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p Many industrially developed capitalist states, especially those in Western Europe, have always experienced an acute need for raw materials, since their reserves are either limited or non-existent. The shortage of raw materials is now being felt even by those countries whose own resources were previously considered adequate. The greatest need is for oil, non-ferrous metals and rare-earth minerals. Consequently, the monopolies’ struggle for raw material sources, including those in African countries, increased during the sixties.

p In this connection, it is of interest to examine specific examples of inter-imperialist struggle for raw material sources in Africa. Naturally, it is impossible to carry out a detailed analysis of all the facts involved. We shall stick to the main battles which give the clearest illustration of this struggle and its means, forms, and methods, and which provide the key to understanding the real substance of many events in Africa as well as the reasons for certain important aspects of the policies of the imperialist powers in Africa.

p ’The contest in Zambia’s copper belt and in Katanga (Zaire}. Zambia accounts for over 50 per cent of Africa’s copper output and approximately 14 per cent of the output of all the capitalist and developing states. The country comes third in the world copper production league, after the USA and Chile. The copper belt forms part of the KatangaRhodesian mining area, which is one of the richest mineral 164 zones in the capitalist world. It stretches for more than 300 km and covers an area of 30,000 sq km. The reserves of copper ore amount to over 2,000 million tons (i.e., not less than 60 million tons of the actual metal), and it is the world’s highest-grade ore, with a metal content of up to 5 per cent. For many years now the copper belt has been the object of a fierce competitive battle between the monopolies, especially those of Britain and the USA.

p Zambian copper is mined by two enormous monopoly groups, the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (henceforth referred to as Anglo-American), representing British capital, and Roan Selection Trust, which belongs to the bankers on Wall Street. The total investments of the two groups in the copper belt add up to about 900 million dollars and the average net profit exceeds 50 million dollars a year.

p The struggle between British and American monopolies for supremacy in the copper belt has always been determined by the profit factor and by competition in the world market. The USA is able to satisfy her copper requirements from her own resources and from Chilean imports, while American companies are major exporters of the metal, which goes mainly to Western Europe. But here American copper has to compete with Zambian copper, which is supplied by British monopolies and which is, moreover, cheaper and of higher quality. Naturally, the US copper-producing concerns strove to seize new positions in the copper belt, which would enable them to regulate market prices in their own interests.

p In 1962 even before Zambian independence, Roan Selection Trust swallowed up one of the largest copper-belt corporations, Roan Antilope, in which it had previously held only 32.65 per cent of the share capital. This move increased RST’s reserves of copper ore by 86 million tons and annual production of the metal by almost 100,000 tons. In turn, in 1964 the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, controlled by Anglo-American, acquired all the shares in Bancroft Mines, Ltd., which owned mines containing some 85 million tons of copper ore.

p With the declaration of Zambian independence, the Americans brought even more pressure to bear on the 165 position of their British competitors. Moreover, the assault was mounted under the banner of the “anti-colonialism” of the US companies, which, unlike Anglo-American, were "not connected" with the racists in South Africa. American propaganda intended for Zambian consumption frequently emphasised the fact that Anglo-American’s headquarters were in Johannesburg and its governing board included well-known racists, whereas the directors of RST were firmly “opposed” to racial discrimination and were "true friends" of Zambia. The RST board was credited with constant efforts to revise the payments system for African miners and to improve their technical skills, and it was only the resistance of the British companies which prevented all this from happening. The American monthly Fortune, for example, declared that "RST, followed somewhat reluctantly at times by Anglo-American, has long made valiant efforts to allow Africans access to skilled jobs".^^1^^ The demagogic nature of such statements becomes obvious if one bears in mind that, despite their "valiant efforts”, the US monopolies did not manage to promote a single African to a responsible position in any of their companies that were exploiting the wealth of the copper belt, and only 3 per cent of the local workforce had been to a secondary school. The president of the ZAMANGLO group, which controls the activities of British companies in the copper belt, the South African multi-millionaire Harry Oppenheimer, gave a terse and categorical reply to the statements of his American competitors: "We are not worried about change. There is no doubt that we shall be able to collaborate with future governments.”^^2^^ Despite Oppenheimer’s confident tone, the outlook for the British monopolies in Zambia gave rise to grave concern in London and Johannesburg. It was clear to Anglo-American’s owners that the struggle would have to be waged on two fronts—against imperialist competitors and the leaders of the new Zambia, who were making no secret of their intention to place the country’s wealth at the service of its people. The monopolies’ concern was also shared by the British Government. Harold Wilson stated that the copper produced in Zambia was of vital importance to the United Kingdom. The British Prime Minister made it quite plain that Britain intended to struggle 166 with all the means at her disposal for these "vital interests”.

p The crisis that arose in Southern Rhodesia with the declaration of “independence” by the racist regime of Ian Smith and all the subsequent developments had a curious effect on the competitive struggle in the copper belt. On the one hand, both the British and American monopolies had an interest in seeing that work was not interrupted in their mines and factories, which obliged them to take joint action. But, on the other hand, each group tried to derive benefit from the situation at its partners’ expense. Thus, before 1966 the output from the copper belt was conveyed by rail through Rhodesia to the port of Beira in Mozambique. The uncompromising stand taken by the Zambian Government against the racists in Southern Rhodesia made it impossible to use this rail route. The Americans offered to fly the copper out in Lockheed Hercules transport planes from Ndola, the centre of the copper belt, to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Since Lockheed was an American company, the British monopolies found themselves in a tight spot, and the air bridge was short-lived. The principal means of transporting Zambian copper came to be the railway owned by Tanganyika Concessions running through Angola to Benguela.

p The British monopolies which consumed and exported Zambian copper were the first to suffer from the interruptions in deliveries from the copper belt. The production of refined copper in Britain fell by 12 per cent in 1966 and by a further 5 per cent in 1967, a development which US suppliers were not slow to take advantage of, and they began to capture traditional British export markets in Europe. The “balance” was only restored in 1967 by the massive strike in the US copper industry, which cut production by almost 30 per cent.

p Inter-imperialist rivalry in the copper belt flared up with new force after the Zambian Government’s decision, announced in August 1969, to partially nationalise the copper industry and to introduce new rules for granting licences to foreign mining companies. In accordance with this decision, the state was to buy 51 per cent of the shares in AngloAmerican and RST for 500 million dollars. The companies, 167 however, would still have a say in overall management and would be responsible for day-to-day control of production.

p The shares were to be transferred to the Zambian Government gradually: the transfer period was fixed at 12 vears for Anglo-American and 8 years for Roan Selection Trust. The new rules for leasing land were an extremely important part of the government measure. The area previously allocated to the companies for geological survey work was to be reduced to one-sixteenth of its size.

p The decision of the Zambian Government alters the situation in the copper belt considerably. Firstly, the monopoly position of Anglo-American and RST is seriously weakened and, secondly, the limiting of their sphere of action provides a further spur to their mutual competitive struggle to consolidate and expand the position they still hold. The last vital factor follows from the new rules for granting licences to mining companies and from the simultaneous reduction of the area previously made over to AngloAmerican and RST. This measure opens up the copper belt to other companies, which makes the competitive battle much fiercer. Immediately after the regulations had been announced, the Zambian Government received applications for mining licences from more than 20 companies. As the France Presse agency reported on the 26 January 1970, "Lusaka is like a boom town. Groups of mining engineers from Japan and America are pushing aside the representatives of the old established firms.”

p Thus, the inter-imperialist struggle in the copper belt is growing in intensity, and the number of protagonists is increasing. Through skilful control Zambia can derive undoubted benefits from the situation.

p The monopolies’ rivalry in Zambia’s copoer belt is taking forms that are comparatively calm, but their struggle for copper and other natural resources in Katanga (Zaire) has already once led to tragic consequences.

p The region of Upper Katanga forms a single mining complex with the Zambian copper belt. 30 per cent of Africa’s copper is mined in this region. In addition. Zaire produces every year up to 10,000 tons of cobalt (80 per cent of world output), 120,000 tons of zinc, 500 tons of cadmium, as well as a significant quantity of tin, germanium, tantalum 168 and other valuable minerals. The diamond mines in the basin of the River Kasai annually supply the world market with 12 million carats of industrial diamonds, or 65 per cent of the capitalist world output.

p Zaire’s resources were exploited for many decades by British and Belgian capital. Before 1967 14.47 per cent of the share capital of the Belgian company Union Miniere du Katanga belonged to the British Tanganyika Concessions. The diamond industry is significantly dependent on the British diamond monopoly De Beers Consolidated Mines. The mining centres of Katanga are served by the railway belonging to Tanganyika Concessions.

p During the postwar period the mineral wealth of Upper Katanga came to be the object of increasing rivalry between the imperialist powers. Ever since the end of the forties the USA had tried its utmost to penetrate into the area, but colonial barriers had blocked the advance of the American monopolies. The City of London awaited the granting of independence to the Congo with considerable trepidation, while Wall Street longed for this event. Anglo-Belgian industrial circles made ready to defend their interests, while the American monopolies prepared to invade the “reserve”. David Rockefeller, who visited the Congo one year before the granting of independence, declared at a press conference in Leopoldville that the United States was highly interested in the Congo, since in ten years’ time the USA would be importing 30 per cent of the raw materials on which all economic life on the far side of the Atlantic depended. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the eve of the Congolese crisis and despite the financial panic in the stock exchanges, the Rockefeller group spent 1.3 million dollars on acquiring shares in the Congolese firm Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et ITndustrie, controlled by the Belgian financial group Societe Generate de Belgique. London reacted to the deal with a burst of indignation.

p The declaration of Congolese independence on the 30 June 1960 heralded the beginning of a grim struggle between the imperialists for positions in the country’s mining industry.

p Since this book does not set out to present a detailed account of the events in the Congo, we shall concern 169 ourselves only with the inter-imperialist contradictions and the clash of interests between the monopolist circles of the USA, Belgium and Britain. This aspect of the Congolese issue deserves serious attention. The rivalry and all-out struggle between imperialist groupings were extremely bitter in the Congo and took various forms. Many of the ways and means of ousting competitors that were employed during the Congolese troubles became stock gambits in the later policies adopted by the capitalist states towards Africa.

p For obvious reasons, bourgeois historians have sidestepped the issue almost completely. Distorted accounts of the events in the Congo were given in the West, in order to justify the actions of the USA, Britain, Belgium and the countries which supported them. The only exception is the wellknown book To Katanga and Back, written by the UN representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O’Brien. He supplies numerous facts which show that not only was there profound disagreement between Britain and the USA, but a real struggle was taking place for Katanga and for influence in the Congo.

p In brief, the main events in the first stage of the crisis were as follows. Belgium attacked the Congo on the 4 July 1960. On the II July Katanga, where the separatist and puppet Tshombe regime had been set up, inspired and financed by Tanganyika Concessions and Union Miniere, seceded from the Congo. This action not only caused great harm to the young republic (the Congo was deprived of 60 per cent of its income), but also blocked the direct access to Katanga of the US monopolies. The 14 July 1960 saw the beginning of the "UN operation”, which lasted until the 1 July 1964. On the 17 January 1961, the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and some of his aides were murdered. On the 18 September 1961, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash. For still unexplained reasons his plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia, 15 km from the town of Ndola, to which he was flying for a meeting with Tshombe. Hammarskjold intended to convince Tshombe of the need to station UN troops in Katanga. Tshombe’s agreement to this proposal would have been tantamount to the separatist leader’s siding with the USA. However, these plans did not suit Britain and 170 Belgium, or Tshombe either. Hammarskjold’s mediation did not take place.

p Thus, the inter-imperialist contradictions are revealed with particular clarity during the first stage in the Congo crisis in 1960-61. Although the task of preventing the progressive regime headed by Patrice Lumumba from growing stronger caused no dissension in the imperialist camp, the ultimate aims of its members were different. Hence the clash in tactics. Britain, which had an interest in preserving her investments in the Union Miniere company, suoported Tshombe and the Katanga separatists. France and Belgium pursued a similar policy. The USA. which aimed to extend the position of her monopolies in the Congo, looked to the Central Government, headed by Cyrille Adoula.

p The contradictions between the USA and the European colonialists became apparent from the outset of the crisis. At the meeting of the Security Council held on the 14 July I960 the USA voted for a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, whereas France voted against and Britain abstained.

p In November 1961 the African and Asian representatives to the Security Council (United Arab Republic, Liberia and Ceylon) tabled a resolution calling for the removal of the chief cause of the Congolese crisis—the colonial powers’ military intervention in Katanga. The resolution contained the demands that the Congo’s political independence should be strengthened, her territorial integrity assured and separatist actions curtailed. Britain, Belgium and France opposed the main points of the resolution. In the main, the USA supported it, but introduced a number of amendments. The resolution was adopted on the 24 November 1961. The voting was 9 in favour and 2 abstentions (Britain and France).

p The Anglo-American conflict reached its peak in December 1961. On one and the same day (13 December), in an attempt to save Tshombe, London sent a special message to the acting UN Secretary General calling for an immediate ceasefire in Katanga, while Washington declared that it categorically rejected a ceasefire in the Congo "until the minimum objectives of the UN have been attained".-"^^1^^ Under direct pressure from the USA, the 19 December 1961 saw 171 a “reconciliation” between Adoula and Tshombe at the Kitona military base. The UN Deputy Secretary General, Ralph Bunch, and the US ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, helped to arrange the meeting and took part in the negotiations and in drawing up the agreement. In purely formal terms, the Kitona agreement seemed to mark a capitulation by Tshombe, but in fact it was only a temporary compromise agreement between the imperialist powers. Britain, Belgium and France supported Tshombe and had no wish to place Katanga under the authority of the Central Government. The USA had already taken control of Adoula’s actions and was now trying to mesmerise Tshombe too. Walter Lippmann wrote: "Behind Adoula the main power is the United States Government. Behind Tshombe the main power consists of large private interests of Great Britain and Belgium."^^4^^

p The military operations in Katanga which the USA organised under the UN flag in the autumn of 1961 did not produce quick results. The economic boycott also had little effect. So the US monopolies and US diplomacy then tried a number of schemes in London and Brussels, but at the same time they stepped up military action too. The French paper Lcs Echos observed that the armed intervention in Katanga was really an episode in the economic war that had been begun in the Congo by several American groups seeking to take control of a new market.^^5^^ In the end the Anglo-Belgian coalition was forced to compromise. When President Kennedy’s Special Representative for African Affairs, Chester Bowles, declared that, if the UN was unable to reunite the Congo, then the United States would probably do the job herself, London and Brussels took the hint.

p However, an examination of the final results makes it perfectly clear that the Americans lost the "first round" in the imperialist struggle for Katanga. They failed to achieve their stated aims, while British monopolies made sizable profits out of the events in the Congo. Tanganyika Concessions, for instance, earned about 10 million dollars from the Benguela railway, which transported all Katanga’s raw materials as from July 1960, since rail links between the “independent” province and the other regions of the Congo had been cut (the separatists had blown up the bridges). 172 Apart from this, as a result of the operations of the Belgian side in Union Miniere in transferring its capital to Belgium, the British side made significant gains in Katanga, which also brought it extra profits amounting to some tens of millions of francs. The factories and mines owned by Union Miniere remained practically unaffected by the military operations, and from March 1962 the production of copper and cobalt even began to increase.

p Faced with this situation, the US Government turned again to the idea of economic sanctions against the Katanga separatists, which meant, in practice, against Union Miniere. American publications began to regularly print details of Union Miniere’s profits and the Tshombe "Government‘s” income, which was being secured with the help of Britain and Belgium. However, the plans for economic sanctions against Katanga met with a negative response from governing circles in Britain, Belgium and France. An American military mission headed by General Truman was then sent to the Congo. As a result of this visit, UN troops entered Katanga in December 1962. Despite “indignation” in London (65 Conservative MPs demanded in Parliament that Katanga should be immediately granted the "right to selfdetermination”), the Americans were uncompromising and single-minded in their conduct of the "third round" of the battle for the Congo. The New York Times reported with great delight that nearly three-quarters of Union Miniere’s productive capacity was already under the control of the forces of law and order.^^6^^

p The threat of considerable material damage forced the British and Belgian monopolists to make further concessions. Separatist resistance came to a halt, as did the calls for Katangan “independence” in the British, Belgian and French parliaments. The territorial integrity of the Congo was restored at the end of February 1963. There is no doubt that, had it not been for the imperialist contradictions, the problem of Katanga would have been resolved very much sooner; the progressive forces in the Congo would have dealt with it themselves and the Congolese people would not have made so many vain sacrifices.

p As a result of their eventful struggle with their competitors, the American monopolies were able to share in the 173 profits of the Union Miniere concern, which continued to exploit Katanga up to January 1967. In the new Congolese company GECOMIN (Societe Generale Congolaise des Mineral) formed to replace it 40 per cent of the share capital belongs to Belgian, British and US companies. But the rivalry between monopolist groups for a share in the exploitation of natural resources has by no means come to an end; it has simply entered a new phase. British and Belgian capital is trying to recover its lost position and American capital is seeking to extend its zone of influence. In addition, the economic battle for Congolese raw materials has been joined by the monopolies of France, the FRG and even Japan, with the last two being particularly active in the field.

p The British journal African World commented: "The main economic rivalry in the country today is among the French, German, Japanese, British and Italians, all of whom have shown a particular interest to invest in Congolese enterprises".^^7^^ It is true that competition in this sphere is on the increase. In 1968 a consortium of five Japanese firms set up a special company to develop the mining industry. 85 per cent of its capital belongs to the Japanese and 15 per cent to the Government of Zaire. The British firm of Leyland Motors is building new factories and is re-equipping old ones. Its capital investments in the country amounted in 1969 to £350,000. All Zaire’s communications are in the hands of the private US-Belgian company Bell Telephone. But British Congo Diamond Distributors defeated their American rivals and secured exclusive rights to export the country’s diamonds. The British also won a profitable contract to build bridges in Orientale Province.

p Examination of the numerous instances of competition and direct conflict between the companies of the imperialist powers in the Republic of Zaire enables one to draw a number of conclusions.

p Firstly, it is apparent that in the course of the struggle for raw material sources inter-imperialist contradictions are capable of reaching such a pitch that they may temporarily overshadow the main class antagonism in the modern world. Secondly, one can see how short-lived imperialist coalitions are. In the early sixties British and Belgian monopolies were acting jointly against US companies, whereas today they are 174 locked in fierce competition with one another. Thirdly, the disastrous consequences of inter-imperialist rivalry for the destiny of the people of a liberated country stand out clearly.

p 7 lie monopolies’ fierce competition for tlic uranium and bauxites of Central Africa. The rivalry between the imperialist monopolies over the mining of African uranium has become very much fiercer in recent years. As the London journal Africa Confidential comments, "As the world’s need for uranium soars ... so will the scramble for uranium in Africa grow more intense".^^8^^ Statistics give no precise information about the reserves of uranium in Africa or, for that matter, anywhere else in the capitalist world. But it is possible to calculate from the scattered pieces of information that have been published that Africa accounts for more than 30 per cent of the known uranium reserves of the capitalist and developing countries and about 20 per cent of uranium output. Apart from South Africa, the main African countries which extract uranium or possess reserves of it are those in Central Africa.

p Ever since uranium deposits were discovered in Africa, all mining and export operations were monopolised by the major imperialist powers—the USA, Britain and France. The early period saw the establishment of a certain division between them of spheres of control over uranium deposits, determined by the dependence of an African country on the capital of a specific foreign power, and also by its former colonial affiliation. However, as the national economies of the countries which possess uranium reserves developed and as the demand for uranium grew in the second half of the sixties, the "gentlemen’s agreements" began to be broken. Competition developed into rivalry and, in some cases, into outright struggle. The Foreign Report, marked “ confidential” and published as a supplement to the British journal The Economist, even called an article on this problem "Central Africa: Battle for Uranium".^^9^^

p The balance of power between the capitalist monopolies in relation to African uranium appears to be as follows. American and British capital is operating in South Africa in accordance with the agreement of f950, whereby the USA and Britain were granted exclusive rights to mine and 175 market the metal. Later they were joined by France and the FRG. West German capital is represented by the Degussa Company, which in 1958 signed a contract with the South African Government for the purchase of uranium concentrates. French companies are predominant in Gabon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Malagasy Republic and Niger. Thus, apart from the southern part of the continent, the promising reserves of uranium are located in the countries of Central Africa and are, moreover, under the monopoly control of France.

p According to forecasts by UN statisticians, world demand for uranium will continue to grow. In 1975 it will stand at about 34-46,000 tons, in 1980 at 65-80,000 tons. Since Africa already provides not less than one-fifth of the world output of uranium and since the continent’s share in the mining of this metal will increase substantially in the foreseeable future, the rivalry between the imperialist powers over the extraction of African uranium is becoming fiercer.

p The importance of individual countries in Africa’s total output of uranium is changing. In the early sixties South Africa accounted for nearly 90 per cent of production. By 1972 about 50 per cent was being produced by other states. Thus, in Gabon the annual production of uranium has been brought up to 1,600 tons, in the CAR to 500 tons and Niger’s output was planned to reach 1,000 tons in 1973.

p The most extensive uranium deposits are to be found in the African countries that were formerly French colonies. Consequently, imperialist rivalry, mainly between France and the USA, is now centred on them. Typical of the Franco-American struggle for influence is an episode that took place in Gabon, which, in addition to uranium, has considerable reserve of manganese, oil and natural gas. In 1964 the US ambassador to the country was publicly accused of inciting a revolt against the pro-French President, Leon M’Ba. The attempted coup was suppressed by French airborne troops and "angry French residents, armed with guns and grenades, attacked the American Embassy in Gabon’s capital, Libreville".^^10^^ In 1968 after it had been rumoured that there were plans for a further coup in Gabon, all 176 members of the American ”Peace Corps" were expelled from the country.

p A no less bitter struggle between Washington and Paris developed in 1968 in other countries of Central Africa. At the centre of the struggle were the considerable deposits of uranium that had been discovered in the Central African Republic. The Foreign Report comments: "The complex politics of Central Africa and the return of the Central African Republic (CAR) to the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) highlight the rivalry between France and the United States in this part of Africa. On the surface there seems little worth fighting for—until one realises the size of the uranium finds and potential finds in the area.”^^11^^

p The course of events was as follows. Originally the CAR, Gabon, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Republic of Chad and Cameroun were members of UDEAC. The deciding voice in this grouping belonged to France. In April 1968 the CAR and the Republic of Chad left UDEAC and formed a new economic grouping together with the Congo (Kinshasa)— the Union of Central African States (UEAC). The official explanation of this decision was that the CAR and Chad, which are landlocked countries, suspected that they were not getting their fair share of the customs revenue which was collected at the ports in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Cameroun. But, as the Foreign Report points out, it was considered in Paris that the move resulted from "American intrigue": "United States interests were trying to branch out from Kinshasa, where they were entrenched, into the traditionally French sphere of interest.... It was assumed that the Americans were attempting to take over . . . uranium production, which was important to the French nuclear programme.”^^12^^

p The problem was too serious for the French monopolies to retreat. Yvon Bourges, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was sent to Bangui, the capital of the CAR, in November 1968, and in December a return visit was paid to Paris by the President of the CAR, Jean Bokassa. In the end the CAR left the new grouping and returned to the UDEAC fold. At the same time an agreement was concluded whereby a joint company would start construction work on 177 a uranium-producing plant in the CAR. A similar agreement was signed between France and Niger, providing ior control by French firms over uranium production.

p France is not only employing diplomatic means to preserve her interests in the countries of former French Africa which possess strategic mineral resources. French garrisons containing a total of 6,500 men are to be found at present in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad and Gabon. A Swiss paper observed, "economic and financial circles know that several territories possess known or suspected resources which are of great interest: such are Madagascar and the Ivory Coast and, in the case of uranium, Gabon, Niger and the Central African Republic".^^13^^

p The imperialist powers’ struggle for uranium, as for other kinds of strategic raw material, engenders intra-African conflicts and is one of the sources of dissension in the continent. The US-French clash in Central Africa led to a worsening of relations between the CAR and the Republic of Zaire, as well as between the CAR and the Republic of Chad. Radio Kinshasa, for instance, expressed bitter resentment at the "campaign of provocation" from the CAR which coincided in time with Yvon Bourges’ stay in Bangui. For her part, the CAR withdrew permission for Air Congo planes to land at Bangui. Border incidents began. Against the scale of world politics these facts seem trivial. But they make considerable negative impact in Africa itself.

p The economies of the African states suffer most. Uranium mining is of vast importance to those African countries which possess uranium deposits. These countries could have an income running into millions of dollars, and Niger and the CAR in particular are counting on this. In practice, however, the bulk of the profits accumulates, in safes belonging to the foreign companies that have seized the right to monopoly control over the exploitation of raw material resources. Thus, the world market price of uranium oxide in concentrates will be in the region of 20 dollars per kg during the seventies. Niger reckons to receive an annual 4 million dollars Irom the sale of her output, while the total receipts will not be less than 20 million dollars. Consequently, 80 per cent of the proceeds will fall into the hands of the monopolies. Similar calculations can be made for other 178 countries too. The young African states are still only learning how to benefit from the inter-imperialist contradictions.

p Although many of the industrially developed countries, especially the USA and France, possess considerable reserves of their own bauxites, the world’s largest aluminium monopolies ate showing an ever greater interest in the African sources of this particular raw material. This is explained not only by the increase in the demand for aluminium in the capitalist countries. African bauxites are noted for their high quality, the deposits are conveniently sited geographically and can be mined easily, and there is a quick return on invested capital.

p The African countries which are endowed with the raw material for producing aluminium are coming to be the scene for conflicts between the capitalist powers. An example is the struggle for Guinean bauxites, in which the monopolies of the USA, France, the FRG and Italy took part.

p Before Guinea attained independence, geological survey work and mining operations on the country’s bauxite deposits, which are the largest in the world, had been carried out since the early fifties by the French company Societe de Bauxite du Midi. In 1957 it was joined by the FRIA international consortium (48.5 per cent American capital, 26.5 per cent French, 10 per cent British, 10 per cent Swiss and 5 per cent West German). At the end of 1961 the Government of Guinea took a decision to terminate the activities of the Societe de Bauxite du Midi, but the results of its surveys, carefully hidden from the Guineans, became known to a number of West-European and American firms. As a result, suggestions for making a concession out of the Boke area, where extremely rich bauxite deposits had been located, were forwarded almost simultaneously by the aluminium monopolies of France, the FRG and the United States.

p The new US ambassador, William Attwood, who arrived in Guinea at this time, acted as go-between for the American companies. He recalls that, before leaving for Guinea, he saw "some aluminium industry executives, who were pressing for a US Government loan and guarantee to develop Guinea’s bauxite deposits. . . .” After some tough 179 bargaining Attwood managed in 1963 to get the concession granted to the relatively obscure American company Harvey Aluminium. However, the rival foreign monopolies carried on the fight, and Attwood tells us that he had to face "charges and countercharges of expropriation, favoritism, bad faith and worse".^^14^^ The rivalry was engendered by a number of circumstances. Firstly, the world’s largest aluminium companies had been excluded from an important bauxite location; secondly, these companies feared competition on the world market from Guinean bauxites; and, thirdly, given the current market situation, they had an interest in seeing that the new source of aluminium was kept in reserve for a time. Having enlisted the support of the World Bank, they managed to block the activities of Harvey Aluminium, and the vast bauxite deposit remained untouched. Harvey Aluminium did not begin work, blaming the intractability of the World Bank, whereas, when the contract was signed in 1963, one of the company’s main arguments had been the Bank’s apparent agreement to provide subsidies for building communications to carry the bauxite from the mines to the ports. The hidden struggle lasted five years (up to autumn 1968), until the idea of internationalising the project was finally accepted.

p This step was forced on the Guinean Government, since the World Bank demanded reliable guarantees and Washington was only prepared to give them if the main American monopolies were allowed to participate in the mining operations. West German capital also took advantage of the situation. President Liibke lent personal support to the idea of involving West German firms in the project. In addition to Harvey Aluminium, which sold 80 per cent of its shares, the new international company, named HALCO Mining, came to have as its shareholders two more monopolies controlled by American capital—the ALCAN Aluminium Company and ALCOA, each with 27 per cent of the shares, the French companies Pechiney and Usines Kuhlmann S. A. (10 per cent), the West German Vereinigte Aluminium Werke (10 per cent) and the Italian Montecatini Edison (6 per cent). HALCO Mining and the Guinean Government have jointly formed a mixed company, the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG).

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p The imperialists have concluded a “truce”, and the loser is Guinea, which is deprived for almost ten years of any additional income from the mining of the new bauxite deposits. As for US-French relations in the country, Attwood reveals that ".. . some French officials and businessmen regarded us (i.e., the USA—author) ... as interlopers in Guinea and sought to discredit us, often in petty ways, with their Guinean contacts".^^15^^

p This example also demonstrates the methods through which the imperialist powers are trying to resolve their own contradictions at the expense of a poorly developed country. Under the terms of the agreement signed in the autumn of 1968 in Washington, the World Bank granted Guinea a loan to finance the CBG at the extremely high annual interest rate of 6.5 per cent. Although the Guinean Government is supposed to take a 65 per cent share of CBG’s profits, it will not actually receive any money until 25 years have passed, since the loan repayments can only be made from Guinea’s part of the profits. Mining operations were scheduled to begin in 1972, and the companies forming HALCO Mining undertook to buy all the bauxite produced for the next 20 years at 7 dollars a ton. In 1969, however, the market price had already risen to 11 dollars. In the final analysis, as calculations show, the foreign companies’ clear profit from the price difference alone will be four times as much as all the profits accruing to Guinea.

p At the same time, however, there is another aspect to this example: it shows how a developing country can benefit from inter-imperialist contradictions. The Guinean Government managed, for instance, to limit the monopoly rule of foreign capital in the bauxite mining industry, to secure important controls over its activities and to eliminate the dominating position of capital from one particular country. There is also no doubt that the Boke project will further the development of the country’s economy and swell the numbers of its working class—the agreement with HALCO Mining provides for a gradual increase in the number of Guineans employed on the project. In addition, the arrangements worked out with the World Bank and HALCO Mining have made the FRIA consortium give up its " 181 neutral stand" and become more compliant. For a long time the Guinean Government had pressed FRIA to increase its bauxite production. The agreement was reached in October 1968. In the new competitive situation FRIA could not avoid compromising, and undertook to expand the annual production of alumina from 500,000 to 700,000 tons and also to cut down on the numbers of foreign experts and to organise a professional training centre for Guinean employees.

p Not only copper, uranium or bauxites formed the object of the bitter competition between the imperialist powers in Africa. A struggle is also developing over the sources of other minerals, from iron ore to diamonds. Making use of both legal and illegal methods, the companies of the USA, Britain, the FRG, France, Italy and Japan are trying to seize one another’s concessions for mining manganese and tantalum, niobium and zirconium, columbite and vanadium. But the main battles are being fought in that classic sphere of inter-imperialist struggle—oil.

p The tangle of contradictions over oil. During the postwar years the capitalist monopolies’ traditional struggle for both the old and the still unallocated oil locations extended to include those African countries in which oil reserves had been discovered. The struggle gathered momentum in the mid-sixties, when the estimates of Africa’s place among the oil-bearing regions of the world took a sharp upward turn.

p The imperialist powers’ struggle for Africa’s oil resources contains an older and a newer phase. There were long, stubborn clashes over the oil in the Sahara. As long ago as 1958, in an attempt to ward off the attacks of the oil monopolies of the USA, Britain, the FRG and Italy, the French Government made it impossible for foreign companies to be granted independent oil concessions in the Sahara and limited their participation in mixed firms. Determined protests and threats issued from the American oil magnates, but they were unsuccessful, at least for as long as Algeria remained a colony. The French monopolies refused to budge. Nor were any results produced by a stern warning given to French companies by the American corporation Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) that it would do its utmost to impede the sale of surplus Saharan crude oil on the world 182 market. The French were dealt the final retaliatory blow in the autumn of 1968. On the 19 October 1968 the American Getty Oil Company concluded an agreement with the Algerian SONATRACH corporation, whereby the Americans surrendered 51 per cent of their Saharan oil shares but received the right to sell Algerian oil, at a higher price, moreover, than the French were able to. The French oil amalgamation ERAP voiced a bitter protest, suspecting with good reason that the US monopolies were trying to eliminate the French oil firms from North Africa.

p There are ample examples to illustrate the history and present state of the rivalry between the monopolies of the capitalist countries in their attempts to obtain positions in the oil industries of the African states. Their interests clash in Algeria, Libya, Zaire, Morocco, Angola and Nigeria. The competition is sharpened by the fact that the dominating positions in each of these countries had been seized by the foreign capital of a particular country before the oil was discovered. So France originally took control of survey work and oil production in Algeria, the USA in Libya, Britain in Nigeria, and so on. However, the allocation of spheres of influence was very much a matter of convention, and was completely ignored once the African countries had attained independence, especially since the African states opted for an independent oil policy.

p The struggle between the oil monopolies in Nigeria merits particular attention.

p Without making a detailed analysis of the complicated tangle of causes underlying the Nigerian crisis, we shall dwell on one highly important aspect of it—the role of the inter-imperialist contradictions in the country.

p “It is, of course, the oil that is the centre of the dispute."^^16^^ That was how the British Financial ’Times summed up the reasons for the civil war in Nigeria. It is difficult not to agree with this conclusion.

p In 1965 oil prospecting operations in the Niger Delta furnished promising results. The oil reserves discovered in the Eastern Region place Nigeria high up in the list of oilrich countries. Before 1965 Nigeria’s known reserves of oil were estimated at 130 million tons, and by 1972 at 1,579 million tons. In 1970 oil production increased by nearly 9 183 times in comparison with 1964—from 6 million to 54 million tons.

p The inter-imperialist struggle for influence in Nigeria became more acute in 1964, when the question was being discussed of her entry to the Common Market, with which at that time the only African countries which were associated were the former French colonies. The Nigerian national bourgeoisie saw greater benefits in association with the Common Market than in the traditional ties with the Commonwealth. Such feelings were actively encouraged by a number of circles in the Western states of mainland Europe and, above all, by the oil companies, which had been closely following the course of the search for oil in Nigeria. Britain, on the other hand, went to considerable lengths to frustrate these plans, which ran counter to her interests.

p The USA also energetically opposed Nigeria’s association with the Common Market. Chapter XIV will give a detailed review of the motives behind the Anglo-American resistance to the various trends towards integration in Africa. In the case of Nigeria, apart from all other reasons, the British and American protests were mainly inspired by the interests of the oil monopolies, as became clear later.

p In the meantime the hidden struggle over Nigerian oil grew more and more heated. The oil companies of Europe and America were persistently forcing their way into areas where the British monopolies were still supreme. In particular, the French oil company SAFRAP obtained permission in May 1966 to carry out additional surveys, to drill for oil and to extract it. Further concessions were also granted to the American oil magnates.

p The activities of her competitors caused great anxiety in Britain. High hopes had been set on Nigerian oil and it was intended that by 1974 25 per cent of Britain’s crude oil requirements would be met by Nigeria.

p The finding of large reserves of oil in Nigeria can be compared with the discovery of the diamond deposits in South Africa, copper in Zambia, and uranium in Zaire, which not only caused an economic boom in a number of capitalist countries, but also set in motion further stages in the inter-imperialist struggle in Africa. It emerged that the country’s main oil-bearing regions were in the south ( 184 precisely the areas claimed by Biafra). The British Daily ’ lelcgraph commented: "The Niger Delta oil area, covering 400,000 square miles, has the potential of a second Kuwait."^^17^^ The Financial ’limes observed: "The potential importance to Britain and the Western nations of this Atlantic crude hardly needs to be underlined at a time of upheaval in the Middle East.”^^18^^

p Foreign capital investment in the Nigerian oil industry topped 500 million dollars in 1966. Oil came to be the largest investment sphere for foreign private capital. By mid1966 oil production involved over 10,000 foreign specialists. The growth in the output of Nigerian oil, its high quality and the favourable drilling and transport conditions brought about a sharp increase in the foreign companies’ profits. In 1966 they netted not less than £ 100 million (280 million dollars), i.e., a return of more than 50 per cent on the capital invested.

p The scramble for Nigeria’s "black gold" led to fierce contradictions between the British, American, French and Italian oil monopolies. The British and Anglo-Dutch companies British Petroleum and Shell, which had invested about 200 million dollars in Nigerian oil and controlled 80 per cent of all oil production, managed to grab the lion’s share. The American Gulf Oil Corporation received 10 per cent and the French group SAFRAP (ERAP) about 5 per cent. In addition, the system of taxing the oil companies was changed in 1966. The sum payable was now levied not on the oil produced but on the known reserves. Naturally, those companies which were already producing oil in substantial quantities, i.e., the Anglo-Dutch Shell-BP group, gained from this reform, and the losers were the French, Americans, Italians and others, who had only just embarked on industrial production. In these circumstances, the rivalry between the oil monopolies grew more intense from month to month and was a major cause of the worsening of the internal political crisis in Nigeria and the ensuring events.

p Anglo-French disagreements stood out most clearly in the complex tangle of inter-imperialist contradictions in Nigeria during the period immediately preceding (he civil war. Despite all the efforts made by French monopolies, 185 their position in the country remained comparatively weak owing to the constant opposition of British companies. In 1967 French capital investments in Nigeria amounted to a mere 5.5 per cent of all foreign investments. But a half of the French capital was invested in the oil industry of the Eastern Region, where 65 per cent of all Nigerian oil was produced before the war. In 1966 the French oil company ERAP produced 610,000 tons of oil in the area and aimed eventually to raise production to 2 million tons, which would amount to some 10 per cent of all oil purchased by France. These plans, however, were being frustrated by the company’s competitors, especially Shell-BP. What was more, a further seven large foreign oil monopolies (6 American and 1 Italian) had designs on Nigeria’s oil. All in all, the French group was in dire straits.

p The Anglo-American contradictions in Nigeria did not stand out so clearly as the Anglo-French contradictions, but they too contributed to the deepending of the crisis. The USA openly resented her modest share (10 per cent) in the oil industry. The American oil companies did their utmost to obtain new concessions for survey work and oil production, especially in the coastal region not far from Port Harcourt. Since the Americans had greater experience of offshore drilling for oil than Shell-BP, the British became a little more accommodating, but still imposed numerous conditions.

p Major representatives of the US oil business—Mobil Oil, Texas Oil, Standard Oil of California and the Phillips Petroleum Company—invested over 150 million dollars in Nigeria, and thus acquired fairly solid starting positions for a competitive struggle. But, although originally opposed to Shell-BP, they later preferred to reach an agreement with the Anglo-Dutch group over a joint policy towards the French companies, which were viewed at that stage as the principal enemy.

p The anti-French alliance between the American and British oil companies is explained by the fact that the main contradictions in the imperialist struggle for oil are between Britain and France and the USA and France. At the same time, the "special relationship" between Britain and the USA obliged them to avoid open conflict in Nigeria, as elsewhere. 186 The other factor involved was the point that American capital relied less heavily on Nigerian oil at the time than British or French capital.

p When the Nigerian situation erupted, all the oil monopolies, irrespective of their temporary alliances, saw that there was a real chance of re-allocating spheres of influence. This is why the Western powers fanned the flames in effect and their relations with the belligerents were to some extent determined by the geographical position of the oil locations controlled by a monopoly or by the opportunities for obtaining more oil-bearing territory. Officially, Britain supported the Federal Government. Nevertheless, in July 1967, when the time came for the oil companies to pay the Nigerian Government its share of the profits, Shell-BP paid out £ 250 million to the leaders of Biafra, which had seceded in May. Typically enough, this was done despite the firm declaration by the Federal Government that it had the right to all concession dues. Military operations had not yet begun, but Shell-BP’s provocatory action made the situation worse. Shortly afterwards the separatists were responsible for the outbreak of civil war.

p It is equally typical that after the secession of the Eastern Region it was reported by the press that its rulers had offered to let 6 million acres of oil-bearing land to the American company Geothermal Research International,^^10^^ and the US State Department set up a special “shock” group on Biafran matters headed by Under-Secretary of State Robert Moore. In this connection it may also be recalled that in March 1967 an information centre was opened in New York under the name of the "Government of Eastern Nigeria Liaison Office”, which then proceeded to disseminate pro-Biafran propaganda. It was given every encouragement by various foundations in the USA.

p While Britain was supplying military equipment to the Federal Government, US planes with American crews maintained the "air bridge" from Portugal to Biafra, by means of which arms were transferred to the separatists. American welfare organisations helped Biafra with food and medical supplies and also provided large sums of money. The "Biafra lobby" in France also played a highly prominent role in equipping Biafra with armaments.

187

p It is also noteworthy that, as military operations gathered momentum, the bourgeois press came to regard the events in Nigeria less and less as the result of internal discord. Other assessments began to appear. For example, the British newspaper The Sun stated that "The Nigerian war has now become a gigantic post-colonial battle between Britain and France for political and economic dividends in West Africa as a whole".^^20^^ The Times stressed that "... a success for Biafra is regarded in Gaullist circles as a success for Quebec. The enemy at bottom is the British Empire, sterling and the dollar.”^^21^^ The Labour weekly Tribune declared that the Biafran leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu, had promised to sell the oilfields that he had seized to French and Italian companies, and the Daily Mirror described France’s policy towards Biafra as a part of the "policy of trying to penetrate former British African territories".^^22^^

p For its part, the French press echoed these statements to some extent. The Right-wing paper L’Aurore acknowledged, for example, that "all these accusations are not unfounded".^^23^^ Having posed the question of whether France’s position was dictated by her oil interests and the wish to undermine British influence in Africa, Le Monde answered in the affirmative.

p These and similar statements made by authoritative newspapers, as distinct from official declarations, provided quite a convincing insight into the real motives behind the Western powers attitudes to the events in Nigeria.

p There are also other noteworthy facts which illustrate the wish of the imperialist powers to “help” settle the conflict. At the end of March 1969, while the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was in Lagos, President Nixon’s special representative, Professor Clarence Ferguson, visited Biafra. After this visit the separatist leader Ojukwu categoricallyrefused to see Wilson. US tactics in Nigeria gave rise to pronounced irritation in London. According to the Paris newspaper La ’I ribmie des Nations, British circles were "appearing somewhat exasperated" at the position taken by their American colleagues over the Nigerian conflict.-” The San Francisco Peoples’ World pointed out that "The Biafra secession is ... supported by US and French oil and banking interests ... to weaken and fragment Nigeria, and split the oil-rich Eastern Region away from British economic 188 domination" and "If Biafra won her independence from Nigeria, the British would be out and Biafra’s ‘allies’ would control one of the world’s great supplies of oil".^^25^^

p The civil war in Nigeria cannot, of course, be explained only by the intrigues of the international oil monopolies. Following neo-colonialist strategies and tactics, they made use of the situation that had developed in the country, inflamed passions and, in the final analysis, caused the crisis to drag on for 2 1/2 years. Only when they had realised the futility of the attempt to carry out a neo-colonialist redivision of Nigeria were the financial and monopolist circles of the West obliged to retreat.

p Even after the insurgents had been defeated in January 1970 and separatist Biafra had ceased to exist, the mutual accusations of the imperialist powers that were a party to the crisis continued. While hypocritically expressing their sympathy for Nigeria and offering various forms of “aid”, they quite bluntly laid the responsibility for the events in the country at one another’s doors.

p In an article significantly entitled "Guilty Conscience" the French Le Monde stated that "Great Britain has taken a hypocritical attitude throughout the affair by supplying arms to Lagos while bemoaning the fate of the casualties that these same arms were causing in the other camp".^^26^^ The New York Times drew an analogy between French policy in Nigeria and in the Congo: "In each case it sought to pry loose from an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ zone of influence huge and prosperous chunks—Katanga, with its copper and uranium, from a pro-American Congo, and Biafra, with its oil, from a pro-British Nigeria”. It goes on to say that "The Nigerian victory ends the French hopes of getting into that fast developing petroleum pool. This, in turn, heightens French interest in gaining a bigger share of Mediterranean oil, particularly Libya‘s”.^^27^^ The British Sunday Express declared forthrightly that responsibility for the Nigerian situation must be borne by the governments of those countries which supplied Biafra with arms in an attempt to obtain her oil.^^28^^

p There can be no lasting peace between the monopolies, but only temporary truces that are forced upon them. In the case of Nigeria, as the facts show, the inter-imperialist 189 contradictions remained unresolved. This is another achievement of the Federal Government, which displayed outstanding tactical ability both within the country and in the international arena.

p Throughout the civil war there was no infringement of the oil monopolies’ interests as a whole. The government declared that, once the oil-bearing regions had been cleared of insurgents, everything necessary would be provided to enable normal working to be resumed. Such guarantees were given not onlv to Shell-BP but also to other foreign companies. The only companies to receive threats that their concessions might be abolished were those from countries whose governments had openly sided with Biafra and had been inclined to grant her diplomatic recognition.

p The firm position taken by the Federal Government and, even more important, its success in conducting the military operations had their effect. The "friends of Biafra" retired and, as soon as the oil areas had been liberated, all companies resumed production.

p Thus, despite the monopolies’ plans, no substantial redistribution of their allocations took place during the struggle for Nigerian oil. It was rather different, though, with political influence.

p London had also tried to make use of the civil war in order to preserve its political position in Nigeria: armaments had been delivered to the Federal Government, loans and credits had been granted and Nigeria had been frequently visited by British ministers, MPs, trade union and religious leaders and businessmen; even the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had come. Nevertheless, Britain lost a great deal politically. London’s wait-and-see tactics during the first months of the war, aptly termed "sitting on the fence" by the press, were extremely revealing and proved disastrous for Britain’s prestige.

p France’s position in Nigeria economically was, of course, not strengthened, but it was not undermined. However, the damage suffered by Paris politically has been very extensive. France’s support for Biafra will influence relations for a long time.

p As the American magazine Time commented, the USA gained nothing but lost nothing. This is only partly true, if 190 one bears in mind the economic interests of American imperialism. The USA also lost out politically from her doublefaced policy towards Federal Nigeria and her moral and material support for Biafra at various stages in the war.

p Economically speaking, the contest between the imperialist powers ended in a draw on this occasion, but they all sustained political losses. As a result, the general position of imperialism in Nigeria weakened.

p The oil monopolies’ struggle in Libya is taking different forms. Yet the outwardly calm sequence of events there hides a great deal of tension. Oil production in Libya, which was started in 1961, has progressed at an unprecedented rate—from 800,000 tons to 160 million tons in 1970. Libya now accounts for 60 per cent of Africa’s total oil production and has moved up to sixth place among the world’s oilproducing countries.

p Practically all survey work and the production of Libyan oil is in the hands of foreign companies representing American, West German, Italian, British, Dutch, French and even Swedish capital. However, the American monopolies account for almost 90 per cent of all the oil produced ( Exxon, Continental Oil, Occidental Petroleum, Amerada, etc.). The concessions for the principal known deposits also belong mainly to American companies: Esso Standard, Caltex, Esso Sirte, Libyan-American Oil and the Oasis Oil Company of Libya. The area of the foreign concessions in Libya exceeds 1 million square km, or 65 per cent of the country. Foreign capital is attracted not only by the size of the Libyan oil reserves but also by the high quality of the oil and the location of the deposits. Oil can be shipped from Libya at less than half the cost of transporting Iranian and Middle Eastern oil.

p The production of Libyan oil is concentrated in US hands, but its main consumers are the countries of Western Europe. This is one of the causes of inter-imperialist contradictions. In 1967 the FRG received 24 per cent of Libya’s oil exports, Italy 21 per cent, France 13 per cent, Britain 12 per cent and the USA 3.5 per cent. The demand for Libyan oil increased particularly with the closure of the Suez Canal.

p The Libyan coup d’etat of the 1 September 1969, which 191 brought revolutionary-democratic forces to power, had a substantial effect on the position of the imperialist powers in the country. The removal of British and American military bases, as well as a number of other measures that were taken to limit US and British influence, altered the balance of forces. Speaking at a press conference in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on the 2 March 1970, the French President, Georges Pompidou, declared, for example, that "a vacuum has formed" in Libya which France had to "fill before others did so".^^29^^ As was shown earlier, the imperialist powers turn to the “vacuum” theme whenever they need to find a cover for their expansionist urges. But the fact remains that Libyan oil is coming more and more to be an object of rivalry between the foreign monopolies. Nor do Western commentators make any secret of it. Thus, when pointing out that French companies were rather slow to tap the vast oil reserves in Libya and that they now hoped to make up for lost time, Alain Murcier, Le Monde’s oil expert, concludes that one of the results of this will be "open war between the French and other international giants".-’^^10^^ For its part, The New York Times comments that "Oil—France’s need of it, the hope of her international companies to produce more of it—is a factor in French diplomacy in Libya. . . .”^^31^^

p Discussion of French oil interests in Libya appeared in the world press following the decision of the French Government to sell the new Libyan Government a large number of Mirage fighters. The gist of world opinion was that this decision was motivated not by any concern for Libya’s security but by France’s desire to gain opportunities for exerting pressure in defence of her oil position in the country. Libya is France’s third largest supplier of petroleum products after Algeria and Iran. France purchases approximately 20 million dollars’ worth of Libyan oil a month. One fact stands out. The French companies represented in Libya—the Compagnie Franfaise des Petroles and the 1’ Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activites Petrolieres—belong to the French Government, i.e., the struggle is being mounted not by private capital but by state capital. It is reported that these companies have embarked on concrete measures. They have made the Libyan Government a higher offer for 192 the concessions than their rivals from other countries. In addition, botli companies have agreed to bear all survey expenses, even if new locations are not quickly discovered and to subsequently offer the Libyans an equal share in exploiting them.”^^2^^

p The oil monopolies of the USA, Britain and other countries are deeply concerned by France’s further, broader plans, which, according to the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur, open up ”. .. the path from armaments to oil, from oil to technical aid and from technical aid to political influence".^^33^^ This refers to the important long-term oil agreement embracing France, Libya and Algeria. At the end of 1969 the President of the Algerian company SONATRACH, Ahmed Ghozali, and the Chairman of the board of the Libyan corporation LIPETCO, Mustapha alKikhya, signed a protocol on the organisation of co- operation between the two companies in information and research and over the price, drilling, transport and sale of the oil produced in the two countries. At the same time, the question of setting up "Franco-Libyan parity companies" and an "Algerian-Franco-Libyan oil triangle" was raised.^^34^^ France had suggested that Libya should step up deliveries of Libyan oil considerably and import more French equipment. Le Nouvel Observateur comments: ”. . . France is ‘recovering’ Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria . .. (and) is concentrating on the western Mediterranean, which is to remain or be firmly established once again as an area of French influence.”^^35^^ Naturally, these moves have not passed unnoticed among France’s competitors and are giving rise to counter-measures. A good example is the activities of American companies in Algeria aimed at containing French influence.

p Major finds of oil and gas were made in Algeria in the second half of the fifties, and the oil industry began to advance rapidly. Algeria’s oil reserves are estimated at 3,800 million tons, and output in 1970 amounted to 46.8 million tons (16 million tons in 1961). The expansion of foreign oil monopolies in Algeria began in 1958, after the French parliament had passed an oil code for the Sahara which allowed foreign (non-French) capital to acquire shares alongside French capital. By 1964, 37 foreign companies were 193 already operating in the Algerian oil industry: 15 French companies, 11 American, 4 West German, 4 Italian and 3 British and Anglo-Dutch. But most of the oil is produced by French companies—the Compagnie de Recherches et d’Exploitation de Petrole au Sahara (CREPS), the Societe Nationale de Recherches et d’Exploitation des Petroles en Algerie (S.N. REPAL) and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (Algerie) (CFP-A). 70 per cent of the oil produced in Algeria is swallowed up by France.

p In 1965 the Boumedienne Government concluded new agreements with France on the joint exploitation of oil and gas deposits. These agreements considerably strengthened the position of the Algerian national company for prospecting, extracting, refining, delivering and selling fuel (SONATRACH). The agreement concluded between SONATRACH and the American firm Getty Oil was mentioned earlier. This and subsequent agreements typify both the methods by which American monopolies penetrate the zones of French interests, and the means whereby a developing country can benefit from inter-imperialist contradictions. Making full use of the advantages provided by their 1965 contracts, the French firms fulfilled their obligations, but not as efficiently as they might have done. Thus, by artificially lowering the price of oil between 1965 and 1968, they deprived Algeria of over 110 million dollars. Not more than 10 per cent of the French companies’ profits were reinvested. Algeria’s dissatisfaction with these and similar actions by her French partner was used by France’s competitors. Getty Oil, for instance, undertook to spend 16.3 million dollars over 5 years on survey work, a sum that is

p 4 times as great as the profits that the firm is currently making in Algeria. On the other hand, in December 1968 SONATRACH signed a new agreement with Getty Oil on the joint working of the major oilfields at Rourd el-Baghel and the repayment of the loan received by deliveries of crude oil. Additionally, Getty Oil agreed to fix the price of oil at 2.21 dollars a barrel, whereas the French companies’ price was 2.095 dollars. Making use of this agreement, the Algerian Government obliged the French companies (under the threat of a ban on oil exports) to raise their price by 1 dollar a barrel on their total turnover, and in April 1969 194 all foreign companies were compelled to raise their prices by an average of 30 cents a barrel.

p Other American firms have also stepped up their activities in Algeria. In 1969 an agreement was signed with the Corelab company providing for the founding of a mixed research organisation to locate and evaluate oil deposits. The mixed oil company ALFLUID appeared, with 51 per cent of its shares belonging to SONATRACH and 49 per cent to the American Core Laboratories Incorporated and others. In 1968 SONATRACH invited a mission of American businessmen and bankers to visit Algeria. They decided that there were good prospects for businesslike co-operation between Algeria and the USA.^^36^^ Notably, the mission concluded that, in inviting representative of the American business world, the Algerian Government "was making an effort to balance its trade ties with France. . . .”^^37^^

p Algeria’s struggle with the oil monopolies for more advantageous terms of co-operation, which is an important aspect of her struggle for economic independence, creates additional contradictions between the competing imperialist powers.

p These examples of the imperialist powers’ struggle for Africa’s raw material resources enable one to make certain conclusions.

p The inter-imperialist struggle for Africa’s raw materials is acquiring a more clear-cut state-monopoly character. Its development is determined by more than the fact that considerable known and conjectured reserves of mineral wealth are concentrated in Africa. After the attainment of political independence by the colonies the foreign capital of both the former metropolises and their competitors still to a considerable extent retains key positions in the economies of the young states, especially since restrictions on its activities are introduced slowly, haphazardly and only in some countries.

p In view of the role of minerals in the industries of the developed capitalist countries and also considering that their own mineral resources are poor, while Africa leads, or nearly leads, the world in terms of reserves and the volume of output, it may be supposed that in the next 10-20 years the principal struggle will develop around the sources of uranium, manganese, chromites, copper, vanadium, 195 antimony, lithic minerals, columbite, beryllium, monazite concentrates and, of course, oil. Consequently, those African countries possessing such deposits will be the main objects of inter-imperialist rivalry.

p The compromises that are forced on the imperialist powers in the course of their battles for African raw materials do not alter the position that many countries in the continent remain the owners of their resources in name only. Foreign capital retains its control over them. This inflicts additional damage on the economy of a young country.

Yet, on the other hand, the contradictions between the capitalist powers weaken the imperialist front and compel the monopolies to make concessions to the newly independent countries, which can be used by progressive forces in order to transform and boost the national economies. The government policies of Algeria, Zambia and Guinea, where specific measures have been adopted to see that the raw material resources serve the country’s own interests and where use has been made of the factor of the inter- imperialist struggle, show what opportunities in this direction lie open to a developing country.

p An analysis of the economic aspects of the inter- imperialist struggle in the developing countries of Africa leads to a number of conclusions.

p Alongside the tendency towards monopolist integration of their efforts to exploit the liberated countries and retain control over their economic life, the imperialist camp is also more and more clearly displaying the processes of disintegration over these issues. Shifts in the world capitalist economy are invigorating the traditional inter-imperialist contradictions, which have already on more than one occasion produced wars for the re-allocation of territories, markets and capital investment spheres. But radical changes in the world now rule out this type of resolution of the contradictions. Therefore, the struggle to redivide the African continent, whose main outlines can be seen clearly enough, is being conducted mainly through economic means. The main 196 spheres of the interests of the imperialist powers in Africa have already been revealed.

p The causes of the intensive economic expansion of the USA in Africa lie not only in the defence of the interests of her own monopolies. American imperialism is also guided by considerations of the global struggle against the national liberation movement and socialism, and claims privileged conditions, moreover, in view of its “contribution” to this struggle. Claims of this sort spread additional discord in the imperialist camp.

Given the interests of world capitalism, the imperialist powers now have a certain interest in the rapid development of the liberated countries. Consequently, their economic strategy involves making some concessions to these countries, so long as they are compatible, of course, with the main aims of imperialism. In conjunction with the growing competition between the imperialist powers for new economic positions in Africa, this fact offers the African countries real possibilities for the first time in their history to make use of some of the processes and tendencies in the world capitalist economy in their own interests.