OF THE PROBLEM: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND KANT
p The sources of the problem may be located in the ancient philosophy of the East and the Greco-Roman world. But to avoid intimidating the reader with a protracted discussion of these roots, let us begin with the Enlightenment, more immediate to our concerns. The fact of the matter is that, on the one hand, the Enlightenment understanding of the problem persists even today and, on the other, for precisely 190 this reason most often of all in the West one may hear the accusation that it oversimplified the problem of the relationship between science and morality.
p The ideologues of the French Enlightenment of the 18th century in fact did resolve the question at hand in an extremely simple manner. Morality, they reasoned, is needed by man to help him organize his life correctly. But the same need was ascribed to science itself, which was called upon to help man acquire all that is essential, including happiness. In this, the tasks of morality and science do coincide. To be sure science studies the world as it is, morality tells man what he must do. These of course are different things. But one’s choice of actions must be posited upon the knowledge of reality, upon the understanding of facts and circumstances. This is already the task of science.
p Incidentally, the Enlightenment philosophers by no means limited themselves to declarations that a simple statement of facts of itself determines what is necessary. Their contemporary opponents in the West (for example, the Neo-Positivists) try to reduce the problem to the relationship of “facts” and “values”, to a description of reality and a decision concerning what is morally due. For the Enlightenment philosophers it was clear that scientific knowledge singles out the determining features (essence) of reality, which are not always apparent to simple observation or exhausted by information. If the imperative is founded upon the existent, the latter may yet turn out to be distinct from that which is perceived by direct observation. Such is human nature, the hidden essence of man, which may bear no resemblance to the actual life of the individual, his habits, ambitions, inclinations or to social organization, social order or the laws of the state. “True” human interests are not those which people in actuality want but those which they should want in accordance with their “nature”. But if we concede that science clarifies human nature then it is science which must explain to people how they must behave. To be moral means to act in accordance with one’s correctly understood interests.
p But are not the demands of the inner nature of the individual in contradiction with external necessity? After all the environment (nature and society) does have its own laws with which one’s actions must conform. In general, what are the origins of the contradictions existing between the subjective ambitions and needs of the individual and those laws, prescriptions, obstacles and injunctions imposed from without? After all, the laws of the external world, of the universe and of social life 191 coincide in principle with the demands of authentic human nature. All tnis, according to the convictions of the Enlightenment philosophers, was the consequence of unfortunate misunderstandings, of historical error and deviation from the only correct, “natural” path. The shortcomings of society and crime are attributable in the final count to ignorance and superstition, to a distorted understanding of one’s own interests. If the individual understands his “true” interests he will act to his own benefit and to that of others, in a word, morally. Enlightenment must eliminate moral shortcomings, so it follows.
p A deep belief in man’s harmony with the surrounding world was the cornerstone of the Enlightenment unity of science and morality. The study of all that exists is man’s self-awareness. [191•1 Man’s self-awareness is equated to understanding one’s duty. In the final result, duty and interest coincide.
p But are we satisfied with this Enlightenment conception?
p At one time it was customary among philosophers to praise the great minds of the past for their unconditional belief in the unlimited possibilities and capabilities of man, including his innate propensity to virtue.
p But the optimism of the philosophers has worn thin with time above all because of its uncritical approach to the then existing social conditions. The "reign of reason" dreamt up by them came to the surface in the form of the system of private enterprise. At the basis of universal harmony lay the transparent model of an idealized bourgeois society: the private entrepreneur, guided entirely by his "correctly understood" interest was presented by his philosophical interpreter as the “natural” benefactor of society; after all, he receives profit only under the condition that he provide work for some, and useful objects and services for others. For this historical personage, ennobled by the logic of philosophical abstraction, duty and interest coincide perfectly. Further, it was precisely he who declared himself a supporter of scientific knowledge.
p But let us look now at the origins of the sceptical stance towards science in relation to its moral significance. We could bring to mind several thinkers who adopted a critical pose to the ideas of the Enlightenment. From them we choose the first 192 and the most consistent of these thinkers, who by virtue of this position now is seen as the precursor of the contemporary antithesis between science and morality. Immanuel Kant—it was he who most clearly recognized the critical nature of such human problem as the relationship between scientific and technological progress and the moral purpose of the intelligent being.
p We observe, apropos of the historico-philosophical evaluations and our contemporary sympathies and antipathies towards the thinkers representing the intellectual life of the past, that there are some who very poignantly reflect and suffer through in their writings the tragic contradictions of their age. Often this turns out to be a profound scepticism and doubt concerning the human prospect, the postulation of unresolvable alternatives or a generally negative resolution of problems. Such a solution, of course, we must not accept as in the least satisfactory. This may however represent the actual historical contribution made by these thinkers, namely, that they didn’t void the problem through a comforting synthesis of the opposites but rather exposed it with penetrating insight. The task now stands before us of resolving it in all its complexity and contradictoriness. Kant was just such a thinker. Subjecting to criticism those philosophical propositions unacceptable to Marxists, we must nevertheless in all justice acknowledge his piercing and restless conscience. In addition, Kant’s scepticism represented a certain critique of the bourgeois way of life.
p From Kant s viewpoint science can do little to aid man in the resolution of his moral problems, for it only studies that which empirically exists or makes up the hidden nature of the existent. Actual interests, needs, desires and ambitions—such "natural properties" of the human species do not seem to Kant to answer to the true human essence and therefore are not a pledge of human morality. Kant never makes a direct utterance concerning his own position on the virtues or shortcomings of man—not to mention which historically concrete man he has in view. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that we may now say that Kant indirectly subjected to criticism bourgeois man, whom he actually observed in the time contemporary to him. Kant’s thought proceeds as if in a system of pure logic and definitional limitations: that which exists in man does not in itself represent a foundation for determining his moral duty. The positive sciences of man in his real manifestations (anthropology and psychology) have, in Kant’s opinion, no bearing upon ethics, the science of morality.
193p Kant is by no means an irrationalist and has no intention of denying the practical achievements of scientific and technological progress. He understands that science has a definite practical significance for man and for his practical decisions on how to behave in any given instance. If it is necessary to attain a given end, one must resort to the corresponding measures, means and methods. Kant expresses this interrelation between activity and knowledge in the formula of "hypothetical imperative": for the achievement of a desired result one must act in a definite manner. Science is called upon to suggest how one must act, but only under the condition that the end pursued by man is determined in advance. But this, as Kant assumes, by no means offers a resolution to a moral problem. The latter concerns the choice of the end as such, which is not a means to another goal, but is an end in itself—higher and unconditional. This is the question of man’s mission.
p The moral task is given formulation by Kant in his celebrated "categorical imperative": act in accordance with that rule which could become the law for all mankind, in order that you represent a choice for each and every person. But to the question of how precisely one must act, what choice must be considered proper Kant can provide no answer. This is the heart of his notorious formalism.
p Certain of the contributors to this look, in defending the unity of science and morality, demonstrate this unity by the argument that without the knowledge of facts, of the conceivable effects of one’s actions and of the means and methods of achieving a determined goal man is not capable of making the proper decision. His good intents and moral motivations remain unfulfilled or lead to regrettable results. Let us assume that this is so, although it sounds somewhat categorical: man does not always make his decisions on the basis of verified knowledge.
p Besides, are "good intentions" and "moral motivations" really of no consequence for us? Is the attainment of "useful results" really sufficient? If these intentions and motivations must only involve a useful outcome, then what are the origins of the notion of “useful” as such? What exactly is of use for mankind? After all this latter is something quite distinct from the realm of known facts. But let us assume further, that the question of what is useful and what is harmful for mankind has been once and for all decided. Even in this situation a fatal alternative (familiar to the student of intellectual history) arises. Some thinkers believed that societal and human progress is achieved as a result of actions produced by "good 194 intentions”. This seemingly rationalistic conception according to which man knows what he wants, and depending upon the veracity of this knowledge, achieves the necessary results, led to a naive moralization in the interpretation of the historical process: history is the fulfilment or moral ideals, the man of virtue being its sole creator. Others, who observed contradiction between the intention and the realization, between the desired and the attained, have been inclined towards a different rendering of history (Kant and Hegel were among them). History is made by people pursuing egotistical interests (or at least unaware of what they do), and their summary actions, by virtue of Providential logic (or the Absolute Spirit), result in the progress of mankind as a whole.
p Consequently even if we may today—possessing a scientific world outlook—discern cause ana effect in history and demonstrate the connection between activity and its consequences, this does not mean that people always behave upon the basis of such knowledge alone. We are not concerned with actual cause-and-effect connections (what and how is happening) but with how people ideally, subjectively choose their goals. Here we have not argued with Kant as yet. According to his understanding, the actual sphere of moral choice begins only when man is faced with the question of the nature of his higher mission. But if such is already known, the rest may be left to science. This is the sphere 01 means and methods.
p It would be useful to clarify the nature of the problem posed but left unsolved by Kant, and facing us today. People simultaneously pursue a multitude of goals. They work for the attainment of concrete results which are stepping stones to the next, more distant goals, which are in turn means to still more remote ends. Life in society in a certain sense is formed from a multitude of interconnected goals, each of which could be determined, justified and explained by means of other goals. Can we, however, determine with the aid of this endless chain of goals the purpose and meaning of human life? To answer affirmatively signifies to proceed only from that which exists, from the nature of the existent in the given moment. And activity determined in such a manner will be goal-expedient but still not goal-positing.
p The question as posed is not essentially concerned with how well-coordinated are the links of any given social system nor with the degree of expediency of this or that action within the framework of that system. It concerns rather the right of the system itself to exist. Even sociology, capable of instructing us in the spheres of management and organization, is not capable 195 of giving a complete answer to this question: in our opinion, it investigates self-reproducing social systems, but not the logic of the historical process as a whole, a process leading to the replacement of one formation by another. This lacuna prevents sociology from uncovering the meaning of human existence. The truly moral question is: for the sake of what is it worth and indeed necessary to live? This is a question of world outlook: is that which exists legitimized simply by the fact of its existence? How should man’s social world be organized? Often this question is decided not in accordance with, but despite existing reality: man must live differently than he in fact lives.
p The other side of the Kantian doctrine of morality is the distinction drawn between the practical results and the moral judgement of an action. If a person acts correctly he always achieves his goal. But if he acts correctly not from the point of view of simple expediency and efficiency, but in the moral sense, no one and nothing can guarantee him success. Necessity deriving from social circumstances, the "logic of facts" does not always encourage the individual to act in a truly moral manner. On the other hand, actions stemming from moral duty do not always answer practical interests and do not always accord with circumstances. Even if an individual is well aware of his moral obligation, this is by no means an assurance that he will act accordingly. External obstacles, compulsion, a fear of public opinion, personal habits and private interests can counteract the performance of moral actions. It is well known that Kant drew idealistic conclusions from this configuration of facts. But we are not immediately concerned with these conclusions (since in the present article we are not attempting to make an historical and philosophical assessment of the Kantian heritage), but only with the question as posed.
p What are the foundations for moral duty? Why is it that to act in accordance with circumstances is not always correct? Why do people gain the right to judge circumstances and to nullify them if they do not correspond to man’s mission? Why is it that moral action, in spite of the logic of simple expediency, does not receive the corresponding remuneration? History testifies that certain moral dictums that did not conform to social conditions and were virtually unfulfillable, have nevertheless survived the centuries and retained significance for contemporary man. How can this be explained?
p At the turn of this century yet another question was posed bearing upon the relationship of morality and science: can one include moral conceptions along with science in the sphere of 196 objective knowledge? This question takes on a varying significance depending on its philosophical orientation.
p Knowledge (including scientific) always “depicts” existing reality observed as fact and verified empirically. But that which is morally imperative may in fact not be enacted in reality: it does not follow from the fact that something is worthy and valuable that it exists or will exist.
p The notion of what is morally imperative may not be equated with knowledge, since it does not inform us of that which exists. Rather it represents a simple articulation of will or emotion. It is not difficult to observe that this (neo-positivist) interpretation of the problem (we deliberately isolated it from the specialized logical subtleties) in substance represents a restatement of Kant.
p There is another interpretation given to this problem, one developed by neo-protestant philosophers. In our discussion we shall also free this interpretation from the specialized religious terminology and purely theological problem study. Man, it is said, ordinarily acts in conformity with the logic of social expediency and in so doing achieves certain practical results. Society makes certain demands of the individual which he must fulfil, otherwise social life as such would be inconceivable. But this sphere of practical “reason” should not be confused with the spnere of ’ authentic" moral behaviour. To the latter we can attribute only fidelity to the absolute moral dictums, to higher justice and the selflessness of moral motives. This second sphere is in a state of irreconcilable conflict with man’s “natural” world and his social being. Moral good cannot emerge from the evil life of society, nor is it capable of being embodied in full in social reality. As may be readily observed, this interpretation speaks to the same issue.
All that we have said above suggests that in deciding the question at hand it is fruitless to begin with a statement of "universally known truths" and to argue “logically”. As long as we are content with a statement of evident facts at the level of common sense and the elementary principles of science, conceptions far removed from a rigorous scientific order will continue to agitate and to retain their significance.
Notes
[191•1] In this sense the Enlightenment philosophers continued a tradition stretching back to antiquity. On the pediment of the Delphic oracle is inscribed the dictum: "Know thyself and you will know the Gods and the universe”. It is said that this idea came to the Greeks from the East.