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p When questions affecting the African countries are being discussed in international organisations, the Western powers display a mixture of unity and dissension. As in other spheres, the factor that unites their efforts is the class interests of the struggle against the national liberation movement, their fear of the spread of socialist ideas, their desire to keep the African countries in the capitalist orbit and, finally, their hostility towards the growing links between the states of the socialist community and free Africa. At the same time, the clash of imperialist interests can also be seen here to a considerable degree. Their rivalry in the economic and political spheres is transferred to international gatherings, traditional inter-imperialist contradictions deepen and new ones appear.

p To a certain extent, this situation is brought about by the fact that the various policies and interests do not clash in any simple way in the activities of the international organisations. The correlation of forces in the world, with which the imperialist powers have to reckon, are reflected here, as in a mirror. In addition, every action taken in an international organisation comes immediately within the focus of world opinion. The positions adopted by the members of an organisation over the main questions being discussed do not remain unnoticed. In many cases these circumstances also have a centrifugal effect on imperialist coalitions.

p The nature of the various international organisations also has a certain bearing on the competition between the imperialist powers. For our present purposes, they can be 284 classified into three groups: (1) organisations whose members include African countries, e.g., the UN; (2) organisations which do not provide for African membership but whose activities extend to Africa, e.g., OECD; and (3) organisations made up entirely of African states but which are of great interest to the imperialist world, e.g., the OAU and EGA. In the first group of organisations the inter-imperialist contradictions include the struggle for the votes of African representatives and for influence on countries that used to form part of the old colonial empires, with due account being taken of the fact that African questions are being discussed in the presence of the Africans themselves and with their participation. In the second group there is direct conflict between the interests of the monopolies in the sphere of economic and trading relations with the liberated countries, and the contradictions are frequently resolved at the latter’s expense. The third group is the object of a hidden struggle between the imperialist powers, which try to influence the decisions taken by these organisations and to propel their “supporters” into the top positions.

p The relations between the USA, Britain and France over African issues became one of the clusters of inter-imperialist contradictions in the UN. The appearance of a large group of young African states in the UN presented Washington with two problems: to preserve American influence within the organisation and to use the organisation for the USA’s further expansion in Africa. Britain and France, in turn, saw in the changing composition of the General Assembly the opportunity to strengthen their own positions through the votes of the African countries, which were linked with them respectively by the British Commonwealth system, the Franco-African "agreements on co-operation" and other bonds. It must be pointed out immediately that the hopes of both the former metropolises and the USA were not realised. With the constant support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the African states are displaying considerably greater independence in the UN than their would-be guardians imagined. The pro-American majority in the UN also faded away. But the contradictions between the imperialists have in no way diminished and in some respects have even intensified,

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p At the beginning of the sixties the book Africa and the World Order, edited by the prominent Africanists Professor Norman Padelford and Professor Rupert Emerson and published in the USA, posed the question: "What kind of United Nations will emerge from the influx of African members, the end of which is not yet in sight? . . . Every country, and perhaps most notably the United States, is confronted by the necessity to reappraise its views of the organisation and of the part it can expect to play in relation to its national interest.”^^1^^

p Examination shows that the USA did not substantially "reappraise her views" of the UN, but did modify her policies within the organisation owing to the new situation. Thus, in a number of cases, e.g., during the Congo crisis (and after it), American diplomacy attempted to use the UN apparatus in the interests of the USA and to oppose the UN to the former metropolises in Africa. Dean Rusk declared forthrightly that, if political problems had to be solved, an international organisation was more acceptable than any of its members acting in isolation and the UN flag might fly in places where the flag of any sovereign nation would be viewed as a challenge. It was this idea in particular that lay behind the American proposal for a permanent United Nations peace-keeping force, which was discussed at the 21st session of the General Assembly (December 1966). Apart from the USSR and a number of African and Asian countries, France opposed the suggestion, which serves as a further illustration of the contradictions between France and America in the UN.^^2^^ The USA took steps to see that the young states had limited voting rights. To this end, the Americans tabled a motion to set up a so-called "finance committee”, in which representation would be proportional to contributions to the UN, i.e, in accordance with the jointstock company principle, and, when deciding on UN operations, the General Assembly would be guided by the recommendations of this committee. This move also failed.

p A series of UN defeats, caused partly by the position of the colonial powers, obliged the USA to resort to subtle manoeuvring when African issues were being debated and voting was taking place on the subsequent resolutions. Britain and France also began to dissociate themselves from their 286 partner quite frequently and even to speak against US proposals when they would clearly affect their interests in Africa. Thus, before 1958 the USA persistently refrained from voting on the UN resolutions condemning South Africa. But in 1958 and in 1960 the American delegate, unlike the British and French representatives, voted on the first occasion for a resolution expressing “concern” over South Africa’s racist policies, and on the second occasion for a resolution condemning the massacre of the 21 March 1960 during the demonstration at Sharpeville. On the 14 July 1960, in the voting on the first Security Council resolution on the Congolese issue the USA supported the resolution, while Britain and France abstained. Needless to say, Washington’s position arose not from any “sympathy” for the indigenous population of Southern Africa, but from the need to curry favour with the new Africa and from the US wish to prevent a progressive initiative from being the prerogative of the Soviet Union alone.

p An example illustrating one of the first open clashes over Africa between the USA, Britain and France in the UN is provided by the debate on African affairs at the 15th session of the General Assembly arising from the US Government proposal to include in the session’s agenda the item "Africa: a United Nations programme for independence and development”. This act of American diplomacy heralded the USA’s "frontal assault" on Africa that had been prepared over a number of years.

p The programme for Africa proposed by the General Assembly took considerable account of the recommendations of a number of scientific centres as well as US Congress special missions which had visited Africa.

p The main feature of the programme was that it was not simply directed against the newly independent African countries’ establishing ties with the socialist states. Behind the US proposals lay a clear desire to also force the former metropolises back and to use the UN flag to seize commanding positions in Africa.^^3^^ In addition, the whole programme was permeated by a spirit of paternalism towards the independent African states. Consequently, the American proposals met with no support even from the USA’s "special relationship" partner. The British Prime Minister, Harold 287 Macmillan, confined himself to the observation that he welcomed Eisenhower’s ideas in principle, but recommended that there should be preliminary discussion of the matter at a summit conference at which, moreover, the Soviet Union was to be present. In fact, Britain rejected the American programme. Most African representatives did not support it either.

p Since the 15th session of the General Assembly overran its time-limit, a number of questions, including the agenda item proposed by the USA, were carried over to its second part, held in March-April 1961. But by that time a new administration had begun to function in Washington, that of John Kennedy, who favoured an African policy that was independent of the European powers.^^4^^

p Eisenhower’s programme for Africa had already displayed a clear departure from the policy of alliance with the old colonial powers. The modifications made to it by the new US Administration considerably reinforced this tendency and emphasised the fact that the West European metropolises were incapable of “handling” the growing national liberation movement in Africa on their own.

p Discussion of the “modified” American programme in the First Committee showed that the Kennedy Administration had decided to replace Eisenhower’s plan by a version of the Latin American "Alliance for Progress”, suitably adapted for Africa. The US representative, Adlai Stevenson, stated bluntly that the ideas that President Kennedy had expressed in connection with the aid programme for Latin America could be equally applied to Africa.

p This way of looking at the question was not to the liking of either Britain or France. London and Paris were not prepared to grant Washington the same amount of freedom in Africa as it had in a large part of Latin America. Harold Macmillan had suggested that the Eisenhower programme required "further consultation”, but the Kennedy plan was whole-heartedly opposed, moreover, by the delegations of countries which usually leant towards Britain and France. The representative of Pakistan, for instance, while acknowledging the urgent need to help Africa, suggested nevertheless that the British "Colombo Plan" should be taken as a model rather than the "Alliance for Progress”. In fact, the 288 intention behind this suggestion was that aid programmes for Africa should follow British lines rather than American and should be directed by Britain and not the USA.

p Criticism of the American proposals was also voiced by the representatives of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Morocco and other African countries. 25 African states tabled a draft resolution on the question, in which their viewpoint and that of the USA were diametrically opposed. In the end, the First Committee failed to complete its discussion of this item and suggested that it be carried over to the General Assembly’s 16th session. There, however, it was not examined.

p Of course, the failure in the UN of the American programme for Africa cannot be explained merely by interimperialist contradictions. The main role here was played by the representatives of the African countries themselves, who recognised the true nature of this programme. But they made successful use of the contradictions between the imperialist powers, and this lightened the struggle against the USA’s expansionist plans. The firm, principled position of the socialist states provided considerable support to the African representatives.

p The 15th session of the UN General Assembly coincided with the Africa Year, when 17 African countries were declared independent. In the years that followed their numbers were swelled by a further 17 young states, and by 1970 the African representation at the UN accounted for 42 votes. As the numbers of the UN’s "African group" grew, the Western powers began to show a regular disarray when voting on resolutions affecting Africa. More and more differences arose between them: the interests of a general imperialist policy were in conflict with those of the “national” imperialisms.

p The records of ten sessions of the UN General Assembly (15th-24th) show that on the 48 occasions when such resolutions were voted the votes of the three powers coincided only 16 times. The French vote failed to coincide with the British vote 25 times and with the US vote 27 times. Britain voted differently from the USA 14 times.^^5^^ Even without any indication of the content of the resolutions, these figures show, firstly, the general level of imperialist solidarity 289 over African matters in the UN and, secondly, the relative level of the contradictions between the individual powers.

p The specific instances of disagreement are also of interest. On several occasions the USA, for tactical reasons, supported resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism, which caused resentment in Britain as well as Portugal. In 1963, unlike Britain and France, the USA voted for a Security Council resolution calling on all states to halt the sale and delivery of arms to South Africa. In 1966 at a plenary session the USA voted for resolutions condemning apartheid and South Africa’s policy towards Namibia. At some sessions France opposed, and Britain and the USA supported, resolutions on the Congo situation. The three powers voted in different ways on resolutions concerning Namibia, Algeria, the Portuguese colonies, the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries, and so on.

p Naturally, one should not attribute too much importance to this dissension among the main imperialist powers and should not consider it as reflecting a greater or lesser understanding of Africa’s problems or the countries’ degrees of “sympathy” for the African peoples. It is based purely on the selfish interests of individual imperialist detachments and the rivalry for influence in the continent. For instance, the American press emphasised that, when the USA voted at the 21st session of the General Assembly in favour of a resolution to convert Namibia into a UN trust territory and abolish South Africa’s mandate, she was only trying, to restore the African countries’ trust in her, which had been weakened by open US support, in most cases, for the policies of the colonial powers. Swept along by the "wind of change" in Africa and bearing in mind the growing influence and authority in the UN of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the imperialist powers are increasingly obliged to resort to subtle manoeuvring and to conceal their true aims.

p Not only the UN but also a number of other international organisations are becoming an arena for the inter-imperialist struggle over influence on the development of the young states in Africa. American methods for seizing political and economic control in the liberated countries and for ousting the former metropolises are spreading into various regional 290 and specialised bodies. An instructive example of this is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

p OECD owes its very existence to inter-imperialist contradictions. Formed at the instigation of the USA in 1961 from the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), OECD was intended to unite the competing West European economic blocs under American hegemony. Although the convention inaugurating OECD reflected the tendency towards limiting the disagreements between the main imperialist powers over their policy towards the developing countries, at the latter’s expense, moreover, it is centrifugal forces that predominate in the organisation’s practical activities. The USA intended not only to end the division of capitalist Europe through OECD, but also to use the new organisation in her own economic and foreign trade interests in the Third World, and especially in Africa. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained to the National Association of Manufacturers, OECD would offer the USA the opportunity to "put pressure on countries" which maintained restrictions on American exports and also to secure guarantees that America’s trading interests would be fully considered in all the agreements concluded. But, when joining OECD, the former metropolises and several other capitalist countries intended to make use of the organisation to further their neo-colonialist policies and, at the same time, to control the activities of their competitors. Unlike OEEC, the OECD programme mentioned the task of "co-ordinating the efforts" of the capitalist states in granting “aid” to the developing countries. Of course, “ coordination” largely turned OECD into an instrument of "collective neo-colonialism”, but it also allowed the partners to keep a close watch on one another’s activities. The organisation’s convention, painfully worked out through two years of trying to balance the members’ bitter contradictions, made special provision for mutual information and consultation over plans to “aid” the development of young states, but, at the same time, it incorporated an article stating that: "No decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures.”^^1^^’

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p The OECD’s main concern in Africa is to clear the path of obstacles to penetration by the monopolies of the member states and to ensure capital investment spheres and markets. However, the inter-imperialist contradictions outweigh the common stimuli towards unity and constantly slow down the taking of "concrete decisions”. Thus, at one of the first minister-level sessions of the OECD Council at the end of 1962 an attempt to work out a common “aid” policy towards the developing countries ended in failure. The leading members of the organisation were unable to agree on how to allocate these countries’ markets and investment spheres. In the end, they produced a woolly declaration about the need for "concerted action”. The Development Assistance Committee, OECD’s main body, tried unsuccessfully to devise alternatives to the negative consequences of the OECD states’ "tied aid" to the developing countries.^^7^^ It proved impossible to surmount the barriers of capitalist competition. The Technical Co-operation Committee, which selects “ experts” and “volunteers” for the developing countries, spends a good deal of its time in patching up quarrels between the main rivals in this field. The 1967 discussion on setting up an OECD consultative committee on oil ended in deadlock. Despite pressure from the USA and Britain, France and the FRG did not support the proposal.

p There are plenty of examples of the inter-imperialist dissension within OfiCD over policy towards the developing countries. An overall examination of them shows that into the Third World are being transferred the fundamental contradictions between the main members of OECD (those between France and the USA; the FRG and Britain; Britain and France; and France and the FRG), as well as the general complex of contradictions between the USA and Western Europe and, more recently, between the USA and Japan too. All these contradictions stood out particularly clearly during the OECD discussions from autumn 1967 onwards on the monetary crisis. The devaluation of sterling, the dollar and the French franc, the introduction of a twotier price for gold and the revaluation of the West German mark caused bitter conflict during the meetings of the OECD Council of Ministers. Since the representatives of the USA, Britain, France and a number of other countries were 292 looking to increased exports to the developing countries as a means of solving their monetary problems and possibly ending their balance of payments deficits, bitter, but fruitless, discussion revolved around the US proposals for abolishing the "reverse preferences" that were being granted to the Common Market members by the “associated” African countries.

p The logic ot the growing competitive struggle between the imperialist powers inevitably urges them to seek compromises, deals and agreements on the allocation of spheres of influence and markets. In the end, international alliances between monopolies are created, which are, in Lenin’s description, "the most striking expressions of the internationalisation of capital".^^8^^ However, the inter-imperialist contradictions do not disappear. In its final document the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties declared that in the capitalist world "industrial and commercial competition is growing sharper, and the financial and currency war is spreading. Competition is growing in Western Europe, including within the Common Market, and also between the capitalist countries of Europe and the USA. Japanese imperialism is energetically joining this struggle for markets and maximum profits".^^9^^ The relations between the members of OECD and the organisation’s practical activities lend full support to this thesis.

p The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is an international organisation in the heart of Africa, around and within which bitter open and concealed clashes take place between the imperialist powers. The very inauguration of the Commission was the centre of a fierce battle: the colonial powers were opposed to it up to 1958. As a result, the ECA appeared ten years later than the similar Commissions for Asia and the Far East, Europe and Latin America.

p Although the ECA’s members comprise only the African countries (except for South Africa, excluded because of her racial discrimination policies) and Britain, France and Spain are the only non-African states to have associate membership, the scope of the Commission’s activities and certain of its structural features predetermine the opportunities for struggle between the imperialist competitors.

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p Officially, the ECA is supposed to help the African members of the UN to determine the prospects for their economic development. But, in fact, EGA is only a consultative body. The Commission’s plenary sessions are held once every two years, and all the practical work is entrusted to its Secretariat, which is a part of the machinery of the UN Secretariat and has a staff of international officials, mainly from the Western capitalist countries. These officials are fully independent of the African countries, are formally answerable to the UN authorities, but can, of course, "heed the advice" of the governments of their own states. This discrepancy between ECA’s tasks and its organisational structure is not only responsible for the Commission’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the economic development of Africa, but also creates opportunities for inter-imperialist struggle, since the competing Western powers receive two channels of influence—the governments of the African countries that follow their lead and the ECA Secretariat.

p It has already been mentioned that the USA and the FRG were very much interested in the drawing up by the Commission of a plan for setting up four sub-regional economic communities in Africa, irrespective of their member countries’ former colonial affiliations. Washington did everything it could to support this scheme. However, as a result of British and French endeavours, the economic unification of Africa did not follow the path suggested by the ECA. The day was won by the former metropolises.

p The interests of the imperialist powers also clash in ECA over the frequently raised matters of economic co-operation and developing the infrastructure of the African countries. Here are a few typical examples.

p In 1965 the EGA Secretariat set to work on plans for improving Africa’s transport system. The continent was “divided” between the missions of the donor countries, which, in practice, meant mainly between the former metropolises. Britain, for instance, was given an area that included Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia, while France received West Africa. Apart from this, transport missions were invited from the FRG, Belgium and Italy to design the projects. Owing to the events in Rhodesia, the British transport mission could not begin work. In its place, 294 a US mission set out under the flag of the World Bank. Disagreements arose both during the missions’ work and after its completion. Thus, under British pressure, the Sierra Leone authorities actually refused to let the French mission into the country, and an American expert dismissed the reports produced by the West German and French missions as unsatisfactory. But, ultimately, the Africans were the losers: the arguments and delays dragged out the designing of regional plans for developing the continent’s transport system for many years.

p In 1963-65 the EGA Secretariat was working on a plan for setting up an All-African Clearing Union. The American expert R. Griffin was entrusted with the preparation of concrete proposals. His report was reviewed at the first meeting of representatives from the African monetary bodies in 1964. Since the Griffin project was primarily geared to US interests and would, if implemented, ease the penetration of American goods on to the African market, the representatives of the countries that were still dependent on the former metropolises (especially the countries linked with France) categorically opposed the project.

p The measures taken by the EGA Secretariat to prepare national development plans for individual African countries are a particular sphere for the contradictions between the imperialist powers. In 1963-67 such plans were drawn up by EGA experts for Zambia, Zaire, Ghana, Ethiopia and several other countries, in accordance with their governments’ applications. The competing capitalist powers watched this form of activity by the Commission’s Secretariat with unslackening interest. The proposed plan could, in fact, put the economic development of a country at variance with the interests of the foreign capital predominant in it or, on the contrary, without taking account of the efforts of an imperialist rival. Just such a situation arose in practice.

p In Zambia a group of experts was working under the leadership of the British economist Dudley Seers, the Director of the Economic Development Division of the ECA’s Secretariat. Part of the group’s assignment was to make a survey of Zambia’s economic position, analyse the employment prospects of the gainfully active population and to make proposals on the strategy for the country’s economic 295 development after its departure from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The programme presented by the Seers group completely oriented Zambia towards retention of close economic ties with Britain and Rhodesia and took the interests of the British mining companies as its starting point. They were assigned the principal role in the future development of the country’s economy. The programme came under fierce attack from experts belonging to other states, and, in the end, it was shelved. Neither Zambia nor the EGA Secretariat returned to it later.

p Attempts were made twice (in 1963 and 1967) by the EGA to compile an economic development plan for the Congo (Zaire). On the first occasion a “multinational” group of experts arduously put together a blueprint which reminded one, as the Indian economist S. Patel put it, of "the first faltering steps of an infant learning to walk".^^10^^ However, in a situation of fierce inter-imperialist struggle in the Congo this project was stillborn too. A follow-up EGA mission confined itself to recommendations on the setting up of state planning organs.

p There are examples,, though, which show that the situation in a country can force the imperialist powers to push their contradictions into the background. In 1966, shortly after the coup d’etat in Ghana, an EGA mission was sent there to work out proposals for the reorganisation of the country’s economy. The mission set off on the personal instructions of the ECA’s Executive Secretary, R. Gardiner. He also selected the members. In this case, the assignment was a limited one—to help Ghana turn away from a noncapitalist path of development, to do away with the state sector in the country’s economy and to limit its economic ties with the socialist countries. The measures that were later taken by the new government of Ghana showed that the mission’s “advice” had been borne in mind. Typically enough, no mention of the mission’s activities was made in the ECA’s official documents.

p The rivalry between the imperialist powers in the EGA is also manifested in the struggle for places in the Secretariat between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries of Africa. For instance, at the 8th and 9th plenary sessions of the Commission the representatives of a number of 296 French-orientated countries complained that they had only been allotted 30 per cent of the places in the Secretariat. Also noteworthy is the fact that the post of Executive Secretary of the EGA Secretariat has been occupied for many years by R. Gardiner. In the summer of 1969 the question arose of making a new appointment to this post. The most likely candidate was the Kenyan Tom Mboya, who had recently inclined towards the USA. Mboya was killed before he could take up the post of Executive Secretary of the EGA, and his main rival, a representative of the pro-French grouping, was not elected.

p The examples quoted above and many other similar ones provide clear proof of the attempts made by the imperialist powers to use the UN Economic Commission for Africa as a venue for the inter-imperialist struggle. In conjunction with a number of other circumstances, the disagreements between the imperialists paralyse the EGA. There is every reason why the regional economic groupings in Africa are not based on the Commission’s proposals. The organisational forms taken by these groupings do not coincide with the ECA’s plans either, and the Commission’s sub-regional bureaux are ignored. The plans being made for the regional industrialisation of Africa give rise to objections from the African countries, since priority is given in them to the interests either of the former metropolises or of their rivals, to the detriment of the social needs of those for whom the plans are designed. The EGA Secretariat’s measures to train a national planning staff have little effect, since they are not only aimed at inculcating Western planning methods but also have to be implemented amid the conflicting interests of various monopolist groupings. And so on.

p At the same time, one must bear in mind the constant effect on the imperialist powers’ policies towards the EGA of the fact that its sessions and the meetings of its working parties are followed by observers from the socialist countries (the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). The delegations of the Soviet Union at sessions of the Commission support the idea that the African countries should be given maximal support to spur on their economic growth, and criticise the neocolonialist manoeuvres of the Western powers in Africa, 297 which often compels them to make concessions to the young states.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African issues in international organisations as a reflection of the whole complex of contradictions between the imperialist powers in Africa shows no signs of abating. Quite the reverse. Apart from the imperialist powers’ selfish interests in the African countries the factors that stimulate this struggle include the political instability characteristic of modern Africa, the rivalry between individual countries and regional organisations for political and economic leadership, the growth of social contradictions and the rise of centrifugal forces in various countries and geographical regions.

p The outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle in international organisations is closely connected with the evolution of the political course taken by the African countries themselves, especially in the UN. They are still split by substantial differences over a number of intra-African problems and aspects of world politics, and this is being used by the imperialist powers for their own ends. Recently, however, there has been a noticeable consolidation of the African countries, especially as regards international economic cooperation, a review of the conditions of world trade and the abolition of the remains of colonialism. Further unification of the "African group" at the UN will compel the imperialist powers to look for other ways of resolving their contradictions. Compromises at the expense of young states will become impossible.

Since the UN and a number of other international organisations also serve largely as forums for the dialogue between the two world systems, the outlook for the inter-imperialist struggle in these organisations both over African issues and over all other matters must be viewed through the optic of the relations between the two systems. The growing international influence of the socialist system and its unity with the national liberation movement will reinforce the antiimperialist front in the UN and other organisations, and will enable the African countries to make still more effective use of the contradictions in the imperialist camp for the sake of peace and progress.