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p Regional co-operation between the newly independent countries of Africa can be a means of accelerating their economic development. In recent years this idea has been gaining greater recognition in Africa, and its implementation on a genuinely democratic and scientific basis could bring the African peoples considerable benefits—political as well as economic.

p The urge towards anti-colonialist unity is one of the characteristic features of the national liberation movement in Africa. Moves towards unity were taken by a number of countries immediately after emancipation.

p The impracticability of many of the regional organisations that have appeared in Africa cannot simply be explained by divergencies in African leaders’ interpretations of units. The members of the organisations had differing levels of economic development, but the structure of their foreign trade was more or less identical, and so the organisations failed to eliminate competition. The failure of a number of groupings can also be blamed on the imperialist powers, which were apprehensive over the formation in Africa of strong state alliances, since (1) these alliances had an antiimperialist basis and might obstruct neo-colonialist policies, and (2) they weakened the influence of the former metropolises on individual countries.

p The regionalist tendencies that appeared in Africa between the late fifties and early sixties arose mainly from political factors; but in the second half of the sixties they displayed a new feature: organisations were being largely created on an economic basis and in the interests of economic development. Thus, the years 1967-70 saw the creation of the East African Economic Community, the Union of Central African States, the West African Economic Community and several other regional groupings.

p The economic bias of the tendencies towards integration, as well as the further improvement of neo-colonialist tactics and their adaptation to the new situation, brought about 267 considerable modifications to the positions of the imperialist powers. For political and economic reasons they could no longer resist the drive of the African countries towards regional co-operation and began to apply themselves to making use of the processes of integration in their own interests.

p By giving their support in principle to the tendencies towards economic integration, the imperialist powers think that they will be able to exert a comprehensive influence on whole groups of African countries. This factor is responsible for the more or less positive approach adopted by the West towards new forms of regional co-operation. However, the attitudes of Britain, France, the USA and the FRG towards the actual processes of integration are not identical. Consequently, there is now a fierce struggle between various imperialist groups and individual powers over the question of regional organisations in Africa.

p The contradictions in this sphere between the USA and the FRG on the one hand and France and Britain on the other are particularly bitter, as is the rivalry between the former metropolises for influence in the existing and emergent groupings. The main bone of contention is the basis on which regional organisations should be formed. The USA actively supported a proposal put forward by the UN Economic Commission for Africa to organise four economic sub-regions in the continent, and welcomed the signing of the protocol inaugurating the East African Economic Community. In practice, however, and not without British endeavours, an East African Community was set up, consisting of only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, i.e., the countries of former British East Africa. The main levers of influence in this community remained in London’s hands. Some other proposals made by the EGA were not acted on either. Then, in collaboration with the FRG, the USA drew up her own plan for sub-regional economic co-operation in Africa, aimed at removing Britain and France from their dominating positions in the continent.

p For their part, France and Britain, which have retained relatively firm economic ties with most of their former colonies, reject all ideas on sub-regional co-operation and support integration, but only within a framework that takes 268 in the territories of the former British or former French Africa. At the same time, they are opposed to “mixed” groupings, in which they might come up against competition from the other imperialist powers.

p The most jealous attitude to the regional question is that of France. Mention has already been made of the measures taken by Paris after the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic left UDEAC at the beginning of 1968 in order to found pointly with the Congo (Zaire) the new organisation UEAC. Fearing an upsurge of American influence in this part of Africa, France secured the return of the CAR to UDEAC, thereby breaking up the new grouping.

p One of France’s successful moves was the setting up in April 1973 on the basis of the West African Customs Union (UDEAO) of a new regional organisation called the West African Economic Community (CEAO). It consists of six French-speaking countries: Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger and Mali. Guinea was also invited to join, but declined to do so.

p In effect, CEAO acts as an alternative to the American plan for setting up an economic sub-region in West Africa. The new grouping may, in theory, become one of the largest regional economic organisations in Africa. The total area of the member countries is 4,271,000 sq km, with a combined population of 25,300,000 people. Considerable mineral reserves are concentrated in the area, a varied range of agricultural commodities is produced and livestock-raising and the textile and food industries are relatively well developed.

p Britain is doing all she can to protect the East African Community, all the more so since it was formed out of the East African Common Services Organisation, which had remained from colonial times. Ethiopia, Zambia, Somali, Burundi and Swaziland have applied for membership, but any expansion of the community is clearly not in London’s interests, which is evidently one of the reasons for delay in considering the applications.

p Despite the resistance of the former metropolises, however, the USA and the FRG, making use of the integration processes in Africa, are trying to recarve the British and French spheres of influence. The position of the USA in the matter merits special attention, since Washington is 269 making the most consistent efforts to use the regionalist idea as a means of inter-imperialist struggle.

p The USA first announced her support for regional cooperation in Africa in 1966. The US attitude was formulated by Edmond Hutchinson, the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of African Affairs at AID, when speaking on the 23 March 1966 in the House of Representatives Commission on US Aid to Africa.

p Hutchinson justified the US Government’s intention to focus attention on regional organisations, regional methods for development and regional channels for “aid” as being of benefit, in the first instance, to the United States. He stated that, since the other Western powers still had an undiminished interest in granting “aid” to Africa, a situation had come about in which the USA, although playing the role of "active partner”, was, nevertheless, not predominant in the matter of “aid” for the continent as a whole. In this connection, the interests of the USA are forcing (my italics—author) the government to concentrate its efforts on a few African countries and also to support regional tendencies. All Hutchinson’s incidental arguments about the benefits that regional organisations might bring the African countries themselves were nothing more than a necessary diplomatic camouflage for the overriding factor— the USA’s urge to become “predominant” in Africa and to oust the former metropolises, since it was precisely they that were being referred to as "the other Western powers”. This thesis was carried further in his speech. Hutchinson made it plain that AID would take measures to see that the “aid” was directly administered by the USA, to a degree and at a rate, moreover, that would accord with "general American interests”.

p The frank pragmatism in this speech and its evident bias against the European partners produced a negative response in London and Paris, which compelled Washington to provide a “theoretical” basis for its pretentions. The mission was taken on by Walt Rostow, who was then special assistant to the President. He declared that the move towards regionalism was of special significance to the United States. After the Second World War world-wide responsibility was thrust upon the USA owing to the need to fill power vacuums. 270 For the USA, he continued, regionalism was a way of avoiding excessive bilateral relations. Regionalism was not a return to isolation, but a means of offering countries in different regions the opportunity of doing the maximum for themselves, and ultimately even more, while at the same time preserving their bonds of interdependence.^^1^^ Returning to the themes of the USA’s "global responsibility”, the need to fill the “vacuum” and so on, Rostow does, nevertheless, make one concession to his European partners. This is contained in his reference to upholding the principle of “ interdependence” and the possibility of the USA’s “avoiding” “excessive” bilateral relations with the developing countries. But the ruling circles of Britain and France were not so much listening to Washington’s voice as carefully following the practical steps taken. While commenting on the founding of UEAC, the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur noted with obvious irritation that the grouping arose "hot on the heels" of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey’s visit to Africa and that it should be seen as a US attempt to undermine French influence in that part of the continent.^^2^^ In response to the American “switch” towards regional organisations in Africa, France adopted a number of concrete counter- measures: in particular, she immediately supplied some of them with additional funds in order that French patronage should be retained.

p In order to form a correct understanding of the essence of the inter-imperialist contradictions over regionalism, one must, in the first place, determine why the processes of integration in Africa attracted the attention of the USA and began to "accord with her national interests”, as was particularly stressed by Secretary of State William Rogers in his report to President Nixon The United States and Africa in the Seventies. Walt Rostow, who has now left the political scene, went so far as to state that it was the USA that was responsible for "a situation in which the Africans are more and more taking over their destiny through regional and subregional institutions".^^3^^

p To some extent, the expansion of American private capital into Africa is limited by the poor economic development of most of the continent and the absence in most countries of opportunities for the transatlantic monopolies to deploy 271 capital investment at a high profitability rate. Other obstacles are the preference barriers that have now been raised by 21 countries (as a result of their association with the EEC) and Africa’s traditional links with the former metropolises. Regionalism in the form proposed by the USA is breaching these barriers. Thus, the USA welcomes regionalism not because it is in the interests of the African countries but only because it opens up additional opportunities for the American monopolies and facilitates the redistribution of markets and spheres of influence on a new basis, in accordance with the existing correlation of forces in the world capitalist economy.

p The main source of contradictions is the fact that the existing system of the African market as a whole corresponds to the interests of the former metropolises, whereas it does not suit the USA, the FRG and Japan, since it limits opportunities for trade and investment. So, while concentrating “aid” on a limited number of selected countries, the United States is encouraging regionalism in order to prevent a fall in the influence of American capital on the economic and social life of the other African states. This explains why the USA is sparing no expense on regional aims in Africa. Full account has been taken of the main recommendations of the "Korry Report”, which pointed out that American “aid” to Africa should be effected primarily through regional and multilateral projects and programmes, and should also make use of methods and channels that involved more than one participant. Guided by this thesis, the USA is attempting to further her expansion by using numerous regional groupings in Africa—from the East African Community to the Council of Concord. These tactics give rise to fresh contradictions with the former metropolises, since they occupy key positions in the regional organisations of African countries.

p In practice, US support for the processes of integration in Africa has boiled down to a reduction in the programmes for bilateral “aid” to the African countries and a simultaneous increase in support for regional projects.

p While supporting the idea of creating large economic subregions, the USA is at the same time taking steps to secure opportunities for influence within the existing groupings. Thus, Washington has granted loans and subsidies to the 272 East African Community, has expressed the wish to help the Council of Concord to carry through its regional projects, quite apart from the considerable financial and technical “aid” already being given to its members (especially the Ivory Coast), is trying to gain favour with the Common Afro-Malagasy Organisation (OGAM), and so on.

p Quite typical are the attempts being made to extend the mechanism of the USA’s regional policy in Africa to include the African Development Bank, in, which, according to its constitution, capital from non-African countries cannot participate. In view of this, the USA operates through two channels—AID and the World Bank. AID suggests that projects should be carried out jointly, and the World Bank offers “aid” for selecting projects and evaluating them.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African integration takes the form of conflict between groupings of capitalist countries, as well as between individual powers. New, collective forms of struggle have appeared, for use in situations where individual states are opposed by a whole bloc of competing countries. This aspect of inter-imperialist contradictions stood out most clearly in the relations between the USA and the EEC (Common Market) over the creation of association between the EEC and Africa.

p The inter-imperialist struggle over African integration cannot be examined without analysing the effect on it produced by association between the EEC and Africa—a system of collective neo-colonialism involving 18 fully associated African countries and 6 with agreements on partial association with the Common Market. The question is highly topical owing to Britain’s entry into the EEC, which will clearly lead to a further expansion of association to include the African Commonwealth countries.

p The true nature of the association between the EEC and Africa, its origins and mode of operation are closely examined in a number of books and articles by Soviet and foreign writers. We shall, therefore, dwell on just two aspects—the practical opportunities for the EEC to influence the processes of African integration and the role of the inter-imperialist contradictions developing within and around the Common Market over association.

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p The main feature of all the African countries’ principal economic and political unions, communities and organisations is the fact that these groupings generally involve in various combinations precisely those countries that are connected with the Common Market (see chart).

p An important question thus arises: to what extent can the members of regional groupings take independent decisions that conflict with the interests of the EEC countries? Or, to put it another way: do the bonds of association or the regional links come first? The facts show that, at least up to the present time, the members of the EEC, and especially France, have retained broad opportunities for influencing the activities of the African groupings and are, above all, furthering the development of African economies along the capitalist path.

p In the case of a member with low economic potential, EEC associate status limits that member’s opportunities not only to decide on the course of internal development but also to foster co-operation with other African countries. These limitations are imposed by the multilateral agreement on association, the EEC countries’ numerous bilateral treaties with the associated countries and also by the fact that the credits, loans and subsidies granted to the associated countries generally have strings attached. Thus, within the framework of their regional groupings the African countries can only use the money received for those projects which would benefit the monopolies of the EEC. What is more, Article 3 of the Yaounde Convention allows associated countries to set up regional groupings or conclude customs and other unions with third states only with the blessing of the EEC! The vital condition here is that the activities of a regional grouping must not be damaging to the interests of one or more members of the EEC. In other words, the regional integration of the associated countries is under Common Market control, and the African countries themselves are constantly threatened by sanctions if they overstep the bounds prescribed by the EEC.

p The provision of finance is the Common Market countries’ strongest means of putting pressure on their associated African partners. Let us consider a few typical examples.

p 1967 saw the conclusion of a special convention on 274 Table 12 Chart Showing the Affiliation of EEC-Associated African Countries to Regional Organisations Also members of Countries fully or partially associated with the EEC Council of Concord Common Afro- Malagasy Organisation Central African Customs and Economic Union Union of Central African States 1 fl nj O £ *(* & II Equatorial Africa and Cameroun Monetary Union West African Economic Community East African Economic Community Maghreb Countries Economic Organisation .2 0 % So o’SS Niger River Commission Organisation of Senegal River States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ivory Coast X X X X X Burundi Upper Volta X X X X X Gabon X X X Dahomey X X X X X Cameroun X X X X X People’s Republic of the Congo X X Zaire X X X X Mauritania \ X X 275 Malagasy Republic X Mali X X Niger X X X X X X Ruanda X Senegal X X X Somali Togo X X X CAR X X X Chad X X X X X X Tunisia* X Morocco* X Kenya* Uganda* X Tanzania* X Nigeria* X X X X X Partially associated. 276 operation between the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and France. In accordance with this convention, the French aid and co-operation fund is financing UDEAC’s main projects, at a total cost of some 170 million African francs, and French technical advisers are working in various Union bodies.

p The two monetary groupings—the West African Monetary Union and the Equatorial Africa and the Cameroun Monetary Union—have a total membership of 11 African countries. Each union is run by an administrative council in which two-thirds of the members are from the African states and the remaining third from France. Nevertheless, France retains complete control over the decision-making process, since she can at any time refuse to grant loans and credits to the unions.

p The Council of Concord, a political and economic organisation of 5 countries, has been in existence for 12 years. During these years the members of the Council have been very active in economic co-operation. They have spoken with a single voice in the Organisation of African Unity, but have adopted the most conservative positions. The Council’s financial basis—the Mutual Assistance and Loan Guarantee Fund—is supported materially by France.

p The co-ordinated study and exploitation of the natural resources of river basins is very important to many African countries. The Organisation of Senegal River States, the Chad Lake Commission and the Niger River Commission, for example, were set up for this purpose. All these organisations have already displayed a certain amount of vigour in tackling their assignments. But the speed at which they can achieve results is impeded by lack of funds. In the end, Holland undertook to subsidise development work on the River Niger, and Lake Chad is being developed by some of the EEC countries and even the USA.

p It would not be difficult to multiply the examples, but they all lead one to the natural conclusion that the independence of the regional groupings in Africa is still considerably limited and subject, with all that entails, both to the EEC associateship obligations of their members and to the willingness of individual Western countries to finance the various projects.

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p It was France which in 1957 initiated the idea of associating African countries with the EEC. The object was to preserve the French monopolies’ position in the colonies under the new circumstances, although this step meant some sharing of France’s sphere of influence with the other members of the Common Market. In Paris’s view, however, this was a lesser evil than allowing the United States into Frenchspeaking Africa. In addition, France counted on being able to use the capital of her West European partners in the pursuance of her African policy. Belgium had similar designs, while the FRG, Italy and Holland saw the association between the EEC and Africa as a possible means of penetrating the French colonial empire, which was on the verge of collapse, and thereby making up for their losses in other developing regions. Thus, the contradictions between the Common Market members themselves—which later intensified—have existed ever since association was devised. However, the main aspect of the inter-imperialist rivalry over EEC associate membership for African countries was the fundamental inter-imperialist contradiction of modern times—between the USA and the Common Market as a whole.

p Neither the Common Market itself nor its African branch could suit Washington, which continued to uphold the idea of global integration, headed by the USA, on the basis of "Atlantic solidarity”. What was more, association raised direct tariff and other barriers against the expansion of the American monopolies over a considerable part of Africa. Sidney Dell, a director of the UNCTAD Secretariat, reflected US views when he wrote: "... The association between African countries and the EEC cannot be considered a healthy one.. . . Western European aid to Africa ... is to be applauded, but there is no reason that it should be made conditional upon associate membership in the EEC.”^^4^^ In the end, the USA launched a frontal assault on the EEC’s African policy.

p It is significant that, up to about 1957, Washington considered its position in Europe to be firm enough and supported some of the “Eurafrican” measures that were being taken while the colonial regimes were still intact. The idea then was to have a "united Europe" and Africa connected to 278 it as links in an "Atlantic partnership" system headed by the USA. But, when a vast area of Africa came to be protected from American monopolies by “associateship” barriers and Eurafrica began to evolve in the direction of a closed market for the West European countries, America’s ruling circles changed course abruptly. In January 1957 the State Department declared ominously that US readiness to assist the countries of Western Europe to consolidate their political and economic strength was conditional upon the further expansion of the Atlantic Union. At a session of the UN General Assembly at the end of 1957 the American representatives insisted that “co-operation” with Africa should be conducted under the auspices not of the EEC, but through the Council of Europe and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), i.e., under the actual control of NATO bodies. With the founding of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, the United States proposed that this organisation should be entrusted with African “development”.

p However, Washington did not confine itself to appeals, but took concrete counter-measures against association. Through the GATT mechanism American representatives in Brussels persistently strove to level the EEC tariffs on produce from the associated and non-associated countries of Africa, thus removing the privileges of the associate members and undermining the basis for association. Several times the US Government handed special memoranda to the EEC countries demanding an end to preferences and customs restrictions. It should be noted that this attitude was viewed most unfavourably by the associated African countries.

p The Americans managed to obtain some results. Under pressure from Washington, the EEC slightly reduced the customs dues on produce from non-associated countries, and some breaches were made for the passage of commodities from the American monopolies to the markets of the associated African countries. But the USA’s struggle with association between the EEC and Africa has not come to an end. It depends closely on the contradictions between the USA and the Common Market as a whole and continues, as these contradictions intensify still further.

p Britain’s attitude to the EEC’s operations in Africa was 279 largely determined by the fact that (1) in 1961 London decided to join the Common Market itself and (2) the zone of British interests in Africa was not originally affected. It soon became clear, however, that the grouping’s expansion was aimed at more than just the former colonial possessions of its members. The EEC leaders were trying to extend Eurafrica to embrace other African countries, including those belonging to the Commonwealth. Despite Britain’s own attitude to the Common Market, her political and business circles were understandably alarmed and irritated by these tendencies.

p A particularly fierce battle developed over the application to the Common Market made in 1963 by Nigeria, and later by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which proposed that their economic relations should be adjusted, i.e., they were seeking associate membership. Supported by the USA, Britain exerted the strongest pressure on Nigeria to drop the idea. The USA delivered a further memorandum to the EEC countries in July 1965 objecting to the attempts of "Little Europe" to draw Nigeria into its orbit, and London and Washington both threatened the Nigerian Government with a suspension of “aid”. Nevertheless, the Ironsi Government, which came to power in Nigeria after the coup of January 1965, signed an agreement on the 16 July 1966 confirming Nigeria’s partial associate membership of the EEC. However, this agreement remained in force for just over a fortnight. A further coup took place and the Gowon Government suspended the agreement. It seemed that Britain and the USA had won the contest, but their victory was short-lived. London had to backtrack, since it applied for Community membership itself in May 1967, and Lagos ratified the agreement after all in January 1968.^^5^^ This act not only damaged the Anglo-American position in West Africa, but also unleashed a curious chain reaction among the African members of the Commonwealth.

p On the 26 July 1968, the Common Market’s negotiations with the countries of East Africa, which had been going on since 1964, came to an end, and Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed a convention providing for their associate membership of the EEC up to the 31 May 1969. On this occasion too the counter-manoeuvring of Britain and the 280 USA was of no avail. London sent the Commission of European Communities and the Governments of the “Six” an official note warning that Britain would challenge the convention under the GATT rules, but this protest had no effect. On the 21 September 1969, representatives of the East African Community and the Common Market signed a protocol in Arusha extending their convention until the 31 January 1975. In this way, the leaders of "Little Europe" accomplished their plan for inducing the countries of East Africa to become associate members in accordance with the principle of free trade and reciprocity. According to press reports, Britain tried to prevent the new agreement from being concluded, but stopped short of open conflict, since she was herself in the Common Market’s waiting-room.

p The discriminatory practices introduced by the EEC in relation to the African countries which are not members compel them, as in the case of Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, to establish a "special relationship" with the Common Market and to conclude association agreements. The members of the Common Market, and especially the FRG and France, have used these agreements as a means of inter-imperialist struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence in Africa on a regional basis. Thus, a strategy of active defence is being employed against competition from the USA, and a frontal assault was launched against the British position.

p Prominent in the plethora of contradictions in the modern imperialist world are those between “national” imperialisms which participate in the same economic blocs. This thesis is amply supported by the relations between the EEC partners over Eurafrica. The Common Market today embraces Britain, France, the FRG and Italy, which have long been at odds with one another in Africa as well as in Europe. Their traditional contradictions are now supplemented by disagreements arising from their joint membership of the EEC.

p It was pointed out earlier that, when agreeing to found the association between the EEC and Africa, the members of the EEC were inspired by different motives. This predetermined the further development of the contradictions and also the fact that their expansion into Africa is being carried out mainly on a national, rather than collective, basis.

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p The main contradiction within the EEC is the rivalry between the FRG, France and Britain. West Germany views association with the African countries not only as a means of penetrating the former colonial empire of France, but also as an opportunity, by expanding the association, to deprive Paris of its privileged position in French-speaking Africa. Under West German pressure, a start was made to abolishing the system of the so-called “super-prices”, which tied a group of African states to France and retarded the development of their trade with other members of the Common Market.

p It may also be recalled that during the existence of the first fund for developing the associated countries (from 1958 to 1962) the FRG did all she could to impede the export of their goods on to her own market, since it was mainly French companies that benefited from this trade. Relying on her economic supremacy within the EEC, the FRG is using the levelling of customs and tariff conditions in Africa for all Common Market members in order to further the expansion of West German capital into Africa and to oust her partners.

p Holland has taken up a rather special position in her policy towards the African countries. In the first place, Dutch interests are centred not so much in Africa as in Asia; and, in the second place, despite her membership of the Common Market, Holland is closely linked with the USA and adopts an Anglo-Saxon, rather than European, outlook on many matters, coming into conflict with both France and the FRG. Thus, during the negotiations on the second Yaounde Convention Holland insisted on the abolition of mutual preferences, which would have benefited neither the associated countries nor the EEC, but would, on the other hand, have greatly extended the opportunities for Anglo-American exporters by raising the competitiveness of their goods.

p One of the EEC’s African clusters of contradictions centred on the Maghreb. Since Tunisia and Morocco had already attained political independence before the Treaty of Rome was signed, both these countries remained outside the convention on association (it automatically applied only to Algeria, which was then considered French territory). 282 However, France managed to arrange for a special protocol to be signed which ensured the preservation of the French economic relations with Tunisia and Morocco that had been established during the colonial period. Naturally, other EEC members objected to this situation, especially since some of the exports from the Maghreb competed with their own products. A struggle that was to last for nearly 10 years began between mainly Paris and Bonn, with France trying to retain her special relations with Morocco and Tunisia and the FRG to weaken them. After lengthy negotiations agreements were signed with Tunisia and Morocco in March 1969 granting them partial association with the EEC for a period of 5 years and the extension to other members of the “Six” of preferences on three-quarters of the commodities entering France on preferential terms. In return, Tunisia and Morocco received tariff quotas for some of their export goods. Algeria, which is pursuing a policy of co-operation with the socialist countries, rejected association with the EEC, while retaining close bilateral economic ties with France.

p Association between the EEC and Africa is a highly dangerous instrument in the nep-colonialist policy of "Little Europe" in the African countries, and the inter-imperialist struggle over association inflicts additional damage on the young states, since the attempts to resolve the contradictions are made principally at their expense.

p The integration processes in Africa, which are emerging from the laws of the world capitalist economy and the world economy as a whole, will undoubtedly develop further as one of the very real possibilities for eliminating the consequences of the colonialists’ fragmentation of the continent and its economic backwardness. However, the imperialist plans for regional economic co-operation between the African countries cannot serve as a democratic alternative to this. Such plans, no matter what form they take, are designed to benefit not the African states but the imperialist power or bloc of capitalist states involved. Any version of imperialist integration is aimed at a fresh redistribution of spheres of influence in Africa. That is why a bitter inter-imperialist struggle is now taking place over regional issues.

The question of regional co-operation between African countries can only be settled to their advantage by them 283 alone, without the interference or patronage of the imperialists. In the struggle to uphold their interests the young states can always count on the help of the socialist community, which consistently opposes all forms of discrimination in international economic relations.