120

p Y. Bassln

p Icon is an important gnosiological concept, ranking with such concepts as image, sign, model, etc. The theoretical “biography” of this concept has much in common with the “biography” of the model. Like models, icons have become an object of philosophical analysis only comparatively recently and are arousing growing interest; at the same time the utilisation of icons in various fields of activity is returning us to our distant past.

p The growing theoretical interest in icons is the result of a variety of reasons. The rapid development in the technical means of obtaining icons (photographic icons, cinematic icons, etc.) and transmitting them over long distances (television, the telegraphing of photographs, etc.) has led to an unusually extensive dissemination of icons in all fields of human activity and in everyday life. Creation of a general theory of icon has acquired especial significance in connection with the solution of the problem of recognising icons by technical devices (perceptrons) as well as of a whole range of problems in engineering psychology. Aesthetics, too, is conscious of the need for special examination of the concept of “an icon”.

p A notable increase in the use of the terms “an icon" and “iconic”, both in art history and in philosophical, scientific and technical writing, directly reflects the close attention being devoted to the problem of an icon. Aesthetics and art history talk of artistic icon’ semiotics—of the iconic sign, model theory—of iconic models, the theory of signals—of icons-signals, psycho-physiological bionics—of psychic icons, and so on. The term “an icon" (and, correspondingly, “iconic”) has by no means the same meaning in all these usages, which leads to serious difficulties in theoretical research.

121

In connection with the above, it is important to clarify the nature of the concept under examination, establish the general and fundamental features of an icon, analyse its gnosiological functions and elucidate the correlation between this concept and the concepts of isomorphism, image, sign and model.

THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF AN ICON

p A general theory of icon is still in the process of formation and it is, therefore, impossible at present to define precisely the concept of an “icon”. Instead, the author has set himself the more modest goal of formulating a number of essential conditions which must be met by any sufficiently general definition of an icon.

p It is not difficult to elicit, on the basis of inductive generalisation from numerous cases in which objects function as icons (whether these objects be drawings, photographs, traces, etc.) that in every case an icon is spoken of when an object stands in a relationship of similarity to another object. The problem, therefore, consists in making the degree of this similarity more precise. It is impossible to do this by inductive, empirical means, since the application of the term “an icon" both in aesthetics and in technology and everyday life, does not, as a rule, rest on firmly established criteria. In noting this difficulty, a number of researchers have proposed to circumvent it by eliminating the dichotomy of “iconic” and “non-iconic" and replacing it by a scale marking off degrees of iconic representation. Since iconic representation lacks strict criteria, the essence of the matter lies in the degree of its presence. Such an approach, it is thought, does away with the problem of determining which combination of properties meets the definition of iconic representation.

p We believe that it is more profitable to bring out the significance of the concept of an icon by means of limiting the most general concept of similarity, which is the concept of isomorphism (or homomorphism as its extreme) elaborated in mathematics.

p Before describing this method, we should note that we view icon as a gnosiological concept. This means that the mere presence of a definite similarity between an object and its original does not make the object an icon. It becomes such when a subject becomes aware of the existing objective similarity in the process of correlating the object and the original. This is why, strictly speaking, it is not the concept of an icon which derives from the concept of isomorphism, but rather the concept of that degree of similarity which exists objectively and is the necessary ontological basis (or a prerequisite) of an icon.

122

p The concept of isomorphism is, in the narrow sense of the word, applicable only in relation to abstract (mathematical, logical) systems. No relationship of absolute isomorphism is ever observed between the members of systems of real objects (which, as a rule, include icons applied in art and also in technology and everyday life). In general, not every characteristic of the elements of an object or even all the elements are reproduced and preserved in an icon. Similarly, not all the particular features of their organisation are reproduced, but only a certain number. Can systems which reproduce only individual, discrete properties of an original be called icons? Which combination of reproduced properties (and which properties) is necessary if a system is to function as an icon and in what does the objective criterion for determining this combination consist? Answers must be provided to all these questions if the concept of “an icon" is to be defined.

p It evidently serves no purpose to call a whole system an icon when only separate, individual properties of the original similar to the object are reproduced and preserved. In this case it can only be stated that an icon of certain properties or relationships is present in the given system. For example, in a recording of a television icon on videotape the one-dimensional sequence of the elements in a series is preserved and reproduced and remains invariant (that is, is represented by an icon). Other properties of spatial and temporal regulation, such as form, metre and so on, are transformed, remaining, however, isomorphic properties of the original. It is said of such properties, not that they are represented, but that they are coded in a given system.

p Let us turn briefly to the term “coding”. Its application presupposes a knowledge of the code or cipher: a knowledge of the exact rules for transition from the properties of the original to the isomorphism of its reflection in a given system. In cases where these rules are not precisely observed another term—“expression”—is preferable. Thus, for example, it is more accurate to say of drawings in which the dimensions of the original are transformed in respect to scale that the size and dimensions of the original are not coded but “expressed” in them.

p But is it meaningful to talk of an icon as such in a case where absolute isomorphism is absent?

p It is relatively easier to answer this question when considering systems to which the concept of physical similarity elaborated in the theory of similarity is extended. The latter is confined to establishing a correlation of this kind between qualitatively homogeneous objects and phenomena; in the theory of similarity an objective criterion—a constant of similarity—is worked out. 123 Systems, as we know, possess geometrical, dynamic or cinematic similarity. If any two systems stand in a relationship of physical similarity, there is a basis for asserting that the ontological prerequisite exists for one of these systems to function as an icon. The majority of icons we encounter in the visual arts (for example, photographic, cinematic or televisual icons) are built on this principle. Thus, the ontological basis of the majority of icons is the relationship of similarity. Depending on the number of coded (or expressed) properties, we can talk of greater or lesser conventionality of an icon. If reproduced properties are only coded (or expressed) without there being a similarity between the given system as a whole and the original, it is not possible to speak of an icon.  [123•1 

p A further ontological prerequisite for an icon that is advanced is that of integrity. Integrity represents a combination of component parts which is characterised by interdependence between the parts and an absence of their autonomy. Integrity as an ontological feature is evidently inherent only to icons, each of which is in itself an “organic” whole. For example, the integrity of movement as a continuous process in space and time can be represented by an icon through a processual “duplicate” of this movement in the form, say, of a pantomime, which in this case functions as an integral icon (in the ontological sense).

p However, movement can also be represented by an icon by another means: through the sum of discrete states of rest, as in cinematic icon. The integrity of an icon in this case is attained as a result of the peculiarity of visual perception known as the strobpscopic effect. The integrity of many icons—even the majority of them—arises, as we can see, only when the objective character of an icon is realised in the process of perception; consequently, integrity bears not an ontological but a gnosiological character.

p The view is expressed that an icon can be both material and ideal. In our view, it is more expedient to categorise ideal icons under the term “image”. It is evidently appropriate to characterise a sensory image (a sensation or perception) as an icon only when the image is viewed as a material signal. When an image is understood as an ideal reflection, to term it “an icon" is to provide an opportunity for confusion.

124

p Icons, being material in their ontological basis, can, generally speaking, encompass not only macroscopic-continuous objects, but also atomic-molecular, quantum-undulatory or discrete-impulse objects. However, man cannot directly and visually perceive objects and phenomena of this last kind and become aware in this way of their objective character. This means that they are not icons in the sense indicated above. Consequently, icons are always systems of a macroscopic-continuous character, although this does not exclude the presence in them, within the bounds of this continuity, of a discrete microstructure.

Thus, systems which can function as icons must necessarily possess the following ontological characteristics. They must be: 1. Material. 2. Macroscopic-continuous. 3. They must possess a certain resemblance to another object. 4. The degree of this resemblance may be expressed—for the majority of icons, at any rate—in the concept of similarity.

THE REPRESENTATIVE FUNCTION OF AN ICON

p The gnosiological nature of an icon is manifested in the elucidation of such ontological signs as integrity and macrocontinuity, but it is displayed with particular clarity in an analysis of the functions of icons. Material systems possessing the ontological features noted above become icons only when they fulfill the gnosiological function of representation. The latter consists in man’s becoming aware of the objective character of given systems in perceiving them and receiving visual, “pictorial” information about the original.

p The function of representation is quite often equated with the sign function—with the property of “being a sign"—particularly in semiotics. An icon here functions as a variant of the sign (iconic sign) with the special character of representation.  [124•1 

p The gnosiological functions of an icon as a representator or iconic sign is analysed in detail in semiotics. An iconic sign is never able to embody all the properties of a designated object with 125 absolute identity; it always has a number of properties distinct from those of the denotatum.

p It is noted that in perceiving sign-vehicle of an iconic sign the material substratum of the sign is simultaneously perceived as a denotatum; that is, knowledge about a number of properties of an object is received indirectly and, at the same time, directly. Here the sign-vehicle functions as one of the denotatum, to which the iconic sign refers us.

p An iconic sign may designate something by any method: characterisation, evaluation, ascription, etc. Poetic, mythological, scientific and other icons, which can fulfill the most varied individual and social functions (aesthetic, informative, etc.), differ correspondingly. An iconic sign’s strong point lies in its ability to present what it designates for contemplation; its weak point lies in the limitation of the range of objects it can designate to those which are.similar to it.

p An icon (or, more precisely, its substratum with the structure inherent to it) is material and sensually perceived. On the basis of this material structure a transmission of semantic information about the original takes place in the perception of an icon. In the given case semantic information bears an ideal and visual character or, what is the same thing, functions as an image. The image is, in fact, the ideal “meaning” of an icon, relatively general in its meaning, stable, normalised and, in its turn, conditioned by the peculiarity of the structure of the icon itself, which, by comparison with signs, is more normalised and, in principle, universal. An icon presupposes for its functioning normal human perception under the condition of personal acquaintance on the part of the perceiver with the original or of his acquaintance with the original through a description. It is required of the icon that the original be “recognised” in it and the number of degrees of freedom of the icon and, correspondingly, its integrity and normalisation are determined specifically by this necessary requirement. Additional limitations on the number of degrees of freedom are conditioned by practical functions of an icon (measurement, etc.), which are accessory in relation to representation.

p An individual, personalised interpretation of the “meaning” of an icon will characterise it from the psychological aspect. In this case it is appropriate to speak not of the “meaning” but of the “sense” of an icon representation.

p An icon also functions as a signal, which bears information (in the Shannon sense). Information is determined by the measure of complexity of the forms of an icon presented for perception. The greater the structural complexity of an icon, the greater the degree 126 of linkage between the elements and the higher the coefficient of their regularity, hence the greater the superfluousness of information or predictability, at least of a statistical character. Insofar as a statistical link in mathematics or the correlation between the past and the future are expressed with the aid of the function of auto-correlation, the quantity of information characterising any of the forms—which means the iconic form as well—is measured by the degree of interconnection or, more precisely, by the auto-correlation of the sequence of elements among themselves.

p The quantity of information is minimal, given complete organisation of the icon, and corresponds to infinite predictability when the function of auto-correlation tends towards zero. As the form of a familiar icon is predictable, it increases the intelligibility and superfluousness of the given message and simultaneously reduces its originality. This is linked to the known advantages of icon as a signal of information. At the same time, experiments in the field of engineering psychology have made it clear that excessive predictability, attained by the principle of “pictorialness” of the signal, is transformed from a means of increasing the reliability of the transmission of information to man to a means of reducing it. The problem of the optimum coding of information with the aid of icons requires further research.

Representation is not, as a rule, the final goal or concluding function of an icon. It is, rather, a constitutive property of an icon, without which it could not exist as such. The final goals of representation may vary. When an icon serves the goals of cognition of an original (including artistic cognition), it functions as an iconic model.  [126•1 

ICON AND THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

p Among the icons used by man in cognitive and practical activity and, in particular, in art, a significant place is occupied by icons whose link with the original bears a causative character. Icons of this type—televisual, photographic and cinematic icons, 127 drawings, traces, imprints, etc.—possess all the necessary ontological features of reflection, such as the presence of real interaction (direct or indirect) between material objects and the preservation of the structure of what is reflected in the structure of the reflector. The functioning of any object as an icon always presupposes gnosiological reflection as well. In the process of correlating icon and the original, distinguishing the content of reflection, etc. an ideal image of the original is formed. The establishment of a resemblance between icon and original and of the degree and character of this resemblance is mediated by the activity of man’s consciousness. This relates in particular to all movements (and poses, as aspects of this movement) of a man made in conscious imitation or icon of any other objects, phenomena, people, etc., as well as to objective, substantial “imprints” of these iconic movements (drawings, sculptures, etc.).

p Elucidation of the nature and mechanism of the formation specifically of this type of an icon is of the greatest interest, since the basic gnosiological problems of the theory of icon are concentrated in this area in their most graphic form. A theoretical basis for elucidating the given question is provided by research into the machanism of sensory reflection and psychical regulation of motor acts.

p How is the relationship of similarity between icons such as drawings or sculpture and the represented objects realised? As a result of the action of the object on the receptive and analytic functions of the analyser initial states of excitation arise in its receptive link which are transformed into a nervous code in the form of stimulatory impulses. The latter reach the central link of the analyser, whence signals are sent controlling the effector link, which carries out the “iconic” motor act. In all three links isomorphism between the content of the action of the object and the corresponding signals in the analyser is preserved. However, the signal-code in its general form (simple correspondence) does not ensure reproduction of the concrete individual properties of the represented object and, consequently, cannot ensure reproduction of a motor act similar in its spatial and cinematic “outline” to the object represented by an icon.

p Contemporary data pioviued by theoretical informational research into the organisation of the effector and central links of the reflector system testify to the fact that neither the structure of channels of central connections, nor the structure of skeletal-muscular effectors will in themselves fix a concrete programme of objective behavioural acts realised by them. The correct conclusion to emerge from this is that in mental regulation the form of 128 organisation of response reactions cannot be realised on the basis of the general code form of the signal and that the mental signal or sensory image usually “works” specifically a« an icon.

p A mental icon ensures the fundamental possibility of preserving a causal similarity between the original and an iconic motor act (pantomime). This causal similarity is, naturally, also preserved in those imprints and traces of this iconic action which also constitute objective icons.  [128•1 

p From the gnosiological point of view the group of icons which we are reviewing is the representation of real sensuous objects mediated by psychological reflection. An icon is directly determined by psychological icons. The latter does not always function as a simple image of sensatiQn or perception which is directly determined by the object. Lenin had sensation and perception specifically in mind when he stressed that an icon necessarily and inevitably presupposes the objective reality of that which is represented. But apart from the sensuous being of an object, the activity of the subject’s consciousness forms an important factor in the formation of a psychological icon or a mental, ideal model of an objective icon. Psychological correlates correspondingly transform images of sensation and perception, as a result of which psychological icons as ideal model of iconic action are created. All this can and not infrequently does lead to a situation in which similar transformation, in conjunction with the combination of different images and the complex analytical and synthetic activity of the consciousness, creates psychological icons which, taken as a whole, do not presuppose the objective reality of that concrete whole which is represented, although it is indubitable that the “building material" for such images is also taken from the real world. Evidently, an objective icon of these images represents objectively existing objects indirectly, mediately, whereas it reproduces psychological icons directly. This, in particular, is the case with an icon of the fantastic images of the artistic consciousness.

p Inasmuch an icon is material and is ultimately always determined by an object, it is objective. Conversely, to the degree 129 that this determination is mediated by the subject’s consciousness, the icon is subjective. Thus, icons of the type we are examining always function as unities of the subjective and the objective. The subjectivity of icons, as distinct from sensory images, in no wa$ means that the former reside in the consciousness of the subject and are inaccessible to external observation. Subjectivity here means that the icon reproduces not only the object, but also the subject. The subject is not represented by an icon but expressed in another specific form: it is coded or, more precisely, it is expressed in a transformed icon.

p Thus, in the icons under examination, the object is represented by an icon and expressed (coded), while the subject is only expressed. Of course, it can also be represented by an icon, but then it will have become an object of an icon.

p Transformation certainly does not mean the obligatory distortion of form. It can be any deviation from the original or noncoincidence with it, whether committed intentionally or subconsciously. However, we do not take into account deformations which are the result of the action of “organic” reasons, including: 1) disruption of the normal activity of the consciousness;

p 2) physical inadequacies (pathology) on the part of the representor;

p 3) inability to objectivise, or to produce an icon.

p The subjective aspect encompasses the relationship of the subject towards that which is represented by an icon (an aesthetic, ethical, utilitarian, etc. relationship). For example, the cognitive approach turns transformation of the icon in the direction of a more profound cognition of the object. The basic transforming operation here is that of abstraction. The utilitarian approach “adapts” the icon in the direction of the solution of practical problems (identification, measurement, etc.). The evaluative approach which manifests itself principally in art, is realised in an artistic representation by a variety of methods and means, through composition, foreshortening, montage, etc. A special aspect of the subjective side of an icon is the evaluative approach towards the icon itself and its substratum.

p In all the cases examined above we have in view icons created without the aid of technical devices. However icons obtained with the aid of some kind of technical device are being disseminated increasingly widely. How is the subjective aspect reflected in icons of this kind?

p In individual icons of this kind, the subject can express itself through the position (camera angle, foreshortening) from which the icon is made or by means of alterations in the technical device itself (changing the lense, focusing, etc.). All this ensures the 130 opportunrty for transformation in the broad sense of the word. Imprints can also be subjected to treatment (for example, in artistic photography). With the combination of icons additional and extremely effective methods of “subjectivisation” of icon arise, which can be grouped together under the single term of “montage”.

p The problems of icon and abstraction and of icon and the “general” form the most important aspect of the study of an icon in the light of the theory of reflection. As has already been noted, every icon presupposes gnosiological reflection, the basis of which is constituted by the processes of abstraction both in the course of creating the icons and in the course of their perception. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that any icon, like any other sensuously perceived phenomenon, is always concrete. Nevertheless, it is said that an abstraction may be not only a concept, that is, the result of a process of mental abstraction, but also a sensuous, visual image (for example, a geometrical drawing, diagram or work of so-called abstract art). For this reason it seems to us necessary to state the following.

p Any icon, being in itself concrete, materialises (in the process of creation) and evokes in the consciousness (in the process of perception) an image of the original. This image is always an abstract representation of the original, since it is always abstracted from something, something is singled out, etc. It is only in this sense, I consider, that reference can be made to the “abstractness” of an icon. In this sense every icon is abstract and only the degree of abstraction differs—from a stereoscopic cinema icon in colour to, say, an iconic diagram. In ordinary usage only icons of a very high order of abstraction are, as a rule, termed “abstract”. Works of so-called abstract art generally contain no icons whatsoever in the exact sense of this term as accepted by us, since in them abstraction is taken to the point of complete divorce from the visible form of the work’s subject.

p In stating that an icon embodies an abstracted image of the original, we mean by an image not a concept but a visual image and, consequently, an image of an individual ooject. An icon is always individual and its denotatum (real or imagined) is always an individual thing. The question arises of whether it is possible to represent the general—^br example, not a certain house, but a house in general. In other words, is it possible to represent by an icon a concept? Can it be made visual?

p In the strict sense of the word this is impossible. The general is, in principle, not visual; it cannot be represented by an icon. The general concept of “a triangle" cannot be identified with the drawing of a triangle. But it is also true that there is no other visual 131 path to the general concept of a triangle than through the icons of separate triangles. However, for the philosopher who rejects the existence of the general and identifies it with a particular case, inasmuch as it represents other particular cases, it is a matter of indifference which case he selects. At the same time there are individual things which, without ceasing to be individual, are nevertheless closer to the general than others. In them the general is manifested more vividly. Individual things of this kind are termed “characteristic” or “typical”; in perceiving them it is easier to render the general abstract. When an icon and, in particular, an artistic icon or a model is presented with the task of expressing the general, the icon, without losing its individuality, is organised in such a way as to elicit the general, essential and normal.

p The specific character of generalising icons in art consists in their expression of the desire not to break away from all the fullness and richness of the concrete and individual or follow the course of rendering an icon abstract or schematic, but to “provoke” associative and generalising processes of thinking by means of searching out “types” or by isolating and emphasising the most characteristic aspects of a phenomenon.

Analysis of the devices and methods of building artistic icons and models, on the basis of which the processes of generalisation are carried out, is very important both from the theoretical point of view (on the level of the general theory of icon) and the practical point of view.