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p The Soviet Union took the blows of Nazi Germany’s main forces. But to achieve an early defeat of fascism and to save human lives it was absolutely necessary that a second front be opened in Europe. On January 1, 1942, twenty-six states, which had earlier subscribed to the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, signed a joint Declaration in the White House. It said:

p “(1) Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

p “(2) Each government pledges itself to cooperate with the government signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies."  [80•1  The anti-fascist coalition was now fully formed and the question of a second front was put on the agenda as a practical task.

p However, the British and American commands continued to limit their military operations to naval and air forces. Though they promised to open a second front, the United States and Great Britain took no actual steps to carry out the promise. With references to unpreparedness, they put off a second front from 1942 to 1943, then from 1943 to the spring of 1944, and from the spring to June.  [80•2  In the meantime, they stressed 81 the importance and urgency of the naval operations in the Atlantic and Pacific. Corliss Lamont, then Chairman of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, wrote at that time that there were groups within the United States who were “trying to switch the main emphasis of the war to the Far East”, opposing all plans for a trans-Channel Second Front, and “seizing every pretext to stir up hatred, suspicion and fear of the Soviet Union”. He added: “By their disruptive tactics they may succeed and are already succeeding in prolonging the war.”   [81•1 

p Progressive public opinion throughout the world demanded that the governments of Britain and the United States discharge their duty as allies. But Western political and military circles paid little heed to the interests of the Soviet Union. Becoming increasingly insistent, however, was the voice of progressive sections of the American public which had launched a movement for the opening of a second front. One union paper, for example, wrote: “We can lose the war by concentrating on the Far East.” It stressed the secondary importance of that front, pointing out that the main enemy was Germany.  [81•2 

p The sweep of the movement for effective aid to the Soviet Union cannot be explained simply by the growing awareness and solidarity of American workers, however important this was. Another no less important factor was the realization of the danger of being left face to face with the powerful enemy if the USSR were defeated. These apprehensions were clearly formulated, for example, by Senator Claude Pepper (Dem., Florida), who said that if the Russian front were breached, if the Russian army wavered, if the supply of war materials to Russia were cut off, then the torrent of Hitlerism would rush to all corners of the world and turn into a mighty wave that nothing could withstand. He spoke about this in the Senate on June 17, 1942.

p Outstanding representatives of American culture and many government figures viewed the courageous struggle of the Soviet people with deep-felt admiration. Among them were the 82 world-famous authors Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair and Ernest Hemingway, Senator Claude Pepper, the eminent public figure Colonel Raymond Robins and many other progressive Americans. They all hailed the heroic fight of the Soviet people and called upon Americans to give them immediate and effective support in the struggle with fascism.

p In letters and telegrams to the USSR Society for Foreign Cultural Ties, many prominent American writers and artists expressed their support of the efforts of the Soviet people in the struggle with fascism.

p Progressive American workers were among the initiators and active participants in a broad campaign under the slogans: “America Must Help Open the Western Front!”, “Shoot at Hitler with Both Barrels!" and “Demand the Repeal of the Whole Neutrality Act!  [82•1 ” These demands were already being voiced in late 1941, on the eve of the United States’ entry into the war. Among the organizations sponsoring the campaign, a big role was played by the Anti-Hitler Labor Committee, one of whose leaders was the progressive Congressman Vito Marcantonio. The Committee planned and conducted a number of mass meetings of working people and unionists. One such meeting took place on October 25, 1941 in New York, at which American workers spoke with concern about the developments in the war. Lauding the successes of the Soviet and British trade unions in achieving unity of action in the struggle against fascism, the participants in the meeting urged the CIO and AFL to join with the British and Russian trade unions in organizing “a joint trade union conference for the purpose of establishing a mighty world anti-Hitler fortress of the BritishRussian-American trade unions".  [82•2 

p Of particular importance was an extraordinary convention of CIO trade unions that was held March 24, 1942 in Washington with over 500 delegates in attendance. It passed a resolution fully supporting the President’s statement on the 83 need for the United States to assume the offensive against the Axis powers. Another resolution provided for the creation of joint committees by AFL and CIO locals to support the nation’s war effort. By the beginning of 1943 there were 1,900 such committees representing approximately 3,750,000 workers, or nearly one-fourth of the number of workers engaged in war production.  [83•1  Most of these committees were under the leadership of CIO unions.

p For the CIO unions the entire first half of 1942 was marked by the growing movement to support the government’s war measures. An active part in this was taken by Americans of Slavonic origin of whom there were then about 15 million in the country. A number of their organizations came to an agreement to convene an American Slav Congress.

p Preparations for the congress began in the spring of that year, and it opened on April 26 in Detroit. CIO and AFL representatives took an active part. In attendance were over 2,500 delegates from Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Bulgarian, Macedonian and other Slav-American organizations. The President of the United States, the leaders of the CIO and AFL, and head of the War Production Board Nelson sent messages of greetings to the congress. The congress addressed a greeting to all the Slavs of Europe, and adopted a special resolution calling for a second front in Europe.

p A permanent National Committee of the American Slav Congress was established, headed by vice-president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (CIO) Leo Krzycki. In the years that followed, American workers of Slavonic origin took an active part in the organization.

p The campaign begun by the CIO convention was also joined by the AFL. On May 1, more than 50 CIO and AFL unions in New York issued a call to their members to strain every effort to ensure victory over the enemy on the Western Front in 1942. Many unions decided to work instead of demonstrating on May 1. In a number of states, drives developed spontaneously to collect funds for aid to the Soviet people and committees were set up for the purpose. The UAW 84 (CIO) conducted a fund-raising campaign. During the years of the struggle for opening the second front, the small Fur and Leather Workers Union collected over $2 million for the aid-to-the-USSR fund.  [84•1 

p Some American unions sent May Day greetings to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions expressing their solidarity. The National Maritime Union of America, for example, wrote on April 30, 1942: “We pledge full support for the immediate opening of an all-out Western Front in Europe.” In its letter of October 16, 1941, the CIO Council of Cook County (Illinois) wrote to the AUCCTU, “We trade unionists of America feel the gravity of the situation and are tugging at the leash, so to speak, to be able to help in your hour of need.” And Lewis Merrill, President of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, cabled, “We are with you for victory in 1942.” Many AFL locals also sent letters, telegrams and resolutions addressed to the AUCCTU pledging to work unremittingly for the opening of a Western Front against Hitler Germany.  [84•2 

p A mass meeting was held in Madison Square Garden in New York on June 22, the first anniversary of the Nazi attack on the USSR. Among those who addressed the many thousands gathered there were Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s closest advisor; Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington; Mayor LaGuardia of New York City; and Supreme Court Justice Reed. Hopkins told about his trip to Moscow and expressed confidence that the Russian armies would drive off the invaders.  [84•3 

p Just over a month later, on July 25, the CIO unions of New York called another meeting in Madison Square Garden. Speaking before tens of thousands of industrial and office workers were Senators Claude Pepper and James Mead (New York), Mayor LaGuardia of New York City, Joseph Curran and Mike Quill, presidents of the Maritime Workers and the Transport Workers.

85

p A 75-member delegation was elected at the meeting and shortly thereafter went to Washington to visit the White House. On behalf of nearly a million CIO union members of the state of New York, the delegates presented the President with a message urging the government to open a second front immediately. Other meetings and demonstrations were held in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New Haven, Buffalo, New Orleans, Detroit, Newark and Pittsburgh.

p The autumn of 1942, when the great battle of Stalingrad was raging, saw an increase in the flow of resolutions, telegrams, letters and postcards coming to the White House, Congress, and the AFL and CIO Washington headquarters, in which unions and individual workers called for a speedy opening of a second front.

p The turning point in the battle against fascism was reached at the end of 1942 on the huge Soviet-German front. The principal event was the rout of the Germans at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. The balance of forces on the front was changed, with the initiative now in the hands of the Soviet command. And although the movement in the United States for opening the second front had somewhat’declined, it did not die out in 1943. Many unions continued to campaign for a Western Front and all-out assistance to the Soviet Union.

p In April 1943, the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship was founded. Its creation was the outcome of activity on the part of the many city and state Committees of American-Soviet Friendship which had arisen in 1941 and 1942. The Chairman of the National Council, Corliss Lament, said: “Never has the friendship between our peoples had such vital meaning as it has today when, thanks to the incomparable skill and courage of the Russian army and people, we are within sight of victory.”   [85•1 

p The Russian War Relief committees that had emerged in 1941 and 1942 continued their fund-raising drives. In the first quarter of 1943, the National Committee of Aiding the Soviet Union collected $4 million, which was used for medical and other supplies sent to the USSR. Workers took an active part in the fund raising.

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p The progressive labor press continued to give wide coverage to the movement of solidarity. Americans of Russian and Ukrainian origin, among whom were many workers and trade unionists published in Russian and Ukrainian the newspapers PyccKuu ^OJloc (Russian Voice) and LLfodeHHi eicmi (Daily News) in New York. These papers kept their readers informed about the situation at the fronts, especially the Eastern Front, and about the movement within the United States for aid to the Soviet Union.

p The conventions of some trade unions criticized the government for its delay in resolving the problem of opening a second front. This criticism was made in speeches at conventions of the longshoremen and warehousemen, the maritime workers, the transport workers, the electrical workers and others. From California, Colorado, Utah, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio and many other states where CIO union conventions were held, came resolutions to the White House all asking the same question: When? When would the second front finally be opened in Western Europe?

p However, there were also voices raised against such demands. In particular, this happened at the sixth national convention of the CIO held in the autumn of 1943 in Philadelphia.

p The convention passed a resolution in which the members of CIO unions pledged their support of the war effort.  [86•1  However, the convention rejected a proposal backed by many delegates to have the resolution include a point about the need to open the second front without delay. Explaining the refusal to accept this demand, the chairman of the drafting committee, Van Bittner, said that unfortunately the committee was composed of civilians and was therefore in no position to set the timing for an Allied landing in Europe. The resolution thus said nothing about the Allied commitment to open a second front. In a number of CIO and AFL unions, the second front question was essentially taken off the agenda, and in many instances was not even raised. This was also the case at conventions of the Railroad Brotherhoods.

p As for the leaders of the AFL, they showed their true face at the 63rd AFL convention in October 1943. Upon the urging of 87 the drafting committee, the convention rejected a resolution submitted by the Vermont State Federation of Labor, which called upon the executive council to consider the possibilities of cooperation with Soviet trade unions within the framework of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee.  [87•1 

p Some delegates vainly insisted that the AFL pursue a policy of unity of action with the CIO on a national scale.

p Voting down a proposal emphasizing the need for constructive negotiations with the CIO, the convention endorsed the political line taken by the executive council on this question. The latest consequence of that line was that during its session of March 31-April 1, 1943, the federation council had unilaterally decided to halt the work of the AFL-CIO Combined Labor War Board which had been created shortly after the United States entered the war to coordinate the war effort of organized workers.  [87•2  The convention arbitrarily accused the CIO of attempting to destroy the AFL by making systematic raids of its trade unions. At the same time, however, the convention demagogically expressed its wish that the Federation keep a unity committee for the purpose of exploring every possibility of establishing unity with the CIO.  [87•3 

p A chronic problem with trade unions had long been that of raiding activities. It was the consequence of the constant hostility not only between AFL and CIO leaders, but also between various independent labor organizations and the Railroad Brotherhoods. Such raids were made particularly against progressive CIO unions, accused of being “infiltrated” by Communists.

p In an article, “Democracy in Labor Unions: A Report and Statement of Policy”, Prof. Clyde Summers wrote: “Employers are not the only enemy, for rival unions may constantly threaten the union’s very existence by raiding its membership or seeking to supplant it as bargaining representative."  [87•4  The instigators of such raids tried to persuade workers to go over to 88 the union they controlled. Often such actions were attended by the sacking of the union’s headquarters and beatings of its activists by hirelings of the rival union.

p Company managers or agents, clergymen, local politicians, sheriffs and police became involved in the bitter clashes. Some corrupt union leaders resorted to the services of gangsters with the aim of taking over one or another local. In such cases gangs would terrorize the members of the victimized union and harass and beat up their leaders. These raids were one of the disgraceful sides of the labor movement of the United States, testifying to the strong influence of criminal elements on the fate of many unions.

p Thus, instead of supporting the movement for opening the second front, the top leaders of the AFL, and wfth them most of the delegates to the 1943 convention, reaffirmed their hostile attitude to the idea of unity on an international or national scale. Despite the imperative necessity for unity and solidarity among all workingmen in the fight to annihilate fascism, the atmosphere at the convention was one of animosity toward the CIO. Green and his closest associates steered the convention and the organized workers along the former lines of hostility toward the Soviet trade unions.

p Nonetheless, despite the stance of hostile forces, the campaign for opening the second front in 1942 or 1943 demonstrated that the attitude of most Americans to the Soviet Union was friendly, and fully confirmed the possibility of a further expansion of Soviet-American ties. Basically, the movement for opening the second front in 1942-1943 was a continuation of the peace movement, but now under wartime conditions. It was humanistic, since its goal was to give support to the Soviet people in the struggle against fascism, and for total destruction of the common enemy. While it was not broad enough to exert decisive influence on US political and military strategy it did help to expose the real reasons for the delays in opening the second front, showing that they were prompted more by political than military considerations.

p Many American writers tend to ignore this movement. Historian Joel Seidman, for example, states that only a minority of workers under the influence of the Communists came out in support of the Soviet Union. “The rest of the labor 89 movement, while not concealing its dislike of communism and staunchly opposing our entry into the war, advocated the sending of aid to the Soviet Union, as a gesture to a country that had been the victim of aggression and as a military measure to help insure the defeat of Hitlerism.”   [89•1  Seidman says nothing about the broad movement of organized labor that was permeated with the spirit of solidarity with all the peoples fighting against fascism, including the Soviet people. Such was the nature of this movement, regardless of what many of its participants may have felt about the difference in the economic and political systems of the USA and the USSR.

p In the war years the US Communist Party declared its support of Roosevelt’s policies and refrained from coming out independently during elections. This was a line aimed at strengthening national unity. In working toward this end, the Communist Party exposed the reactionary elements in Congress and the bourgeois parties, the Hearst press and the activity of many pro-fascist groupings. It came out against the candidates of the Republican Party in the elections of 1940 and 1944, particularly against its presidential candidate, Thomas Dewey.

p The Communist Party regarded the American workers as the most progressive and cohesive anti-fascist segment of the population. Their most organized section was in the trade unions, which had a total membership at that time of eleven million. That is why the Communist Party attached primary importance to work in the unions.

p An important effort of the party during these years was its work to promote unity of action by the AFL, CIO and Railroad Brotherhoods. Owing to its vigorous activity the Joint AFLCIO Board was created in early 1942. Although the board developed its activity in plants and unions very slowly, which drew criticism in the Communist press, it nonetheless played an important role in coordinating union actions aimed at speeding up output and increasing labor productivity.

p The Communist Party advocated uninterrupted war production and supported the position of unions that pledged not 90 to strike for the duration. All the energies of the working class for the defeat of the common enemy of mankind—such was the slogan of the American Communists.

p The Communists supplemented their educational activity by direct participation in the work of union locals. They enjoyed the confidence and respect of the membership among unions in the fur and leather, food and tobacco, electrical and radio, iron mining, ore mining and smelting industries. The Communists had considerable influence in the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union of the Pacific Coast. All these unions were affiliated with the CIO. Many leaders and rank-and-file members in the maritime workers’, fishermen’s, and marine cooks’ and stewards’ unions heeded the voice of the Communists. They were also very active in the farm equipment workers’ union. Local party organizations enjoyed the support of labor unions in Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Flint, Dearborn and Pittsburgh.

p The main center of the Communist Party’s activity was, as before, New York, where its National Committee was located and where it held its conferences and conventions. Also located in New York were headquarters of some large unions and the executive committee of the American Labor Party, with whom the Communist Party cooperated. Among the New York unions in whose work Communists took part were the electrical workers’, fur and leather workers’, communication workers’, maritime workers’, hotel and restaurant workers’, wholesale and retail trade employees’, and department store clerks’ unions.

p The Communist Party was an influential working-class organization, closely connected with the CIO. There were many CIO unions in the city and state of New York, with a total of almost a million members. Communist Party organizations also carried out important work in Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania and especially on the West Coast in California, Oregon and Washington. The party had among its members many experienced journalists and union officials who headed a number of big CIO unions. It endorsed the general line of the CIO executive board and maintained and strengthened contacts with its president Philip Murray. On his part, Murray not only did not reject this cooperation, but did a great deal to make it fruitful. Of course, Murray and the Communists held 91 fundamentally different views on working-class problems, but this did not interfere with their cooperation. Both were aware of the common goals in the struggle with fascism. This was the platform on which their temporary unity of action was based.

p The Communist Party also sought this kind of cooperation with the American Federation of Labor. However, the openly hostile attitude of the AFL leaders prevented establishing direct contacts. Communists working in some local AFL organizations experienced great difficulties.

p Important educational work was done by Communist-led labor schools in New York and San Francisco, which offered lecture courses in the natural sciences, philosophy, political science and history. The Communist Party took an active part in preparing and conducting mass meetings in New York, Chicago and San Francisco, and played a prominent role in launching the movement for a second front in Europe in 1942-1943.

p On May 15, 1943, the Presidium of the Communist International introduced a resolution for endorsement by its sections proposing that the International be dissolved. The statement spoke of the historic role the Comintern had played in uniting the working people in the struggle against fascism and war. At the same time, it pointed to the insurmountable difficulties involved in trying to solve the tasks of the labor movement of each individual country through an international center. It also underlined the differences among the various countries in level and rate of social and political development, and degree of worker awareness and organization. The Presidium pointed to the need for Communist parties to display greater flexibility and independence in solving the national and international tasks standing before them. The resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International said: “The entire course of events over the past quarter-century and the experience gathered by the Communist International have convincingly shown that the organizational form for uniting the workers chosen by the First Congress of the Communist International ... has more and more become outgrown by the movement’s development and by the increasing complexity of its problems in separate countries, and has even become a hindrance to the further 92 strengthening of the national working-class parties."  [92•1  The world war sharpened the differences in the situations existing in the various countries. Back in 1935, taking into account the changes both in the international situation and the labor movement, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International had instructed the Executive Committee “to proceed, in deciding any question, from the concrete situation and specific conditions obtaining in each particular country".  [92•2 

p With the consent of the sections, the Presidium of the Executive Committee on June 8, 1943 announced the dissolution of the Comintern.  [92•3 

p The Comintern had played an important role in uniting the progressive forces of the international proletariat around the Communist parties. Furthermore, it rendered invaluable service in fighting fascism.

p The dissolution of the Comintern in many ways increased the responsibility of Communist parties in the work of uniting the progressive forces in each particular country. This applied to the Communist Party of the USA no less than to others. We might recall that as early as November 1940 it had withdrawn from the Comintern because of the threat of its being outlawed under the Voorhis Act. The CP USA noted in an official communication that the decision to dissolve the International did not affect the organizational status of the party, because since 1940 it had not maintained ties with any other organizations outside the 93 country.  [93•1  The party leadership declared that the party would follow the principles of proletarian internationalism and fight for the unity of the international labor movement and for national unity in the interest of achieving victory over fascism.

p However, it so happened that by the end of the war, the unity of the party itself was shaken, and the party faced a difficult period of ideological and organizational disarray. The crisis did not break out suddenly; it festered slowly, finally developing into the revisionism of Earl Browder. Looking back, the American Communists now make a comprehensive assessment of the zigzags that occurred in the party’s history. This applies in particular to its withdrawal from the Comintern. It was not only anti-Communist legislation that precipitated the withdrawal; it was provoked by ingrained opportunism and the Browderist revisionism that had already taken root. The withdrawal from the international organization only gave added fuel to these tendencies.

p Entry into the war gave rise to a movement for national unity. All classes and groups of Americans were called upon to unite in the war against fascism, and Roosevelt’s policies were destined to epitomize this. As can be readily imagined, in a country so full of social contrasts this unity was viewed by different sections of the populace not only through the prism of national interests, but through that of class interests as well.

The struggle between the monopolies and labor did not stop, for the contradictions between them still remained. Although the unions pledged to refrain from striking for the duration of the war, the strike movement was still in sharp evidence, as confirmed by the following strike statistics covering the period from 1940 through 1945:  [93•2 

Work stoppages Workers involved 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 2,508 4,288 2,968 3,752 4,956 4,750 23,222 (in thousands) 577 2,360 840 1,980 2,120 3,470 11,347 4.1 13.5 8.7 38.0 94.0 Man-days idle 6.7 23.0 (in millions) 94

The above figures show that labor intensified its struggle against the monopolies in 1944 and 1945, as compared with the two-year period of neutrality. Moreover, as can be seen from the following table, with the exception of the figure for man-days idle, the strike figures were higher during the war years than during the entire preceding decade:   [94•1 

Work stoppages Workers involved (in thousands) Man-days idle (in millions) 1930-1939 1940-1945 20,150 23,222 9,114 11,347 141.8 94.0

p This seemingly paradoxical situation had a number of causes. First of all, the size of the working class had grown considerably in comparison with the prewar decade. Whereas in 1939 there were 30.3 million in nonagricultural employment, there were 42.1 million in 1943. Moreover, total employment in manufacturing had grown from 10 million to 17.3 million,  [94•2  and the number of production workers in the manufacturing industry had gone up from 8.2 million to 15 million.  [94•3  We might compare these data with the corresponding figures for 1935, when the total number of workers employed in manufacturing was only 8.9 million, including 7.3 million production workers.  [94•4  The impressive numerical growth of the working class during the war years could not but be reflected in an increase in the number of work stoppages and workers involved.

p The main reason for the growth of the strike movement was still the insecurity of a considerable part of the working class, especially in areas not involved in defense work, or where unskilled manpower was used on a large scale.

p Further, as we have already seen, there was a marked increase of activity in the entire economy during the years 95 America took part in the war, and this led to a sharp deficit of labor power in industry. In periods of economy upswing, the workers were as a general rule no less active in fighting for their rights than in times of crisis or depression. In fact, they tended to resort to the strike even more readily, for they had less fear of being left without a job. Indeed, during the war the threat of mass unemployment had temporarily disappeared, and this created favorable conditions for successful strikes. However, labor’s natural desire to exploit the favorable economic situation by intensifying the strike struggle clashed with the political sentiments and goals conditioned by the war. A real contradiction arose, which most unions tried to overcome by doing everything possible to avoid conflicts with employers and come to terms with them at the negotiating table. They made every effort to stick to their pledge not to resort to the strike for the duration. However, this was not always possible.

p The monopolies frequently violated collective bargaining agreements and refused to renew them on new terms. Progressive American historian Philip Foner wrote: “Unfortunately, there were employers ... who, placing profits above everything else, sought to take advantage of the workers’ patriotism. Aware that the union would not resort to strikes, these employers arrogantly refused to recognize the union’s just demands despite wartime living costs.”   [95•1  It is little wonder that workers were forced to strike. Their reaction was natural. Marx wrote: “If, during the phases of prosperity, when extra profits are made, he [the worker—Auth.] did not battle for a rise of wages, he would, taking the average of one industrial cycle, not even receive his average wages, or the value of his labour. It is the utmost height of folly to demand that while his wages are necessarily affected by the adverse phases of the cycle, he should exclude himself from compensation during the prosperous phases of the cycle."  [95•2 

p Lenin was talking about the same thing in 1901 when he wrote about Russian workers: “A few years ago industry was flourishing, trade was brisk, and the demand for workers was 96 great. Nevertheless, the workers organised a number of strikes to improve their working conditions; they realised that they must not let the moment slip by, that they must take advantage of the time when the employers were making particularly high profits and it would be easier to win concessions from them.”   [96•1 

p In the United States, the World War II period was just such a phase of industrial upswing when the workers sought to improve working conditions and win concessions from the industrialists.

p These, then, were the reasons behind the fact that the strike movement was on an even higher level during the war years than in the preceding decade.

p In January 1942, a conflict came to a head in the steel industry that threatened to develop into a general industrywide strike. It centered at the plants of four big corporations in the Little Steel group: Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. These companies employed a total of 175,000 workers who belonged to various trade union organizations which were not yet united into a single union, but acted under the leadership of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO). The workers demanded a wage increase of one dollar a day and recognition of the SWOC as their official bargaining agent.

p The steel companies refused to accept the demands, whereupon the workers decided to call a general strike. But the war was on, and the unions had pledged themselves to seeking settlement of all disputes through negotiations. The leadership of the SWOC, headed by Murray, again met with representatives of Little Steel, but with no results.

p To avert a general strike, the SWOC deemed it necessary to lodge a complaint with the War Labor Board against the steel companies’ policy of increasing work quotas without increasing wages. In the meantime, a broad discussion of the demands set forth took place at meetings of workers in the steel mills. On February 26, the War Labor Board began hearings on the dispute with the participation of representatives of Little Steel and the SWOC. The CIO delegates argued that the insignificant wage increase in April 1941 was more than offset by the 97 13.3 per cent growth in the cost of living. Despite the fact that the monopolies and the board temporized, the workers continued to work and produce the steel needed for the war. The union’s demands were studied and discussed at length, and it was only in July 1942 that the board finally handed down a final decision. It was one that could hardly satisfy the workers.

p By its decision of July 16, 1942, the board rejected the workers’ wage demands and ruled that wages must go no higher than 15 per cent above the level existing as of January 1, 1941.  [97•1  Once wages reached that level they would in effect be frozen, regardless of the ever-rising cost of living. This approach, which came to be known as the Little Steel formula, was later used in other industries.

p Locals of many unions refused to submit to the wage freeze and demanded wage increases above those set by the Little Steel formula. When their efforts to get the monopolies to negotiate failed, they resorted to local strikes.

p Unlike these strikes, which were not sanctioned by the national bodies of the unions involved, strikes in the coal industry were organized by the United Mine Workers itself, headed by John L. Lewis. Of the 3 ,,752 work stoppages in 1943, 430 were in the coal industry, involving 605,000 miners. As a result, of the 13,500,000 man-days lost that year, 9,346,000, or almost 70 per cent, were in that industry.  [97•2 

p Progressive public leaders pointed out that it was the refusal of the coal companies to make any concessions that obstructed peaceful settlement of the conflicts. At the end of April 1943, the threat of a general coal strike loomed. Roosevelt intervened, warning Lewis that if the miners did not resume work by 10 a.m. of May 1, the government would seize the coal mines on the basis of the Connally amendment to the 1940 Universal Military Conscription Law. On May 2, when a large number of workers did not show up for work, the President instructed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to take action. Despite this move, almost all the miners were now on strike. 98 Ickes ordered resumption of work. The union did not obey the order. There followed a series of meetings between Lewis and Ickes, and radio addresses by Roosevelt, Lewis and the mineowners. However, the miners did not submit so easily to persuasion. In accordance with the President’s order, Ickes established federal control over the mines.

p In the meantime, strikes broke out at the Chrysler company. In Akron and Detroit, 79,000 workers stopped work at plants producing tyres for military vehicles. Almost half of the striking Chrysler workers soon returned to their jobs under pressure from the union’s central leadership. However, 45,000 Chrysler workers continued to strike.

p As for the miners, after a short intermission they continued their strikes. Roosevelt set a new back-to-work deadline. The miners agreed to return to work on June 7, on the condition that they would leave the mines again on June 20, if their demands were not met by then. The conflict between the miners and the government became protracted.

p Citing the miners’ strikes, the monopolies and some congressmen in Washington accused labor of using in their own interests the war-generated situation on the labor market, and increased their attacks against Roosevelt’s labor legislation. Pointing to the “miners’ revolt”, certain members of Congress proposed a bill for a harsh new law providing for government intervention and use of force to settle labor conflicts.

p The appearance of such a bill indicated the monopolies’ growing dissatisfaction with the Wagner Act, which they veiled with talk about the conditions and demands of wartime. Shortly before, Roosevelt, anticipating congressional efforts to repeal the Wagner Act, had come out against the passage of any special law providing for the curtailment of labor’s rights, including the right to strike, since on the whole the unions were fulfilling their pledge to abstain from striking in the war industry. Therefore, the President vetoed the bill. But Congress overrode the veto, after which, on June 25, 1943, Roosevelt had to sign the bill into law.

p The law went down in the annals of Congress as the War Labor Disputes Act,  [98•1  but it became more widely known as the 99 Smith-Connally Act, so named after the congressmen who introduced it: Representative Howard Smith (Dem., Virginia), author of the 1940 Alien Registration Act, and Senator Tom Connally (Dem., Texas).

p The Smith-Connally Act prohibited strikes in the defense industry. In the event of a strike threat, the President was empowered to take emergency steps. The law stated that he had the power and authority to place any plant, mine or facility into the possession of the United States whenever he “finds, after investigation, and proclaims that there is an interruption of the operation of such plant, mine, or facility as a result of a strike or other labor disturbance, that the war effort will be unduly impeded or delayed by such interruption, and that the exercise of such power and authority is necessary to insure the operation of such plant, mine or facility in the interest of the war effort".  [99•1  Further, it was stipulated that any such plant, mine, or facility placed under the control of the government would be returned to its owners only when its production capacity was restored, for which a period of 60 days was given.  [99•2 

p The law further stated: “Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any person (1) to coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person, to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine or facility, or (2) to aid any such lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption interfering with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of such interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or direction thereof or for the payment of strike, unemployment, or other benefits to those participating therein....

“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."  [99•3  Besides

100 this, unions were prohibited for the duration of the war and for the first six months thereafter from contributing funds to election campaigns during congressional and presidential elections.

p The labor unions protested against the passage of the bill. They realized that it was a dangerous precedent which would be followed by new moves by reaction to cancel out liberal legislation. Furthermore, it would complicate the situation in the country, and make the main task—the defeat of fascism—that much more difficult. Condemning the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, Murray said that such a harsh measure was unjustified, since labor well understood its duty and was contributing to the cause of defeating the common enemy. William Green in a message to President Roosevelt described the bill as fascist legislation that struck “at the very heart of democratic processes and is violative of the fundamental principles upon which our ... government rests".  [100•1  However, taking into account the importance of the political factor and the need to maintain national unity, the unions restricted themselves only to protests.

p Although the bill was passed, Roosevelt tried to avoid applying the new law. But he did not always succeed. A case in point was the conflict between the government and Montgomery Ward and Co., a big retail trading firm, over a contract to be concluded with the retail and wholesale workers’ union.

p This is how the conflict between the company and the government developed. On June 2, 1942, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins asked the National War Labor Board to look into the labor dispute at Montgomery Ward and Co. Chairman of the NWLB William H. Davis announced on June 30 that the board would examine the case, and on September 5 recommended that the company increase wages by five cents an hour. The company rejected the recommendation. In response, the NWLB on December 8, 1942 ordered the company to include in a collective bargaining agreement points ensuring the principle of hiring union members, arbitration, and the granting of seniority benefits. The company rejected this order, calling it illegal and uneconomical.

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p At this point the President intervened. On December 12, 1942, Roosevelt wrote to the president of the company, Sewell Avery, in Chicago: “As Commander-in-Chief in time of war, I hereby direct Montgomery Ward and Company to comply, without further delay, with the NWLB’s order of December eight, 1942.”  [101•1  However, the subsequent correspondence between the War Labor Board and the President, on the one hand, and the company, on the other, showed that the latter, having carried out the order at one of its enterprises, continued to ignore it at others. The conflict became protracted and increasingly aggravated. Finally, on April 12, 1944, the union called a strike in Chicago, and threatened to extend it to all the company’s enterprises and stores. Again, Roosevelt intervened, ordering the union to call off the strike. The union complied, but the company continued to defy all the directives of the War Labor Board. In the meantime, the bourgeois press was at work building an atmosphere of sympathy with the company. Roosevelt was subjected to attacks by both corporations and Republicans.

p On December 27, 1944, the President instructed the War Department to seize all the company’s trading establishments and place them under government control. In accordance with the provisions of the Smith-Connally Act and Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, the War Department took under its control the enterprises of Montgomery Ward and Co. in New York, Detroit, Dearborn, Chicago, San Pablo, Denver, San Rafael, Portland and other cities. The company’s assets were sequestered. When the troops seized the premises of the company’s headquarters in Chicago, company president Avery resisted and had to be carried out bodily.

p The Montgomery Ward and Co. case was a clear manifestation of reactionary efforts to challenge the Wagner Act and all liberal legislation. This was the crux of the conflict. Under the circumstances, Roosevelt saw no other alternative than to take the side of the labor union.

p Despite the Smith-Connally Act, strikes continued to occur in 1944 and 1945. As a result of economic pressure on the 102 monopolies, the workers in many industries improved their material position. Wages went up considerably for workers engaged in the transportation of war materials by rail, motor vehicle and water. There was a particularly noticeable increase in the earnings of longshoremen in the East and West Coast unions. Miners, steelworkers, auto workers, workers in defense plants, communications workers and others achieved a considerable rise in standard of living.

p The distinctive feature of most of the strikes during the war years was that they were local rather than industry-wide, and that they were initiated by union locals rather than by the central executive bodies of the unions involved. Besides this, the strikes were of short duration.

p In 1943, AFL organizations accounted for 37.3 per cent of all the strikes and 19.6 per cent of all the workers involved in strikes that year.  [102•1  In the first months of America’s participation in the war some people thought that the AFL would play a more active role in strikes than the CIO. In a letter dated August 10, 1942, Murray, on behalf of the CIO, wrote to Green: “We have ... been deeply concerned about the stoppages which have been caused by certain affiliates of the AFL.... I am firmly of the opinion that no stoppages of work can be permitted.... The interest of our nation demands that there shall be continuous production and nothing must interfere."  [102•2  However, the situation changed in 1943, when CIO unions turned out to be the more active in the strike struggle. Of all the workers involved in strikes in 1943, 44.3 per cent were CIO members; in numbers, this was twice as many as there were AFL strikers. While AFL strikes accounted for 10.7 per cent of the man-days idle, CIO strikes accounted for 16.1 per cent.  [102•3 

p As in other industries there were no general strikes in the auto industry. The union fulfilled its pledge to abstain from striking,  [102•4  but this of course did not rule out a large number of short local conflicts. For example, in May 1943 a strike took 103 place at the Ford plant in River Rouge (Local 600).  [103•1  In June, workers at the Packard plant struck.  [103•2  In July, shop foremen at the Ford Motor plant in the town of Obey went on strike.  [103•3  In the summer of that year, a total of twelve strikes took place at various Chrysler plants.  [103•4 

p In 1944, strikes took place at Ford plants, the city transit system of Philadelphia, and telephone and telegraph companies in the state of Ohio. However, most of the strikes that year were small and sporadic.

p In contrast with the preceding year, 1945 was marked by a rising tide of mass strikes. The American workingmen realized that after the war ended they would have to face their class antagonist at home in even sharper clashes than before. This thought was cogently expressed by Benjamin Lawrence, a steelworker and member of Local 1561 in East Providence, Rhode Island. In a letter to the editor of the Steel Labor, he wrote: “We, laborers of America, know we have strong enemies here at home who fight us under the cover of war. Do not fight them today, just keep ‘stalling’ until the war is over.... Do not fight two battles at the same time, the results would be terrible to us today if we lose at home; but we gain by destroying the enemies of the world."  [103•5 

p In the first six months of 1945, a total of 2,310 strikes took place, involving 1,250,000 workers. As a result of these strikes, over 1.5 million man-days were lost. With the expiration of the no-strike pledge, the unions were preparing for the great class battles that lay ahead.

p At the beginning of the year, progressive forces within the CIO came out with the demand for an end to discrimination against Negroes. Negro workers were generally the first to be laid off when there was a cut-back in production. Employers used “low seniority" (a result of mass Negro unemployment in the prewar years) as a pretext for this form of discrimination. The CIO Political Action Committee launched a campaign calling for state legislation prohibiting discrimination against 104 Negroes. The Communist Party was in the front ranks of the defenders of the rights of the Negro people. It took an active part in getting democratically-inclined legislators to introduce bills in the states of New York, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota and Pennsylvania. They were also working for the creation of a federal fair hiring practices commission.

p In the spring of 1945, the miners resumed their strike struggle in Pennsylvania, Alabama and West Virginia. At the same time, strikes broke out at automobile plants in Detroit. In May, 225,000 maritime workers joined the struggle. Among the strikers were many Negroes. The number of Negro seamen had increased sharply during the war, but here too they were the first to be laid off. The maritime workers demanded of the War Shipping Administration that the wartime wage level be retained, particularly premium pay for war risk, which amounted to an average of about $100 a month per seaman. The union sought the establishment of a 6-hour workday, with four shifts on all ships; a month’s paid vacation; and severance pay. The union set about creating a strike fund of half a million dollars for possible nationwide strikes in the future. The War Shipping Administration offices were picketed.

p Everything indicated that American unions were regrouping. The “no-strike” slogan gave way to the “No Contract, No Work" slogan. The unions were preparing to come out with a program of struggle to hold on to the standard of living already achieved and to raise it.

p On the whole, the economic situation during the war, industry’s interest in uninterrupted production, and the strike struggle promoted a higher living standard for American workers than they had during the years of neutrality, let alone the years of crisis and depression in the 1930s. However, before discussing the changes that took place in the economic position of the workers during the war, it would be well to say a few words about the general state of affairs in the country during that period.

In the first place, the United States was located tens of thousands of miles away from the war fronts, so that not a single bomb fell on its territory. The economy not only did not 105 suffer from the war but actually entered a period of unprecedented high activity. The military-industrial concerns and the banks reaped unheard-of profits during World War II, as can be seen from the following figures (in billions of dollars)  [105•1 :

Profits Before taxes After taxes 1940 1941 1942 9.3 17.0 21.0 6.4 9.3 9.4 1943 24.5 10.5 1944 1945 Total 23.3 19.0 114.1 10.4 8.3 54.3

p In the steel industry alone, corporate profits from 1940 through 1943 amounted to 1.2 billion after,taxes.  [105•2  The data on other industries, especially heavy industry, confirm the trend toward an inordinate growth of profits during the war. Of the $54.3 billion in profits (after taxes) made during the war years, the monopolies paid out almost $25.9 bijlion to their stockholders. The rest constituted undistributed profits. The average annual profits (after taxes) for the period 1940-1945 were about $8.7 billion, compared with average profits after taxes of $3.3 billion in 1936-1939. Wartime corporate profits after taxes, therefore, rose by more than 160 per cent.  [105•3  The superprofits allowed the monopolies to make concessions to the working class and to satisfy its demands during the boom years in order to avoid undesirable and costly interruptions in production.

p In the second place, ever since the Civil War of 1861-1865, America had been spared the ravages of war, and the standard of living of workers in the United States was higher than that of working people in other countries. The war increased this difference, sharply worsening the economic position of workers in the other countries at war, while actually improving it in the United States. The Russian language newspaper Russian Voice, for example, had this to say about life in Chicago: “We are living a quiet and relatively prosperous life because there, overseas, young people are giving their lives for the freedom of all mankind.... There are no shortages of anything in Chicago as yet. There is plenty of everything, and 106 people eat and dress well.”  [106•1  That commentary could have been made about many other cities. The partial rationing on canned foods (soups, fruits and vegetables), butter, meat and fats, introduced in the spring of 1943, did not have any serious effect on the standard of living.

p Most Americans bumped into the war only through the newspaper, radio or motion pictures. Those who had relatives or friends in the armed forces also knew about it from their letters and stories. Never threatened by air raids, American cities got along without black-outs. Only on April 18, 1942 a black-out was ordered in the Atlantic coast zone. People visiting America from Europe were struck by the brightness of American cities at night. The newspaper quoted earlier gave this description of Chicago: “Millions of lights strike the eye. Street lamps and illuminated store windows make everything as visible as in daytime."  [106•2  And in another issue it wrote: “San Francisco glowed with a myriad of lights. The skyscrapers were aglow with a patchwork of lighted windows.... Neon signs on the downtown streets flashed with the glare of molten metal, stars were dimmed by the bright light flooding the city."   [106•3  All this engendered a sense of complacency, and for many even indifference, to the tragedy being played out on the fields of Europe and Asia.

p In the third place, the United States entered the war only in December 1941, and began active land operations in the decisive areas only at the end of 1942 (the African campaign), with subsequent action in 1943 (the invasion of Italy) and the large-scale operation in the summer of 1944 (the landing in Normandy). Relatively few families experienced the grief of losing relatives or dear ones in the war. Compared with the other nations, US casualties were low.

p Further, as a result of the industrial boom, employment increased sharply, and for a short period of time unemployment was reduced almost to nil, which was also very much due to the fact that a great number of Americans were in the armed forces. The demand for labor power had already grown in the 107 period of neutrality. After Pearl Harbor the need for workers and especially skilled workers became even greater. This explains the unprecedented influx of women and Negroes into industry and transportation. In 1944, almost 19.4 million women were employed in the economy.  [107•1  In November of that year, there were 16,130,000 women working in nonagricultural establishments, as compared with 10,620,000 four years earlier.  [107•2  While in 1940 women made up 28 per cent of the total work force, the figure went up to 37 per cent in 1945.  [107•3 

p Greater than ever before was the influx of Negro, Puerto Rican and Mexican workers not only into agriculture but industry as well. This created the illusion of equal employment opportunities. At the beginning of 1944, of the 5,500,000 Negro workers in the country, 1,500,000, or 36 per cent, worked in defense plants.  [107•4  The flow of Negro workers into industry caused a rapid growth of the Negro population in the cities of the North and West.  [107•5 

p War production increased the demand for skilled workers, creating conditions for a large part of the unskilled to receive vocational training and for many others. to raise their job qualifications. The number of untrained workers in the labor force declined, while the number of skilled and especially semiskilled workers grew. This applied also to Negro workers. The total number of skilled workers and specialists among them rose from 500,000 to 1,000,000 between 1940 and 1944. The number of organized Negro workers grew. In the steel industry, for example, the number of Negro union members grew from 35,000 in 1940 to 70,000 in 1943.  [107•6  The situation was similar in most industries. Raising one’s qualifications was one of the ways for a significant part of the unskilled and especially semiskilled workers to earn higher wages. The heightened demand for labor power stimulated an increase in the number 108 of working members per family, which also promoted growth in workers’ real incomes.

p The hourly wage rates and corresponding weekly earnings of workers grew.  [108•1  Although in varying degrees, hourly wages went up in all industries. To cite one example, the average hourly wage for United States Steel Corp. employees climbed from $0.90 in 1940 to $1.40 in 1946.  [108•2 

p Overtime work, which under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was subject to a time-and-one-half rate of pay, was widely practised in industry. The monopolies sought to get a longer workweek established in an effort to get around this provision of the law. But the resistance of the labor unions and the threat of strikes compelled employers to refrain from encroachments of this kind and to pay the overtime rate in accordance with the law.

p However, the need for a longer workweek became more and more obvious. On February 9, 1943, Roosevelt issued order No. 9301, lengthening the workweek from 40 to 48 hours, but requiring that all hours in excess of 40 per week should be compensated at the rate established by law.  [108•3  This order empowered the chairman of the War Manpower Commission to establish during wartime a minimum 48-hour workweek either in an entire industry or in certain areas of the country.

p In a number of war industries which had huge orders the workweek was longer than in others. It went as high as 60 hours, and sometimes even higher. The 40-hour week was retained at small enterprises.

Under the impact of the above factors, the overall wage fund doubled, going from $48.6 billion in 1940 to $102 billion in 1943.  [108•4  Beginning from 1941, the wage fund grew an average of $20 billion a year. The weekly earnings of workers also doubled, as can be seen from the following figures on average weekly wages of production workers in the manufacturing industries (in dollars):

109 23.86 25.20 29.58 36.65 43.14 46.08 44.39

p Thus, average weekly wages showed steady growth up to and including 1944, but began to decline somewhat by the end of 1945.

p Weekly wages also grew in the steel, coal, and construction industries. The wage increases in these industries were not accidental. The miners, for example, staged more strikes than any other group of workers during the war years, winning higher wages as a result. In the construction industry the rate and scope of building were very high.

p A different picture was observed, however, in retail and wholesale trade, the services field, and in other areas not directly connected with federal war contracts. In wholesale trade, the average weekly wage was $29.82 in 1939 and $43.94 in 1945; in retail trade, $23.14 and $31.55; and in the service field (laundry work, for example), $17.64 and $27.73.  [109•1  A closer look at the wage statistics for the manufacturing industries reveals the same tendency. The more an enterprise had to do with the production of goods to satisfy civilian needs and the less it was related to the production of steel, cannon and munitions, aircraft, military trucks, armored cars, tanks, jeeps, ships, submarines, etc., the lower were the wages and earnings of the workers. In general, wages tended to rise in civilian and non-durable goods production too, but their growth rate lagged far behind that in the defense industry and in durable goods production.  [109•2 

p From 1939 through 1945, average annual earnings in industry as a whole, computed on the basis of 40 hours per week, went up from $1,264 to $2,189. Growth in annual earnings was also registered in the separate industries. Thus, in mining it was from $1,367 to $2,621; in construction, from $1,268 to $2,600; in manufacturing, from $1,363 to $2,517; and in transportation, from $1,723 to $2,734.  [109•3  These figures do not include earnings for work performed in excess of 40 110 hours a week, compensated at a time-and-one-half rate as established by the 1938 law.

p Thus, during the war, for the first time since the decade of crises, stagnation, unemployment and extremely low incomes, American workers were able to find jobs and win wage increase. This growth was promoted not only by the industrial boom but also by the mass strike struggle on the eve of and during World War II.

p The status of American workers, especially those in low-paid categories, could have been improved much more had not wage levels been stabilized by application of the Little Steel formula mentioned earlier. That formula, setting limits to wage increase, clearly served the interests of the monopolies. On April 27, 1942, Roosevelt said: “Wages can and should be kept at existing scales.”   [110•1  On October 2, 1942, Congress passed a new wage and price control law, empowering the President to issue a general order to stabilize prices and wages at levels existing as of September 15, 1942. In accordance with this law, the President on October 3, 1942 signed executive order No. 9250, prohibiting any increase or decrease in wages without the approval of the War Labor Board.

p True, the government also stabilized rents and prices of consumer goods. On April 8, 1943, the President put a ban on rent increases and approved a list of commodities subject to price decreases. At the same time, the Little Steel formula was still invoked with respect to wage rates. While wages were subjected to control by both industry and the government, the controls over rents and prices were enforced only by federal control officers.

p The unions opposed the Little Steel formula as a method of freezing wages and fought to have it scrapped. John T. Dunlop, professor of economics at Harward University, wrote: “The unchanged formula became a symbol of a grievance which grew in irritation."  [110•2  The unions pointed to the continually rising cost of living. According to estimates by government agencies it had gone up 30 per cent (well over the 111 stipulated 15 per cent), while AFL and CIO figures showed a 45 per cent increase.  [111•1  As for the War Labor Board, it continued to assert that the workingman’s take-home pay corresponded to the subsistence minimum. As a result of a stubborn strike struggle, some union locals succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the corporations and the government Control Board officials, winning wage rises for their workers regardless of the Little Steel formula. But all this was not achieved without struggle.

A simple comparison of wage and cost-of-living indices does not give a full picture of the standard of living of working-class families, although it does help us to understand the overall trend. Even data on average annual expenditures do not reflect the whole complexity of life and cannot reveal the differences in economic position among the many categories of workers with varying standards of living. They can only indicate the overall pattern in absolute figures. This is what is shown by the following data on average annual expenditures required to maintain a family of four, calculated by the Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics at the University of California (in dollars)  [111•2 :

March 1942 March 1944 Food 793.94 920.97 Clothing 245.04 279.73 Home payments, rent, public utilities 408.00 408.00 Home repairs and maintenance 116.05 117.54 Furniture and appliances 15.00 15.80 Miscellaneous expenses (including medical care) 672.00 681.81 Taxes 72.71 245.28 Interest 258.08 299.00 Annual total 2,580.82 2,964.13 Weekly total 49.61 57.00

p Thus, average annual expenses went up $383.31 in just two years. The increase in outlays for food and taxes was particularly high ($299.60).

112

p We might also cite the minimum budget for a family of four, computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the State of New York as of June 15, 1943. This budget amounted to $1,803 per year (including tax payments), or $35 a week.  [112•1  Another budget of interest was the one computed for an average worker’s family in a worker settlement. In Braddock, Pennsylvania, located 10 miles from Pittsburgh, where steelworkers employed by the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co. lived, the cost of living went up 30 per cent during the war. In January 1945, the average family there spent $57 a week, or $2,964 a year.  [112•2  According to a union study, 55 per cent of the families had incomes exceeding current expenses, so that part of their incomes could go into savings. But for almost half of the families expenses exceeded income, making no saving possible.

p It would be wrong to think, however, that improved conditions during the war marked the beginning of a period of prosperity. Though some American economists and historians come to just this conclusion,  [112•3  analysis of the changes in the economic situation of the workers during the war brings one to the indisputable fact that although the majority of the American working class saw an improvement in its condition, low-paid workers remained in difficult straits. It must be understood that so far we have been dealing with average wages—in industry as a whole and in individual industries. Our discussion of cost of living was also based on average figures. But it should always be borne in mind that a large part of the workers had lower incomes and higher deficits than those making the average wage or more. To draw conclusions on the basis of average figures, as do many American scholars, means to disregard the interests of a considerable part of the working class which lived in far from prosperous circumstances during the war.

p This particularly applied to Negro, Puerto Rican and 113 Mexican workers. They had jobs, and their earnings went up, but one must not forget where they stood and what their standard of living was on the eve of the war. It was only in comparison with the preceding period that their life during the war seemed better. The following words of Karl Marx can be applied to just such workers: “You must not... allow yourselves to be carried away by the high-sounding per cents in the rate of wages. You must always ask, What was the original amount?”  [113•1  Even official government statistics cannot conceal the fact that this large segment of the American working class remained in a difficult situation.

p During the war, poor working conditions and inadequate safety engineering moved the broad masses of working people to righteous indignation. Employers paid little heed to the fact that the increased workweek of 60 or more hours caused overstrain, especially among women, adolescepts and elderly workers, and this in turn brought about an increase in accidents. According to data from the division of health and labor protection of the War Production Board, between December 1941 and January 1944, some 37,600 workers were killed, 210,000 maimed, and 4.5 million temporarily disabled in industrial accidents.

Such are the facts concerning the economic position of American workers during World War II. On the whole, it improved in comparison with the preceding decade, but the degree of improvement was quite different for different sections of the working class. Besides, the improvement proved to be temporary. Toward the end of the war, especially after the victory over Germany, a trend toward lower weekly and annual earnings was already in evidence. For example, between victory in Europe and victory in Japan, the average weekly wage of the Steelworkers dropped from $56.32 (in April 1945) to $42.70 (in September 1945), or by almost 24 per cent.  [113•2  A similar situation existed in other industries. These were signs presaging the inevitable exacerbation of the class struggle that was to come.