p The “anti-colonialism” myth set the USA apart from the European metropolises on the moral and ethical level. Another ideological formula, the so-called “vacuum” theory, was employed by US imperialism in its attempts to find a political and legal basis for its claim to be the trustee of the liberated countries.

p The colonial powers reckoned that they would be able to keep Africa free of revolutionary change, but they were disappointed. The independence of Libya was proclaimed in December 1951. In July 1952 a revolution took place in Egypt. The Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia put an end to colonial oppression in January and March 1956. The national liberation movement gathered momentum in regions south of the Sahara as well. This was the moment at which the notorious “vacuum” theory emerged on to the scene. Its potential usefulness was grasped immediately by the ruling circles of America and West Germany. The theory stated in effect that the place of the retiring colonial powers had to be filled by other powers which were capable of “protecting” the young states from “chaos” and “turmoil”.

p The theory was first put forward in a collective work published by the American Council on Foreign Relations. This Council was managed by prominent members of US foreign policy departments, one of whom was Allen Dulles, the familiar figure of the CIA. It was further developed at the Conference on Contemporary Africa which the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies sponsored in Washington in August 1954. It was declared at the Conference that "the European countries are increasingly less able to carry the responsibility they have assumed in this area".^^1^^

p The proponents of the “vacuum” theory tried to give it some respectability in imperialist circles by basing their arguments on the need to oppose the “communist” threat to the liberated countries. This was a perfectly natural gambit, since the stepping up of the American and West 49 German penetration of Africa in the mid-fifties coincided with the decision taken by ruling circles in the West to escalate the "cold war" and adopt a series of measures against the Soviet Union, other countries of the socialist community and the national liberation movement. By giving an anti-communist finish to their plans for securing the colonial succession, the USA and the FRG thought that, even if they were unable to throw the European metropolises off guard completely, they could at least contain their opposition to the new policy. The West German co-authors of the “vacuum” theory were particularly zealous in this respect. This is hardly surprising, given the correlation of forces at the time and the need for the FRG, if not for the USA, to disguise its intentions more thoroughly. Thus, having announced that the main aim of the FRG’s policies in Africa was to resist "the spread of communism”, Bonn’s ideologists constantly linked this proposition with the “vacuum” theory. In an article entitled "Black Africa—the Power-less Continent" the influential West German journal Aussenpolitik wrote: "In the eyes of the interested non-African states, the decolonisation process has created a power vacuum in Africa that has to be filled before the enemy steps in.. . Western countries are prepared to take over the zones of influence more or less voluntarily evacuated by the colonial powers in order to further the main aim—to ensure an anti-communist orientation there.”^^2^^

p In the United States the problem of the "African Succession" was described in much franker terms. The aims pursued were also spelled out more honestly. In his book The New Africa the correspondent of the Washington Evening Star, Smith Hempstone, wrote that Britain and France were leaving Africa with their reputations there well and truly sullied. The vacancy should be filled by a smiling and personable America, so that the profits would start rolling in.^^3^^

p The European colonial powers did not in tne least share the view that any sort of “vacuum” could form in Africa, nor were they packing their bags. However, the metropolises had to contend with a growing national liberation movement as well as the aspirations of their competitor-allies. The deepening of inter-imperialist contradictions forced 50 them to take counter-measures and keep changing their ground in order to neutralise the expansion into Africa of the USA, the FRG and, later, Japan. In an effort to enlist the support of other states for the fight against the liberation movement and the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Africa, the colonial powers were obliged to bargain with their NATO colleagues, while at the same time striving to preserve and strengthen their own positions in the continent.

p Immediately after the war the contradictions between Britain and America were the most blatant. Britain emerged from the war economically weakened yet hanging on to her vast colonial empire. It included a considerable part of Tropical Africa and the Middle East, the whole of the Indian sub-continent, Malaya and other parts of South-East Asia, as well as a number of territories in Oceania and the Western Hemisphere. The USA, victorious and resplendent in its economic, political and military might, naturally gazed longingly at the domains of its weaker European allies, which no longer possessed the economic, political or military capacity to keep their overseas dependencies safe from their imperialist rival.

p During the first postwar years Washington’s "anti- colonialists" fixed their sights firmly on the British colonies. Even in wartime the colonial issue had proved a stumbling-block in the Anglo-American alliance. Numerous British documents and materials, as well as the statements of British leaders show that at least up to 1946 London was not considering the possibility of losing its colonial empire; on the contrary, it was assumed that the colonies could be preserved under undivided British rule, irrespective of Washington.

p However, when the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonies began to take on menacing proportions, British ruling circles realised that they could not hold firm in isolation. British diplomacy then had to face up to the problem, which persisted up to the beginning of the sixties, of how to bring about joint British-US action against the liberation forces and yet retain Britain’s overwhelming influence in the colonial world. The problem remained unsolved. Despite the persistent efforts of both the British Conservative and Labour Governments to form a single Anglo-American colonial front, commanded by the British 51 of course, the USA of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and, especially, Kennedy displayed a firm resolve not to "drag Britain’s chestnuts out of the fire”.

p During the disintegration of the colonial system the US position was aptly summed up by Under-Secretary of State Eugene Rostow in his article "Europe and the USA—- Partners out of Necessity": "The European states emerged from the war seriously weakened and, since they possessed overseas empires, were faced by the bitter prospect of a more or less rapid withdrawal from them. Despite the financial relief that such a course entailed, it was a nerve-shattering and often traumatic experience. We are now feeling the weight of the burden that history has thrust upon us. We have taken upon ourselves responsibility for the new world in Asia, Africa and the Middle East where, abandoned by Western Europe, a considerable number of weak, vulnerable young nations have evolved. The British and French will have to accept the loss of their world empires and become reconciled to their new dimension in world politics.’"^^1^^

p However, Washington’s attempts to carry out a "changing of the guard" unilaterally in the liberated countries were not to the liking of London and Paris. The British Government tried assiduously to bring the USA into line with their colonial policy or, failing that, to at least ensure US neutrality.

p Before his retirement Winston Churchill was very active in this field, especially over the knotty problem of Egypt. For instance, addressing a meeting of the US Congress on the 17 January 1952, Churchill endeavoured to limit Washington’s opposition to British policy in Egypt. He declared that the British troops stationed there were acting "as servants and guardians of the commerce of the world”, and called upon the United States to station troops in the Suez Canal zone "as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us".^^5^^

p The British Government took other steps to secure US support. On the 27 July 1956, the day after Egypt’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, Eden stated that British troops based in Cyprus would again, if necessary, occupy the Canal Zone. Eden appealed to the USA to join Britain, recalling that in 1950 Britain had unhesitatingly supported America in the Korean War.^^0^^ But the principle 52 of "one good turn deserves another" proved weaker in the event than the inter-imperialist contradictions. The efforts of Labour leaders to bring pressure to bear on the USA were equally fruitless. The speech delivered by Herbert Morrison in the British House of Commons in which he expressed the Labour Opposition’s disenchantment with the “unsatisfactory” conduct of "our American friends" who "do rather try our patience"^^7^^ made no impression on the USA. There was no response to Morrison’s appeal to the American Government to demonstrate "to the whole world" that Britain, the USA and France were “united”.

p The depth of Anglo-American contradictions in Africa in the fifties was most clearly revealed by the situation that resulted from the three-pronged attack on Egypt in 1956.

p It can be stated without exaggeration that London gravely underestimated Washington’s determination to pursue an independent policy towards North-East Africa and not to be guided by the interests of its British ally. When planning the joint attack on Egypt with France and Israel, the British Government was clearly mistaken in its assumption that the USA would, at the worst, adopt a policy of non-interference. In fact, the opposite happened.

p The intensity of Anglo-American contradictions during that period can be gauged from the exchange of telegrams between Eden and Eisenhower. In reply to Eisenhower’s personal telegram of the 30 October 1956 suggesting immediate and frank Anglo-American consultation^^8^^ Eden said nothing positive, stating simply that "when the dust settles there may well be a chance for our doing a really constructive piece of work together”. Even when a few hours later on the same day Eisenhower protested at the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt, Eden could still, as he put it, see "no reason at this moment to suppose that the United States would oppose us at the United Nations upon almost every point".^^9^^

p As is generally known, the decisive role in halting the attack on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel was played by the firm position of the Soviet Union. In special messages sent on the 5 November 1956 to the governments of Britain, France and Israel the Soviet Government demanded an immediate end to the aggression, delivering a stern 53 warning,^^10^^ which, as is recognised by the English historian F. S. Northedge, dealt the final blow to the British policy in Egypt.

p However, the brunt of British criticism was borne by the USA, whose reluctance to protect the interests of Britain to the detriment of its own caused unprecedented annoyance in official quarters in London and provoked an outburst of anti-American feeling even among Conservatives. In November 1956 110 Conservative Members of Parliament tabled a motion in the House of Commons sharply condemning US policy during the events in Egypt. As they saw it, the American attitude was "gravely endangering the Atlantic alliance".^^11^^

p Another noteworthy example of Anglo-American contradictions exacerbated by the practical application of the “vacuum” theory is the split between the two powers over the Baghdad Pact.

p The creation of the British-instigated Baghdad Pact ( subsequently renamed CENTO) in 1955 had a direct bearing on the problem of defending British possessions in the Middle East and Africa. The US Government supported the idea of the Pact in principle, but later, when the organisation actually emerged, not only refused to accede to it, but also, in Eden’s words, "tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the pact".^^12^^

p The point was that despite the officially declared aim of CENTO—defence against the "communist threat"—British diplomacy had other ends in sight. With the help of the Pact, London hoped in the first place to be able to look after British interests in the Middle East and North Africa, which were threatened not by communism (and certainly not by Arab communism), but by the national liberation movement. A no less important problem seemed to the British Government to be the growth of US influence in the area. By creating a multilateral bloc, London supposed that the USA could be involved in a military and political alliance headed by Britain. This would have the effect of not only placing the might of America at the service of British interests, but also limiting the contradictions and disagreements in the policies of both powers towards that part of the world. The plan did not quite work out. Up to the end of 1958 the USA 54 flatly refused to accede to the new pact, since such a step would have implied support for British aspirations in the Arab East and North Africa and hence a renunciation of its own policy. In later years the United States became a member of the pact’s main committees, concluded bilateral military agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, completely ousted Britain from the leading role in CENTO and proceeded to make systematic use of the bloc for its own ends.

p US moves connected with the setting up x)f CENTO and the openly negative attitude of the Americans towards the British-led aggression in Egypt marked the beginning of Anglo-American rivalry in an Africa that was being cleared of the rule of the European metropolises. The position adopted by the USA at that time was accurately expressed by John Foster Dulles. He declared that, although Great Britain and the USA were allies in NATO, on other matters "the United States would not identify itself fully with colonial powers".^^13^^

p The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, subsequently gave the British view of the USA’s "independent role" in a confidential message to Commonwealth representatives. Listing the “mistakes” made by Britain in the Middle East and North Africa, among which he included the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, Lloyd commented bitterly that these “mistakes” were the result of "strong American pressure”. He concluded: "We have striven hard to arrive at a common Anglo-American policy without success. We have to look after ourselves now.”^^14^^

p The main disagreements between the USA and the European metropolises were not over the question of what part a decolonised Africa would play in the capitalist world. There was no particular difference of opinion here. The question that really troubled relations between the imperialist powers and which still remains to be solved was— who should exercise “control” over the newly independent countries?

p In the late fifties and early sixties Britain, Belgium and, to some extent, France held the view that collaboration with the USA in the Third World was desirable. Washington’s position, however, was the exact opposite. "Joint 55 efforts" with any colonial power were generally thought to be a hindrance to US interests. This position was embodied in the “vacuum” theory, which was a real windfall for American imperialism. The FRG, Japan and some other countries caught on quickly. After all, it was no longer a question of cutting one’s rivals, but simply of filling a “ vacuum”. It was much more convenient to follow such a course than to openly abide by Emerson’s recommendations, for example. He advised the USA to be completely independent in its relations with African countries and in its handling of African problems. US policy should in no circumstances be influenced by America’s European allies.^^1^^’

p Despite its anti-communist trimmings, the “vacuum” theory was directed primarily against the USA’s European allies, the colonial powers. Its designers proceeded from the view that there was no point in fighting a losing battle to preserve the colonial regimes. Naturally, the Americans had no intention of accelerating the liberation of the colonies: on the contrary, they strove to retard the process; but it was clear to them that it would inevitably win in the end. As G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared, the United States supported the "continuing tide of self-determination" so long as it took the form of a "deliberate, expeditious preparation for selfgovernment"^^16^^—after consultation with the USA, of course. It was obviously intended to “consult” not the outgoing metropolises but the forces which came to power in the new states that would emerge from the former colonies. Thus "filling the vacuum" meant simply that the USA would step in as “spiritual” leader of a liberated country and would ensure that the metropolis aspiring to that role was disqualified.

The other noteworthy feature of the “vacuum” theory was that it reflected not only the scepticism prevalent in US ruling circles over their European allies but also the American conviction that the peoples of Africa were incapable of shaping their own destinies and building a new life by themselves. Even today this assumption underlies much of Washington’s African policy.