THE ROOTS OF THE DISTINCTION
p In our time the problem of the relationship of science and morality has been invested with a degree of specificity, although its principle content still remains within the 197 boundaries of the Kantian juxtaposition of the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Science discovered atomic energy (and much else) and this accomplishment of the human intellect and of technology may be applied either for the good or for the bad of man. This is where the alternative arises: science does not have any moral significance, say certain Western minds, it does not determine the use to which its achievements and data are put. Science, consequently, must be supplemented with some other mode of the human reasoning, including the category of morality, which must suggest how and to what end scientific achievements will be applied. Science has never before been so morally significant, ooject others, for today scientific discoveries exert the unprecedented influence on the fate of mankind. Therefore the scientist must be imparted with a consciousness of his accountability before mankind. It follows that science must be subsumed under the moral law just as is any other aspect of human activity.
p What can be said of this antithesis? It doesn’t require a specialist in ethics to note that the opponents in substance have no point of dispute. Some simply sharpen or dramatize the problem by virtue of their inclination towards a tragic or pessimistic bent of mind, while others, to the contrary, cover the same ground in optimistic tones. Incidentally, to view the morality of science in terms of the necessity of imposing limitations in one form or another is illogical. If science and the scientist are to be confronted with certain moral demands this indicates that science as such does not bring forth these demands, rather it stands in need of a formulation to be contributed by morality.
p But let us attempt, nevertheless, to transgress the boundaries imposed by such a statement of the problem and decide whether or not science with its concomitant attributes—- rational and logical thinking and empirical verification—is capable not only of demonstrating the path to the achievement of predetermined goals but also of helping man in the choice of these goals? How can we pinpoint the fallacy in the Kantian dilemma and in the entire philosophical school of thought which remains within its boundaries? This fallacy lies above all in the fact that the ultimate, or higher goal of human ambitions is interpreted as something of an unconditional nature, as free of external determination and thereby rationally and empirically undefinable. What is then the origin of these "higher goals”, viz., the goals which are not formulated by existing reality, by any given system of social relations but which on the contrary underlie, justify or reject this reality?
198p The reality of human existence is by no means onedimensional. In addition to existing reality there is that which is essential, law-governed, that which determines such reality. In man’s life in society the essential characteristics of his being are by no means always in direct causal dependence upon external circumstances and facts. Sometimes, in fact, they are in a sharp contradiction. This is what actually forms the logic of historical change: one and the same social reality (for example, contemporary capitalist society) both reproduces itself in the form of a system of existing facts and is fraught with tendencies which sooner or later undermine the social order of the system. This is also a link—but one of a principally different order—the link of transition, development, motion into the future. Social contradictions, conflicts, class struggle, the clash of ideologies are phenomena yielding to explanation only from the point of view of their substance. Only in the context of historical development, which is both conditioned by the past and the present and creates something principally new, can we understand the emergence of goals, ideals, criticism of the substance of revolutionary programmes for a social change which counterpose reality as morally imperative.
p Thus, science is capable of explaining the emergence of man’s "higher goals" which extend beyond the boundaries of the system of relations existing in a given society. But can science provide a foundation for such goals?
p In the explanation of the origin of human goals man is regarded as one of the links in a functioning and developing system, as an object of the activity of socio-nistorical laws of development and as an agent of "natural-historical necessity”. The problem of substantiation, or “justification” (as moralists would have it) of goals presupposes the acceptance of man as an active, free and goal-positing subject. But to explain how and why this or that individual became what he is (what were his social and life conditions, his upbringing, the level of his education, the reasons underlying his conduct and the origins of his guiding motivations) does not signify a justification ofhis actions nor does it elicit his responsibility, nor reveal his merit or guilt. Sometimes it is necessary for an individual to act in disregard of circumstances and in opposition to the very “facts” which predetermined him as such.
p What are the roots of the differences in the two modes of argumentation: on the one hand, in a "scientific manner" and on the other, according to the logic of morality? A resolution of the question depends above all on our understanding (or on the actual content) of science. In the so-called "positivist 199 science" represented by a multitude of relatively isolated and specialized research areas, to which one cannot refer as to "science in general”, the study subject is regarded as something external to the consciousness of the investigator. The intellectual activity of the scientist is taken into consideration in terms of methodology, or a mode of dealing with the object, viz., as an aid which may be dropped as soon as the result sought is received. It is unimportant whether or not (and for what reason) man needs the subject studied by the given specialized discipline and the results of the investigation. The process of cognition, the search for scientific truth is all that is invested with importance. As a result of abstracting and deflecting the object under investigation from the human world the scientist’s consciousness treats the object as something indifferent to the subject and in this sense as something objective. As to how the scientific data received will be applied, this falls outside the limits of the process of scientific research proper. Of course, the scientist may also be a public figure, a morally responsible person, a citizen and a thinker concerned over trie fate of the world. In such an instance he is not indifferent to the application of his discoveries. But, and we repeat, in and of itself the mode of regarding the world as a totality of objects does not determine the practical cognition of this world by the individual. Precisely for this reason scientific knowledge can be applied indiscriminately. The nature of its application does not depend upon science itself.
p Man may also become an object of investigation by the positive sciences—for example, by social psychology. But the tter is free to explain only the immediate causes of normal or “abnormal” (in one way or another) behavioral acts of the average group of men as well as work out methods for exerting direct influence over the consciousness and feelings of human beings. However, it cannot show precisely how the individual ought to act, not simply in terms of adaptation to existing social conditions, but in terms of the conscious creation of these conditions, the transformation of the very preconditions for law-governed activities of people.
p In other words (if we express this proposition in the language of the philosopher) for social psychology man functions as an externally and internally determined object, not as a free subject. For precisely this reason data yielded by the study of man can be applied variously—to the detriment or for the good of man. One might recall in this connection the practice of psychological brain-washing of the people, for example, through commercial advertising and political 200 propaganda. Public figures in the West (and above all scientists) have repeatedly expressed the fear that the newest discoveries in the study of the mechanisms of the human psyche could become a tool for the spiritual enslavement of the individual.
p But is a principally different mode of cognition possible? Yes, Marxist philosophers answer this question, such a mode is readily possible. It is the mode of considering the world as a whole, including man as an active being within it, as a unity of subject and object. In the context of such an approach to cognition man, who in all his activities is subordinated to objective laws, will stand out also as an active maker of history, its subject.
p The integrated philosophical world outlook of dialectical materialism thus erases the distinction between the two modes of investigating man and nature in terms of the existent and the imperative. But the heart of the matter is that each concrete science as it has in fact evolved and is evolving is something distinct from philosophy both in modes of thinking and methods. [200•1 The data gathered in any concrete science can determine the goal of human activity only to the extent that certain more general, universal and essential goals of man are known in advance. Here the necessity arises of “ supplementing” the scientific conclusions with moral principles, with an understanding of "in the name of what man lives”. In this sense morality and science cannot be equated, for they describe different aspects of human life activity.
201p Marxist philosophy, characterized by rigorous scientific methods, is able to respond to questions concerning the meaning of human life. But philosophy—and this represents the other side of the question—as a result of the extreme generality of the questions it tackles, can make no claims to offer solutions to everyday problems of man. The study of general problems of existence at the level of history and humanity (which is philosophy’s terrain) should not be mechanically transferred to concrete circumstances as a yardstick for each and every daily event. In daily life the individual does not argue like a philosopher, not only because it is impossible to elevate the consciousness of every person to the heights of abstraction, but also because the position of the individual in his daily routine cannot always be directly inferred from his world outlook. Attempts to establish such a rigorous dependency in all cases can lead only to pedantic and doctrinaire attitudes, trivializing the very notion or philosophy.
p Morality is also a world view incorporating the determination of goals and the understanding of the meaning of human life. But in the sphere of maximal abstraction it, of course, is not the equal of philosophy. It is quotidian (both mass and individual) consciousness, not a theory, i. e., the subject of specialized professional reflection. Morality emerges well before philosophy (although not quite as early as is sometimes assumed).
p It is hardly possible to say that morality emerges simultaneously with human society. Therefore the assertion would seem to be unjustified that, as we often read, primitive man was a creature bearing high moral qualities. We are not concerned with how primitive man conducted himself in the early collective and with the restrictions he set upon his behaviour, but rather with the mode of behavioral regulation with which a state of mores was achieved which is so attractive to some contemporary moralists. By no means all behavioral norms, but rather a limited type of them in distinction from all the rest, is encompassed by the notion of “morality”.
p If we instruct an individual to follow only one behavioral code so that the "only possible" becomes tor him almost a physical necessity and if nothing compels him to deviate from the immutable order or even to entertain thoughts about other forms of activity, we cannot still call this pattern of behaviour morality.
p For primitive man the form of behaviour was, in the language of cybernetics, “programmed”. But man—including primitive man—differs from a programmed device in that in a physical 202 and psychological sense, not possessing any instincts in the sphere of community life, from the very beginning he was capable of a range of actions when faced with conditions in which the situation itself posed alternatives, displayed internal conflict, contradiction or incompatibility of interests and demands. Without this there would have been no morality, which since ancient times has been regarded as the choice between good and evil. The word “habit” also provides little help in our attempt to explain the rather rigidly ordered behaviour of primitive man. Habit must first be given form and then constantly reinforced by external constraint. The simplest form of such collective influence was coercion and psychological pressure, which is in fact a threat to apply the same coercion to he who deviated from the general norm. This, of course, is not morality.
p If we allow for the fact that the primitives were stricter than our contemporaries in the observance of collective prescriptions even then it does not necessarily follow that the mode of regulation of their behaviour was morality. The latter expresses the mode of spiritual connection between the individual and society. Certain means of spiritual influence were at the disposition of the primitive collective (to be sure, they were to all appearances already developed at the point when the primitive mob took on trie form of a tribal organization). It was essential for the maintenance of general discipline that at least some of the members of the tribe were convinced of how one can and must act in this or that situation—otherwise this discipline would have been impossible. But this conviction could not have a rational foundation: at that point the awareness was too dim of what constituted the necessary conditions for cohabitation, althouigh it was precisely these conditions which had to be constantly reproduced in the form of corresponding behavioral norms.
p Certain students of the primitive world, in establishing the existence of rather complex regulations among tribal people, try to explain their origin by means of the rationally expedient thinking of our distant ancestors: man, so it is said, understood what was good or bad for the life of the individual and the clan, and from this deduced the necessary behavioral norms. In our opinion, the practical result attained through the spontaneous experience of many generations and their unconscious selection of a code of life is presented by these scholars as the conscious goal and product of rational calculation. This is in fact the “riddle” of primitive life: it worked out numerous injunctions and prescriptions which even the great minds of 203 antiquity, trying to argue “scientifically”, could not explain in a rational manner. We could include among these norms the extremely subtle rules governing sexual behaviour, which gradually limited the number of relatives who established the matrimonial bonds.
p In what manner were primitive conceptions of what was morally imperative and what was taboo established? Above all by means of evolving ideas about the sacred and the inviolable in the existing mode of life. "This is necessary because this is it, because it is universally accepted, and it is impossible to act otherwise”. Such was the simplest foundation for existing behavioral norms. This is not morality, however, but the logic of simple custom, unfortunately not always distinguished from morality in the true sense of the word.
p The attempts at explanation (as of yet not rational) of the origin of the existing norms governing society begin with primitive mythology. Totems and ancestors, then later gods and legendary heroes explained to man why he must act just so and not otherwise. Still this is not morality in the true sense. The authority of dead or concocted ancestors, in order to have the force of injunction, needed emotional reinforcement. After all, the lawgiver from the world beyond possessed no direct power, hence was incapable of applying sanctions. These sanctions had to be thought up.
p The mode of fixing universally obligatory behavioral norms in the consciousness of each individualbecame rituals—sacred ceremonies of an “imaginary” character by means of which the individual supposedly made mystical contact with the other world, and fulfilled the commands of his ancestors. His actual conduct in the community took on in his mind a higher meaning of sorts, a meaning which could not be translated into the language of real relationships and practical needs. But man at that time stood in need precisely of such forms—mystifying the authentic meaning of his practical activity—for accumulating his social experience since he did not and could not understand the true, socially expedient meaning of his actions. The necessary under these conditions could only be recognized in the form of the sacredly inviolable.
p We may assume that in the era of the early tribal system each socially useful action acquired in the consciousness of man a ceremonial and symbolic nature. This is suggested, for example, by primitive magic, connected both with the hunt and the healing of disease. Man at that time quite simply didn’t make a distinction between practical activity leading to a desired result and symbolic rites, simply depicting such a 204 quasi-expedient act. It was believed that no activity can have a useful result without the performance of maeic rituals. To deviate from the rigidly canonized sequence of “operations” meant not only to fail in one’s objective but also to violate the sacral laws, to draw upon one s kin sundry calamities as punishment by the otherworldly forces.
p All of this pertains to the ideological (magical, religious, fantastic) conceptualization by primitive man of his social reality and practical aims. But we can isolate here yet one other aspect—the method of regulating reality itself. The motivation of activity on the principle of expediency (a characteristic feature of man’s consciousness of a later era) was difficult to be understood by the individual at that point, especially in relation to the awareness of the social consequences of his actions. It was simpler to act according to immutable code: carrying out this code, so it seemed, was in itself a selfsufficient activity. The result of such conduct was regarded not as the consequence of a correct or incorrect choice of means and methods, but a manifestation of the very order of things, as a matter of Providence, the normal order of events, luck or chance.
p It may be hypothetically assumed that moral consciousness is genetically more closely connected with such forms of reasoning than with notions concerning the expediency of human actions. We have in mind, of course, not magic or symbolism, and even less so mystical and religious forms of consciousness, but simply a scheme of activity; the link between situation and action is regarded as something imperative, obligatory and irrelevant to the result achieved (the latter is viewed as something independent of man’s purposeful actions). Why in general does such a mode of practical reasoning arise?
p The fortuitous and unforeseen which is often contrary to the intentions and aims of one’s actions has long occupied a secure place in human history. Hence by no means all aspects of life in society could be governed by the principle of expediency. Since some human actions have in the majority of cases led to the desired results and had useful consequences, while others—to a disastrous outcome, generalization and clarification of the logical connection between actions and the results achieved— were beyond the reach of rational consciousness; this connection merely unfolds gradually through spontaneous experience on a wide scale. In individual experience the rule which is expedient when viewed at the macroscopic level, can operate as an inviolable demand (“act in such a fashion, and don t bother about the results”). In addition, socially useful results do not 205 always reveal their social significance to the individual. They remain beyond the range of assessment from the viewpoint of use-value. Even if we concede that the individual coula always glimpse the practical consequences of his actions, he would not be in a position to evaluate their historical significance. Nevertheless the individual had somehow to isolate that which was necessary for the life of the community from that which undermined its foundations.
p Out of this arose the need to formulate general rules governing human actions without even the understanding of its expediential nature, and to assess human actions without yet understanding why certain actions are preferable to others. There emerged both unconditional imperatives, prescriptions and commands applicable in a multitude of instances, and the notions of good and evil, which by no means were initially explained by the conceptions of usefulness and expediency. As the measure and sphere of rational consciousness increased, social life grew more complex and the boundaries of its sphere which had as of yet not been comprehended, expanded. All this conditioned the necessity of that mode of consciousness which would set man’s goals before the conditions and prerequisites for such goals would be understood. One of these forms of consciousness was morality.
p Here we have arrived at the core of the problem under discussion: both science and morality determine the goals and the rules governing practical activity, but the mode of determination differs. Science can formulate man’s goals only within the framework of comprehension of the actual conditions underlying man’s existence, given the verifiable knowledge of the prerequisites for these very goals (“what does this goal serve”, "wny is this necessary”) and of the external factors of their realization (“is this goal achievable, and what means will do to carry it out”). In other words, science determines only the purposeful activity of man, predicts the results of this activity and demonstrates the necessity of these results. In the moral form of regulating human activity the given conditions and the prerequisites of goals may remain uncfarified. This constitutes both a “weak” point of morality as compared to science, and its “strong” point.
Morality sometimes demands the “inexplicable” of man, that which in terms of its consequences transgresses the boundaries of his rational reasoning. Sometimes morality demands the “impossible” of man, that is to say it forces him to recognize the necessity of those actions for which the historical conditions have not as yet sufficiently matured and consequently the 206 grounds for such actions are not manifest. Moral imperatives can turn out to be extremely “impractical” or may demand actions of an individual which, under certain conditions, cannot be made into a universal rule. But mankind simply would make no progress if it set for itself only those goals and demands which could be immediately realized: it would reproduce over and over again the same conditions of existence. Indeed, many moral demands which were unrealizable in the distant past but which are now practical goals, were passed over to us from the past as a spiritual inheritance to the future. The historical character of man consists in the handing down of unresolved questions from one generation to the next. Such is the spiritual continuity in the life of mankind.
Notes
[200•1] This bears not only upon the natural and precise sciences, but upon certain societal disciplines. It is one thing to talk of the philosophical sciences—ethics, aesthetics, historical materialism, in which the general world-view orientation enters directly into the subject of study and investigation. But there are more limited and specialized disciplines, such as, for sociological theory of averages in which general philosophical unction primarily as methodological prerequisites. Characteristic ies is the investigation of social phenomena within the framework of “closed”, self-reproducing systems and man as an “agent” or “link” in this system, viz., in the capacity of an object functioning according to the laws of that structure into which he is included.
The study of logic of the historical process as a whole, in which man functions in the capacity of an active subject as well as questions concerning the “direction” or “meaning” of historical change, or focusing on the formation of man over thousands of years, and man’s subsequent self-awareness as a free, creative subject—these are tasks not for sociology as a specialized discipline but for the philosophy of history, historical materialism. The distinction in problematique can hardly be explained solely by levels of abstraction, for it is ooth more concrete and more general. The key to the matter is, to all appearances, in the very mode of formulating the problems.