation, or nationality, all employees under the jurisdiction of that union. Negro workers believed in the sincerity of the union’s intentions, entered into its ranks, and were active participants in the union-led strike struggle of the Ford workers.

p In an effort to frighten the workers, Ford began firing union activists. The union came out in defense of those dismissed and 48 demanded their reinstatement. The company refused, and the workers had to fight. In February 1941, at meetings in River Rouge and Lincoln they decided to strike. R.J.Thomas, President of the UAW-CIO, wrote: “Under the circumstances, the Ford workers and our organization find no other alternative than to give the customary notice of intention to strike. We prefer the methods of conciliation and collective bargaining....”   [48•1 

p The protest movement mounted. The union press warned the company that the struggle against Ford would not stop until he recognized the workers’ rights and equalized their wages with those at GM, Chrysler and other auto companies.  [48•2 

p One important feature of the movement should be stressed: the determination of the workers to fight for the highest wage scale already paid in some industry or company to be made standard for all. Strikes were a means of levelling wages on the basis of some average hourly rate. As shown earlier, this is what happened in the coal industry, where the miners got rid of the North-South differential.

p The Ford strike was a similar example. The average wage at Ford was five cents less than for the entire industry and more than ten cents less than at Chrysler and GM. However, Ford was adamant in his decision not to recognize the union. He used every stratagem he could to keep workers from joining the union.  [48•3 

p One of these stratagems was to increase the wages of certain categories of workers before he was compelled to recognize the union. Professor John Dunlop of Harvard University wrote: “An organizing drive will be more apt to succeed if prospective members can be convinced that they will immediately benefit from affiliation. And there can be no more convincing demonstration of this benefit than a wage increase."  [48•4  Therefore, not only Ford but many other employers, in an effort to frustrate the success of one or another union organizing drive, 49 were not averse to raising wages themselves before the labor organization was recognized. Of course, the capitalists granted wage increases that were more advantageous to themselves than those for which the union was fighting.

p However, the striking workers and their union were not deceived by these compromises and half-measures. The experience of many years of struggle strengthened their solidarity. They staunchly picketed the plants, carrying posters declaring, “No contract, no work!" Ford resorted to hired guards and strikebreakers, who made attacks upon the strikers. When these measures did not produce the desired results, Ford began to look for support from the courts. However, there too he suffered defeat, for the courts were forced, in accordance with the Wagner Act, to rule that Ford was obliged to recognize the union, reinstate the 23 fired workers, pay them compensation, and conclude a collective contract with Local 600 of the UAW.

p Communists and other left elements took an active part in the preparations for and conduct of the strike. Ford Facts and thousands of leaflets were distributed at the gates of the plants, on the picket lines and in city streets in Michigan. They exposed the allegations spread by Ford’s admirers saying that Ford was a philanthropist, that he helped the needy, and was ready to produce munitions for the country without concern for profits (!), if other companies supported his patriotic effort.  [49•1 

p The first big strike in the history of the giant Henry Ford enterprise in River Rouge broke out on April 2. It was militant and offensive in character and lasted 10 days. It ended on April 12 in a victory for the union, which won reinstatement of the fired workers and the company’s agreement to negotiate a collective contract. The contract was signed on June 21, 1941.

p Under the contract, the workers won the same wage as was received by workers in other automobile companies. In addition, Ford accepted the principle that workers were obliged to join the union within a month after being hired, recognized their right to receive certain seniority benefits and agreed to pay a time-and-a-half rate for overtime work and premium pay for night work.

50

The CIO United Auto Workers union was opposed by an AFL union carrying the same name. An overwhelming majority of the workers chose the CIO. The democratic principles of the CIO were a strong factor in rallying unorganized workers, as could be seen from the results of referendums held between January 1939 and May 1941   [50•1 in the various companies:

CIO AFI. General Motors Chrysler Briggs Packard Motor Products Kelsey-Hayes Total Other companies 86,868 26,504 40,908 5,005 13,301 1,052 6,094 1,457 2,033 188 2,457 0 151,661 34,206 190,476 45,571

p In May 1941, a similar survey was made by the National Labor Relations Board at the Ford plants in River Rouge and Lincoln. In a mass referendum in River Rouge, 51,866 workers supported the CIO, and 20,364 the AFL; the vote in Lincoln was 2,008 to 587.  [50•2  The CIO won out in the struggle against Ford and emerged victorious over the AFL.

p Sixty thousand Ford workers gathered in Cadillac Square on May 20, 1941, to mark this major success in joining their forces for the struggle against Ford. CIO vice-president Murray, president of the UAW (CIO) R.J.Thomas, the Black singer Paul Robeson and others spoke at the meeting. Murray stressed that the CIO organized workers regardless of race, nationality or religion. He said that the CIO would never take the course of politically ostracizing minority groups and would devote its entire activity to the emancipation of all workers.  [50•3 

p The actions of the Ford workers were a vivid example of the sharp class struggle in industry during the years of neutrality. They were a continuation of the mass movement for industrial 51 unions and the democratic and independent development of the labor movement.

p The strikes that broke out at various aircraft and shipbuilding enterprises were local in character. They were led by locals of the International Association of Machinists (AFL) and the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (CIO). The struggle took place at plants of the Boeing Airplane Co. in Seattle, the North American Aviation Inc. in Los Angeles, and the shipyards of the Bethlehem Ship Building Corporation in San Francisco.

p Unpublished documents from the office of the AFL executive council, now kept in the Library of Congress, and a number of newspaper reports shed light on the methods used both by the leaders of the AFL and the government to suppress these strikes.

p After receiving a large government contract for heavy bombers in the summer of 1940, the Boeing Airplane Co. increased work loads without a corresponding hourly wage increase. I AM Local 751 called a strike at the end of July, demanding a halt to the practice of unilaterally revising work loads which resulted in greater labor intensification and a worsening of living conditions. They elected a committee to lead the strike. General leadership was carried out by the executive committee of the local.

p The strike broke out against the will of the AFL officialdom which immediately took steps to quash it, maintaining that it was triggered by an “anti-government” action on the part of progressive figures in the local.

p The course of the struggle revealed the direct links between the AFL leadership, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and such government agencies as the Immigration and Naturalization Commission and the Defense Department.

p The entire work of suppressing the strike on the part of the AFL was done by one John Ph. Frey, head of the Federation’s Department of Metal Workers. Upon instructions of AFL president William Green he came on an unofficial visit to Seattle, where, according to his own testimony, he immediately got in contact with FBI Division Chief S.J.Drayton, inspector of Immigration and Naturalization J. H. Zumwalt, and Defense 52 Department representative Major John Corkille.  [52•1  After discussing with them a plan to liquidate the strike, Frey went into action against the executive committee of the union local.

p The John Ph. Frey Papers in the Library of Congress contain letters showing the methods he used in the struggle against the worker activists at that plant. Frey saw a “Red danger" everywhere, and he declared any strike to be the doing of Communists. Prey’s letters confirm the fact that he had, not only in this plant but in others, in various states as well, a broad network of informers who regularly supplied him with information about the activity of Communists and left-wing activists in the trade unions. “Through certain sources of information which I had before leaving for Seattle,” he wrote, “I was able to contact a member of the Communist Party in the higher brackets in the Seattle organization, who works in the Boeing plant."  [52•2  With the help of such informers in the union local and the Communist unit, Frey was able to learn whether one or another union activist was a Party member, and then hastened to relay this information to the top officials of that man’s union. For instance, he informed the national leadership of the IAM that three of the fifteen members of the executive committee of the Seattle local were Communists, and that there was a Party committee in the plant, consisting of nine members, whose names he would report as soon as he got the information from “his men" at the plant.

p Fighting against ClO-organized strikes, Frey and other AFL leaders on more than one occasion publicly accused strikers of anti-government actions. This device was calculated to intimidate the workers. During the years of neutrality, when the no-strike pledge had not yet been made and the monopolies were waging an offensive on the living standard of the workers and deriving ever increasing profits, neither Frey nor AFL president Green felt any qualms about blatantly accusing workers of engaging in “outlaw strikes”.

p In its efforts to avert or settle disputes, the government made wide use of mediation and intervention in labor 53 relations. The Conciliation Service had its representatives everywhere, and they went out of their way to hinder, and wherever possible stifle, the mass strike movement. To enhance the government’s role in labor relations Roosevelt on March 19, 1941 created the National Defense Mediation Board.  [53•1  Among the members of the board were four labor representatives (two each from the AFL and the CIO) and four employer representatives. Clarence A. Dykstra, a big industrialist, was appointed chairman. The executive order creating the board stated that its job included settling labor disputes by means of negotiations with the management of companies and enterprises in the defense industry, and handling disputes that could not be settled by the Conciliation Service.

p There were also cases in which the government and the President called in the army to intervene in labor disputes in the defense industry. In June 1941, troops were called in to suppress a strike at a North American Aviation Inc. plant in Inglewood, California. The UAW (CIO), which also united workers in the aircraft industry was demanding a new minimum hourly wage of 75 cents instead of the existing 50 cents. The company rejected the demand. Local 683 in Los Angeles called a strike. Bourgeois propaganda ascribed the strike to Communist intrigues, and the Dies Committee in the House of Representatives immediately charged that the union was pursuing a policy of sabotage.

p The dispute drew the attention of the government and the President himself. With the consent of CIO vice-president and head of the labor division of the Office of Production Management Sidney Hillman, Attorney General Robert H.Jackson and the President’s closest advisor Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt issued an order for the dispatch of troops and government seizure of the plant. A force of 3,500 soldiers dispersed the pickets and occupied the plant.

p The economic upswing and the intensified strike movement made for an improvement in the living standard of the workers as compared with the 1930s. However, the industrialists, expanding their production, kept raising the output rates 54 without increasing wages. It was against this policy that the workers were fighting.

p The years of neutrality saw a rise both in employment and in wages. In September 1941, Murray reported that in the preceding six months alone the total wage fund for CIO workers had increased by $800 million as a result of the broad movement for higher wages. This affected unorganized workers to a somewhat lesser extent, but among them, too, the higher wages were in evidence. The biggest results of this rise were felt in the defense industries, where major companies received contracts for munitions and other materials.

p Realizing that US entry in the war against Germany, Italy and Japan was inevitable, the government was disturbed by the increasing subversive activity by agents of these countries. There was growing public concern over pro-fascist and reactionary organizations like the German-American Bund, the Italian Fascist Clubs, the Japanese Military Servicemen’s League and the Fate of America Party. It has been estimated that over 700 such organizations were operating in the United States during the war. Most of them more or less openly expressed their sympathies with the Hitler regime and acted in its favor, being secretly linked with the German, Italian or Japanese intelligence services. During the years of neutrality espionage became an even more serious danger than was the case in prior years.

p The administration and Congress began drawing up legislation directed against foreign intelligence agents. One such measure was the Alien Registration Act passed by Congress on June 28, 1940, which came to be known as the Smith Act (the author of the bill was Howard W. Smith, a Democratic member of the House of Representatives from the state of Virginia).

p The crux of the law was spelled out in Section 1, which said: “It shall be unlawful for any person, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the military or naval forces of the United States:

p “—to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces of the United States.”  [54•1  55 The law banned the distribution for these purposes of any written or printed matter.

p Section 2 of the law stated: “It shall be unlawful for any person—to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government."  [55•1  It was made unlawful to publish or distribute materials calling for the overthrow of the government or “to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence".  [55•2  Section 5 prescribed the punitive measures to be taken against persons found guilty of these crimes. “Any person who violates any of the provisions of this title shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both."  [55•3 

p The law set down rules for issuing visas to aliens for entry to and residence in the United States. Among the main requirements were mandatory registration and fingerprinting of aliens. Moreover, the registration procedure included the presentation of certain information under oath. Violations of these provisions were punishable by a $1,000 fine or six months’ imprisonment, or both. On the basis of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, violators were subject to deportation to the country from which they came.  [55•4 

p Such was the substance of the Smith Act. During World War II it was directed against espionage and subversive organizations of the fascist countries; however, it was later used by reactionary circles in the struggle against progressive, democratic working-class organizations, particularly the Communist Party.

p In the meantime, reactionary legislators in the halls of Capitol intensified their anti-labor propaganda. Various anti-union bills were introduced in the committees and houses 56 of Congress. This was particularly characteristic of the 77th Congress in 1941.

p Time and again, charges were levelled against the Communist Party and other democratic elements from the floor of both houses of Congress. Representative Clare Hoffman of Michigan, an old Red-baiter, continued his attacks on the CIO and the Communist Party. He lashed out against one CIO union in these words: “This CIO union is doing the work of Hitler just as certainly, just as effectively, in fact, more effectively, than if its members were enrolled in his armed forces. They are betraying their country."  [56•1 

p Militant workers were accused of being subversive, unpatriotic, and un-American. Congressman Voorhis, the author of the law prohibiting the Communist Party from maintaining international ties, claimed that all strikes in the United States were inspired and run by the Communists. In the House of Representatives he came out for expelling the Communists from the ranks of labor, and added at this point: “We should assist the leaders of the A.F. of L., we should assist Phil Murray in the things he said recently, we should support every constructive leader and man in the ranks of labor in this important and essential job."  [56•2 

p At the height of the strike struggle in 1941, the House of Representatives considered many bills aimed at curtailing the rights of labor. Thus, a bill proposed by Congressman Carl Vinson (Rep., Georgia) envisaged banning strikes, with violations punishable by fine and imprisonment. Congressmen Dirksen, Ford and Hobbs proposed bills prohibiting strike votes among workers, introducing compulsory arbitration and black lists, and providing for the punishment of strike organizers right up to imprisonment.

p Many congressmen who themselves were far from having any sympathies with the progressive forces acknowledged the existence of an anti-labor atmosphere in Congress. Congressman Samuel Dickstein, speaking in the House of Representatives, said: “...there is much hysteria through the Nation today on the subject of strikes in industry. This hysteria is seen more 57 clearly in the press, in inspired editorials, and among certain groups of this Congress.” Characterizing the situation in Congress, he said, “we have an atmosphere of hysteria against organized labor, an atmosphere that I regret to note has swept Congress to the point of seriously considering passage of bills that would destroy labor’s right to organize, would destroy labor’s right to bargain collectively, would destroy labor’s right to strike."  [57•1 

p Dissatisfaction with the activity of Congress grew. A Washington Post article entered into the Congressional Record said that “the opposition to the Vinson bill has assumed formidable proportions. Organized labor has taken a united stand against the measure."  [57•2  In a speech in the House of Representatives in the summer of 1941, Congressman Vito Marcantonio, a prominent figure in the American Labor Party of the state of New York, exposed the proponents of repressive anti-strike bills. He said: “You will only be making the exploitation of labor worse than it is and you will be forcing American workers into a condition of civil war simply because you stand here and under the influence of hysteria you seek to protect the employers who are making millions, and millions, and millions of dollars of profits.... Curtail the right to strike and you force American labor into a condition of compulsory labor."  [57•3 

p In response to the increased activity of the democratic forces coming out with an exposure of the anti-labor policy, the reactionaries in Congress did not delay in undertaking still another action against the unions. Soon after Marcantonio’s speech, Senator Tom Connally (Dem., Texas) introduced an amendment to the Universal Military Conscription Law of

p 1940, which would empower the government to seize any plant turning out munitions or other war materials whenever a strike or “labor unrest" caused a production stoppage, whereupon the plant would be operated for a specific period of time under government control.  [57•4  The amendment was passed on June 12, 1941. Its approval by Congress meant recognition of the right 58 of the government to intervene in labor disputes in the defense industry. To a certain extent, this laid the groundwork for the Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act which was to be passed in 1943.

Still, as we shall see later, no matter how hard they tried to stop it, the strike struggle continued in the years that followed. However, 1941 was drawing to a close, and the country was on the brink of entering World War II. This had a decisive influence on the sentiments of the American people in general and the working class in particular.