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p Early in the morning of September 1, 1939, the American people learned that war had broken out in Europe. Newspaper headlines blared: “Hostilities Begun!”, “Hitler Acts Against Poland”, “Envoys Tell of Bombing of 4 Cities”, “Britain Evacuates 5,000,000 in Cities”, “Roosevelt Warns Navy”. The radio reported rapid movement of Hitler’s troops in Poland, the capture of Danzig, and the demarches by the British and French governments.

p Crowds of people gathered in the streets and squares of American cities and towns, anxiously discussing the possible consequences of the war for America. The question of greatest concern to Americans was whether the United States could avoid taking part in it.

p On September 3, when Britain and France declared war on Germany, President Roosevelt delivered a major address over the radio, in whkh he promised to pursue a policy of non-intervention. He said: “I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can be made a true neutrality."  [13•1  However, the President’s speech was full of reservations. Despite assurances that the United States would not enter the conflict as long as it remained within his power to prevent it, his address evoked serious doubts in the practicability of a policy of nonintervention.

p On September 5, the government issued a neutrality proclamation, stating that the United States would not 14 participate in the war or help either of the belligerent sides. The proclamation prohibited the recruitment on United States territory of volunteers into the armies of the belligerent nations, the arming or equipping of their ships and their use of American territorial waters for military purposes. It also provided for a number of other restrictions and rules of conduct for the crews of their ships in American ports. At the same time, in accordance with the Neutrality Act, a proclamation embargoing arms shipping to the belligerents was issued.

p The nation’s political and military leaders, headed by the President, adopted a waiting tactic. They felt that a policy of non-intervention best met the goals and interests of the United States, which sought to derive the greatest possible benefit from the war in Europe.

p At its initial stage, the war in Europe was an imperialist war. It arose within the capitalist system and was the logical consequence of its profound contradictions. The chief instigator of the war was German fascism, the striking force of international reaction. In contrast to imperialist World War I, World War II took place in socio-political conditions that had changed due to the existence of the Soviet Union, whose peaceful foreign policy was a potent factor for counteracting the aggressive plans of Hitler Germany.

p But the Soviet Union could not single-handedly avert the war danger. This was something that required the joint efforts of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France. The Soviet Union had proposed just such a policy of collective security in Europe long before the onset of the war. But the ruling circles of the bourgeois-democratic states turned thumbs down on any effective program of struggle for preserving peace, and embarked instead on a course of appeasing Hitler.

p Like Great Britain and France, the United States, pursuing its policy of temporizing, rejected cooperation with the Soviet Union, thus killing the chances of a collective rebuff to fascist aggression.

p The Munichite politicians (who tried to appease Hitler with the Munich agreement of 1938 that predetermined the partition and subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany) sought to avoid war within the capitalist system. They hoped to channel German aggression in an easterly 15 direction, against the Soviet Union. To this end, they were prepared to sacrifice the freedom and independence of East European countries. At the crucial moment they did just that.

p The Soviet Union, for its part, proceeded from the fact that German imperialist aggression threatened not only itself but the Western powers as well. Consequently, it proposed concluding a mutual assistance treaty, a so-called Eastern Pact, with the Western powers. But such a move did not figure in the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists, who in Munich in September 1938 signed an ignominious agreement with Hitler. Thus, the actions of the governments of the countries of Western democracy quashed any chance of preserving peace through collective security. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union was left with no other alternative than to delay a confrontation with fascist Germany by concluding a nonaggression treaty with it. This it did in August 1939, thereby winning a certain amount of time for defense preparations and averting the danger of being drawn into war under extremely unfavorable conditions.

p The enemies of the Soviet Union in the capitalist world raised a great hue and cry, distorting the Soviet foreign policy and the real aims of the treaty. As historian Thomas Bailey of Stanford University noted, upon the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact consternation struck those in the West who had fondly hoped that Germany “might be egged upon" the USSR so that the two countries “would bleed each other to death".  [15•1 

p Thus, contradictions of a dual nature were operating in the initial period of the war. On the one hand, there were the contradictions between the two capitalist groupings, and on the other, there was the imperialist circles’ class hatred of the Soviet Union. The desire of both groups of imperialists to provoke hostilities against the USSR also explains what came to be called the “phony war" which began after the defeat of Poland.

p German fascism was not only pursuing the aim of gaining world dominance; it was also driven by ideological, class motives as it sought the destruction of the USSR and suppression of the democratic movement throughout the world.

16

p However, it encountered growing resistance on the part of the peoples of Europe. The Resistance movement, which had already let itself be felt during the short German-Polish war, kept growing and increasingly influenced the character of World War II.

p Did this factor have any impact on the political situation in the United States? It did not at first, since bourgeois propaganda gave a biased account of the military operations and ignored such things as the growing guerrilla war in a number of European countries. Later, however, as more countries fell victim to aggression and their progressive forces reinforced the Resistance, this factor increasingly contributed to an intensification of anti-fascist sentiments in America. Sooner or later the attitude in trade union circles was bound to undergo serious evolution from neutrality to an awareness of the necessity of US participation in the war.

p It is quite apparent that the character and specific features of the American labor movement at that time were determined by the goals and tasks of the progressive forces in the struggle against fascism, and this requires that in studying the problems of the class struggle in the United States the basic factors in the development of World War II and of US domestic and foreign policy should be taken into account.

p When the war broke out in Europe, the American working people were strongly under the influence of isolationist and neutralist propaganda, and for this reason the policy of neutrality proclaimed by the government enjoyed the support of the broad masses, including, above all, the working class. In the initial period of the war, only a few progressive Americans realized how damaging these sentiments were to the cause of peace.

p Among those who understood this full well was the US Communist Party. From the very first days of the war it condemned isolationism and passiveness and demanded vigorous US action to restore peace. The Communist Party called for aid to Poland, an embargo against Japan and Germany, credits and material aid to China; and the re-establishment of the national independence of Czechoslovakia and Austria. Time and again it declared that the war in Europe was the second imperialist war.

17

p Only a minority in the United States shared this view of the events in Europe. The Communist Party had extremely limited possibilities to reach the public with its message, and the broad masses of workers, who were under the influence of bourgeois propaganda, had a very hazy idea of the real nature of the events taking place. Attitudes in the labor unions were shaped under the influence of the general conditions in which the people found themselves. The workers and the democratic strata were,in Foster’s words, “largely isolationist".  [17•1 

p The most popular slogan characterizing the anti-war sentiment was “Keep America Out of War”. Organized workers, concerned over the sudden outbreak of war psychosis in the country, came out with demands for US neutrality. The belief prevailing among unionists was that lifting the arms embargo would lead to war. The labor movement as a whole agreed that America should not let itself be drawn into the maelstrom of the European war. On September 22, 1939, the Michigan Labor Leader quoted a passage from a resolution made by Local 7 of the United Auto Workers at the Chrysler plants, which demanded no war except in defense of American soil, nationalization of munitions industries, defeat of mobilization bills that destroyed civil liberties, no war expenditures except for strict defense, and retention of the arms embargo.  [17•2  At numerous meetings, workers voiced the overriding desire to keep out of the conflicts in Europe and Asia and not let America be drawn into the war. Similar sentiments were expressed at various labor union conventions. Moreover, many union leaders not infrequently used the “Keep America Out of War" slogan in an anti-Soviet spirit.

p Characteristic in this respect was the convention of the United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union held in September 1939 in St. Louis, Missouri. Noting that the convention was meeting at a particularly important time, the union’s president said: “I say to you that we want America to keep out of this war. Ninety per cent of us are hoping and praying that the system of Nazism will be 18 overthrown and German workers liberated, and we are hoping that this will be brought about by the Democracies engaged in this affair.”  [18•1  AFL president William Green spoke at that convention from the same neutralist positions. He said: “We are going to live in peace, maintain a neutral attitude and refuse to become involved in European conflict. May I urge you again to maintain a neutral attitude both in thought and action."  [18•2  Shortly afterwards he wrote: “Labor firmly believes that we should have no part in this European War."  [18•3 

p Although in its neutrality proclamation of September 5 the government declared that the official US policy was one of non-intervention, the Neutrality Act passed in 1935 and later amended was subjected to criticism. In view of the economic upswing that had begun, this law, which banned munitions exports, became more and more of a hindrance to the interests of the nation’s industrial and financial community, which was now demanding that it be revised. Britain and France, who were pinning great hopes on US assistance, were also interested in this.

p There were other reasons, too, for business and political leaders to consider it necessary to adapt the Neutrality Act to the new conditions. Regarding the bloc of fascist countries as their chief rival, they were interested in its defeat, for a victory of Hitler Germany and militarist Japan over Britain, France and China would pose a serious threat to the security of the United States.

p At the same time, some Washington politicians were hoping to direct German aggression eastward, and Japanese aggression northward. In either case, the aim was to turn World War II into an anti-Soviet crusade by international reaction. However, Roosevelt and many other farsighted political figures in the United States realized that a fascist victory in Europe and Asia would seriously undermine the positions of the United States. Considering the situation in Europe, 19 Roosevelt decided to call a special session of Congress on September 21, 1939 to review the Neutrality Act. It was not only a question of amending the old law or passing a new one. What had to be decided was the question of the US position as a whole, the direction that the entire domestic and foreign policy of the country would take in the new circumstances.

p Addressing a joint session of Congress, Roosevelt urged the repeal of the arms embargo. “These embargo provisions, as they exist today,” he said, “prevent the sale to a belligerent by an American factory of any completed implements of war, but they allow the sale of many types of uncompleted implements of war, as well as all kinds of general material and supplies. They, furthermore, allow such products of industry and agriculture to be taken in American-flag ships to belligerent nations.”  [19•1 

p A i»H’, proposed by the President, providing for cancellation of the embargo, was introduced in Congress. The ensuing debate in both houses was extremely fierce. The advocates of lifting the embargo had only a marginal numerical advantage, but the group of congressmen working to defeat the bill acted very energetically. Republican Senator William E. Borah, justifying the position taken by the opponents of the President’s proposal, declared that repeal of the embargo would inevitably draw the United States into the conflict and, moreover,would be a violation of international law.

p Republican representative William Blackney sought to rely on the authority of the famous American historian, Charles A. Beard, who had come out at the time with a sharp condemnation of the President’s position. Beard had written: “President Roosevelt’s foreign policy is as clear as daylight. He proposes to collaborate actively with Great Britain and France in their everlasting wrangle with Germany, Italy and Japan. He wants to wring from Congress the power to throw the whole weight of the United States on the side of Great Britain and France in negotiations, and in war if they manage to bungle the game.... From the point of view of the interests of the United States as a continental nation in this hemisphere, the Roosevelt policy, in my opinion, is quixotic and dangerous. It is quixotic 20 for the reason that it is not based upon a realistic comprehension of the long-time history of Europe and Asia.”   [20•1 

p Back in the spring of 1938, the progressive press had attacked Beard’s isolationism, pointing out that he made no distinction between the bourgeois-democratic and the fascist countries and ignored the role the working class of Britain, France and the USA were playing in the struggle for peace and democracy. Moreover, Beard, Harry E. Barnes and others of the “neorevisionist” school of historians later declared that the United States had committed a blunder in foreign policy by not seeking to form an anti-Soviet bloc with the fascist powers.

p The congressional debate was a reflection of the political struggle in the country around the question of war and peace, and testified to deepening differences within the bourgeoisie between those who sympathized with Hitler Germany and those who supported France and Great Britain. At the same time, the desire of Roosevelt and his supporters to get the arms embargo lifted by no means signified that they intended immediately to alter the US position by making the country an active participant in the war. Foreseeing the inevitability of US entry into the war, they felt it necessary to step up preparations for it and give Britain and France the chance to buy munitions. However, for one reason or another, the majority in Congress continued to favor America’s neutrality. This was the wish of the general public as well. Congressmen received tens of thousands of letters and telegrams from their constituents demanding that peace be preserved for America.

p But while against US involvement in the war, people had no clear idea of how this end could be achieved. Some felt that the arms embargo should continue, others came out for its repeal. Varying views on Roosevelt’s foreign policy were revealed in particular in resolutions of various labor union conventions held in late 1939. But as far as the question of whether or not the United States should enter the war was concerned, there were no differences of opinion. Both the AFL and CIO held to the same position—the country should not participate in the war. In October 1939, the AFL held its 59th convention, and the CIO, its second. The AFL convention confirmed the 21 federation’s opposition to the very idea of US involvement. The American Federationist magazine, the AFL organ, wrote, “The American Federation of Labor is opposed to any entanglement in European disputes or wars.... The Federation will do everything in its power to have our Government maintain neutrality in spirit and in act.”  [21•1 

p The CIO convention was just as explicit in a resolution saying that the workers did not want war and were against participation in it. The CIO, it said, supported a policy of neutrality based on the demand to keep America out of war, and urged stronger legislation to limit war profits by imposing taxes on excess profits and high incomes.  [21•2  The CIO leaders called upon all union members to place their full confidence in Roosevelt.

p Despite the fact that, by and large, the views of the AFL and CIO leaders with respect to war coincided, the labor unions were not in full agreement concerning the bill to amend the Neutrality Act by lifting the arms embargo.

p In late September 1939, the California State Federation of Labor held its 40th convention in Oakland, representing 267,000 rank-and-file AFL members. The convention was unanimous in its opposition to a lifting of the arms embargo. This was the position taken by most AFL unions. But there were also other views on the matter. At their conventions in 1939 and early 1940 a number of CIO unions passed resolutions supporting a new neutrality bill on the condition that peace for America be maintained. Such resolutions were passed, for instance, by the second annual convention of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (CIO) in San Francisco, the 13th national convention of the Oil Workers’ International Union (CIO) in Fort Worth, Texas, the first annual convention of the International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America (CIO) in Bellingham, Washington, and the third annual convention of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union in North Bend, Oregon. Unlike the AFL unions, the CIO unions were generally inclined to favor revision of the Neutrality Act.

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p Some labor leaders not only failed to raise or discuss questions concerning labor’s attitude to the war in Europe in their executive committees and locals, but refrained from bringing up such questions at their unions’ conventions. For example, in his report to the 24th annual convention of his union held in December 1940 at Lakeland, Florida, William Hutcheson, president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, said nothing about the war in Europe and the tasks it entailed for the union’s membership and leadership. On the whole, public opinion gradually tended to favor the administration’s proposal, and this was bound to influence the final decision of Congress. Despite stiff resistance, the advocates of amending the Neutrality Act won out. On November 3, 1939, Congress approved the final version of the new law, the Senate passing it by a vote of 55 to 24, and the House of Representatives, 243 to 172.  [22•1  The President signed the new Neutrality Act on November 4, whereupon he issued a statement indicating the zones from which American ships were thenceforth banned. The new law cancelled the embargo on the export of munitions; belligerents were permitted to buy any goods from the United States on a cash-and-carry basis, that is, if they paid for the goods and shipped them out on non-American ships. US merchant and passenger ships were forbidden to transport goods or passengers of belligerents, or to be armed themselves. Certain restrictions were imposed on ships and submarines belonging to belligerent nations upon their entry into the territorial waters and ports of the United States.

p The new neutrality law could in fact be used to advantage by Britain and France because both possessed more powerful naval and merchant fleets in the Atlantic than Germany. Munitions manufacturers were given the opportunity to export arms to Western Europe and to produce them on an ever increasing scale, deriving huge profits therefrom. Objectively, considering the subsequent events, the lifting of the arms embargo also worked in the interests of the nations fighting fascism.

p Thus, the course of events compelled the United States to 23 take the first step toward cooperation with the countries fighting Nazi Germany. In the meantime, the great mass of organized workers continued to oppose US involvement in the war. Americans were most apprehensive of all about sending their soldiers to Europe. Many congressmen and prominent trade union officials underscored this point. Congressman Izak of California, for example, said in this connection: “Our boys must never again be sent across the seas.”  [23•1  Robert J.Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers of America, said at a convention of his union in St. Louis in July 1940: “We do not want to see our boys sent over there for useless butchering, as they were sent over in the previous world war."  [23•2 

p Many labor leaders expounded the idea that while keeping out of the war, the United States would at the same time play a big rote hi the victory of the democratic forces. The United Mine Workers Journal, which was under the influence and supervision of John L. Lewis, spread neutralist and isolationist ideas. So-called “geographic factors" were invoked to support the idea that it was impossible for the war to reach the American continent. The basic argument for denying that there was a war danger for the United States was that America was protected by two vast oceans. One could frequently find statements such as the following in the magazine: “With war raging all over Europe, three thousand miles away, the American people may very well thank God for the Atlantic Ocean."  [23•3 

p In fact, however, the situation was much more complicated than many workers and their leaders imagined. In a message to Congress on January 3, 1940, Roosevelt underlined the fact that the overwhelming majority of American citizens had not abandoned their hope and expectation that the United States would not become involved in the war.  [23•4  However, he said that those who maintained that all that Americans had to do was to 24 mind their own business and keep the nation out of war, were oversimplifying the whole situation.  [24•1 

p The situation imperatively demanded that the United States re-examine foreign policy and military questions. Nonetheless, the US continued to temporize so as to join in partnership with Britain and France at a time when it could achieve victory with the least losses which meant increased losses to its future allies. For this reason, the government undertook new steps to build up the armed forces, made bigger and bigger appropriations for military purposes, and let out contracts to the monopolies. The production of airplanes, tanks, artillery, ships and ammunition increased.

p The war in Europe imparted special importance to the elections coming up in the autumn of 1940. Which of the two dominant bourgeois parties would come to power? Which would gain a majority in Congress? Who would become the new president? What line would Congress and the administration follow in the future? All these questions were of concern not only to America but also to many other countries.

p It was quite natural that at a time like this the progressive and left elements in the labor movement felt it imperative to intensify the struggle for working-class unity. Liberal circles in the government, and especially President Roosevelt, resumed efforts to unite the AFL and CIO. This unity was important to Roosevelt in connection with the forthcoming elections, for he was counting on the support of organized labor. During the AFL and CIO conventions, the President sent messages to them urging them to renew negotiations on unifying the two labor union centers. On November 9, 1939, he met with Green in the White House, and again pressed for a resumption of negotiations between the AFL and CIO. However, both sides were far from any thought of reconciliation.

p Although the efforts to merge the labor centers failed, their organizations were, in practical terms, faced with the problem of coordinating their actions under the new conditions. Roosevelt, in particular, was interested in winning labor support for the steps he had decided to take to prepare the country for possible entry into the war.

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p On November 5, 1940, the American people were to go to the polls to elect a president, the entire House of Representatives, one-third of the Senate, and a number of state governors. As always, the bourgeois political parties launched an intensive election struggle.

p The Republican national convention opened in Philadelphia on June 24, 1940. There, the party platform, drawn up in the traditional spirit, was adopted. One of its drafters, Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, summed up the substance of the platform in a brief speech. He said, in part: “The Republican Party stands for Americanism, preparedness and peace; no foreign war; an Army and Navy so strong that no unfriendly power can successfully attack America.... National defense is vital to our existence as a nation of free people. A free economy is necessary in war as in peace."  [25•1 

p The Republicans promised to promote the use of capital, human and agricultural resources in the interest of creating new wealth and profits and raising purchasing power. They promised to extend social insurance to a wider range of Americans, provide for full employment, and guarantee collective bargaining for the workers and credits for the farmers. In a word, as Lodge pointed out in his summary of the points in the platform, no one was to go cold and hungry in America, and there would be equality of opportunity in the industrial and political life of the nation regardless of race, color or creed.

p The Republicans fiercely attacked Roosevelt’s New Deal. They said, for example, that it had failed to solve the problem of unemployment and revive opportunity for the nation’s youth. Moreover, they fastened upon the New Deal full responsibility for the danger of involvement in war.  [25•2 

p Having adopted such a promising platform on literally all the problems facing the nation, the convention delegates nominated Wendell L. Willkie, a well-known attorney for the banking house of Morgan, for president and Senator Charles L. McNary for vice-president.

p The Democratic convention opened on July 15, 1940 in 26 Chicago. The election platform adopted there promulgated the idea that the Democratic Party was a peace party pledged to keep the United States out of war. The Republican Party was called the crisis party, unable to raise the living standard of the people or defend the rights of labor and the civil liberties of Americans.

p The platform contained many points relating to the status of labor and the rights of Negroes. In particular, it said that the Democrats would continue to develop the New Deal policy and vigorously defend the Wagner Act and the rights of the Negro people. The convention declared that the main task was to achieve national unity and build up the nation’s defenses.

p Defying the Republicans, who in their platform called for a ban on nominating any President for re-election to a third term, the Democratic convention nominated Roosevelt as its presidential candidate, the first time in the history of the United States that a President was nominated to run for a third term. The Senate passed a resolution introduced by majority leader Alben W. Barkley (Dem., Kentucky), permitting this. The Democratic vice-presidential candidate was Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace.

p Once the two parties had adopted their platforms, the election struggle began. Presidential candidates Roosevelt and Willkie set out on campaigning trips around the country.

p The Communist Party also entered the election race. It held its national convention May 30 to June 2, 1940, in New York, and adopted a party platform. The convention declared: “Not a cent, not a gun, not a man for war preparations and the imperialist war. Resist the militarization and armaments program.... Fight against war profiteering.”   [26•1 

p Communists were urged to take an active part in the election campaign and to nominate worker candidates on the Party ticket. A special place in the platform was devoted to domestic policies, formulating the tasks of the Party in the fight to satisfy the urgent needs of the people, curb inflation and bring down the cost of living.

p The Party convention nominated Earl Browder for president and James Ford for vice-president.

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p In the course of the election campaign, the Communist Party was forced into a position that made it difficult to publicize its platform and its candidates. The Party was subjected to persecution; Communists were fired from their jobs, thrown into jail on charges of conspiracy and attempts to overthrow the existing system, etc.

p On the eve of the 1940 election campaign, the Dies Committee charged 50 leading Party workers headed by Foster with un-American activities and demanded that they submit the lists of Party members and an account of the Party’s finances. While the Committee was questioning the Party leaders, FBI agents and police raided the Party’s offices in Philadelphia, Boston, Los Angeles and other cities.

p There were many instances where legal action was brought against union leaders who were active in the left wing of the labor movement. Some of the trials were anti-Communist in character. Much publicity was given, for example, to the trial of 25 leaders of the progressive Fur and Leather Workers Union, which began on February 20, 1940, in a New York federal court. The men were charged with violating the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust law. The union was thereby threatened with the loss of its right to exist and use the strike as a means of protecting the interests of workers.

p Despite the lack of proof of the defendants’ guilt, the jury found eleven leaders of the union guilty, and the judge sentenced them to various terms in jail. Labor unions launched a campaign of protest against the sentence and demanded the release of the convicted men. One hundred and fourteen leaders of the AFL, CIO and Railroad Brotherhoods joined the campaign. They sent Roosevelt a telegram demanding release of the prisoners.

p Together with the government and the courts, rightist trade union leaders and the reactionary press also came out against the Communist Party. Reactionary papers called on the FBI and the Department of Justice to suppress the Communist Party. Frequent demands were made in Congress to ban the Party or place it under government control.

p In the summer of 1940, as a result of the anti-Communist hysteria, Congress began debate on a bill drafted by Representative Jerry Voorhis of California. Congress passed the bill in 28 October, at the very height of the election campaigns. Under pretext of struggle against organizations of a “criminal” nature or having a “criminal” tendency, the Voorhis Act made it incumbent upon the government to register all organizations “under foreign control”, and prohibit them from having any international ties.

p The black list law, as the Communists called it, was spearheaded against the US Communist Party. The legislators in Congress worked out measures to isolate the Communist Party from the international labor and communist movement, and to force it to sever relations with the Comintern. They pictured it as a “foreign agent" and sought to discredit the Party by identifying it with allegedly conspiratorial organizations.

p An extraordinary convention of the Communist Party was held November 16 and 17, 1940, in New York to discuss the situation. A report to the convention said that in view of the fact that the Voorhis Act would go into effect on January 1, 1941, the Party had to discuss the measures it must take. The convention reaffirmed the Party’s adherence to the principles of proletarian internationalism and its determination to fight for the repeal of the Voorhis Act. The convention also announced that in order to protect the Party from persecution under the Voorhis Act, all organizational ties with the Comintern and all other organizations abroad would be severed.

p Thus, as much as two-and-a-half years prior to the dissolution of the Communist International, the US Communist Party left its ranks, forced to take this step to avoid new persecution under the Voorhis Act. Although the Party was still legal, repressive actions against it continued. It was in these difficult conditions that the Party had to wage the struggle in the 1940 elections.

p Political struggle centered on the question of attitude to fascism and war. In the second half of 1940, transformation of the imperialist war into an anti-fascist, people’s war became increasingly apparent. The suppression of the freedom and independence of entire nations provoked reactions on the part of patriots who had joined the ranks of the partisans and francs-tireurs. The Resistance movement came into being in 29 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and other European countries.

p Liberation tendencies intensified and the idea of a collective rebuff to the enemy matured. The prerequisites for uniting all anti-fascist forces were being created in the course of the war.

p Americans watched the events unfolding in Europe in 1940 with a sense of growing alarm. The situation was indeed critical. It showed that the “phony war" had come to an end. On April 9, German troops invaded Denmark, and on April 10, they were already in control of the major ports of Norway. On May 10, Hitler’s armies invaded Belgium and Holland, after which the battle for France broke out. The British forces suffered defeat at Dunkirk, and the French army was retreating toward Paris. Under these conditions, Chamberlain’s Munichite government in London fell on May 7 and 8, 1940, and two days later Winston Churchill’s new war cabinet was formed.

p In Washington, in the meantime, Roosevelt was conferring with the military command and members of his cabinet. In connection with the German offensive on the Western Front, Roosevelt told the Pan-American Scientific Congress on May 10, 1940, “I am a pacifist. But I believe that... you and I, in the long run and if it be necessary, will act together to protect, to defend by every means our science, our culture, our American freedom and our civilization."  [29•1  On May 17, in a message to Congress in which he sought to substantiate the need for a sharp increase in defense spending, he pointed out, quite directly now, that “the American people must recast their thinking about national protection".  [29•2  The President asked Congress to appropriate at once an additional one billion dollars for the needs of the Army and Navy, which was necessary, in his words, to speed up the production of armaments and military supplies, and increase the output of combat aircraft to 50,000 a year.  [29•3 

p Assessing the President’s activity at the beginning of the war, William Z. Foster later wrote that, realizing that the United 30 States would inevitably enter the struggle against Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, Roosevelt pursued a general course toward war against fascism. Toward this end, Roosevelt’s policy initially was one of making the United States “the great arsenal of democracy”.

p Where did the labor unions stand during the 1940 election campaigns? The leaders of the Communist Party realized that the Communists had no possibility to lead the broad masses of organized and unorganized workers. This circumstance immeasurably raised the responsibility and role of the unions.

p Most labor organizations came out in support of Democratic congressional candidates. Union conventions and meetings passed resolutions favoring the re-election of Roosevelt for a third term as a guarantee that the New Deal policies would be continued.

p Neutralist sentiments still prevailed in labor union circles, but some supporters of neutrality condemned war preparedness measures while others acknowledged the need for them. On this issue, most of the leaders of the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhoods, as well as those of the miners’ union, belonged to the first group, while a considerable part of the CIO leaders and unions were in the second.

p Republican backers in the labor unions used the defense measures which the government had decided to undertake as propaganda against the Democrats.They tried, for example,to represent the Burke-Wadsworth Military Service Bill as a betrayal of the national interest. The bill provided for universal military conscription for male citizens from 18 to 65, and compulsory military training. This bill was the first attempt to provide for a regular army based on peacetime conscription. Britain and the United States at the time had small land forces and no compulsory military service. In the past, they had reinforced their armed forces with volunteers. On the eve of World War II, the United States still had no universal military conscription law.

p The appearance of such a bill emphasized the vulnerability of peace for America. Matters were moving toward US participation in a big war, and in such a war it would be impossible to operate with volunteers only. But even so, the labor unions came out from pacifist positions and opposed the 31 bill. They were supported in this by the mass of rank-and-file workers. Time was needed to overcome the obstruction this bill encountered during the lengthy debates. Philip Murray, vice-president of the CIO and United Mine Workers, told the international convention of the United Automobile Workers at St. Louis on August 1 that there was no need of a conscription law in peacetime. He believed that the young men of America should be given an opportunity to enlist in the armed services voluntarily.  [31•1 

p Congress passed the bill on September 14, 1940, and the President signed it on September 16. It went into effect as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.  [31•2  This was a new step by the administration and Congress in preparing the United States for war. Soon, the labor unions also abandoned their opposition to the new law and began to support it. Shortly after the bill was passed, The American Federationist wrote: “The American Federation of Labor opposed this bill while it was under consideration because it felt that the traditional American system of voluntary enlistment should be given a full trial first. But now that peacetime conscription has become the law of the land, the American Federation of Labor has pledged every effort to make it supremely successful."  [31•3 

p While supporting the conscription law, the labor unions continued to favor US neutrality. However, this common platform did not rule out differences concerning the rate and scope of preparations for possible involvement in the war. The tenacity and influence of isolationist sentiments among workers evoked varying attitudes among the unions to the government’s defense measures. Still, the objective course of World War II, the growing threat of its drawing closer to American shores, and the country’s increased preparations for entry into the war, all tended to weaken isolationist sentiments.

p The Republicans, however, succeeded in creating opposition to President Roosevelt in the United Mine Workers union, headed by John L.Lewis. Lewis supported Roosevelt in 1936, 32 but in 1937, relations between them worsened. In 1940, Lewis no longer concealed his pro-Republican orientation and embarked on a course supporting Willkie and McNary. In effect, this decision placed him among the political enemies of Roosevelt. Lewis’ position was complicated by the fact that he was president of the CIO, which united almost five million workers, most of whom intended to vote for Roosevelt. Lewis realized that it would be hard for him to continue heading an organization that was oriented toward the Democratic Party. The question facing him was: how to induce the masses to follow him?

p He used a variety of maneuvers. At first he tried to convince the workers that Roosevelt would not be nominated for re-election, and that the states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York were trending toward the Republican column.  [32•1  In a major speech at the 36th convention of the UMWU in Columbus, Ohio, Lewis bitterly criticized the Democratic Party, defining it as the minority party.  [32•2  When Roosevelt was nonetheless nominated, Lewis, using the propaganda machine of the United Mine Workers, launched a campaign for Willkie’s election. The United Mine Workers Journal wrote that Roosevelt’s re-election would be equivalent to putting American boys on troop transports to Europe. It spread the isolationist thesis that the United States could stay out of the war because it was separated from it by a vast ocean.

p As the top man in Labor’s Non-Partisan League, which he helped found in 1936, Lewis sought to steer the League’s activity against the Democrats. However, the work the League actually did went counter to the intentions of its leader. Relying on his popularity and prestige among workers, Lewis decided to come out with an open call for labor to vote Republican. In a radio speech on October 25, 1940, he threatened to retire as president of the CIO if Willkie was defeated due to the lack of labor support. Stating his view that the election of President Roosevelt for a third term would be a national evil of the first magnitude, Lewis said, “I think that the election of Mr. 33 Wendell Willkie is imperative in relation to the country’s needs. I commend him to the men and women of labor and to the nation. It is obvious that President Roosevelt will not be re-elected for the third term, unless he has the overwhelming support of the men and women of labor. If he is, therefore, re-elected, it will mean that the members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations have rejected my advice and recommendation. I will accept the result as being the equivalent of a vote of no confidence, and will retire as President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.”   [33•1 

p He repeated this threat on more than one occasion in later speeches, saying that if you want to lose Lewis, vote for Roosevelt, and if you want to keep Lewis, vote for Willkie.  [33•2 

p The stance of the CIO president caused serious friction within the CIO leadership. Lewis’ opponents grouped around Sidney Hillman. Disagreements manifested themselves at a convention of CIO unions of the state of New York in September 1940. Hillman’s group came out in support of Roosevelt. In protest to this line, 356 delegates headed by Allan Haywood walked out and opened their own conference. Haywood declared that the convention proceedings contravened the constitution, and Lewis said that the CIO executive board would discuss this “shameful affair”. But Hillman’s group turned out to have more influence in the CIO. It was supported by the leadership of a number of big unions, including the UAW and the United Steelworkers of America.

p The majority of the workers did not follow Lewis. They rejected his advice to vote for Willkie and his bid to become the indisputable leader of the masses. This was confirmed by a stream of resolutions supporting Roosevelt’s candidacy and telegrams from unions protesting against Lewis’ position. On November 5, 1940, the majority of the American people said “yes” to Roosevelt and “no” to Willkie. Lewis had no other alternative than to carry out his threat and submit his 34 resignation as CIO president, which he did at the third CIO convention in November of that year.

p Roosevelt won the election, but Willkie gathered an impressive number of votes. Suffice it to say that of the 49.8 million votes cast, 26.8 million or 53.8 per cent were for Roosevelt, as against 22.3 million, or 44.8 per cent, for Willkie.  [34•1  Among the latter there were many labor votes.

p In looking back over the election campaigns and the part played in them by the working class and its labor unions, one cannot avoid noting a certain very typical feature in the behavior of the top labor leaders. Be they from the AFL or CIO, they always alleged that their position in the elections was an independent one. Whenever the opportunity presented itself many stressed that they preferred to stay out of politics, that they were above partisan politics and had nothing in common with either of the two bourgeois parties.

p In fact, however, one group was pulling the majority of the working class over to the Democratic side, while the other was trying to get labor to back the Republicans. Each waged a struggle for influence over the workers and defended both their own interests and the interests of one or another faction of the bourgeoisie. Hillman praised Roosevelt and censured the Republicans; Lewis praised Willkie and reviled the Democrats. While fighting this verbal battle between themselves, the labor bosses remained ideological captives of the bourgeois parties.

p Remaining in the White House, Roosevelt continued in 1940 and 1941 his course toward preparing the United States for war. In this, he not only relied on the Democratic Party, but made good use of eminent Republicans. And as before, he gave special attention to problems of labor. The administration’s labor policy was considerably influenced by the changes taking place in the economic situation because of the war in Europe. It is very important, therefore, to consider these new trends in the nation’s economy.

p From the moment World War II began, big US finance capital appreciably strengthened its economic and political positions both within the country and in the capitalist world as a whole.

35

p During the years of neutrality, American monopolies launched into feverish activity in the defense industries which promised them the biggest profits. The Wall Street banks and corporations were foremost among those who reaped these profits. At the same time, they intensified the penetration of their representatives into the government apparatus to promote the expansion of defense production. Government contracts and the big subsidies that went with them were indeed an alluring prospect.

p The administration devoted considerable attention to the structure of government in connection with the war situation in Europe and the new tasks that now stood before the monopolies and the government. The President frequently addressed himself to the question of adapting the government apparatus to the growing needs of the moment and making it more flexible and maneuverable. He dissolved some committees and boards, reorganized others, and set up new ones. Due to the tasks arising because of the war and the possibility of US involvement in it, the government’s role and influence in the economy grew. This process went hand-in-hand with the penetration of representatives of big capital into the government apparatus, which on the whole strengthened statemonopoly capitalism in the nation’s economy and politics.

p In late May 1940, President Roosevelt established a National Defense Advisory Commission and appointed the president of the General Motors Corporation, William S. Knudsen, to head it. Its purpose was to help stimulate the production of war materials and to study the factors influencing production efficiency. A number of boards and divisions were set up under the Commission. Knudsen himself supervised the industrial production board; vice-president of General Motors E. Johnson headed the arms and ammunition production division; and chairman of the board of the United States Steel Corporation Edward Stettinius headed the industrial materials division. Among the heads of other divisions were Ralph Budd, president of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., and William Harrison, former president of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

p On January 7, 1941, Roosevelt reorganized the National Defense Advisory Commission into the Office of Production 36 Management, again appointing William Knudsen to head it, and making Sidney Hillman its associate director-general. In accordance with Roosevelt’s executive order of January 7, 1941, establishing the OPM, a labor division headed by Hillman, was organized within it on March 17. In August 1941, Stettinius became the lend-lease administrator, and Nelson Rockefeller, the eldest son of John D. Rockefeller, became US coordinator of inter-American relations.

p The government’s heightened role in the capitalist economy was seen not only in the construction of enterprises in various industries, especially in the defense industry, but also in open government intervention in labor relations. And it was generally not in the interests of the workers that government mediation bodies acted.

p With reference to World War I, Lenin had written: “In the course of the war world capitalism has taken a forward step not only towards concentration in general, but also towards transition from monopoly in general to state capitalism on a much broader scale than before.”   [36•1  During World War II a new step was taken on the way of strengthening state capitalism in the economy. This was especially characteristic of the USA.

p The upswing in industrial production was accompanied by technological progress. New enterprises were built and new equipment introduced. Assembly line production was improved and automation made its appearance. Technological progress in industry brought about a temporary rise in unemployment, but this was counteracted in subsequent years by the broad construction of new plants which created new jobs and by mobilization into the armed forces.

p According to US Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, the country did not yet feel a shortage of skilled manpower during the years of neutrality. The Bureau of Employment also confirmed this fact in April 1940, and announced that of 3,300,000 job seekers in 33 states there were 23,000 technicians, 657,000 skilled craftsmen and 858,000 semiskilled production workers available for work.  [36•2  In some industries 37 employment was still a little lower than in the preceding years, although this was no longer characteristic of industry as a whole.

p The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, was an important event. This was the law providing for the transfer on loan or lease of war supplies to belligerents whose resistance to the aggressor countries was vital to US defense.  [37•1 

p The President was empowered to instruct the relevant government department to organize the production of war materials and the procurement of strategic raw materials and to make them available to any country whose defense the President deemed vital to the defense of the United States. On March 27 and October 28, 1941, Congress passed the first and second appropriation acts to finance lend-lease. In a message to Congress a year later, the President reported on the results of allocations made under the acts. Of the two appropriations amounting to $12,972 million, $12,272 million had already been allocated, $2,838 million going into the production of aircraft, $1,664 million into vessels, $1,993 million into artillery, $959 million into tanks, and so forth.  [37•2 

Not surprisingly, therefore, by the end of the period of neutrality American monopolies had expanded their capacities for producing munitions and other war supplies. This brought about a further upsurge of industry and the onset of a period of war-industry boom. In the first two years of World War II, American monopolies already showed a sharp increase in profits. As compared with 1939, when profits amounted to $6.4 billion before taxes and $5 billion after taxes, these figures were, respectively, $9.3 billion and $6.4 billion in 1940, and $17.2 billion and $9.4 billion in 1941.  [37•3  The monopolies had even better prospects for expanding production further and deriving new profits. Quite naturally, now more than ever before they were interested in uninterrupted work of their enterprises. However, the implementation of these plans also depended on the working class which had its own material interests not coinciding with the objectives of the capitalists.