p We have emphasized the differences between science and morality. But is there any common ground between them? Does morality include an element of knowledge of man himself? It was already underscored that genetically morality is linked with custom, but in many ways it differs from that form of consciousness which underlies and maintains custom. [206•1 We refer in this connection to two essential points having a direct relation to the question under discussion.
p First, the logic supporting a moral demand does not necessarily originate in that which is given, universally accepted and recognized. In moral argumentation we encounter, for example, reasoning such as the following: "Let everyone act as he will, but it is incorrect and I shall act otherwise.” 207 “Although the majority believe that one must act just so, in point of fact one must act quite differently.” The man possessing moral consciousness is capable, therefore, of freeing himself 01 the power of the established order (custom) and the traditional opinion and thus of taking a critical stance towards the dominant foundations of social life. The moral consciousness of the oppressed classes could never become revolutionary if it based its demands only on that which is.
p The capability of maintaining a critical stance to reality and of juxtaposing to this reality something of an ideal and imperative order takes form in man in the period marking the shattering of the tribal and primitive communal ties and the emergence of class differentiation. At this point there arise for the first time nostalgic conceptions of the "golden age" and a belief that the existing order, customs and laws in some manner or another violate the “true” foundations of human life. Although this critique of the existent was initially directed to the past (a fairly idealized past at that), from this critique at a later date springs man’s ability to predicate a better future, to prophesy forms of human community which after a number of centuries will become realities. This ability to hazily outline a more humanistic and just society arises long before the social sciences make their initial conclusions concerning, man’s progress in history and the inevitable emergence of a society free of exploitation and oppression.
p The ancient Utopias and the pre-scientific socialism of the modern world were nourished above all by moral notions of the depravity of the then existing social reality and of the necessity of bringing about a moral world order. Only the scientific communism of Marx replaced moral duty with the objective necessity of history. But having transformed a world-view into a science, Marxism by no means eliminated m,oral views—those forms of mass and individual thought in which the laws of history are reflected in a pattern of evaluations and ideals as well as spiritual strivings.
p This is one of the concrete instances or aspects of the interrelationship of science and morality. We have in mind here not science in general but rather socio-historical science. Although its scientifically demonstrative propositions were anticipated by the moral form of assimilating social reality, to a large extent this science replaced morality, restricting the latter in the sphere of ordinary consciousness—of a dream of a better future and of the final triumph of justice. The interconnection and simultaneous distinction between science and ’morality, however, consists in the very fact that even "strict 208 science" cannot do without a moral justification of its conclusions.
p An essential distinction between science and morality, between the true and the good, is also manifested in the mode of substantiating notions which in terms of their practical conclusions may quite fully coincide. Let us suppose that both the comprehension of the objective necessity of movement into the future and the acceptance of moral exigency of an ideal world order induce people to identical actions. In the first instance, however, the essence of man, substantiating the necessity of revolutionary practice, is an historical category, as an entity given definition by the past. In the second instance, the essence of man, requiring the establishment of "authentically human" conditions, is perceived as the only possible truth which was only gradually apprehended in the course of historical progress. But we must not conclude from the foregoing that the moral consciousness is ahistorical or metaphysical. If the course of history is a law-governed process, its general scheme can be presented in the perspective of the evolution of the principle of essence, which is inherent in human history as a whole. However, the moral viewpoint cannot become a philosophy of history, nor can it explain the laws and mechanisms underlying social change; it remains only a mode by which man may apprehend his “mission”.
p Moralizing as well as the substitution of moral postulates for scientific methods has been a common occurrence in the realm of socio-philosophical thought. When moral consciousness intrudes into the sphere of socio-historical theory and endeavours to explain the course of history it often degenerates to the level of ideological apologetic of an order far removed from morality. The intermingling of scientific and moral criteria can only act to the detriment of both.
p Thus the question of the relationship between science and morality cannot be decided through a simple choice between the alternatives: either unity and identity or distinction and discreteness. The fact of mutual interconnectedness presupposes differentiation. Functioning in a certain sense as things of a different order, science and morality “penetrate” one another much as electromagnetic fields through a medium of any degree of density. Moral laws operate in the field of scientific activity and morality as an object of study is subject to all the laws of scientific analysis.
p But let us return to the differences between morals and customs. The second such difference consists in that a customary norm is spread only in the community widely 209 practising this norm. In the case of relatively autarchic communities the customs practised by each of them, granted all their diversity, remain indifferent to each other: some communities follow certain customs, others follow different ones. The question of who is “right” never arises. Morality is a different matter. Here the notions of what is correct and morally exigent are extended to all people regardless of individual group, tribal or national affiliation. This aspect of the moral consciousness arises for the first time parallel with embryonic notions concerning the unity of the human species—when the narrow confines of tribal thought are sundered. According to the latter the individual is obligated only to his tribe and no further. Only the recognition of certain universal laws of life can be attributed to moral consciousness in the proper sense. Any given morality (including class) propagates its tenets as being true and equally obligatory for all mankind.
p In The German Ideology Marx and Engels wrote: "The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.” Marx in a marginal note observed that "universality corresponds... to the class contra the state". [209•1 The foregoing also fully pertains to morality in an antagonistic society. The dominant class is in a position to recognize any given moral principles only to the extent they are compatible with the existing order and the privileged position of this class within it. These are the historically restricted boundaries delimitating such notions as justice, humanism and equality. But this class understanding of morality by the dominant class is by no means limited to the boundaries of their own existence. To the contrary, it is imposed upon all classes and estates. Even the oppressed classes are compelled in a certain sense to share this interpretation, to submit to the norms set by the dominant morality to the extent and as long as these classes retain their loyalty to the given order, reconcile themselves to it and live according to its laws. But when an oppressed class rises in revolution (or in some other way strikes out against the established order) its class morality begins to clash with the dominant morality. But even this morality is not confined to the boundaries of any given estate. To the contrary, it 210 functions at the given stage as the only correct and universal morality and therefore clashes with the dominant morality, excludes and negates the latter. This morality not only subjectively is universal, but also objectively reflects the requirements posed by history, augurs the coming social order and in this sense operates as a universal morality.
p Of course, class morality always reflects class and therefore particular rather than general interests. But the justification of this morality lies in the measure of coincidence between the particular interests and the needs of the progressive development of mankind as a whole. In other words a comparison of the various class positions vis-a-vis morality clarifies which one is truly humanist, just and humane; in a word, which one has the truly moral basis. It follows that morality is not merely the expressed will of a given subject (in this case a class). After all, this expression of will itself must have a moral substantiation. When two contrary moral viewpoints clash the question is decided of which is “right” not of which can by force and effort impose its interests upon the other. From the point of view of morality we can justify or condemn the interests themselves (“authentic” or “distorted”, “high” or “low”).
p Of course, practically the question "who will win and who will lose out" is decided depending upon the interrelation of real forces (material, economic and political). But here the moral problem is-also decided: which side is “right”. Otherwise an ideological struggle in the realm of morality would be senseless. Of course, each class pushes and confesses "its own" morality, contrasting it to the morality of other classes. But in scientific analysis or assessment of the worth of each of the systems of morality known to us it seems that one must avoid applying a plurality of criteria which are in no way interconnected. For such a point of view in substance excludes both morality and science.
p The point of view of ethics, which compares various types of morality in terms of their relative worth, should not be confused with a scientific understanding of the historical role of each of them. This is one more aspect differentiating science from morality. Is such a comparison justified within the boundaries of the moral consciousness itself?
p If the socio-historical science simply confirmed the existence of differing class interests there would be no grounds for testing how each of the moral systems "measures up”. In such a case the "scientific analysis" of one or another form of morality would be limited to a clarification of "whom it profits”. But this is in fact key, that class interests represent a 211 manifestation of objective socio-historical laws of development, therefore every class interest (and the corresponding morality) is at the same time a step in the ladder of progressive development of history. We can measure up the historical significance of various moral systems and their place on this “ladder”. The negation of the past was always a step higher and therefore a further development of the past experience.
p The question of the universality of given moral propositions often contains paradoxes. Virtually none of the moral norms of the past was enacted in a ubiquitous manner. In fact, it was impossible given class differentiation, the isolation of estates from one another and the existence of national and cultural barriers. In these conditions the demands of morality equally applicable to all mankind, turned out to be at best barren “wishes” and more commonly represented expressions of hypocrisy. The official ideology of the exploiter classes often profited off the moral consciousness of the people in general or of individual thinkers. Impotence, frustration and passive expectation of the triumph of justice often took the form of abstract ideals. But we must not overlook the other side of the matter: the spiritual heritage of the past has passed on to us the ideas of universal equality, individual freedoms, humanism and fraternity, the basic universal moral norms worked out by the people in their struggle with social injustice and moral vice.
p Many of the moral commandments addressed equally to all men turned out to be unfeasible in conditions marked by class antagonisms. Indeed, how can we talk of the universality of the commandment "thou shalt not kill" in the context of antagonistic society, international and civil war, the death penalty applied against dissidents, treachery and murder? It is one affair to eliminate an enemy of society and of the nation but quite another to deprive a fellow-citizen of his life for selfish reasons. But despite this reservation the commandment "thou shalt not kill" had an abstract and universal character and admitted no exceptions. This commandment turned out to be not only impracticable but also contradictory to all awareness of social expediency. From this point on morality was confronted with an impassable hurdle—how to make the ideal and reality coincide. This point also marked the initiation of ideological profiteering on the part of the dominant class, of the propagation of submission and non-resistance to evil, and of political contrivances expressed in doctrines stating the inferiority of entire nations and classes which must be sacrificed for the benefit of the "true representatives" of mankind. But strange as it is, this commandment, smeared by 212 innumerable crimes and acts of barbarism committed in its name, continues to occupy a place in people’s moral consciousness, and holds this place without sacrificing its rigorously uncompromising nature. If in certain circumstances the killing of an individual would appear to be an absolute necessity this indicates that the circumstances themselves are not entirely moral, that there must in the final result be implemented a social state in which the elimination of human life is not necessary. Such was the “extreme” conclusion arrived at by the moral consciousness. The logic of history confirms the justice of this conclusion. The future belongs to communism—to a society without coercion or bloodshed.
p On what foundation does the belief in the inviolability of human life rest if historical conditions to this date refute such a notion? In what manner does the impossible become the possible if it relies only upon the power of the moral dictate? Is it admissible to draw conclusions concerning the subsequent course of history on the basis of moral indignation against certain aspects of social life? How can one arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to alter the objective conditions of the existing social order on the basis that a certain moral imperative is impracticable?
p From the foregoing we may draw only the following inference: the ultimate conclusions reached by the sociohistorical science and the moral consciousness are identical. But the methods of reaching these conclusions are principally different. Indeed, at the time of germination of many of the moral notions which we have inherited, mankind could not know what awaited it in the future. It could only conjecture in the form of the ideal. The logic of this conjecture posited a state of irreconcilability with the existing conditions and a striving towards something differing from existing reality. Granted the “indemonstrability” of the logic of the moral consciousness it nevertheless turned out to be historically perspicacious and prophetic.
p This might all seem rather mystical to the excessively pedantic “rationalist”. But the scientific understanding of the logic of the historical development of the moral consciousness presupposes a clarification of those objective prerequisites engendering such paradoxes. The very conditions underlying human existence forced man’s consciousness to transgress the boundaries set by the existing system of social relations and to take the endless path of historical creativity although this very facility of the moral consciousness was devoid of scientific underpinnings.
213Science at any point in history is limited by what is known and verified. But at each of these points there is still a huge area of spontaneous notions, intuitive guesswork and positing of ends, all of which at that date remained outside the realm of verified knowledge. Subsequently these notions will be verified, the "rational core" adopted and the rest discarded. This is all retrospection, speaking with the benefit of hindsight. As to forecasting the future, this must always be somewhat hypothetical. Some of the cardinal concepts of morality represent such a “supposition” the verity of which will be tested by the science of the future. We note thus that the connection between science and morality is also of a historical nature. Science representing a higher form of consciousness in terms of verifiabiuty, demonstrability and the logical substantiability of its conclusions, at a later date "ties up the loose ends" of moral consciousness which consistently transgresses the borders of reliable fact.
Notes
[206•1] The reader should not interpret this to say that morality, historically breaking away from custom, subsequently crowds out and replaces simpler forms of regulation such as customs, traditions and rituals. The latter also retain their significance in contemporary society in formulating and directing our activities, habits, motivations, and conceptions of what is correct, fitting and necessary. But in our society these regulators, granted their importance in everyday life, carry out the more “prosaic” function of ordering out activities along a well-trodden and verified route of typical behavioral forms, simplifying for us the choice of action in each given instance. If we are to refer to a choice of world-views and ideals, to a substantiation of the very principle underlying behaviour or to a resolution of a conflict between various ways of life and thought—at this point we are dealing with a true moral problem. One should not be isolated from the other, for subsequently the resolution of the moral problem on a mass scale leads to the affirmation of new customs and traditions which ultimately “consolidate” the results of the moral search and choice.
[209•1] Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p. 62.