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p Y. Khachikyan

p The question of the correlation between representativeness and expressiveness has been a focus of constant attention both for practicing artists and theoreticians of art. This is quite natural in the light of the close affinity of this problem to that of discovering the nature of artistic cognition, as well as to that of classifying the arts.

p The assertion that every fully valid artistic image is a unity of representativeness and expressiveness is often met in writings on aesthetics.

p Existing definitions resemble one another in that almost all of them link the concept of “representativeness” to the reflection of the external, sensually perceived aspect of real phenomena and that of “expressiveness” to the reflection of their inner essence. While we do not in principle object to such a differentiation, since it is, in a certain sense, a just one, we must nevertheless emphasise that it is too general in character. At a certain point it is contiguous with a differentiation between the categories of phenomenon and essence and is, therefore, applicable not just to art alone. But even these closely related definitions differ one from the other. Thus, man’s thoughts and feelings—his spiritual traits—belong in the one case to the representative side of art and in the other, to the expressive side; one writer will view representation as being, without reservations, a reflection of the external, sensually perceived appearance of the world, while another will see it as the reflection primarily of this appearance; in one case expression will be characterised as a property of the work of art, in another it will be viewed as an ability of the artist, and so on.

p It is our view that definitions of the categories of “112 representativeness" and “expressiveness” must at the very least meet the following conditions: 1) they must be specific to art and not coincide with the usual, non-terminological meaning of these words and 2) they must characterise all art and not individual forms of it.

p We shall make two further qualifications. Firstly, the gnosiological nature of representativeness and expressiveness in art must be clearly realised. Both categories are the product of the process of reflection. However, although writings on aesthetics and art generally treat the former in this way (hardly anyone would seriously speak of the representativeness of, for example, a mountain or a tree), the concept of expressiveness is sometimes used to characterise phenomena in the external world, which is fundamentally incorrect.

p Secondly, it is necessary to realise just as clearly that expressiveness in art possesses an artistically cognitive and not a general gnosiological character. The task is to reveal the essence of expressiveness as a category of art. Meanwhile some authors, in characterising expressiveness as a gnosiological phenomenon, fail to notice or to take into account its specifically artistic features.

p Inconsistency in interpreting representativeness and expressiveness leads to contradictory comparative evaluations of their place and significance in a work of art. Of course, the thesis that representativeness alone is insufficient to be considered art, while expressiveness is unattainable without representativeness is, in general, profoundly correct. However, additional clarification of the subordination of the two aspects under consideration is required within, of course, the framework of their unity. The question of the predominance of one of them is very important. Here it must be remembered that this problem is not automatically dismissed by the acknowledgement of unity. It is not by chance that the majority of writers asserting this unity proceed, at the same time, from the principle of the predominance either of representativeness or of expressiveness.

p In this connection we wish to examine critically an opinion which, in all its apparent veracity, seems to us to be erroneous. This view declares that the aim of art is representativeness: an error rooted, in our opinion, in the belief that any feature or quality of reflection is linked exclusively to representativeness.

p An approach of this kind tacitly allows for the possibility of erroneously concluding that the expressive aspect of art is not involved in reflection.

p However, both the representative and expressive sides of a work of art represent a reflection of reality; but this reflection is, as it were, on different levels. Representativeness is direct, primary 114 reflection, while expressiveness is mediated and derivative reflection. The former is a necessary basis for revealing the latter, since the former represents the result of fixing real phenomena, which are being reflected, by material means, and it is through the former that their aesthetic significance is revealed. But if, nevertheless, disclosing and embodying the aesthetic value of real phenomena is the aim of artistic cognition, then however high a value we place on the cognitive significance of the representative aspect, it is expressiveness, as an indicator of the aesthetic, that will testify to the full value of artistic cognition. We are thus entitled to assert, in stating the unity of representativeness and expressiveness, that the latter is the aim of art, while the former is the means of achieving it. This, we propose, by no means minimises the role and significance of representativeness but, on the contrary, emphasises its absolute necessity in art, since - direct, pure expressiveness does not and cannot exist apart from representativeness. However, while representativeness is the necessary basis for and bearer of expressiveness, the former is not identical to the latter and does not automatically lead to it. Otherwise any representation would be expressive and by its expressiveness be equal to any other representation of one and the same object.

p A work of art is expressive when it conveys more than it represents. If, in a work, representation in itself exhausts the content of that work, then the latter is not expressive. Expressiveness demands an extra, special effort on the part of the artist over and above what is required for representation as such.

p The fact that expressiveness, however defined, is a universal feature of art is not a matter for dispute. Whether representativeness is an equally universal feature or whether it is inherent only in specific forms of art does, however, provide grounds for contention.

p The classification of the arts into representative and nonrepresentative possesses only one unquestionable virtue: the terminology here does not allow any doubt concerning the universal character of expressiveness.

p However questions immediately arise: on what basis is expressiveness attained in non-representative arts, for example? What is the non-representative basis of the image like? How and in what is the bond between a work of non-representative art and reality manifested? For it is impossible to see this bond only in the material aspect of a work of art.

p What is important is representation which is realised with the help of material means, that is, by transferring certain aspects and manifestations of reality into a work of art and depicting them in it.

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p If the term “representative”, although interpreted in different ways, characterises specifically the primary, necessary reflection of reality in art, then the term “non-representative” is too vague. Lacking its own positive content, it denotes at best a negation of what is revealed and embraced by the term “representative”. And it is not surprising that writers who use the term “non-representative" seldom burden themselves with the task ’of revealing its content, although, as a rule, they always define the opposite, positive term.

p Recently the long dominant and yet to be fully overcome trends in aesthetics towards an excessive concentration on literature have come under increasing criticism. Such criticism is useful, as it promotes the elaboration of universal, genuinely aesthetic categories and principles, but its scope must be extended to include trends towards excessive concentration on painting which are evident, in particular, in the interpretation of representativeness. However, the embracement of the whole of art within a single principle is “prevented” not so much by the representativeness of some arts and the non-representativeness of others as by the fact that representativeness in art is often identified with a representativeness specific only to certain arts, in particular, painting. Paradoxically, this is sometimes done by those who limit the sphere of representativeness in art and by those who recognise it as a universal attribute of art.

p The appearance of tendencies towards excessive concentration on painting in interpreting “representativeness”, with all the consequences that follow from this, is, of course, not fortuitous.

p The crux of the matter is that the problem of the correlation of representativeness and expressiveness was elaborated within the framework of the so-called “representative” arts (painting, sculpture and drawing)—and, above all, of painting—prior to and .more fully than in the other arts. A consequence of this is, in particular, that the representativeness specific to painting has come to be perceived and understood as representativeness in general. This is why some deny representativeness in a number of arts, while others, acknowledging it as a universal category in art, seek, very unconvincingly, to refer to the type of representativeness specific to painting. On the other hand, the striving to interpret representativeness as a conformity of reproduction to the visual aspect of things and objects is linked to the dominant role of visual images in the cognition of the world and, correspondingly, in the activity of our imagination.

p Visual images arc, of course, cognitively the richest and most valuable. It is also indisputable that the functioning imagination 116 does invariably recreate and reconstruct in the memory the visual aspect of the world as well. However, it is incorrect to apply the term “representativeness” to two qualitatively different things: namely, to the visual aspect of the world of objects as reproduced in a work of art and to the visual images which arise in our imagination by association. Yet some, who speak of representativeness in music, too, having in mind the imitation of sounds, see the meaning and significance of such imitation in its stimulating of visual images that arise by association.

p This approach to the issue is unacceptable, since it is in fact based on an inadmissible substitution of the perception of the visual aspect of an object by its mental reproduction. Moreover, it tacitly passes over the fact that visual images within the imagination can arise by association together with images of another character in the perception of a work belonging to any form of art, including perception of the visual images in painting, and that visual images within the imagination are by no means a monopoly of those arts in which a visible picture of reality is absent.

p The truth obviously is that representativeness and expressiveness manifest themselves in each form of art in a way specific to that form. It is, therefore, inadmissible to project their concrete embodiment in one form of art on to other forms and, consequently, such definitions of representativeness and expressiveness are needed which would be applicable to all forms of art.

p A general definition of expressiveness is the ability to convey something vividly and figuratively in art. However, what this “something” is must be more precisely defined if the concept of “expressiveness” is not to lose its specific meaning and significance and remain within the limits of its usual meaning. The essence of the problem consists in what art should express and how it should do this in order to acquire artistic expressiveness.

p At the same time it is clear that the attempt to define expressiveness in art as the ability to reflect man’s inner state through his external appearance explains only one of the manifestations of expressiveness in art while failing to define it as a universal category of art as a whole. In this connection we should like to examine in more detail how expressiveness manifests itself in portraiture.

p In a portrait the representative principle is usually linked to reproduction of the features and external aspect of the subject generally; the expressive principle is linked to conveyance of the subject’s inner spiritual state. A portrait, whether a piece of sculpture, a painting or a drawing, would not really be of artistic value if, for example, reproducing only the external features of a 117 person, it did not possess psychological value and.failed to express his inner world.

p Psychological expressiveness results from the realisation of a dual aim—the embodiment in a work of the objective and the subjective—and is manifested on two levels. These are, firstly, the discovering of the essence and inner meaning of the reflected phenomena and, secondly, the revealing of the artist’s attitude to these phenomena. But these two aspects are not encountered separately, but in a unity. The objective is always coloured and “animated” by the artist’s attitude towards it. This relationship is already present in the very fact of comprehending the essence of what is reflected. The subjective acquires meaning and can be realised only when the objective is present, since expressiveness on the subjective level, mediated through the artist’s attitude, always presupposes an object, the attitude to which is being expressed. This is why the unity of objective and subjective features is an indispensable condition for expressiveness; moreover, a psychological characterisation, however subtle and profound, does not attain true artistic expressiveness or become a fully valid artistic fact if it has not conveyed the artist’s attitude towards what is being represented. It should be added that reflection of the spiritual world of a character forms a component of expressiveness only in those artistic forms and genres which directly depict man.

p Thus, the expressiveness of the human face and body in life and in art cannot, for all their closeness, be identified. In the former case such expressiveness represents a real fact, in the latter, the result of the cognition of reality. In life it is a characteristic of the features of a definite person; in certain forms and genres of art it is itself one of the components of artistic expressiveness. Expressiveness in art is, further, an indicator of the aesthetically significant, showing the necessary ability of a work of art to convey and reveal the aesthetic content of that which is reflected. Therefore, the portrayal of an expressive human face, for example, attains the significance of artistic expressiveness only to the degree in which it contains, in addition to everything mentioned above, an aesthetic evaluation as well. But expressiveness is perceived emotionally, not rationally. No logical arguments can demonstrate the expressiveness of a work of art if it lacks emotional impact. Expressiveness in art is always linked with emotional and aesthetic reality. In a certain sense it can be said that the concept of the expressiveness of a work of art outside its emotional and aesthetic impact is meaningless, although on the other hand, expressiveness is more than emotional and aesthetic effectiveness.

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p Expressiveness is invariably linked with the figurativeness in art. In our view, expressiveness in art should be understood to mean the ability of a work of art or, more precisely, of its representative aspect, to convey emotionally to those perceiving it an aesthetically treated complex of ideas and feelings, in which the essence of what is reflected and the artist’s attitude to it are simultaneously revealed. A work of art is not expressive if it does not possess all these qualities.

p The question arises in connection with this of whether expressiveness is inherent in the objects and phenomena of reality attributively or whether they acquire this quality only in works of art after passing through the crucible of artistic cognition.

p We recognise the complexity and contentiousness of this question and make no claim to resolve it; rather, we wish only to express doubt concerning the legitimacy of the concept of “the expressiveness of life”. We believe that in this case it will not be enough just to make reservations warning against the identification of expressiveness in life with expressiveness in art.

p In non-terminological, general usage, “expressiveness” is interpreted in at least three ways: as meaningfulness (significance); as the vivid, figurative conveyance and disclosure of something and, finally, as the reflection of man’s inner state through his outward appearance. The last interpretation has already been discussed in connection with portraiture and from what was noted it followed, firstly, that psychological expressiveness, while forming a component of artistic expressiveness in some artistic forms and genres is, at the same time, not identical with or equivalent to the concept of “artistic expressiveness”. Secondly, it followed that expressiveness in this sense (outside art) is applicable only to man.

p It may readily be noted that the two other meanings attached in common usage to “expressiveness” also predominantly characterise man, his actions or, at least, the work of his hand and mind and are not applicable to all manifestations of reality.

p Thus, the concept of “artistic expressiveness" is not applicable to reality by virtue of its gnosiological character, while the everyday meanings attached to the same word are similarly inapplicable because they lack universality and cannot be applied to all phenomena in the objective world. In short, the question of what is expressiveness in life as a basis for expressiveness in art remains essentially open.

p The phrase “the expressiveness of life" is imprecise and, we consider, denotes something else—apparently, life’s emotional and aesthetic impact—since this feature is, firstly, inherent both in art and reality (notwithstanding the difference between reflection and 119 that which is reflected) and, secondly, is an essential component of artistic expressiveness.

p In reality emotional and aesthetic impact appears in the process of direct, spontaneous perception of objects and phenomena.

In art the emotional and aesthetic impact of nature reflected is an important component of expressiveness (by no means exhausting it or being reduced to it) and a result of artistic cognition. A painter does not simply reproduce an aspect of nature that has stirred him, but simultaneously embodies his feelings and emotional attitude towards what has been reproduced; through his painting he shows both what has stirred him and why. This already testifies to the expressiveness and not simply to the emotional and aesthetic impact of a work of art. Emotional and aesthetic impact and expressiveness are sometimes mistakenly identified; the latter is used to characterise emotional and aesthetic impact only because expressiveness itself unquestionably possesses this feature.