SCIENTIFIC TRUTH AND MORAL GOOD
p The question discussed in this book is by no means a novel one. As early as the nineteenth century stormy debates could be heard on this subject and since the turn of this century when science and morality seemed to take up firm opposing positions in literature, the argument of the two “hypostases” of the spiritual world of man ignited with new force. It was carried on in the form of an argument between “rationalism” and “romanticism”, between “physics” and “lyrics”, between reason and sentiment, between social expediency and personal intimacy, between the historical necessity driving us into the future and the personal fate, the tragedy and happiness of the individual who does not submit to the dictates of the universal laws of historical development. Then somehow it turned out that the discussion took the form of an argument concerning scientific truth and moral good, knowledge and ethics.
p How did this happen? For quite some time now people have been disturbed by the fact that neither scientific and technological progress nor the professions concerned with precise knowledge create preconditions for the comprehensive development of the personality, neither do they resolve all problems of a daily the more so of a spiritual order. For this we need something else. But this “something” seemed for long to be multifaceted and elusive of definition. Its significance and profile seemed just as ambiguous.
p The extremely broad scope of this problem calls forth our doubts. Couldn’t it be that two unrelated subjects have been intertwined here, subjects in each case requiring an independent approach? Morality is of course not “lyrics” as distinct from “physics”; it is not “intimate” as opposed to the objective laws of human existence; it is not simply personal fate or one’s 189 calling, by no means comparable with historical necessity. Romanticism and struggle, one’s lot in life and one’s success, will and heroic deed, guilt and tragedy—all this, although interconnected in human life (after all everything is interconnected) represent things which cannot be juxtaposed, things of a different order. Without a precise definition of the scope of the problem, ethics—the science of morality—would be inconceivable. Morality in and of itself is not a science: the objective cognition of reality is not a choice of a moral position, and the resolution of an intellectual task is not to be equated to a moral deed. Duty is not truth but something of a completely different order.
p If we assume that everyone is fully aware of what truth and science are and what is beauty and that everyone, drawing from his life experience, knows what makes up happiness and defeat, desire and ambition, will and its enactment, one nevertheless still must provide a definition for morality. As matters stand, in the dispute concerning the relationship between morality and science the former seems to retain something of a fluctuating and indeterminate quality, receiving one or another definition in accordance with the viewpoint of the moment. Therefore within certain limits an attempt to solve the given problem may be made by way of specifying the terms and clarifying the nature and specifics of morality.
First, a word or two about the problem itself. The “task” must be formulated in such a way that only one answer may be derived. Before a problem may be resolved it must be correctly posed. To prevent the discussion from taking on a scholastic nature stemming from insufficient comprehension of the substance of the given problem (i. e., what must be clarified and what demonstrated) we shall attempt at first to determine the origins of the problem itself.
Notes